path: root/epan/dissectors/packet-ipsec.c

/* packet-ipsec.c
 * Routines for IPsec/IPComp packet disassembly
 *
 * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
 * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
 * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 */


/*

Addon: ESP Decryption and Authentication Checking

Frederic ROUDAUT (frederic.roudaut@free.fr)
Copyright 2006 Frederic ROUDAUT

- Decrypt ESP Payload for the following Algorithms defined in RFC 4305:

Encryption Algorithm
--------------------
NULL
TripleDES-CBC [RFC2451] : keylen 192 bits.
AES-CBC with 128-bit keys [RFC3602] : keylen 128 and 192/256 bits.
AES-CTR [RFC3686] : keylen 160/224/288 bits. The remaining 32 bits will be used as nonce.
DES-CBC [RFC2405] : keylen 64 bits

- Add ESP Payload Decryption support for the following Encryption Algorithms :
BLOWFISH-CBC : keylen 128 bits.
TWOFISH-CBC : keylen 128/256 bits.
CAST5-CBC :  keylen 128

- Check ESP Authentication for the following Algorithms defined in RFC 4305:

Authentication Algorithm
------------------------
NULL
HMAC-SHA1-96 [RFC2404] : any keylen
HMAC-MD5-96 [RFC2403] : any keylen
AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [RFC3566] : Not available because no implementation found.

- Add ESP Authentication checking for the following Authentication Algorithm :
HMAC-SHA256 : any keylen
HMAC-RIPEMD160-96 [RFC2857] : any keylen

- Added/Modified Authentication checking (David Dahlberg <dahlberg@fgan.de>):
CHG: HMAC-SHA256 is now HMAC-SHA-256-96 [draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00]
     -> It is implemented this way in USAGI/KAME (Linux/BSD).
ADD: HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC4868]
     ICV length of HMAC-SHA-256 was changed in draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-01
     to 128 bit. This is "SHOULD" be the standard now!
ADD: Additional generic (non-checked) ICV length of 128, 192 and 256.
     This follows RFC 4868 for the SHA-256+ family.

*/

#include "config.h"


#include <epan/packet.h>
#include <epan/addr_resolv.h>
#include <epan/ipproto.h>
#include <epan/prefs.h>
#include <epan/expert.h>
#include <epan/tap.h>
#include <epan/exported_pdu.h>
#include <epan/proto_data.h>
#include <epan/decode_as.h>
#include <epan/capture_dissectors.h>

#include <stdio.h>    /* for sscanf() */
#include <epan/uat.h>
#include <wsutil/str_util.h>
#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h>
#include <wsutil/pint.h>

#include "packet-ipsec.h"
#include "packet-ip.h"

void proto_register_ipsec(void);
void proto_reg_handoff_ipsec(void);

static int proto_ah;
static int hf_ah_next_header;
static int hf_ah_length;
static int hf_ah_reserved;
static int hf_ah_spi;
static int hf_ah_iv;
static int hf_ah_sequence;
static int proto_esp;
static int hf_esp_spi;
static int hf_esp_iv;
static int hf_esp_icv;
static int hf_esp_icv_good;
static int hf_esp_icv_bad;
static int hf_esp_sequence;
static int hf_esp_encrypted_data;
static int hf_esp_decrypted_data;
static int hf_esp_contained_data;
static int hf_esp_pad;
static int hf_esp_pad_len;
static int hf_esp_protocol;
static int hf_esp_sequence_analysis_expected_sn;
static int hf_esp_sequence_analysis_previous_frame;

static int proto_ipcomp;
static int hf_ipcomp_next_header;
static int hf_ipcomp_flags;
static int hf_ipcomp_cpi;

static gint ett_ah;
static gint ett_esp;
static gint ett_esp_icv;
static gint ett_esp_decrypted_data;
static gint ett_ipcomp;

static expert_field ei_esp_sequence_analysis_wrong_sequence_number;


static gint exported_pdu_tap = -1;

static dissector_handle_t ipcomp_handle;
static capture_dissector_handle_t ah_cap_handle;

static dissector_handle_t data_handle;

static dissector_table_t ip_dissector_table;

/* Encryption algorithms defined in RFC 4305 */
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_NULL 0
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_3DES_CBC 1
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CBC 2
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR 3
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_DES_CBC 4
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_BLOWFISH_CBC 5
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_TWOFISH_CBC 6

/* Encryption algorithm defined in RFC 2144 */
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_CAST5_CBC 7

/* Encryption algorithms defined in RFC 4106 */
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM     8
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_8   9
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_12  10
#define IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_16  11

/* Authentication algorithms defined in RFC 4305 */
#define IPSEC_AUTH_NULL 0
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 1
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_96 2
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_128 3
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA384_192 4
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA512_256 5
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 6
#define IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD160_96 7
/* define IPSEC_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC_96 6 */
#define IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_64BIT 8
#define IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_96BIT 9
#define IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_128BIT 10
#define IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_192BIT 11
#define IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_256BIT 12

/* ICV types (not an RFC classification) */
#define ICV_TYPE_UNCHECKED 0  /* ICV is not verified */
#define ICV_TYPE_HMAC 1       /* ICV is verified before decryption using an HMAC */
#define ICV_TYPE_AEAD 2       /* ICV is verified during decryption using an AEAD cipher */

#define IPSEC_IPV6_ADDR_LEN 128
#define IPSEC_IPV4_ADDR_LEN 32
#define IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 32
#define IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4 8
#define IPSEC_SA_IPV4 1
#define IPSEC_SA_IPV6 2
#define IPSEC_SA_UNKNOWN -1
#define IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY '*'
/* the maximum number of bytes (10)(including the terminating nul character(11)) */
#define IPSEC_SPI_LEN_MAX 11
#define IPSEC_SA_SN 32
#define IPSEC_SA_ESN 64


/* well-known algorithm number (in CPI), from RFC2409 */
#define IPCOMP_OUI      1       /* vendor specific */
#define IPCOMP_DEFLATE  2       /* RFC2394 */
#define IPCOMP_LZS      3       /* RFC2395 */
#define IPCOMP_MAX      4


static const value_string cpi2val[] = {
  { IPCOMP_OUI, "OUI" },
  { IPCOMP_DEFLATE, "DEFLATE" },
  { IPCOMP_LZS, "LZS" },
  { 0, NULL },
};

/* The length of the two fields (SPI and Sequence Number) preceding the Payload Data */
#define ESP_HEADER_LEN 8


static const value_string esp_encryption_type_vals[] = {
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_NULL, "NULL" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_3DES_CBC, "TripleDES-CBC [RFC2451]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CBC, "AES-CBC [RFC3602]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR, "AES-CTR [RFC3686]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC [RFC2405]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_CAST5_CBC, "CAST5-CBC [RFC2144]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_BLOWFISH_CBC, "BLOWFISH-CBC [RFC2451]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_TWOFISH_CBC, "TWOFISH-CBC" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM,    "AES-GCM [RFC4106]" }, /* deprecated; (no ICV length specified) */
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_8,  "AES-GCM with 8 octet ICV [RFC4106]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_12, "AES-GCM with 12 octet ICV [RFC4106]" },
  { IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_16, "AES-GCM with 16 octet ICV [RFC4106]" },
  { 0x00, NULL }
};

static const char *
esp_get_encr_algo_name(gint esp_encr_algo)
{
  return esp_encryption_type_vals[esp_encr_algo].strptr;
}


static const value_string esp_authentication_type_vals[] = {
  { IPSEC_AUTH_NULL, "NULL" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, "HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_96, "HMAC-SHA-256-96 [draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_128, "HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC4868]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA384_192, "HMAC-SHA-384-192 [RFC4868]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA512_256, "HMAC-SHA-512-256 [RFC4868]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, "HMAC-MD5-96 [RFC2403]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD160_96, "MAC-RIPEMD-160-96 [RFC2857]" },
  /*    { IPSEC_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC_96, "AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [RFC3566]" }, */
  { IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_64BIT, "ANY 64 bit authentication [no checking]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_96BIT, "ANY 96 bit authentication [no checking]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_128BIT, "ANY 128 bit authentication [no checking]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_192BIT, "ANY 192 bit authentication [no checking]" },
  { IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_256BIT, "ANY 256 bit authentication [no checking]" },
  { 0x00, NULL }
};

static const char *
esp_get_auth_algo_name(gint esp_auth_algo)
{
  return esp_authentication_type_vals[esp_auth_algo].strptr;
}


/*-------------------------------------
 * UAT for ESP
 *-------------------------------------
 */
/* UAT entry structure. */
typedef struct {
  guint8 protocol;
  gchar *srcIP;
  gchar *dstIP;
  gchar *spi;

  guint8 encryption_algo;         /* see values in esp_encryption_type_vals */
  gchar *encryption_key_string;
  gchar *encryption_key;
  gint encryption_key_length;
  gboolean         cipher_hd_created;
  gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd;     /* Key is stored here and closed with the SA */

  guint8 authentication_algo;     /* see values in esp_authentication_type_vals */
  gchar *authentication_key_string;
  gchar *authentication_key;
  gint authentication_key_length;

  guint8 sn_length;
  guint32 sn_upper;
} uat_esp_sa_record_t;

static uat_esp_sa_record_t *uat_esp_sa_records = NULL;

/* Extra SA records that may be set programmatically */
/* 'records' array is now allocated on the heap */
#define MAX_EXTRA_SA_RECORDS 16
typedef struct extra_esp_sa_records_t {
  guint num_records;
  uat_esp_sa_record_t *records;
} extra_esp_sa_records_t;
static extra_esp_sa_records_t extra_esp_sa_records;

static uat_t * esp_uat = NULL;
static guint num_sa_uat = 0;

