path: root/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c

/* airpdcap.c
 *
 * $Id$
 * Copyright (c) 2006 CACE Technologies, Davis (California)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
 *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
 *    without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
 * GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
 * Software Foundation.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

/****************************************************************************/
/*	File includes								*/

#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif

#include <epan/tvbuff.h>
#include <epan/crc32.h>
#include <epan/strutil.h>
#include <epan/ws_strsplit.h>
#include <epan/emem.h>
#include <epan/pint.h>

#include "airpdcap_system.h"
#include "airpdcap_int.h"

#include "crypt-sha1.h"
#include "crypt-md5.h"

#include "airpdcap_debug.h"

#include "wep-wpadefs.h"

#ifdef NEED_G_ASCII_STRCASECMP_H
#include "../g_ascii_strcasecmp.h"
#endif

/****************************************************************************/

/****************************************************************************/
/*	Constant definitions							*/

#define	AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN	20

/*	EAPOL definitions							*/
/**
 * Length of the EAPOL-Key key confirmation key (KCK) used to calculate
 * MIC over EAPOL frame and validate an EAPOL packet (128 bits)
 */
#define	AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN	16
/**
 *Offset of the Key MIC in the EAPOL packet body
 */
#define	AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET	77
/**
 * Maximum length of the EAPOL packet (it depends on the maximum MAC
 * frame size)
 */
#define	AIRPDCAP_WPA_MAX_EAPOL_LEN	4095
/**
 * EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 1, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
 * from a STA when neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for
 * Key Descriptor 1.
 * @note
 * Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
 */
#define	AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP	1
/**
 * EAPOL Key Descriptor Version 2, used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and
 * from a STA when either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP
 * for Key Descriptor 2.
 * /note
 * Defined in 802.11i-2004, page 78
 */
#define	AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP	2

/****************************************************************************/

/****************************************************************************/
/*	Macro definitions							*/

extern const UINT32 crc32_table[256];
#define CRC(crc, ch)	 (crc = (crc >> 8) ^ crc32_table[(crc ^ (ch)) & 0xff])

#define	AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(ptk)	(ptk + 32)

/****************************************************************************/

/****************************************************************************/
/*	Type definitions							*/

/*	Internal function prototype declarations				*/

#ifdef	__cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

/**
 * It is a step of the PBKDF2 (specifically the PKCS #5 v2.0) defined in
 * the RFC 2898 to derive a key (used as PMK in WPA)
 * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
 * 63 ASCII encoded characters)
 * @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
 * encoded characters
 * @param iterations [IN] times to hash the password (4096 for WPA)
 * @param count [IN] ???
 * @param output [OUT] pointer to a preallocated buffer of
 * AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN characters that will contain a part of the key
 */
static INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
    const guint8 *ppbytes,
    const guint passLength,
    const CHAR *ssid,
    const size_t ssidLength,
    const INT iterations,
    const INT count,
    UCHAR *output)
    ;

/**
 * It calculates the passphrase-to-PSK mapping reccomanded for use with
 * RSNAs. This implementation uses the PBKDF2 method defined in the RFC
 * 2898.
 * @param password [IN] pointer to a password (sequence of between 8 and
 * 63 ASCII encoded characters)
 * @param ssid [IN] pointer to the SSID string encoded in max 32 ASCII
 * encoded characters
 * @param output [OUT] calculated PSK (to use as PMK in WPA)
 * @note
 * Described in 802.11i-2004, page 165
 */
static INT AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
    const CHAR *passphrase,
    const CHAR *ssid,
    const size_t ssidLength,
    UCHAR *output)
    ;

static INT AirPDcapRsnaMng(
    UCHAR *decrypt_data,
    guint mac_header_len,
    guint *decrypt_len,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    INT offset)
    ;

static INT AirPDcapWepMng(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    UCHAR *decrypt_data,
    guint mac_header_len,
    guint *decrypt_len,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    INT offset)
    ;

static INT AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    const UCHAR *data,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    INT offset)
    ;
/**
 * It checks whether the specified key is corrected or not.
 * @note
 * For a standard WEP key the length will be changed to the standard
 * length, and the type changed in a generic WEP key.
 * @param key [IN] pointer to the key to validate
 * @return
 * - TRUE: the key contains valid fields and values
 * - FALSE: the key has some invalid field or value
 */
static INT AirPDcapValidateKey(
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
    ;

static INT AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
    UCHAR *eapol,
    USHORT eapol_len,
    UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
    USHORT key_ver)
    ;

/**
 * @param ctx [IN] pointer to the current context
 * @param id [IN] id of the association (composed by BSSID and MAC of
 * the station)
 * @return
 * - index of the Security Association structure if found
 * - -1, if the specified addresses pair BSSID-STA MAC has not been found
 */
static INT AirPDcapGetSa(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
    ;

static INT AirPDcapStoreSa(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
    ;

static const UCHAR * AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
    const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
    ;

static const UCHAR * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
    const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
    ;

static void AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    const UCHAR pmk[32],
    const UCHAR snonce[32],
    const INT x,	/*	for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384	*/
    UCHAR *ptk)
    ;