/*
   Name : static gint compute_ascii_key(gchar **ascii_key, gchar *key)
   Description : Allocate memory for the key and transform the key if it is hexadecimal
   Return : Return the key length
   Params:
      - gchar **ascii_key : the resulting ascii key allocated here
      - gchar *key : the key to compute
      - char **err : an error string to report if the input is found to be invalid
*/
static gint
compute_ascii_key(gchar **ascii_key, const gchar *key, char **err)
{
  guint key_len = 0, raw_key_len;
  gint hex_digit;
  guchar key_byte;
  guint i, j;

  if(key != NULL)
  {
    raw_key_len = (guint)strlen(key);
    if((raw_key_len > 2) && (key[0] == '0') && ((key[1] == 'x') || (key[1] == 'X')))
    {
      /*
       * Key begins with "0x" or "0X"; skip that and treat the rest
       * as a sequence of hex digits.
       */
      i = 2;    /* first character after "0[Xx]" */
      j = 0;
      if(raw_key_len %2  == 1)
      {
        /*
         * Key has an odd number of characters; we act as if the
         * first character had a 0 in front of it, making the
         * number of characters even.
         */
        key_len = (raw_key_len - 2) / 2 + 1;
        *ascii_key = (gchar *) g_malloc ((key_len + 1)* sizeof(gchar));
        hex_digit = g_ascii_xdigit_value(key[i]);
        if (hex_digit == -1)
        {
          g_free(*ascii_key);
          *ascii_key = NULL;
          *err = ws_strdup_printf("Key %s begins with an invalid hex char (%c)", key, key[i]);
          return -1;    /* not a valid hex digit */
        }
        (*ascii_key)[j] = (guchar)hex_digit;
        j++;
        i++;
      }
      else
      {
        /*
         * Key has an even number of characters, so we treat each
         * pair of hex digits as a single byte value.
         */
        key_len = (raw_key_len - 2) / 2;
        *ascii_key = (gchar *) g_malloc ((key_len + 1)* sizeof(gchar));
      }

      while(i < (raw_key_len -1))
      {
        hex_digit = g_ascii_xdigit_value(key[i]);
        i++;
        if (hex_digit == -1)
        {
          g_free(*ascii_key);
          *ascii_key = NULL;
          *err = ws_strdup_printf("Key %s has an invalid hex char (%c)",
                     key, key[i-1]);
          return -1;    /* not a valid hex digit */
        }
        key_byte = ((guchar)hex_digit) << 4;
        hex_digit = g_ascii_xdigit_value(key[i]);
        i++;
        if (hex_digit == -1)
        {
          g_free(*ascii_key);
          *ascii_key = NULL;
          *err = ws_strdup_printf("Key %s has an invalid hex char (%c)", key, key[i-1]);
          return -1;    /* not a valid hex digit */
        }
        key_byte |= (guchar)hex_digit;
        (*ascii_key)[j] = key_byte;
        j++;
      }
      (*ascii_key)[j] = '\0';
    }

    else if((raw_key_len == 2) && (key[0] == '0') && ((key[1] == 'x') || (key[1] == 'X')))
    {
      /* A valid null key */
      *ascii_key = NULL;
      return 0;
    }
    else
    {
      /* Doesn't begin with 0X or 0x... */
      key_len = raw_key_len;
      *ascii_key = g_strdup(key);
    }
  }

  return key_len;
}


static bool uat_esp_sa_record_update_cb(void* r, char** err) {
  uat_esp_sa_record_t* rec = (uat_esp_sa_record_t *)r;

  /* Compute keys & lengths once and for all */
  g_free(rec->encryption_key);
  if (rec->cipher_hd_created) {
    gcry_cipher_close(rec->cipher_hd);
    rec->cipher_hd_created = FALSE;
  }
  if (rec->encryption_key_string) {
    rec->encryption_key_length = compute_ascii_key(&rec->encryption_key, rec->encryption_key_string, err);
  }
  else {
    rec->encryption_key_length = 0;
    rec->encryption_key = NULL;
  }

  g_free(rec->authentication_key);
  if (rec->authentication_key_string) {
    rec->authentication_key_length = compute_ascii_key(&rec->authentication_key, rec->authentication_key_string, err);
  }
  else {
    rec->authentication_key_length = 0;
    rec->authentication_key = NULL;
  }

  /* TODO: Make sure IP addresses have a valid conversion */
  /* Unfortunately, return value of get_full_ipv4_addr() or get_full_ipv6_addr() (depending upon rec->protocol)
     is not sufficient */

  /* TODO: check format of spi */

  /* Return TRUE only if *err has not been set by checking code. */
  return *err == NULL;
}

static void* uat_esp_sa_record_copy_cb(void* n, const void* o, size_t siz _U_) {
  uat_esp_sa_record_t* new_rec = (uat_esp_sa_record_t *)n;
  const uat_esp_sa_record_t* old_rec = (const uat_esp_sa_record_t *)o;

  /* Copy UAT fields */
  new_rec->protocol = old_rec->protocol;
  new_rec->srcIP = g_strdup(old_rec->srcIP);
  new_rec->dstIP = g_strdup(old_rec->dstIP);
  new_rec->spi = g_strdup(old_rec->spi);
  new_rec->encryption_algo = old_rec->encryption_algo;
  new_rec->encryption_key_string = g_strdup(old_rec->encryption_key_string);
  new_rec->encryption_key = NULL;
  new_rec->cipher_hd_created = FALSE;
  new_rec->authentication_algo = old_rec->authentication_algo;
  new_rec->authentication_key_string = g_strdup(old_rec->authentication_key_string);
  new_rec->authentication_key = NULL;
  new_rec->sn_length = old_rec->sn_length;
  new_rec->sn_upper = old_rec->sn_upper;

  /* Parse keys as in an update */
  char *err = NULL;
  uat_esp_sa_record_update_cb(new_rec, &err);
  if (err) {
    g_free(err);
  }

  return new_rec;
}

static void uat_esp_sa_record_free_cb(void*r) {
  uat_esp_sa_record_t* rec = (uat_esp_sa_record_t*)r;

  g_free(rec->srcIP);
  g_free(rec->dstIP);
  g_free(rec->spi);
  g_free(rec->encryption_key_string);
  g_free(rec->encryption_key);
  g_free(rec->authentication_key_string);
  g_free(rec->authentication_key);

  if (rec->cipher_hd_created) {
    gcry_cipher_close(rec->cipher_hd);
    rec->cipher_hd_created = FALSE;
  }
}

UAT_VS_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, protocol, uat_esp_sa_record_t, guint8, IPSEC_SA_IPV4, "IPv4")
UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, srcIP, uat_esp_sa_record_t)
UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, dstIP, uat_esp_sa_record_t)
UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, spi, uat_esp_sa_record_t)
UAT_VS_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, encryption_algo, uat_esp_sa_record_t, guint8, 0, "FIXX")
UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, encryption_key_string, uat_esp_sa_record_t)
UAT_VS_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, authentication_algo, uat_esp_sa_record_t, guint8, 0, "FIXX")
UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, authentication_key_string, uat_esp_sa_record_t)
UAT_VS_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, sn_length, uat_esp_sa_record_t, guint8, IPSEC_SA_SN, "32-bit")
UAT_HEX_CB_DEF(uat_esp_sa_records, sn_upper, uat_esp_sa_record_t)


/* Configure a new SA (programmatically, most likely from a private dissector).
   The arguments here are deliberately in the same string formats as the UAT fields
   in order to keep code paths common.
   Note that an attempt to match with these entries will be made *before* entries
   added through the UAT entry interface/file. */
void esp_sa_record_add_from_dissector(guint8 protocol, const gchar *srcIP, const char *dstIP,
                                      gchar *spi,
                                      guint8 encryption_algo,           /* values from esp_encryption_type_vals */
                                      const gchar *encryption_key,
                                      guint8 authentication_algo,       /* values from esp_authentication_type_vals */
                                      const gchar *authentication_key)
{
   uat_esp_sa_record_t* record = NULL;
   if (extra_esp_sa_records.num_records == 0) {
      extra_esp_sa_records.records = g_new(uat_esp_sa_record_t, MAX_EXTRA_SA_RECORDS);
   }
   /* Add new entry */
   if (extra_esp_sa_records.num_records < MAX_EXTRA_SA_RECORDS) {
      record = &extra_esp_sa_records.records[extra_esp_sa_records.num_records++];
   }
   else {
      /* No room left!! */
      REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Failed to add UE as already have max (%d) configured\n",
                           MAX_EXTRA_SA_RECORDS);
      return;
   }

   /* Copy key fields */
   record->protocol = protocol;
   record->srcIP = g_strdup(srcIP);
   record->dstIP = g_strdup(dstIP);
   record->spi = g_strdup(spi);

   /* Encryption */
   record->encryption_algo = encryption_algo;
   record->encryption_key_string = g_strdup(encryption_key);
   record->encryption_key = NULL;
   record->cipher_hd_created = FALSE;

   /* Authentication */
   record->authentication_algo = authentication_algo;
   record->authentication_key_string = g_strdup(authentication_key);
   record->authentication_key = NULL;

   /* XXX - Should we change the function so private dissectors pass this in? */
   record->sn_length = IPSEC_SA_SN;
   record->sn_upper = 0;

   /* Parse keys */
   char *err = NULL;
   uat_esp_sa_record_update_cb(record, &err);
   if (err) {
       /* Free (but ignore) any error string set */
       g_free(err);
   }
}

/*************************************/
/* Preference settings               */

/* Default ESP payload decode to off */
static gboolean g_esp_enable_encryption_decode = FALSE;

/* Default ESP payload Authentication Checking to off */
static gboolean g_esp_enable_authentication_check = FALSE;

/**************************************************/
/* Sequence number analysis                       */

/* SPI state, key is just 32-bit SPI */
typedef struct
{
    guint32  firstValidSN;
    guint32  previousSequenceNumber;
    guint32  previousFrameNum;
} spi_status;

/* The sequence analysis SPI hash table.
   Maps SPI -> spi_status */
static wmem_map_t *esp_sequence_analysis_hash = NULL;

/* Results are stored here: framenum -> spi_status */
/* N.B. only store entries for out-of-order frames, if there is no entry for
   a given frame, it was found to be in-order */
static wmem_map_t *esp_sequence_analysis_report_hash = NULL;