#ifdef	__cplusplus
}
#endif

/****************************************************************************/

/****************************************************************************/
/* Exported function definitions						*/

#ifdef	__cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

INT AirPDcapPacketProcess(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    const guint8 *data,
    const guint mac_header_len,
    const guint tot_len,
    UCHAR *decrypt_data,
    guint *decrypt_len,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    gboolean mngHandshake,
    gboolean mngDecrypt)
{
    const UCHAR *address;
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id;
    int index;
    PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
    int offset = 0;
    guint bodyLength;
    const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
        0xAA,             /* DSAP=SNAP */
        0xAA,             /* SSAP=SNAP */
        0x03,             /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
        0x88, 0x8E        /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
    };

#ifdef _DEBUG
    CHAR msgbuf[255];
#endif

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapPacketProcess");

    if (ctx==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
    }
    if (data==NULL || tot_len==0) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "NULL data or length=0", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapPacketProcess");
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
    }

    /* check if the packet is of data type	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_TYPE(data[0])!=AIRPDCAP_TYPE_DATA) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "not data packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA;
    }

    /* check correct packet size, to avoid wrong elaboration of encryption algorithms	*/
    if (tot_len < (UINT)(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_CRYPTED_DATA_MINLEN)) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "minimum length violated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_WRONG_DATA_SIZE;
    }

    /* get BSSID */
    if ( (address=AirPDcapGetBssidAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
        memcpy(id.bssid, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
        sprintf(msgbuf, "BSSID: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.bssid[0],id.bssid[1],id.bssid[2],id.bssid[3],id.bssid[4],id.bssid[5]);
#endif
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
    } else {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "BSSID not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
    }

    /* get STA address	*/
    if ( (address=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
        memcpy(id.sta, address, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
        sprintf(msgbuf, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
#endif
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
    } else {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
    }

    /* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and station MAC	*/
    if ((index=AirPDcapGetSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
        /* create a new Security Association	*/
        if ((index=AirPDcapStoreSa(ctx, &id))==-1) {
            return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
        }
    }

    /* get the Security Association structure	*/
    sa=&ctx->sa[index];

    /* cache offset in the packet data (to scan encryption data)	*/
    offset = mac_header_len;

    /*	check if data is encrypted (use the WEP bit in the Frame Control field)	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_WEP(data[1])==0)
    {
        if (mngHandshake) {
            /* data is sent in cleartext, check if is an authentication message or end the process	*/
            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Unencrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

            /* check if the packet as an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24)	*/
            if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

                /* skip LLC header	*/
                offset+=8;

                /* check the version of the EAPOL protocol used (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24)	*/
                /* TODO EAPOL protocol version to check?	*/
                /*if (data[offset]!=2) {
                    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("EAPOL protocol version not recognized", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                    return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
                }*/

                /*	check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25)	*/
                if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
                    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                    return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
                }

                /* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25)	*/
                bodyLength=pntohs(data+offset+2);
                if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) {
                    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                    return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
                }

                /* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body	*/
                offset+=4;

                /* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27)	*/
                if (/*data[offset]!=0x1 &&*/	/* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated)	*/
                    data[offset]!=0x2 &&		/* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type			*/
                    data[offset]!=0xFE)		/* TODO what's this value???					*/
                {
                    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                    return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
                }

                /* start with descriptor body	*/
                offset+=1;

                /* manage the 4-way handshake to define the key */
                return AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, key, offset);
            } else {
                /* cleartext message, not authentication */
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "No authentication data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_DATA_ENCRYPTED;
            }
        }
    } else {
        if (mngDecrypt) {

            if (decrypt_data==NULL)
                return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;

            /*	create new header and data to modify	*/
            *decrypt_len = tot_len;
            memcpy(decrypt_data, data, *decrypt_len);

            /* encrypted data	*/
            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "Encrypted data", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

            /* check the Extension IV to distinguish between WEP encryption and WPA encryption	*/
            /* refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.2.1.2, pag.35 for WEP,	*/
            /*		IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.2.2, pag. 45 for TKIP,		*/
            /*		IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.3.3.2, pag. 57 for CCMP			*/
            if (AIRPDCAP_EXTIV(data[offset+3])==0) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "WEP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                return AirPDcapWepMng(ctx, decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
            } else {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapPacketProcess", "TKIP or CCMP encryption", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                return AirPDcapRsnaMng(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, decrypt_len, key, sa, offset);
            }
        }
    }

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}

INT AirPDcapSetKeys(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
    const size_t keys_nr)
{
    INT i;
    INT success;
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapSetKeys");

    if (ctx==NULL || keys==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "NULL context or NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
        return 0;
    }

    if (keys_nr>AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Keys number greater than maximum", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
        return 0;
    }

    /* clean key and SA collections before setting new ones	*/
    AirPDcapInitContext(ctx);

    /* check and insert keys	*/
    for (i=0, success=0; i<(INT)keys_nr; i++) {
        if (AirPDcapValidateKey(keys+i)==TRUE) {
            if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PWD key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
                AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(keys[i].UserPwd.Passphrase, keys[i].UserPwd.Ssid, keys[i].UserPwd.SsidLen, keys[i].KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
            }
#ifdef	_DEBUG
            else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WPA-PMK key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
            } else if (keys[i].KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a WEP key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
            } else {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapSetKeys", "Set a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_4);
            }
#endif
            memcpy(&ctx->keys[success], &keys[i], sizeof(keys[i]));
            success++;
        }
    }

    ctx->keys_nr=success;

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapSetKeys");
    return success;
}


INT AirPDcapGetKeys(
    const PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM keys[],
    const size_t keys_nr)
{
    UINT i;
    UINT j;
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapGetKeys");

    if (ctx==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
        return 0;
    } else if (keys==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "NULL keys array", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
        return (INT)ctx->keys_nr;
    } else {
        for (i=0, j=0; i<ctx->keys_nr && i<keys_nr && i<AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR; i++) {
            memcpy(&keys[j], &ctx->keys[i], sizeof(keys[j]));
            j++;
            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapGetKeys", "Got a key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        }

        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapGetKeys");
        return j;
    }
}

/*
 * XXX - This won't be reliable if a packet containing SSID "B" shows
 * up in the middle of a 4-way handshake for SSID "A".
 * We should probably use a small array or hash table to keep multiple
 * SSIDs.
 */
INT AirPDcapSetLastSSID(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    CHAR *pkt_ssid,
    size_t pkt_ssid_len)
{
    if (!ctx || !pkt_ssid || pkt_ssid_len < 1 || pkt_ssid_len > WPA_SSID_MAX_SIZE)
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;

    memcpy(ctx->pkt_ssid, pkt_ssid, pkt_ssid_len);
    ctx->pkt_ssid_len = pkt_ssid_len;

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

INT AirPDcapInitContext(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
{
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapInitContext");

    if (ctx==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
    }

    memset(ctx->keys, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM) * AIRPDCAP_MAX_KEYS_NR);
    ctx->keys_nr=0;
    memset(ctx->sa, 0, AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR * sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));

    ctx->first_free_index=0;
    ctx->index=-1;
    ctx->sa_index=-1;
    ctx->pkt_ssid_len = 0;

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapInitContext", "Context initialized!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapInitContext");
    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

INT AirPDcapDestroyContext(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
{
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapDestroyContext");

    if (ctx==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "NULL context", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
    }

    ctx->first_free_index=0;
    ctx->index=-1;
    ctx->sa_index=-1;

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapDestroyContext", "Context destroyed!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapDestroyContext");
    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

#ifdef	__cplusplus
}
#endif

/****************************************************************************/

/****************************************************************************/
/* Internal function definitions						*/

#ifdef	__cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

static INT
AirPDcapRsnaMng(
    UCHAR *decrypt_data,
    guint mac_header_len,
    guint *decrypt_len,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    INT offset)
{
    INT ret_value;

    if (sa->key==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "No key associated", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
    }
    if (sa->validKey==FALSE) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "Key not yet valid", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
    }
    if (sa->wpa.key_ver==1) {
        /*	CCMP -> HMAC-MD5 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, RC4 is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm	*/
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

        ret_value=AirPDcapTkipDecrypt(decrypt_data+offset, *decrypt_len-offset, decrypt_data+AIRPDCAP_TA_OFFSET, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
        if (ret_value)
            return ret_value;

        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "TKIP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        /* remove MIC (8bytes) and ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet	*/
        *decrypt_len-=12;
    } else {
        /*	AES-CCMP -> HMAC-SHA1-128 is the EAPOL-Key MIC, AES wep_key wrap is the EAPOL-Key encryption algorithm	*/
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

        ret_value=AirPDcapCcmpDecrypt(decrypt_data, mac_header_len, (INT)*decrypt_len, AIRPDCAP_GET_TK(sa->wpa.ptk));
        if (ret_value)
            return ret_value;

        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsnaMng", "CCMP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
        /* remove MIC (8bytes) from the end of packet	*/
        *decrypt_len-=8;
    }

    /* remove protection bit	*/
    decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;

    /* remove TKIP/CCMP header	*/
    offset = mac_header_len;
    *decrypt_len-=8;
    memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+8, *decrypt_len-offset);

    if (key!=NULL) {
        memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));

        if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
            key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
        else if (sa->wpa.key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
            key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
    }