/* During the first pass, update the SPI state.  If the sequence numbers
   are out of order, add an entry to the report table */
static void check_esp_sequence_info(guint32 spi, guint32 sequence_number, packet_info *pinfo)
{
  /* Do the table lookup */
  spi_status *status = (spi_status*)wmem_map_lookup(esp_sequence_analysis_hash,
                                                        GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)spi));
  if (status == NULL) {
    /* Create an entry for this SPI */
    status = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), spi_status);
    status->previousSequenceNumber = sequence_number;
    status->previousFrameNum = pinfo->num;

    /* And add it to the table */
    wmem_map_insert(esp_sequence_analysis_hash, GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)spi), status);
  }
  else {
    spi_status *frame_status;

    /* Entry already existed, so check that we got the sequence number we expected. */
    if (sequence_number != status->previousSequenceNumber+1) {
      /* Create report entry */
      frame_status = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), spi_status);
      /* Copy what was expected */
      *frame_status = *status;
      /* And add it into the report table */
      wmem_map_insert(esp_sequence_analysis_report_hash, GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->num), frame_status);
    }
    /* Adopt this setting as 'current' regardless of whether expected */
    status->previousSequenceNumber = sequence_number;
    status->previousFrameNum = pinfo->num;
  }
}

/* Check to see if there is a report stored for this frame.  If there is,
   add it to the tree and report using expert info */
static void show_esp_sequence_info(guint32 spi, guint32 sequence_number,
                                   tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo)
{
  /* Look up this frame in the report table. */
  spi_status *status = (spi_status*)wmem_map_lookup(esp_sequence_analysis_report_hash,
                                                        GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->num));
  if (status != NULL) {
    proto_item *sn_ti, *frame_ti;

    /* Expected sequence number */
    sn_ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_esp_sequence_analysis_expected_sn,
                                tvb, 0, 0, status->previousSequenceNumber+1);
    if (sequence_number > (status->previousSequenceNumber+1)) {
      proto_item_append_text(sn_ti, " (%u SNs missing)",
                             sequence_number - (status->previousSequenceNumber+1));
    }
    proto_item_set_generated(sn_ti);

    /* Link back to previous frame for SPI */
    frame_ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_esp_sequence_analysis_previous_frame,
                                   tvb, 0, 0, status->previousFrameNum);
    proto_item_set_generated(frame_ti);

    /* Expert info */
    if (sequence_number == status->previousSequenceNumber) {
      expert_add_info_format(pinfo, sn_ti, &ei_esp_sequence_analysis_wrong_sequence_number,
                             "Wrong Sequence Number for SPI %08x - %u repeated",
                             spi, sequence_number);
    }
    else if (sequence_number > status->previousSequenceNumber+1) {
      expert_add_info_format(pinfo, sn_ti, &ei_esp_sequence_analysis_wrong_sequence_number,
                             "Wrong Sequence Number for SPI %08x - %u missing",
                             spi,
                             sequence_number - (status->previousSequenceNumber+1));
    }
    else {
      expert_add_info_format(pinfo, sn_ti, &ei_esp_sequence_analysis_wrong_sequence_number,
                             "Wrong Sequence Number for SPI %08x - %u less than expected",
                             spi,
                             (status->previousSequenceNumber+1) - sequence_number);
    }
  }
}

/*
   Default ESP payload heuristic decode to off
   (only works if payload is NULL encrypted and ESP payload decode is off or payload is NULL encrypted
   and the packet does not match a Security Association).
*/
static gboolean g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic = FALSE;

/* Default to doing ESP sequence analysis */
static gboolean g_esp_do_sequence_analysis = TRUE;



/*
   Name : static int get_ipv6_suffix(char* ipv6_suffix, char *ipv6_address)
   Description : Get the extended IPv6 Suffix of an IPv6 Address
   Return : Return the number of char of the IPv6 address suffix parsed
   Params:
      - char *ipv6_address : the valid ipv6 address to parse in char *
      - char *ipv6_suffix : the ipv6 suffix associated in char *

      ex: if IPv6 address is "3ffe::1" the IPv6 suffix will be "0001" and the function will return 3
*/
static int get_ipv6_suffix(char* ipv6_suffix, char *ipv6_address)
{
  char suffix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 + 1];
  int cpt = 0;
  int cpt_suffix = 0;
  int cpt_seg = 0;
  int j =0;
  int ipv6_len = 0;
  gboolean found = FALSE;

  ipv6_len = (int) strlen(ipv6_address);
  if(ipv6_len  != 0)
    {
      while ( (cpt_suffix < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6) && (ipv6_len - cpt -1 >= 0) && (found == FALSE))
        {
          if(ipv6_address[ipv6_len - cpt - 1] == ':')
            {
              /* Add some 0 to the prefix; */
              for(j = cpt_seg; j < 4; j++)
                {
                  suffix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 -1 -cpt_suffix] = '0';
                  cpt_suffix ++;
                }
              cpt_seg = 0;

              if(ipv6_len - cpt - 1 == 0)
                {
                  /* Found a suffix */
                  found = TRUE;
                }
              else
                if(ipv6_address[ipv6_len - cpt - 2] == ':')
                  {
                    /* found a suffix */
                    cpt +=2;
                    found = TRUE;
                  }

                else
                  {
                    cpt++;
                  }
            }
          else
            {
              suffix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 -1 -cpt_suffix] = g_ascii_toupper(ipv6_address[ipv6_len - cpt - 1]);
              cpt_seg ++;
              cpt_suffix ++;
              cpt++;
            }
        }

      if(cpt_suffix % 4 != 0)
        {
          for(j = cpt_seg; j < 4; j++)
            {
              suffix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 -1 -cpt_suffix] = '0';
              cpt_suffix ++;
            }
        }

    }

  for(j = 0 ; j < cpt_suffix ; j ++)
    {
      suffix[j] = suffix[j + IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 - cpt_suffix] ;
    }

  suffix[j] = '\0';
  memcpy(ipv6_suffix,suffix,j + 1);
  return cpt;
}

/*
   Name : static int get_full_ipv6_addr(char* ipv6_addr_expanded, char *ipv6_addr)
   Description : Get the extended IPv6 Address of an IPv6 Address
   Return : Return the remaining number of char of the IPv6 address parsed
   Params:
      - char *ipv6_addr : the valid ipv6 address to parse in char *
      - char *ipv6_addr_expanded : the expanded ipv6 address associated in char *

      ex: if IPv6 address is "3ffe::1" the IPv6 expanded address
            will be "3FFE0000000000000000000000000001" and the function will return 0
          if IPV6 address is "3ffe::*" the IPv6 expanded address
            will be "3FFE000000000000000000000000****" and the function will return 0
*/
static int
get_full_ipv6_addr(char* ipv6_addr_expanded, char *ipv6_addr)
{
  char suffix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 + 1];
  char prefix[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 + 1];
  char *prefix_addr;

  int suffix_cpt = 0;
  int suffix_len = 0;
  int prefix_remaining = 0;
  int prefix_len = 0;
  int j = 0;
  guint i = 0;
  guint addr_byte = 0;
  guint mask = IPSEC_IPV6_ADDR_LEN;
  char* mask_begin = NULL;


  if((ipv6_addr == NULL) || (strcmp(ipv6_addr, "") == 0))  return -1;

  memset(ipv6_addr_expanded, 0x0, IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6);

  mask_begin = strchr(ipv6_addr, '/');
  if(mask_begin)
  {
    if(sscanf(mask_begin, "/%u", &mask) == EOF)
      mask = IPSEC_IPV6_ADDR_LEN;
    mask_begin[0] = '\0';
  }

  if((strlen(ipv6_addr) == 1) && (ipv6_addr[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY))
    {
      for(j = 0; j < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6; j++)
        {
          ipv6_addr_expanded[j] = IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY;
        }
      ipv6_addr_expanded[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6] = '\0';
      return 0;
    }

  suffix_cpt = get_ipv6_suffix(suffix,ipv6_addr);
  suffix_len = (int) strlen(suffix);

  if(suffix_len <  IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6)
    {
      prefix_addr = wmem_strndup(wmem_packet_scope(), ipv6_addr,strlen(ipv6_addr) - suffix_cpt);
      prefix_remaining = get_ipv6_suffix(prefix,prefix_addr);
      prefix_len = (int) strlen(prefix);
      memcpy(ipv6_addr_expanded,prefix,prefix_len);
    }


  for(j = 0; j <= IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 - prefix_len - suffix_len; j++)
    {
      ipv6_addr_expanded[j + prefix_len] = '0';
    }

  memcpy(ipv6_addr_expanded + IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 - suffix_len, suffix,suffix_len + 1);

  for(i = 0; i < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6; i++)
  {
    if(4 * (i + 1) > mask)
    {
      if(mask <= 4 * i || ipv6_addr_expanded[i] == '*')
        ipv6_addr_expanded[i] = '*';
      else {
        if(sscanf(ipv6_addr_expanded + i, "%X", &addr_byte) == EOF)
           break;
        addr_byte &= (0x0F << (4 * (i + 1) - mask));
        addr_byte &= 0x0F;
        snprintf(ipv6_addr_expanded + i, 4, "%X", addr_byte);
      }
    }
  }

  if(suffix_len < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6)
    return (int) strlen(ipv6_addr) - suffix_cpt - prefix_remaining;
  else
    return (int) strlen(ipv6_addr) - suffix_cpt;
}


/*
   Name : static gboolean get_full_ipv4_addr(char* ipv4_addr_expanded, char *ipv4_addr)
   Description : Get the extended IPv4 Address of an IPv4 Address
   Return : Return true if it can derive an IPv4 address. It does not mean that
            the previous one was valid.
   Params:
      - char *ipv4_addr : the valid ipv4 address to parse in char *
      - char *ipv4_addr_expanded : the expanded ipv4 address associated in char *

      ex: if IPv4 address is "190.*.*.1" the IPv4 expanded address will be "BE****01" and
            the function will return 0
          if IPv4 address is "*" the IPv4 expanded address will be "********" and
            the function will return 0
*/
static gboolean
get_full_ipv4_addr(char* ipv4_address_expanded, char *ipv4_address)
{
  char addr_byte_string_tmp[4];
  char addr_byte_string[4];

  guint addr_byte = 0;
  guint i = 0;
  guint j = 0;
  guint k = 0;
  guint cpt = 0;
  gboolean done_flag = FALSE;
  guint mask = IPSEC_IPV4_ADDR_LEN;
  char* mask_begin = NULL;

  if((ipv4_address == NULL) || (strcmp(ipv4_address, "") == 0))  return done_flag;

  mask_begin = strchr(ipv4_address, '/');
  if(mask_begin)
  {
    if(sscanf(mask_begin, "/%u", &mask) == EOF)
      mask = IPSEC_IPV4_ADDR_LEN;
    mask_begin[0] = '\0';
  }

  if((strlen(ipv4_address) == 1) && (ipv4_address[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY))
  {
    for(i = 0; i <= IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4; i++)
    {
      ipv4_address_expanded[i] = IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY;
    }
    ipv4_address_expanded[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4] = '\0';
    done_flag = TRUE;
  }

  else {
    j = 0;
    cpt = 0;
    k = 0;
    while((done_flag == FALSE) && (j <= strlen(ipv4_address)) && (cpt < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4))
    {
      if(j == strlen(ipv4_address))
      {
        addr_byte_string_tmp[k] = '\0';
        if((strlen(addr_byte_string_tmp) == 1) && (addr_byte_string_tmp[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY))
        {
          for(i = 0; i < 2; i++)
          {
            ipv4_address_expanded[cpt] = IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY;
            cpt ++;
          }
        }
        else
        {
          if (sscanf(addr_byte_string_tmp,"%u",&addr_byte) == EOF)
            return FALSE;

          if(addr_byte < 16)
            snprintf(addr_byte_string,4,"0%X",addr_byte);
          else
            snprintf(addr_byte_string,4,"%X",addr_byte);
          for(i = 0; i < strlen(addr_byte_string); i++)
          {
            ipv4_address_expanded[cpt] = addr_byte_string[i];
            cpt ++;
          }
        }
        done_flag = TRUE;
      }

      else if(ipv4_address[j] == '.')
      {
        addr_byte_string_tmp[k] = '\0';
        if((strlen(addr_byte_string_tmp) == 1) && (addr_byte_string_tmp[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY))
        {
          for(i = 0; i < 2; i++)
          {
            ipv4_address_expanded[cpt] = IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY;
            cpt ++;
          }
        }
        else
        {
          if (sscanf(addr_byte_string_tmp,"%u",&addr_byte) == EOF)
            return FALSE;

          if(addr_byte < 16)
            snprintf(addr_byte_string,4,"0%X",addr_byte);
          else
            snprintf(addr_byte_string,4,"%X",addr_byte);
          for(i = 0; i < strlen(addr_byte_string); i++)
          {
            ipv4_address_expanded[cpt] = addr_byte_string[i];
            cpt ++;
          }
        }
        k = 0;
        j++;
      }
      else
      {
        if(k >= 3)
        {
          /* Incorrect IPv4 Address. Erase previous Values in the Byte. (LRU mechanism) */
          addr_byte_string_tmp[0] = ipv4_address[j];
          k = 1;
          j++;
        }
        else
        {
          addr_byte_string_tmp[k] = ipv4_address[j];
          k++;
          j++;
        }
      }

    }

    for(i = 0; i < IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4; i++)
    {
      if(4 * (i + 1) > mask)
      {
        if(mask <= 4 * i || ipv4_address_expanded[i] == '*')
          ipv4_address_expanded[i] = '*';
        else {
          if(sscanf(ipv4_address_expanded + i, "%X", &addr_byte) == EOF)
             return FALSE;
          addr_byte &= (0x0F << (4 * (i + 1) - mask));
          addr_byte &= 0x0F;
          snprintf(ipv4_address_expanded + i, 4, "%X", addr_byte);
        }
      }
    }
    ipv4_address_expanded[cpt] = '\0';
  }

  return done_flag;
}

/*
   Name : static goolean filter_address_match(gchar *addr, gchar *filter, gint len, gint typ)
   Description : check the matching of an address with a filter
   Return : Return TRUE if the filter and the address match
   Params:
      - gchar *addr : the address to check
      - gchar *filter : the filter
      - gint typ : the Address type : either IPv6 or IPv4 (IPSEC_SA_IPV6, IPSEC_SA_IPV4)
*/
static gboolean
filter_address_match(gchar *addr, gchar *filter, gint typ)
{
  guint i;
  char addr_hex[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 + 1];
  char filter_hex[IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6 + 1];
  guint addr_len;
  guint filter_len;

  if (typ == IPSEC_SA_IPV4) {
      if (!get_full_ipv4_addr(addr_hex, addr))
          return FALSE;
      if (!get_full_ipv4_addr(filter_hex, filter))
          return FALSE;
  } else {
      if (get_full_ipv6_addr(addr_hex, addr))
          return FALSE;
      if (get_full_ipv6_addr(filter_hex, filter))
          return FALSE;
  }

  addr_len = (guint)strlen(addr_hex);
  filter_len = (guint)strlen(filter_hex);

  if((filter_len == 1) && (filter[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY)){
      return TRUE;
  }

  if(addr_len != filter_len)
      return FALSE;

  /* No length specified */
   if( ((typ == IPSEC_SA_IPV6) && (filter_len == IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV6)) ||
       ((typ == IPSEC_SA_IPV4) && (filter_len == IPSEC_STRLEN_IPV4)))
   {
      /* Check byte by byte ... */
      for(i = 0; i < addr_len; i++)
      {
         if((filter_hex[i] != IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY) && (filter_hex[i] != addr_hex[i]))
            return FALSE;
      }
      return TRUE;
   }
   else
      return FALSE;
  return TRUE;

}


/*
   Name : static goolean filter_spi_match(gchar *spi, gchar *filter)
   Description : check the matching of a spi with a filter
   Return : Return TRUE if the filter matches the spi.
   Params:
      - guint spi : the spi to check
      - gchar *filter : the filter
*/
static gboolean
filter_spi_match(guint spi, gchar *filter)
{
  guint i;
  guint filter_len = (guint)strlen(filter);

  /* "*" matches against anything */
  if((filter_len == 1) && (filter[0] == IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY))
    return TRUE;

  /* If the filter has a wildcard, treat SPI as a string */
  if (strchr(filter, IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY) != NULL) {
    gchar spi_string[IPSEC_SPI_LEN_MAX];

    snprintf(spi_string, IPSEC_SPI_LEN_MAX,"0x%08x", spi);

    /* Lengths need to match exactly... */
    if(strlen(spi_string) != filter_len)
      return FALSE;

    /* ... which means '*' can only appear in the last position of the filter? */
    /* Start at 2, don't compare "0x" each time */
    for(i = 2; filter[i]; i++)
      if((filter[i] != IPSEC_SA_WILDCARDS_ANY) && (filter[i] != spi_string[i]))
        return FALSE;
  } else if (strtoul(filter, NULL, 0) != spi) {
    return FALSE;
  }
  return TRUE;
}


/*
   Name : static goolean get_esp_sa(g_esp_sa_database *sad, gint protocol_typ, gchar *src,  gchar *dst,  guint spi,
           gint *encryption_algo,
           gint *authentication_algo,
           gchar **encryption_key,
           guint *encryption_key_len,
           gchar **authentication_key,
           guint *authentication_key_len,
           gcry_cipher_hd_t **cipher_hd,
           gboolean **cipher_hd_created

   Description : Give Encryption Algo, Key and Authentication Algo for a Packet if a corresponding SA is available in a Security Association database
   Return: If the SA is not present, FALSE is then returned.
   Params:
      - g_esp_sa_database *sad : the Security Association Database
      - gint *pt_protocol_typ : the protocol type
      - gchar *src : the source address
      - gchar *dst : the destination address
      - gchar *spi : the spi of the SA
      - gint *encryption_algo : the Encryption Algorithm to apply the packet
      - gint *authentication_algo : the Authentication Algorithm to apply to the packet
      - gchar **encryption_key : the Encryption Key to apply to the packet
      - guint *encryption_key_len : the Encryption Key length to apply to the packet
      - gchar **authentication_key : the Authentication Key to apply to the packet
      - guint *authentication_key_len : the Authentication Key len to apply to the packet
      - gcry_cipher_hd_t **cipher_hd : pointer handle to be used for ciphering
      - gboolean **cipher_hd_created: points to boolean indicating that cipher handle has
                                      been created.  If FALSE, should assign handle to
                                      *cipher_hd and set this to TRUE.