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

static INT
AirPDcapWepMng(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    UCHAR *decrypt_data,
    guint mac_header_len,
    guint *decrypt_len,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    INT offset)
{
    UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
    size_t keylen;
    INT ret_value=1;
    INT key_index;
    AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
    UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
    UCHAR *try_data = ep_alloc(*decrypt_len);

    if (sa->key!=NULL)
        useCache=TRUE;

    for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
        /* use the cached one, or try all keys	*/
        if (!useCache) {
            tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
        } else {
            if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                tmp_key=sa->key;
            } else {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
            }
        }

        /* obviously, try only WEP keys...	*/
        if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP)
        {
            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

            memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
            memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);

            /* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36)	*/
            memcpy(wep_key, try_data+mac_header_len, AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
            keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
            memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);

            ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
                keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
                try_data + (mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
                *decrypt_len-(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));

            if (ret_value == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS)
                memcpy(decrypt_data, try_data, *decrypt_len);
        }

        if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
            /* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association	*/

            sa->key=tmp_key;

            if (key!=NULL) {
                memcpy(key, &sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
                key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
            }

            break;
        } else {
            /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys	*/

            if (useCache==TRUE) {
                useCache=FALSE;
                key_index--;
            }
        }
    }

    if (ret_value)
        return ret_value;

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

    /* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet	*/
    *decrypt_len-=4;

    /* remove protection bit	*/
    decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;

    /* remove IC header	*/
    offset = mac_header_len;
    *decrypt_len-=4;
    memcpy(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

/* Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004, 8.5.3, pag. 85	*/
static INT
AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    const UCHAR *data,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
    INT offset)
{
    AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key, pkt_key;
    INT key_index;
    INT ret_value=1;
    UCHAR useCache=FALSE;
    UCHAR eapol[AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN];
    USHORT eapol_len;

    if (sa->key!=NULL)
        useCache=TRUE;

    /* a 4-way handshake packet use a Pairwise key type (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pg. 79)	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=1) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Group/STAKey message (not used)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
    }

    /* TODO timeouts? reauthentication?	*/

    /* TODO consider key-index	*/

    /* TODO considera Deauthentications	*/

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);

    /* manage 4-way handshake packets; this step completes the 802.1X authentication process (IEEE 802.11i-2004, pag. 85)	*/

    /* message 1: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=0, Mic=0, Ack=1, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=0)	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
        AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
        AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==0)
    {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 1", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

        /* On reception of Message 1, the Supplicant determines whether the Key Replay Counter field value has been			*/
        /* used before with the current PMKSA. If the Key Replay Counter field value is less than or equal to the current	*/
        /* local value, the Supplicant discards the message.																					*/
        /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will be send another Message 1 (hopefully!)												*/

        /* save ANonce (from authenticator)	to derive the PTK with the SNonce (from the 2 message)	*/
        memcpy(sa->wpa.nonce, data+offset+12, 32);

        /* get the Key Descriptor Version (to select algorithm used in decryption -CCMP or TKIP-)	*/
        sa->wpa.key_ver=AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]);

        sa->handshake=1;

        return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
    }

    /* message 2|4: Supplicant->Authenticator (Sec=0|1, Mic=1, Ack=0, Inst=0, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=0, Nonce=SNonce|0, MIC=MIC(KCK,EAPOL))	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_INST(data[offset+1])==0 &&
        AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==0 &&
        AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
    {
        if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset])==0) {

            /* PATCH:	some implementations set secure bit to 0 also in the 4th message		*/
            /*		to recognize which message is this check if wep_key data length is 0		*/
            /*		in the 4th message								*/
            if (data[offset+92]!=0 || data[offset+93]!=0) {
                /* message 2	*/
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 2", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

                /* On reception of Message 2, the Authenticator checks that the key replay counter corresponds to the	*/
                /* outstanding Message 1. If not, it silently discards the message.												*/
                /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame,	*/
                /* the Authenticator silently discards Message 2.																		*/
                /* -> not checked; the Supplicant will send another message 2 (hopefully!)										*/

                /* now you can derive the PTK	*/
                for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr || useCache; key_index++) {
                    /* use the cached one, or try all keys	*/
                    if (!useCache) {
                        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                        tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
                    } else {
                        /* there is a cached key in the security association, if it's a WPA key try it...	*/
                        if (sa->key!=NULL &&
                            (sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
                             sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
                             sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)) {
                                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Try cached WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                                tmp_key=sa->key;
                        } else {
                            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "Cached key is of a wrong type, try WPA key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                            tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
                        }
                    }