*/
static gboolean
get_esp_sa(gint protocol_typ, gchar *src,  gchar *dst,  guint spi,
           gint *encryption_algo,
           gint *authentication_algo,
           gchar **encryption_key,
           guint *encryption_key_len,
           gchar **authentication_key,
           guint *authentication_key_len,
           gcry_cipher_hd_t **cipher_hd,
           gboolean **cipher_hd_created,
           guint8 *sn_length,
           guint32 *sn_upper
  )
{
  gboolean found = FALSE;
  guint i, j;

  *cipher_hd = NULL;
  *cipher_hd_created = NULL;

  /* Check each known SA in turn */
  for (i = 0, j=0; (found == FALSE) && ((i < num_sa_uat) || (j < extra_esp_sa_records.num_records)); )
  {
    /* Get the next record to try */
    uat_esp_sa_record_t *record;
    if (j < extra_esp_sa_records.num_records) {
      /* Extra ones checked first */
      record = &extra_esp_sa_records.records[j++];
    }
    else {
      /* Then UAT ones */
      record = &uat_esp_sa_records[i++];
    }

    if((protocol_typ == record->protocol)
       && filter_address_match(src, record->srcIP, protocol_typ)
       && filter_address_match(dst, record->dstIP, protocol_typ)
       && filter_spi_match(spi, record->spi))
    {
      found = TRUE;

      *encryption_algo = record->encryption_algo;
      *authentication_algo = record->authentication_algo;
      *authentication_key = record->authentication_key;
      if (record->authentication_key_length == -1)
      {
        /* Bad key; XXX - report this */
        *authentication_key_len = 0;
        found = FALSE;
      }
      else {
        *authentication_key_len = record->authentication_key_length;
      }

      *encryption_key = record->encryption_key;
      if (record->encryption_key_length == -1)
      {
        /* Bad key; XXX - report this */
        *encryption_key_len = 0;
        found = FALSE;
      }
      else {
        *encryption_key_len = record->encryption_key_length;
      }

      /* Tell the caller whether cipher_hd has been created yet and a pointer.
         Pass pointer to created flag so that caller can set if/when
         it opens the cipher_hd. */
      *cipher_hd = &record->cipher_hd;
      *cipher_hd_created = &record->cipher_hd_created;

      *sn_length = record->sn_length;
      *sn_upper = record->sn_upper;
    }
  }

  return found;
}

static void ah_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result)
{
    snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "IP protocol %u as",
        GPOINTER_TO_UINT(p_get_proto_data(pinfo->pool, pinfo, proto_ah, pinfo->curr_layer_num)));
}

static gpointer ah_value(packet_info *pinfo)
{
    return p_get_proto_data(pinfo->pool, pinfo, proto_ah, pinfo->curr_layer_num);
}

static void
export_ipsec_pdu(dissector_handle_t dissector_handle, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb)
{
  if (have_tap_listener(exported_pdu_tap)) {
    exp_pdu_data_t *exp_pdu_data = export_pdu_create_common_tags(pinfo, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(dissector_handle), EXP_PDU_TAG_DISSECTOR_NAME);

    exp_pdu_data->tvb_captured_length = tvb_captured_length(tvb);
    exp_pdu_data->tvb_reported_length = tvb_reported_length(tvb);
    exp_pdu_data->pdu_tvb = tvb;

    tap_queue_packet(exported_pdu_tap, pinfo, exp_pdu_data);
  }
}

/**
 * Implements much of RFC 5879, "Heuristics for Detecting ESP-NULL Packets"
 *
 * Does NOT attempt to properly detect ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC.
 */
static int
esp_null_heur(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *esp_tree)
{
  int esp_packet_len, esp_pad_len, esp_icv_len, offset;
  guint encapsulated_protocol;
  guint32 saved_match_uint;
  gboolean heur_ok;

  tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
  dissector_handle_t dissector_handle;

  /* Possible ICV lengths to try. Per RFC 5879, smallest to largest.
   */
  static const int icv_lengths[] = {
    12,
    16,
    24,
    32,
    -1
  };

  esp_packet_len = tvb_reported_length(tvb);

  for (int i = 0; (esp_icv_len = icv_lengths[i]) != -1; i++) {

    /* Make sure the packet is not truncated before the fields
     * we need to read to determine the encapsulated protocol.
     */
    if (tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, -(esp_icv_len + 2), 2))
    {
      offset = esp_packet_len - (esp_icv_len + 2);
      esp_pad_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
      encapsulated_protocol = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
      dissector_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ip_dissector_table, encapsulated_protocol);
      if (dissector_handle == NULL) {
        continue;
      }
      if (ESP_HEADER_LEN + esp_pad_len > offset) {
        continue;
      }
      heur_ok = TRUE;
      for (int j=0; j < esp_pad_len; j++) {
        if (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset - (j + 1)) != (esp_pad_len - j)) {
          heur_ok = FALSE;
          break;
        }
      }
      if (!heur_ok) {
        continue;
      }

      saved_match_uint  = pinfo->match_uint;
      pinfo->match_uint = encapsulated_protocol;
      next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, ESP_HEADER_LEN, offset - ESP_HEADER_LEN - esp_pad_len);
      /* If the matching dissector has been disabled or rejects the packet,
       * consider the heuristic failed.
       * XXX: Should we also catch exceptions and consider those failures too?
       *
       * Note that the case of ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC will find the correct
       * padding and encapsulated protocol using a 16 byte ICV, but needs to
       * skip over the 8 bytes of IV.
       */
      if (call_dissector_only(dissector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_parent_tree(esp_tree), NULL) == 0) {
        pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_uint;
        continue;
      }
      export_ipsec_pdu(dissector_handle, pinfo, next_tvb);
      pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_uint;

      if (esp_tree) {
        if (esp_pad_len !=0) {
          proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_pad,
                              tvb, offset - esp_pad_len,
                              esp_pad_len, ENC_NA);
        }

        proto_tree_add_uint(esp_tree, hf_esp_pad_len, tvb,
                            offset, 1,
                            esp_pad_len);

        proto_tree_add_uint_format(esp_tree, hf_esp_protocol, tvb,
                                   offset + 1, 1,
                                   encapsulated_protocol,
                                   "Next header: %s (0x%02x)",
                                   ipprotostr(encapsulated_protocol), encapsulated_protocol);
      }

      return esp_icv_len;
    }
  }
  return esp_icv_len;
}

static gboolean
capture_ah(const guchar *pd, int offset, int len, capture_packet_info_t *cpinfo, const union wtap_pseudo_header *pseudo_header)
{
  guint8 nxt;
  int    advance;

  if (!BYTES_ARE_IN_FRAME(offset, len, 2))
    return FALSE;
  nxt = pd[offset];
  advance = 8 + ((pd[offset+1] - 1) << 2);
  if (!BYTES_ARE_IN_FRAME(offset, len, advance))
    return FALSE;
  offset += advance;

  return try_capture_dissector("ip.proto", nxt, pd, offset, len, cpinfo, pseudo_header);
}

static int
dissect_ah(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data)
{
  proto_tree *ah_tree, *root_tree;
  proto_item *pi, *ti;
  guint       ah_nxt;         /* Next header */
  guint8      ah_len;         /* Length of header in 32bit words minus 2 */
  guint       ah_hdr_len;     /* Length of header in octets */
  guint       ah_icv_len;     /* Length of ICV header field in octets */
  guint32     ah_spi;         /* Security parameter index */
  tvbuff_t   *next_tvb;
  dissector_handle_t dissector_handle;
  guint32 saved_match_uint;

  col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "AH");
  col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);

  ah_nxt = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 0);
  ah_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 1);
  ah_hdr_len = (ah_len + 2) * 4;
  ah_icv_len = ah_len ? (ah_len - 1) * 4 : 0;

  root_tree = p_ipv6_pinfo_select_root(pinfo, tree);
  p_ipv6_pinfo_add_len(pinfo, ah_hdr_len);

  pi = proto_tree_add_item(root_tree, proto_ah, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
  ah_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(pi, ett_ah);

  proto_tree_add_item(ah_tree, hf_ah_next_header, tvb, 0, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
  ti = proto_tree_add_item(ah_tree, hf_ah_length, tvb, 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
  proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%u bytes)", ah_hdr_len);
  proto_tree_add_item(ah_tree, hf_ah_reserved, tvb, 2, 2, ENC_NA);
  proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ah_tree, hf_ah_spi, tvb, 4, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &ah_spi);

  col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "AH (SPI=0x%08x)", ah_spi);

  proto_tree_add_item(ah_tree, hf_ah_sequence, tvb, 8, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
  proto_tree_add_item(ah_tree, hf_ah_iv, tvb, 12, ah_icv_len, ENC_NA);

  proto_item_set_len(pi, ah_hdr_len);

  /* Save next header value for Decode As dialog */
  p_add_proto_data(pinfo->pool, pinfo, proto_ah,
                    pinfo->curr_layer_num, GUINT_TO_POINTER(ah_nxt));

  next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, ah_hdr_len);

  if (pinfo->dst.type == AT_IPv6) {
    ipv6_dissect_next(ah_nxt, next_tvb, pinfo, tree, (ws_ip6 *)data);
  } else {
    /* do lookup with the subdissector table */
    saved_match_uint  = pinfo->match_uint;
    dissector_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ip_dissector_table, ah_nxt);
    if (dissector_handle) {
      pinfo->match_uint = ah_nxt;
    } else {
      dissector_handle = data_handle;
    }
    export_ipsec_pdu(dissector_handle, pinfo, next_tvb);
    call_dissector(dissector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
    pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_uint;
  }
  return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
}

static int
dissect_esp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_)
{
  proto_tree *esp_tree = NULL, *decr_tree = NULL, *icv_tree = NULL;
  proto_item *item = NULL;
  proto_item *iv_item = NULL, *encr_data_item = NULL, *icv_item = NULL;

  /* Packet Variables related */
  gchar *ip_src = NULL;
  gchar *ip_dst = NULL;

  guint32 spi = 0;
  guint encapsulated_protocol = 0;
  gboolean decrypt_dissect_ok = FALSE;
  tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
  dissector_handle_t dissector_handle;
  guint32 saved_match_uint;

  gboolean null_encryption_decode_heuristic = FALSE;
  guint8 *esp_iv = NULL;
  guint8 *esp_encr_data = NULL;
  guint8 *esp_decr_data = NULL;
  guint8 *esp_icv = NULL;
  tvbuff_t *tvb_decrypted = NULL;

  /* IPSEC encryption Variables related */
  gint protocol_typ = IPSEC_SA_UNKNOWN;
  gint esp_encr_algo = IPSEC_ENCRYPT_NULL;
  gint esp_auth_algo = IPSEC_AUTH_NULL;
  gint icv_type = ICV_TYPE_UNCHECKED;
  gchar *esp_encr_key = NULL;
  gchar *esp_auth_key = NULL;
  guint esp_encr_key_len = 0;
  guint esp_auth_key_len = 0;
  gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher_hd;
  gboolean         *cipher_hd_created;

  gint offset = 0;
  gint esp_packet_len = 0;
  gint esp_iv_len = 0;
  gint esp_block_len = 0;
  gint esp_encr_data_len = 0;
  gint esp_decr_data_len = 0;
  gint esp_icv_len = 0;
  gint esp_salt_len = 0;
  gboolean decrypt_ok = FALSE;
  gboolean decrypt_using_libgcrypt = FALSE;
  gboolean icv_checked = FALSE;
  gboolean icv_correct = FALSE;
  gboolean sad_is_present = FALSE;
  gint esp_pad_len = 0;