                    /* obviously, try only WPA keys...	*/
                    if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
                        tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
                        tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK)
                    {
                        if (tmp_key->KeyType == AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD && tmp_key->UserPwd.SsidLen == 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len > 0 && ctx->pkt_ssid_len <= AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
                            /* We have a "wildcard" SSID.  Use the one from the packet. */
                            memcpy(&pkt_key, tmp_key, sizeof(pkt_key));
                            memcpy(&pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid, ctx->pkt_ssid_len);
                             pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen = ctx->pkt_ssid_len;
                            AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(pkt_key.UserPwd.Passphrase, pkt_key.UserPwd.Ssid,
                                pkt_key.UserPwd.SsidLen, pkt_key.KeyData.Wpa.Psk);
                            tmp_key = &pkt_key;
                        }

                        /* derive the PTK from the BSSID, STA MAC, PMK, SNonce, ANonce	*/
                        AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(sa,			/* authenticator nonce, bssid, station mac	*/
                            tmp_key->KeyData.Wpa.Pmk,	/* PMK	*/
                            data+offset+12,		/* supplicant nonce	*/
                            512,
                            sa->wpa.ptk);

                        /* verify the MIC (compare the MIC in the packet included in this message with a MIC calculated with the PTK)	*/
                        eapol_len=pntohs(data+offset-3)+4;
                        memcpy(eapol, &data[offset-5], (eapol_len<AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN?eapol_len:AIRPDCAP_EAPOL_MAX_LEN));
                        ret_value=AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(eapol,						/*	eapol frame (header also)		*/
                            eapol_len,													/*	eapol frame length				*/
                            sa->wpa.ptk,												/*	Key Confirmation Key				*/
                            AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1]));		/*	EAPOL-Key description version	*/

                        /* If the MIC is valid, the Authenticator checks that the RSN information element bit-wise matches		*/
                        /* that from the (Re)Association Request message.																		*/
                        /*		i) TODO If these are not exactly the same, the Authenticator uses MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request	*/
                        /* primitive to terminate the association.																				*/
                        /*		ii) If they do match bit-wise, the Authenticator constructs Message 3.									*/
                    }

                    if (!ret_value &&
                        (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD ||
                        tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK ||
                        tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK))
                    {
                        /* the temporary key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association	*/

                        sa->key=tmp_key;

                        if (key!=NULL) {
                            memcpy(key, &tmp_key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
                            if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP)
                                key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_TKIP;
                            else if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY_DESCR_VER(data[offset+1])==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP)
                                key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_CCMP;
                        }

                        break;
                    } else {
                        /* the cached key was not valid, try other keys	*/

                        if (useCache==TRUE) {
                            useCache=FALSE;
                            key_index--;
                        }
                    }
                }

                if (ret_value) {
                    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "handshake step failed", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
                    return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
                }

                sa->handshake=2;

                return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
            } else {
                /* message 4	*/

                /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear."	*/

                /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter																							*/
                /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one	*/
                /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message.						*/
                /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the	*/
                /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4.																				*/

                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4 (patched)", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

                sa->handshake=4;

                sa->validKey=TRUE;

                return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
            }
            /* END OF PATCH																					*/
            /*																										*/
        } else {
            /* message 4	*/

            /* TODO "Note that when the 4-Way Handshake is first used Message 4 is sent in the clear."	*/

            /* TODO check MIC and Replay Counter																							*/
            /* On reception of Message 4, the Authenticator verifies that the Key Replay Counter field value is one	*/
            /* that it used on this 4-Way Handshake; if it is not, it silently discards the message.						*/
            /* If the calculated MIC does not match the MIC that the Supplicant included in the EAPOL-Key frame, the	*/
            /* Authenticator silently discards Message 4.																				*/

            AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 4", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

            sa->handshake=4;

            sa->validKey=TRUE;

            return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
        }
    }

    /* message 3: Authenticator->Supplicant (Sec=1, Mic=1, Ack=1, Inst=0/1, Key=1(pairwise), KeyRSC=???, Nonce=ANonce, MIC=1)	*/
    if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])==1 &&
        AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset])==1)
    {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake", "4-way handshake message 3", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);

        /* On reception of Message 3, the Supplicant silently discards the message if the Key Replay Counter field		*/
        /* value has already been used or if the ANonce value in Message 3 differs from the ANonce value in Message 1.	*/
        /* -> not checked, the Authenticator will send another message 3 (hopefully!)												*/

        /*	TODO check page 88 (RNS)	*/

        return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
    }

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}

static INT
AirPDcapRsnaMicCheck(
    UCHAR *eapol,
    USHORT eapol_len,
    UCHAR KCK[AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN],
    USHORT key_ver)
{
    UCHAR mic[AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN];
    UCHAR c_mic[20];	/* MIC 16 byte, the HMAC-SHA1 use a buffer of 20 bytes */

    /* copy the MIC from the EAPOL packet	*/
    memcpy(mic, eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);

    /* set to 0 the MIC in the EAPOL packet (to calculate the MIC) */
    memset(eapol+AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_OFFSET+4, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);

    if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_CCMP) {
        /* use HMAC-MD5 for the EAPOL-Key MIC	*/
        md5_hmac(eapol, eapol_len, KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, c_mic);
    } else if (key_ver==AIRPDCAP_WPA_KEY_VER_AES_CCMP) {
        /* use HMAC-SHA1-128 for the EAPOL-Key MIC */
        sha1_hmac(KCK, AIRPDCAP_WPA_KCK_LEN, eapol, eapol_len, c_mic);
    } else
        /* key descriptor version not recognized */
        return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;

    /* compare calculated MIC with the Key MIC and return result (0 means success) */
    return memcmp(mic, c_mic, AIRPDCAP_WPA_MICKEY_LEN);
}

static INT
AirPDcapValidateKey(
    PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key)
{
    size_t len;
    UCHAR ret=TRUE;
    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");

    if (key==NULL) {
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "NULL key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
        AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapValidateKey");
        return FALSE;
    }

    switch (key->KeyType) {
        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
            /* check key size limits	*/
            len=key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
            if (len<AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MINLEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WEP key: key length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                ret=FALSE;
            }
            break;

        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
            /* set the standard length	and use a generic WEP key type	*/
            key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_40_KEY_LEN;
            key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
            break;

        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
            /* set the standard length	and use a generic WEP key type	*/
            key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen=AIRPDCAP_WEP_104_KEY_LEN;
            key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
            break;

        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
            /* check passphrase and SSID size limits	*/
            len=strlen(key->UserPwd.Passphrase);
            if (len<AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MIN_LEN || len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_PASSPHRASE_MAX_LEN) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: passphrase length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                ret=FALSE;
            }

            len=key->UserPwd.SsidLen;
            if (len>AIRPDCAP_WPA_SSID_MAX_LEN) {
                AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapValidateKey", "WPA-PWD key: ssid length not accepted", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
                ret=FALSE;
            }

            break;

        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
            break;

        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
            break;

        default:
            ret=FALSE;
    }

    AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapValidateKey");
    return ret;
}

static INT
AirPDcapGetSa(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
    INT index;

    if (ctx->sa_index!=-1) {
        /* at least one association was stored														*/
        /* search for the association from sa_index to 0 (most recent added)	*/
        for (index=ctx->sa_index; index>=0; index--) {
            if (ctx->sa[index].used) {
                if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
                    ctx->index=index;
                    return index;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    return -1;
}

static INT
AirPDcapStoreSa(
    PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
    INT last_free;

    if (ctx->sa[ctx->first_free_index].used) {
        /* last addition was in the middle of the array (and the first_free_index was just incremented by 1)	*/
        /* search for a free space from the first_free_index to AIRPDCAP_STA_INFOS_NR (to avoid free blocks in	*/
        /*		the middle)																													*/
        for (last_free=ctx->first_free_index; last_free<AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; last_free++)
            if (!ctx->sa[last_free].used)
                break;

        if (last_free>=AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR) {
            /* there is no empty space available. FAILURE	*/
            return -1;
        }

        /* store first free space index	*/
        ctx->first_free_index=last_free;
    }

    /* use this info	*/
    ctx->index=ctx->first_free_index;

    /* reset the info structure	*/
    memset(ctx->sa+ctx->index, 0, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));

    ctx->sa[ctx->index].used=1;

    /* set the info structure	*/
    memcpy(&(ctx->sa[ctx->index].saId), id, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID));

    /* increment by 1 the first_free_index (heuristic)	*/
    ctx->first_free_index++;

    /* set the sa_index if the added index is greater the the sa_index	*/
    if (ctx->index > ctx->sa_index)
        ctx->sa_index=ctx->index;

    return ctx->index;
}

/*
 * AirPDcapGetBssidAddress() and AirPDcapGetBssidAddress() are used for
 * key caching.  In each case, it's more important to return a value than
 * to return a _correct_ value, so we fudge addresses in some cases, e.g.
 * the BSSID in bridged connections.
 * FromDS    ToDS    Sta    BSSID
 * 0         0       addr2  addr3
 * 0         1       addr2  addr1
 * 1         0       addr1  addr2
 * 1         1       addr2  addr1
 */

static const UCHAR *
AirPDcapGetStaAddress(
    const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
{
    switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
        case 0:
        case 1:
        case 3:
            return frame->addr2;
        case 2:
            return frame->addr1;
        default:
            return NULL;
    }
}

static const UCHAR *
AirPDcapGetBssidAddress(
    const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *frame)
{
    switch(AIRPDCAP_DS_BITS(frame->fc[1])) { /* Bit 1 = FromDS, bit 0 = ToDS */
        case 0:
            return frame->addr3;
        case 1:
        case 3:
            return frame->addr1;
        case 2:
            return frame->addr2;
        default:
            return NULL;
    }
}