  /* Variables for decryption and authentication checking used for libgrypt */
  gcry_md_hd_t md_hd;
  int md_len = 0;
  gcry_error_t err = 0;
  int crypt_algo_libgcrypt = 0;
  int crypt_mode_libgcrypt = 0;
  int auth_algo_libgcrypt = 0;
  gchar *esp_icv_expected = NULL; /* as readable hex string, for error messages */
  unsigned char ctr_block[16];


  guint32 sequence_number;
  guint8 sn_length = IPSEC_SA_SN;
  guint32 sn_upper = 0;

  /*
   * load the top pane info. This should be overwritten by
   * the next protocol in the stack
   */

  col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "ESP");
  col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);

  /*
   * populate a tree in the second pane with the status of the link layer
   * (ie none)
   */
  item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_esp, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
  esp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_esp);
  proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(esp_tree, hf_esp_spi, tvb,
                      0, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &spi);
  proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(esp_tree, hf_esp_sequence, tvb,
                      4, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sequence_number);

  col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "ESP (SPI=0x%08x)", spi);

  /* Sequence number analysis */
  if (g_esp_do_sequence_analysis) {
    if (!pinfo->fd->visited) {
      check_esp_sequence_info(spi, sequence_number, pinfo);
    }
    show_esp_sequence_info(spi, sequence_number,
                           tvb, esp_tree, pinfo);
  }

  esp_packet_len = tvb_reported_length(tvb);

  /* Get length of remaining ESP packet (without the header) */
  esp_encr_data_len = esp_packet_len - ESP_HEADER_LEN;
  if (esp_encr_data_len <= 0)
    return tvb_captured_length(tvb);

  offset = ESP_HEADER_LEN;

  /* The SAD is not activated */
  if(g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic &&
     !g_esp_enable_encryption_decode)
    null_encryption_decode_heuristic = TRUE;

  if(g_esp_enable_encryption_decode || g_esp_enable_authentication_check)
  {
    /* Get Source & Destination Addresses in gchar * with all the bytes available.  */

    if (pinfo->src.type == AT_IPv4){
      protocol_typ = IPSEC_SA_IPV4;
    }else if (pinfo->src.type == AT_IPv6){
      protocol_typ = IPSEC_SA_IPV6;
    }

    /* Create strings for src, dst addresses */
    ip_src = address_to_str(pinfo->pool, &pinfo->src);
    ip_dst = address_to_str(pinfo->pool, &pinfo->dst);

    /* Get the SPI */
    if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) >= 4)
    {
      spi = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 0);
    }


    /*
      PARSE the SAD and fill it. It may take some time since it will
      be called every times an ESP Payload is found.
    */

    if((sad_is_present = get_esp_sa(protocol_typ, ip_src, ip_dst, spi,
                                    &esp_encr_algo, &esp_auth_algo,
                                    &esp_encr_key, &esp_encr_key_len, &esp_auth_key, &esp_auth_key_len,
                                    &cipher_hd, &cipher_hd_created, &sn_length, &sn_upper)))
    {

      switch(esp_auth_algo)
      {
      case IPSEC_AUTH_NULL:
        esp_icv_len = 0;
        break;

      case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_64BIT:
        esp_icv_len = 8;
        break;

      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_128:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_128BIT:
        esp_icv_len = 16;
        break;

      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA512_256:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_256BIT:
        esp_icv_len = 32;
        break;

      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA384_192:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_192BIT:
        esp_icv_len = 24;
        break;

      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_96:
        /*             case IPSEC_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC_96: */
      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD160_96:
      case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_96BIT:
      default:
        esp_icv_len = 12;
        break;
      }

      switch(esp_encr_algo)
      {
      case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_8:
        esp_encr_algo = IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM;
        esp_icv_len = 8;
        break;

      case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_12:
        esp_encr_algo = IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM;
        esp_icv_len = 12;
        break;

      case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM_16:
        esp_encr_algo = IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM;
        esp_icv_len = 16;
        break;

      case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM:
        esp_icv_len = 0;
      }

      if(g_esp_enable_authentication_check)
      {
        if (sn_length == IPSEC_SA_ESN && g_esp_do_sequence_analysis) {
          spi_status *status = (spi_status*)wmem_map_lookup(esp_sequence_analysis_hash,
                                                                GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)spi));
          /* We only support 2^32 - 1 frames (and only 2^31 - 1 in the Qt packet
           * list), so at most we can overflow once. In a normal capture we
           * expect half the frames to be from each direction, too. The proper
           * method in RFC 4303 Appendix A involves storing valid sequence
           * numbers at multiple points for subsequent passes to slide the window,
           * but we shouldn't need to. */
          if (status && status->firstValidSN) {
            const guint32 window = 0x8000U;
            if (status->firstValidSN >= window) {
              if (sequence_number < (status->firstValidSN - window)) {
                sn_upper++;
              }
            } else {
              if (sequence_number >= (status->firstValidSN - window)) {
                sn_upper--;
              }
            }
          }
        }

        switch(esp_auth_algo)
        {
        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96:
          /*
            RFC 2404 : HMAC-SHA-1-96 is a secret key algorithm.
            While no fixed key length is specified in [RFC-2104],
            for use with either ESP or AH a fixed key length of
            160-bits MUST be supported.  Key lengths other than
            160-bits MUST NOT be supported (i.e. only 160-bit keys
            are to be used by HMAC-SHA-1-96).  A key length of
            160-bits was chosen based on the recommendations in
            [RFC-2104] (i.e. key lengths less than the
            authentication length decrease security strength and
            keys longer than the authentication length do not
            significantly increase security strength).
          */
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_NULL:
          break;

          /*
            case IPSEC_AUTH_AES_XCBC_MAC_96:
            auth_algo_libgcrypt =
            authentication_check_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;
          */

        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_96:
        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA256_128:
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA384_192:
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_SHA384;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_SHA512_256:
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_SHA512;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96:
          /*
            RFC 2403 : HMAC-MD5-96 is a secret key algorithm.
            While no fixed key length is specified in [RFC-2104],
            for use with either ESP or AH a fixed key length of
            128-bits MUST be supported.  Key lengths other than
            128-bits MUST NOT be supported (i.e. only 128-bit keys
            are to be used by HMAC-MD5-96).  A key length of
            128-bits was chosen based on the recommendations in
            [RFC-2104] (i.e. key lengths less than the
            authentication code length decrease security strength and
            keys longer than the authentication code length do not
            significantly increase security strength).
          */
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_MD5;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_HMAC_RIPEMD160_96:
          /*
            RFC 2857 : HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 produces a 160-bit
            authentication code.  This 160-bit value can be
            truncated as described in RFC2104.  For use with
            either ESP or AH, a truncated value using the first
            96 bits MUST be supported.
          */
          auth_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_MD_RMD160;
          icv_type = ICV_TYPE_HMAC;
          break;

        case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_64BIT:
        case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_96BIT:
        case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_128BIT:
        case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_192BIT:
        case IPSEC_AUTH_ANY_256BIT:
        default:
          break;
        }

        if(icv_type == ICV_TYPE_HMAC)
        {
          /* Allocate buffer for ICV  */
          esp_icv = (guint8 *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, esp_packet_len - esp_icv_len, esp_icv_len);

          err = gcry_md_open (&md_hd, auth_algo_libgcrypt, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
          if (err)
          {
            gcry_md_close(md_hd);
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s, gcry_md_open failed: %s\n",
                                 gcry_md_algo_name(auth_algo_libgcrypt), gcry_strerror(err));
          }
          else
          {
            md_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (auth_algo_libgcrypt);
            if (md_len < 1 || md_len < esp_icv_len)
            {
              gcry_md_close(md_hd);
              REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s, grcy_md_get_algo_dlen failed: %d\n",
                                   gcry_md_algo_name(auth_algo_libgcrypt), md_len);
            }
            else
            {
              unsigned char *esp_icv_computed;

              gcry_md_setkey( md_hd, esp_auth_key, esp_auth_key_len );

              gcry_md_write (md_hd, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, 0, esp_packet_len - esp_icv_len), esp_packet_len - esp_icv_len);

              if (sn_length == IPSEC_SA_ESN) {
                guint8 sn_bytes[4];
                phton32(sn_bytes, sn_upper);
                for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
                  gcry_md_putc(md_hd, sn_bytes[i]);
                }
              }

              esp_icv_computed = gcry_md_read (md_hd, auth_algo_libgcrypt);
              if (esp_icv_computed == 0)
              {
                gcry_md_close(md_hd);
                REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s, gcry_md_read failed\n",
                                     gcry_md_algo_name(auth_algo_libgcrypt));
              }

              if(memcmp (esp_icv_computed, esp_icv, esp_icv_len) == 0) {
                icv_checked = TRUE;
                icv_correct = TRUE;
              } else {
                icv_checked = TRUE;
                icv_correct = FALSE;
                esp_icv_expected = bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, esp_icv_computed, esp_icv_len);
              }
            }

            gcry_md_close(md_hd);
          }
        }
      }

      if(g_esp_enable_encryption_decode)
      {
        /* Deactivation of the Heuristic to decrypt using the NULL encryption algorithm since the packet is matching a SA */
        null_encryption_decode_heuristic = FALSE;

        switch(esp_encr_algo)
        {
        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_3DES_CBC :
          /* RFC 2451 says :
             3DES CBC uses a key of 192 bits.
             The first 3DES key is taken from the first 64 bits,
             the second from the next 64 bits, and the third
             from the last 64 bits.
             Implementations MUST take into consideration the
             parity bits when initially accepting a new set of
             keys.  Each of the three keys is really 56 bits in
             length with the extra 8 bits used for parity. */

          /* Fix parameters for 3DES-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = esp_block_len = 8;
          crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_3DES;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          if (esp_encr_key_len != gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt))
          {
              REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm 3DES-CBC : Bad Keylen (got %u Bits, need %lu)\n",
                                   esp_encr_key_len * 8,
                                   (unsigned long) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt) * 8);
              decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }
          else
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CBC :
          /* RFC 3602 says :
             AES supports three key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits,
             and 256 bits.  The default key size is 128 bits,
             and all implementations MUST support this key size.
             Implementations MAY also support key sizes of 192
             bits and 256 bits. */

          /* Fix parameters for AES-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = esp_block_len = 16;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          switch(esp_encr_key_len * 8)
          {
          case 128:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES128;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          case 192:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES192;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          case 256:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES256;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          default:
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm AES-CBC : Bad Keylen (%u Bits)\n",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_CAST5_CBC :
          /* RFC 2144 says :
             The CAST-128 encryption algorithm has been designed to allow a key
             size that can vary from 40 bits to 128 bits, in 8-bit increments
             (that is, the allowable key sizes are 40, 48, 56, 64, ..., 112, 120,
             and 128 bits.)
             We support only 128 bits. */

          /* Fix parameters for CAST5-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = esp_block_len = 8;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          switch(esp_encr_key_len * 8)
          {
          case 128:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_CAST5;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;
          default:
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm CAST5-CBC : Bad Keylen (%u Bits)\n",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }
          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_DES_CBC :
          /* RFC 2405 says :
             DES-CBC is a symmetric secret key algorithm.
             The key size is 64-bits.
             [It is commonly known as a 56-bit key as the key
             has 56 significant bits; the least significant
             bit in every byte is the parity bit.] */

          /* Fix parameters for DES-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = esp_block_len = 8;
          crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_DES;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          if (esp_encr_key_len != gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt))
          {
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm DES-CBC : Bad Keylen (%u Bits, need %lu)\n",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8, (unsigned long) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt) * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }
          else
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR :
        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM :
          /* RFC 3686 says :
             AES supports three key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits,
             and 256 bits.  The default key size is 128 bits,
             and all implementations MUST support this key
             size.  Implementations MAY also support key sizes
             of 192 bits and 256 bits. The remaining 32 bits
             will be used as nonce. */

          /* Fix parameters for AES-CTR/AES-GCM */
          esp_iv_len = 8;
          esp_block_len = 1;
          /* The counter mode key includes a 4 byte nonce following the key, which is used as the salt */
          esp_salt_len = 4;
          esp_encr_key_len -= esp_salt_len;

          crypt_mode_libgcrypt =
            (esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR) ? GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR : GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM;
          switch(esp_encr_key_len * 8)
          {
          case 128:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES128;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          case 192:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES192;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          case 256:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_AES256;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          default:
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm %s : Bad Keylen (%u Bits)\n",
                                 (esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR)  ? "AES-CTR" : "AES-GCM",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }

          if (esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM) {
            if (esp_auth_algo != IPSEC_AUTH_NULL) {
              REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error: AES-GCM encryption can only be used with NULL authentication\n");
            }
            icv_type = ICV_TYPE_AEAD;
          }

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_TWOFISH_CBC :
          /*  Twofish is a 128-bit block cipher developed by
              Counterpane Labs that accepts a variable-length
              key up to 256 bits.
              We will only accept key sizes of 128 and 256 bits.
          */

          /* Fix parameters for TWOFISH-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = 16;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          switch(esp_encr_key_len * 8)
          {
          case 128:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_TWOFISH128;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          case 256:
            crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_TWOFISH;
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;
            break;

          default:
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm TWOFISH-CBC : Bad Keylen (%u Bits)\n",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_BLOWFISH_CBC :
          /* Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Systems developed
             the Blowfish block cipher algorithm.
             RFC 2451 shows that Blowfish uses key sizes from
             40 to 448 bits. The Default size is 128 bits.
             We will only accept key sizes of 128 bits, because
             libgrypt only accept this key size.
          */

          /* Fix parameters for BLOWFISH-CBC */
          esp_iv_len = esp_block_len = 8;
          crypt_algo_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_BLOWFISH;
          crypt_mode_libgcrypt = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;

          if (esp_encr_key_len != gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt))
          {
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<ESP Preferences> Error in Encryption Algorithm BLOWFISH-CBC : Bad Keylen (%u Bits, need %lu)\n",
                                 esp_encr_key_len * 8, (unsigned long) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (crypt_algo_libgcrypt) * 8);
            decrypt_ok = FALSE;
          }
          else
            decrypt_using_libgcrypt = TRUE;

          break;

        case IPSEC_ENCRYPT_NULL :
        default :
          /* Fix parameters */
          esp_iv_len = 0;
          esp_block_len = 1;

          /* Allocate buffer for decrypted data  */
          esp_decr_data_len = esp_encr_data_len - esp_icv_len;
          esp_decr_data = (guint8 *)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, esp_decr_data_len);

          tvb_memcpy(tvb, esp_decr_data, ESP_HEADER_LEN, esp_decr_data_len);

          decrypt_ok = TRUE;

          break;
        }

        esp_encr_data_len -= (esp_iv_len + esp_icv_len);

       /*
        * Zero or negative length of encrypted data shows that the user specified
        * wrong encryption algorithm and/or authentication algorithm.
        */
       if (esp_encr_data_len <= 0) {
         return esp_packet_len;
       }

       /*
        * Add the IV to the tree and store it in a packet scope buffer for later decryption
        * if the specified encryption algorithm uses IV.
        */
        if (esp_iv_len) {
          tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, esp_iv_len);

          iv_item = proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_iv, tvb, offset, esp_iv_len, ENC_NA);
            proto_item_append_text(iv_item, " (%d bytes)", esp_iv_len);
            esp_iv = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, esp_iv_len);

          offset += esp_iv_len;
        }

       /*
        * Add the encrypted portion to the tree and store it in a packet scope buffer for later decryption.
        */
       if (esp_encr_data_len) {
         encr_data_item = proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_encrypted_data, tvb, offset, esp_encr_data_len, ENC_NA);
         proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, " (%d bytes) <%s>",
                                esp_encr_data_len,
                                esp_get_encr_algo_name(esp_encr_algo));

         esp_encr_data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, esp_encr_data_len);
         offset += esp_encr_data_len;

         /*
          * Verify that the encrypted payload data is properly aligned: The ciphertext length
          * needs to be a multiple of the of block size (which equals 1 for 'stream ciphers'
          * like AES-GCM and AES-CTR) and the ciphertext needs to terminate on a 4-byte boundary,
          * according to RFC 2406, section 2.4. Given the fact that all current block sizes are
          * powers of 2, only the stricter alignment requirement needs to be checked:
          */
         if (esp_block_len > 4 && esp_encr_data_len % esp_block_len != 0) {
           proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, "[Invalid length, ciphertext should be a multiple of block size (%u)]",
                                  esp_block_len);
           decrypt_using_libgcrypt = FALSE;
         } else if (esp_encr_data_len % 4 != 0) {
           proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, "[Invalid length, ciphertext should terminate at 4-byte boundary]");
           decrypt_using_libgcrypt = FALSE;
         }
       }


        /*
         * Add the ICV (Integrity Check Value) to the tree before decryption to ensure
         * the ICV be displayed even if the decryption fails.
         */

        if (esp_icv_len) {
          icv_item = proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_icv, tvb, offset, esp_icv_len, ENC_NA);
          proto_item_append_text(icv_item, " (%d bytes) <%s>",
                                 esp_icv_len,
                                 icv_type == ICV_TYPE_AEAD ?
                                 esp_get_encr_algo_name(esp_encr_algo) :
                                 esp_get_auth_algo_name(esp_auth_algo));

        }

        if (decrypt_using_libgcrypt)
        {
          /*
           * Allocate buffer for decrypted data.
           */
          esp_decr_data = (guchar*)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, esp_encr_data_len);
          esp_decr_data_len = esp_encr_data_len;

          tvb_memcpy(tvb, esp_decr_data, ESP_HEADER_LEN,  esp_encr_data_len);

          /* (Lazily) create the cipher_hd */
          if (!(*cipher_hd_created)) {
            err = gcry_cipher_open(cipher_hd, crypt_algo_libgcrypt, crypt_mode_libgcrypt, 0);
            if (err) {
              REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s Mode %d, grcy_open_cipher failed: %s\n",
                                   gcry_cipher_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), crypt_mode_libgcrypt, gcry_strerror(err));
            }
            else
            {
              /* OK, set the key */
              if (*cipher_hd_created == FALSE)
              {
                err = gcry_cipher_setkey(*cipher_hd, esp_encr_key, esp_encr_key_len);

                if (err) {
                  gcry_cipher_close(*cipher_hd);
                  REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s Mode %d, gcry_cipher_setkey(key_len=%u) failed: %s\n",
                                       gcry_cipher_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), crypt_mode_libgcrypt, esp_encr_key_len, gcry_strerror(err));
                }
              }

              /* Key is created and has its key set now */
              *cipher_hd_created = TRUE;
            }
          }

          /* Now try to decrypt */
          if (esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_CTR || esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM)
          {
            unsigned int  ctr_block_size = sizeof(ctr_block);