/* Function used to derive the PTK. Refer to IEEE 802.11I-2004, pag. 74	*/
static void
AirPDcapRsnaPrfX(
    AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
    const UCHAR pmk[32],
    const UCHAR snonce[32],
    const INT x,	/*	for TKIP 512, for CCMP 384	*/
    UCHAR *ptk)
{
    UINT8 i;
    UCHAR R[100];
    INT offset=sizeof("Pairwise key expansion");

    memset(R, 0, 100);

    memcpy(R, "Pairwise key expansion", offset);

    /*	Min(AA, SPA) || Max(AA, SPA)	*/
    if (memcmp(sa->saId.sta, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0)
    {
        memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
        memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
    }
    else
    {
        memcpy(R + offset, sa->saId.bssid, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
        memcpy(R + offset+AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN, sa->saId.sta, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
    }

    offset+=AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN*2;

    /*	Min(ANonce,SNonce) || Max(ANonce,SNonce)	*/
    if( memcmp(snonce, sa->wpa.nonce, 32) < 0 )
    {
        memcpy(R + offset, snonce, 32);
        memcpy(R + offset + 32, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
    }
    else
    {
        memcpy(R + offset, sa->wpa.nonce, 32);
        memcpy(R + offset + 32, snonce, 32);
    }

    offset+=32*2;

    for(i = 0; i < (x+159)/160; i++)
    {
        R[offset] = i;
        sha1_hmac(pmk, 32, R, 100, ptk + i * 20);
    }
}

static INT
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(
    const guint8 *ppBytes,
    const guint ppLength,
    const CHAR *ssid,
    const size_t ssidLength,
    const INT iterations,
    const INT count,
    UCHAR *output)
{
    UCHAR digest[36], digest1[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN];
    INT i, j;

    /* U1 = PRF(P, S || INT(i)) */
    memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidLength);
    digest[ssidLength] = (UCHAR)((count>>24) & 0xff);
    digest[ssidLength+1] = (UCHAR)((count>>16) & 0xff);
    digest[ssidLength+2] = (UCHAR)((count>>8) & 0xff);
    digest[ssidLength+3] = (UCHAR)(count & 0xff);
    sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest, ssidLength+4, digest1);

    /* output = U1 */
    memcpy(output, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
    for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
        /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
        sha1_hmac(ppBytes, ppLength, digest1, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN, digest);

        memcpy(digest1, digest, AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN);
        /* output = output xor Un */
        for (j = 0; j < AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN; j++) {
            output[j] ^= digest[j];
        }
    }

    return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}

static INT
AirPDcapRsnaPwd2Psk(
    const CHAR *passphrase,
    const CHAR *ssid,
    const size_t ssidLength,
    UCHAR *output)
{
    UCHAR m_output[AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN];
    GByteArray *pp_ba = g_byte_array_new();

    memset(m_output, 0, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);

    if (!uri_str_to_bytes(passphrase, pp_ba)) {
        g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);
        return 0;
    }

    AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 1, m_output);
    AirPDcapRsnaPwd2PskStep(pp_ba->data, pp_ba->len, ssid, ssidLength, 4096, 2, &m_output[AIRPDCAP_SHA_DIGEST_LEN]);

    memcpy(output, m_output, AIRPDCAP_WPA_PSK_LEN);
    g_byte_array_free(pp_ba, TRUE);

    return 0;
}

/*
 * Returns the decryption_key_t struct given a string describing the key.
 * Returns NULL if the key_string cannot be parsed.
 */
decryption_key_t*
parse_key_string(gchar* input_string)
{
    gchar *type;
    gchar *key;
    gchar *ssid;

    GString    *key_string = NULL;
    GByteArray *ssid_ba = NULL, *key_ba;
    gboolean    res;

    gchar **tokens;
    guint n = 0;
    decryption_key_t *dk;
    gchar *first_nibble = input_string;

    if(input_string == NULL)
        return NULL;

    /*
     * Parse the input_string. It should be in the form
     * <key type>:<key data>[:<ssid>]
     * XXX - For backward compatibility, the a WEP key can be just a string
     * of hexadecimal characters (if WEP key is wrong, null will be
     * returned...).
     */

    /* First, check for a WEP string */
    /* XXX - This duplicates code in packet-ieee80211.c */
    if (g_ascii_strncasecmp(input_string, STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP ":", 4) == 0) {
        first_nibble += 4;
    }

    key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
    res = hex_str_to_bytes(first_nibble, key_ba, FALSE);

    if (res && key_ba->len > 0) {
        /* Key is correct! It was probably an 'old style' WEP key */
        /* Create the decryption_key_t structure, fill it and return it*/
        dk = g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));

        dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
        /* XXX - The current key handling code in the GUI requires
         * no separators and lower case */
        dk->key  = g_string_new(bytes_to_str(key_ba->data, key_ba->len));
        g_string_down(dk->key);
        dk->bits = key_ba->len * 8;
        dk->ssid = NULL;

        g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
        return dk;
    }
    g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);


    tokens = g_strsplit(input_string,":",0);

    /* Tokens is a null termiated array of strings ... */
    while(tokens[n] != NULL)
        n++;

    if(n < 2)
    {
        /* Free the array of strings */
        g_strfreev(tokens);
        return NULL;
    }

    type = g_strdup(tokens[0]);

    /*
     * The second token is the key (right now it doesn't matter
     * if it is a passphrase[+ssid] or an hexadecimal one)
     */
    key = g_strdup(tokens[1]);

    ssid = NULL;
    /* Maybe there is a third token (an ssid, if everything else is ok) */
    if(n >= 3)
    {
        ssid = g_strdup(tokens[2]);
    }

    if (g_ascii_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK) == 0) /* WPA key */
    {
        /* Create a new string */
        key_string = g_string_new(key);

        key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
        res = hex_str_to_bytes(key, key_ba, FALSE);

        /* Two tokens means that the user should have entered a WPA-BIN key ... */
        if(!res || ((key_string->len) != WPA_PSK_KEY_CHAR_SIZE))
        {
            g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
            g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);

            g_free(type);
            g_free(key);
            /* No ssid has been created ... */
            /* Free the array of strings */
            g_strfreev(tokens);
            return NULL;
        }

        /* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
        dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));

        dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK;
        dk->key  = g_string_new(key);
        dk->bits = dk->key->len * 4;
        dk->ssid = NULL;

        g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
        g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
        g_free(key);
        g_free(type);

        /* Free the array of strings */
        g_strfreev(tokens);
        return dk;
    }
    else if(g_ascii_strcasecmp(type,STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD) == 0) /* WPA key *//* If the number of tokens is more than three, we accept the string... if the first three tokens are correct... */
    {
        /* Create a new string */
        key_string = g_string_new(key);
        ssid_ba = NULL;

        /* Three (or more) tokens mean that the user entered a WPA-PWD key ... */
        if( ((key_string->len) > WPA_KEY_MAX_CHAR_SIZE) || ((key_string->len) < WPA_KEY_MIN_CHAR_SIZE))
        {
            g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);

            g_free(type);
            g_free(key);
            g_free(ssid);

            /* Free the array of strings */
            g_strfreev(tokens);
            return NULL;
        }

        if(ssid != NULL) /* more than three tokens found, means that the user specified the ssid */
        {
            ssid_ba = g_byte_array_new();
            if (! uri_str_to_bytes(ssid, ssid_ba)) {
                g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
                g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
                g_free(type);
                g_free(key);
                g_free(ssid);
                /* Free the array of strings */
                g_strfreev(tokens);
                return NULL;
            }

            if(ssid_ba->len > WPA_SSID_MAX_CHAR_SIZE)
            {
                g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
                g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);

                g_free(type);
                g_free(key);
                g_free(ssid);

                /* Free the array of strings */
                g_strfreev(tokens);
                return NULL;
            }
        }

        /* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
        dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));

        dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD;
        dk->key  = g_string_new(key);
        dk->bits = 256; /* This is the length of the array pf bytes that will be generated using key+ssid ...*/
        dk->ssid = byte_array_dup(ssid_ba); /* NULL if ssid_ba is NULL */

        g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
        if (ssid_ba != NULL)
            g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);

        g_free(type);
        g_free(key);
        if(ssid != NULL)
            g_free(ssid);

        /* Free the array of strings */
        g_strfreev(tokens);
        return dk;
    }

    /* Something was wrong ... free everything */

    g_free(type);
    g_free(key);
    if(ssid != NULL)
        g_free(ssid); /* It is not always present */
    if (ssid_ba != NULL)
        g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);

    /* Free the array of strings */
    g_strfreev(tokens);

    return NULL;
}

/*
 * Returns a newly allocated string representing the given decryption_key_t
 * struct, or NULL if something is wrong...
 */
gchar*
get_key_string(decryption_key_t* dk)
{
    gchar* output_string = NULL;

    if(dk == NULL || dk->key == NULL)
        return NULL;

    switch(dk->type) {
        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
            output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WEP,dk->key->str);
            break;
        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
            if(dk->ssid == NULL)
                output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD,dk->key->str);
            else
                output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s:%s",
                    STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD, dk->key->str,
                    format_uri(dk->ssid, ":"));
            break;
        case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
            output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",STRING_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK,dk->key->str);
            break;
        default:
            return NULL;
            break;
    }

    return output_string;
}

#ifdef	__cplusplus
}
#endif

/****************************************************************************/

/*
 * Editor modelines
 *
 * Local Variables:
 * c-basic-offset: 4
 * tab-width: 8
 * set-tabs-mode: nil
 * End:
 *
 * ex: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab
 * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
 */