            /* Set CTR first */
            memset(ctr_block, 0, ctr_block_size);
            memcpy(ctr_block, esp_encr_key + esp_encr_key_len, esp_salt_len);
            memcpy(ctr_block + esp_salt_len, esp_iv, esp_iv_len);

            if (crypt_mode_libgcrypt == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) {
              ctr_block[ctr_block_size-1] = 1;
              if (esp_encr_algo == IPSEC_ENCRYPT_AES_GCM) {
                /* AES-CTR is used as fallback for AES-GCM (only) if gcrypt does not have AEAD ciphers.
                 * The extra increment is necessary because AES-GCM reserves counter 0 for the final
                 * step to create the authentication tag and starts encryption with counter 1.
                 */
                ctr_block[ctr_block_size-1]++;
              }
              err = gcry_cipher_setctr(*cipher_hd, ctr_block, 16);
            } else {
              err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*cipher_hd, ctr_block, esp_salt_len + esp_iv_len);
            }
          }
          else
          {
            err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*cipher_hd, esp_iv, esp_iv_len);
          }

          if (err) {
            gcry_cipher_close(*cipher_hd);
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s Mode %d, gcry_cipher_set%s() failed: %s\n",
                                 gcry_cipher_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), crypt_mode_libgcrypt,
                                 (crypt_mode_libgcrypt == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) ? "ctr" : "iv",
                                 gcry_strerror(err));
          }


          if (g_esp_enable_authentication_check && icv_type == ICV_TYPE_AEAD) {
            /* Allocate buffer for ICV  */
            esp_icv = (guint8 *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, esp_packet_len - esp_icv_len, esp_icv_len);

            if (sn_length == IPSEC_SA_SN) {
              err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(*cipher_hd, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, 0, ESP_HEADER_LEN), ESP_HEADER_LEN);
            } else {
              guint8 *aad = wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, ESP_HEADER_LEN + 4);
              tvb_memcpy(tvb, aad, 0, 4);
              phton32(&aad[4], sn_upper);
              tvb_memcpy(tvb, &aad[ESP_HEADER_LEN], 4, ESP_HEADER_LEN);
              err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(*cipher_hd, aad, ESP_HEADER_LEN + 4);
            }

            if (err) {
              gcry_cipher_close(*cipher_hd);
              REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s Mode %d, gcry_cipher_authenticate() failed: %s\n",
                                   gcry_cipher_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), crypt_mode_libgcrypt, gcry_strerror(err));
            }
          }

          if (!err)
          {
            err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(*cipher_hd, esp_decr_data, esp_decr_data_len, esp_encr_data, esp_encr_data_len);
          }

          if (err)
          {
            gcry_cipher_close(*cipher_hd);
            REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s, Mode %d, gcry_cipher_decrypt failed: %s\n",
                                 gcry_cipher_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), crypt_mode_libgcrypt, gcry_strerror(err));
          }
          else
          {
            /* Decryption has finished */
            decrypt_ok = TRUE;

            if (g_esp_enable_authentication_check && icv_type == ICV_TYPE_AEAD) {
              guchar *esp_icv_computed;
              gint tag_len;

              tag_len = (gint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(crypt_algo_libgcrypt);

              if (tag_len < esp_icv_len) {
                fprintf (stderr, "<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s, tag length (%d) is less than icv length (%d)\n",
                         gcry_md_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), tag_len, esp_icv_len);
              }

              esp_icv_computed = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, tag_len);
              err = gcry_cipher_gettag(*cipher_hd, esp_icv_computed, tag_len);
              if (err) {
                gcry_cipher_close(*cipher_hd);
                REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("<IPsec/ESP Dissector> Error in Algorithm %s:  gcry_cipher_gettag failed: %s",
                                     gcry_md_algo_name(crypt_algo_libgcrypt), gcry_strerror(err));
              }

              if (memcmp(esp_icv_computed, esp_icv, esp_icv_len) == 0) {
                  icv_checked = TRUE;
                  icv_correct = TRUE;
              } else {
                icv_checked = TRUE;
                icv_correct = FALSE;
                esp_icv_expected = bytes_to_str(pinfo->pool, esp_icv_computed, esp_icv_len);
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
    else if(g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic)
    {
      /* The packet does not belong to a Security Association */
      null_encryption_decode_heuristic = TRUE;
    }

    if(decrypt_ok)
    {
      tvb_decrypted = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, (guint8 *)wmem_memdup(pinfo->pool, esp_decr_data, esp_decr_data_len),
                                              esp_decr_data_len, esp_decr_data_len);

      add_new_data_source(pinfo, tvb_decrypted, "Decrypted Data");
      item = proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_decrypted_data, tvb_decrypted, 0, esp_decr_data_len, ENC_NA);
      proto_item_append_text(item, " (%d byte%s)", esp_decr_data_len, plurality(esp_decr_data_len, "", "s"));

      decr_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_esp_decrypted_data);

      /* Make sure the packet is not truncated before the fields
       * we need to read to determine the encapsulated protocol */
      if(tvb_bytes_exist(tvb_decrypted, esp_decr_data_len - 2, 2))
      {
        gint esp_contained_data_len;

        esp_pad_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb_decrypted, esp_decr_data_len - 2);
        esp_contained_data_len = esp_decr_data_len - esp_pad_len - 2;

        if(esp_contained_data_len > 0)
        {
          item = proto_tree_add_item(decr_tree, hf_esp_contained_data, tvb_decrypted, 0, esp_contained_data_len, ENC_NA);
          proto_item_append_text(item, " (%d byte%s)", esp_contained_data_len, plurality(esp_contained_data_len, "", "s"));

          /* Get the encapsulated protocol */
          encapsulated_protocol = tvb_get_guint8(tvb_decrypted, esp_decr_data_len - 1);

          dissector_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ip_dissector_table, encapsulated_protocol);
          if (dissector_handle) {
            /*
             * Recursively dissect the decrypted frame
             *
             * Note that the dissection restarts at the top level 'tree' here, not
             * at 'decr_tree', which is hidden inside the ESP subtree. This has
             * the effect that the protocol layers of the decrypted packet show up
             * in the protocol stack of the Packet Details Pane immediately below
             * the ESP layer, which is more intuitive and practical for the user.
             */
            saved_match_uint  = pinfo->match_uint;
            pinfo->match_uint = encapsulated_protocol;
            next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb_decrypted, 0, esp_contained_data_len);
            export_ipsec_pdu(dissector_handle, pinfo, next_tvb);
            call_dissector(dissector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
            pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_uint;
            decrypt_dissect_ok = TRUE;
          }
        }
      }

      if(decrypt_dissect_ok)
      {
        if(decr_tree)
        {
          if(esp_pad_len !=0)
            proto_tree_add_item(decr_tree, hf_esp_pad,
                                tvb_decrypted,
                                esp_decr_data_len - esp_pad_len - 2,
                                esp_pad_len, ENC_NA);

          proto_tree_add_uint(decr_tree, hf_esp_pad_len, tvb_decrypted,
                              esp_decr_data_len - 2, 1,
                              esp_pad_len);

          proto_tree_add_uint_format(decr_tree, hf_esp_protocol, tvb_decrypted,
                                     esp_decr_data_len - 1, 1,
                                     encapsulated_protocol,
                                     "Next header: %s (0x%02x)",
                                     ipprotostr(encapsulated_protocol), encapsulated_protocol);
        }
      }
      else
      {
        next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb_decrypted, 0,
                                  esp_decr_data_len);
        export_ipsec_pdu(data_handle, pinfo, next_tvb);
        call_dissector(data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, decr_tree);
      }
    }
  }

  /*
    If the packet is present in the security association database and the field g_esp_enable_authentication_check set.
  */
  if(!g_esp_enable_encryption_decode && g_esp_enable_authentication_check && sad_is_present)
  {
    next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length_caplen(tvb, ESP_HEADER_LEN, esp_packet_len - ESP_HEADER_LEN - esp_icv_len, -1);
    export_ipsec_pdu(data_handle, pinfo, next_tvb);
    call_dissector(data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, esp_tree);
  }
  /* The packet does not belong to a security association and the field g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic is set */
  else if(null_encryption_decode_heuristic)
  {
    if(g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic)
    {
      esp_icv_len = esp_null_heur(tvb, pinfo, esp_tree);
    }

    if(esp_icv_len != -1)
    {
      offset = esp_packet_len - esp_icv_len;
      if(esp_tree)
      {
        /* Make sure we have the auth trailer data */
        if(tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, esp_icv_len))
        {
          icv_item = proto_tree_add_item(esp_tree, hf_esp_icv, tvb, offset, esp_icv_len, ENC_NA);
        }
        else
        {
          /* Truncated so just display what we have */
          icv_item = proto_tree_add_bytes_format(esp_tree, hf_esp_icv, tvb, offset,
                                      esp_icv_len - (esp_packet_len - tvb_captured_length(tvb)),
                                      NULL, "Integrity Check Value (truncated)");
        }
      }
    }
  }

  if(icv_item != NULL) {

    gboolean good = FALSE, bad = FALSE;

    icv_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(icv_item, ett_esp_icv);

    if(icv_checked) {
      if (icv_correct) {
        proto_item_append_text(icv_item, " [correct]");
        good = TRUE;
        if (sn_length == IPSEC_SA_ESN && g_esp_do_sequence_analysis) {
          spi_status *status = (spi_status*)wmem_map_lookup(esp_sequence_analysis_hash,
                                                                GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)spi));
          if (status && !status->firstValidSN) {
            status->firstValidSN = sequence_number;
          }
        }
      } else {
        proto_item_append_text(icv_item, " [incorrect, should be %s]", esp_icv_expected);
        bad = TRUE;
      }
    } else {
      proto_item_append_text(icv_item, " [unchecked]");
    }

    item = proto_tree_add_boolean(icv_tree, hf_esp_icv_good,
                                  tvb, offset, esp_icv_len, good);
    proto_item_set_generated(item);

    item = proto_tree_add_boolean(icv_tree, hf_esp_icv_bad,
                                  tvb, offset, esp_icv_len, bad);
    proto_item_set_generated(item);
  }

  return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
}


static int
dissect_ipcomp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* dissector_data _U_)
{
  proto_tree *ipcomp_tree;
  proto_item *ti;
  guint8 comp_nxt;      /* Next Header */
  guint32 comp_cpi;     /* Compression parameter index */
  dissector_handle_t dissector_handle;
  guint32 saved_match_uint;
  tvbuff_t *data, *decomp;

  /*
   * load the top pane info. This should be overwritten by
   * the next protocol in the stack
   */
  col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "IPComp");
  col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);

  comp_nxt = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 0);

  /*
   * populate a tree in the second pane with the status of the link layer
   * (ie none)
   */
    ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ipcomp, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
    ipcomp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ipcomp);

    proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(ipcomp_tree, hf_ipcomp_next_header, tvb,
                        0, 1, comp_nxt, "%s (0x%02x)", ipprotostr(comp_nxt), comp_nxt);
    proto_tree_add_item(ipcomp_tree, hf_ipcomp_flags, tvb, 1, 1, ENC_NA);
    proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ipcomp_tree, hf_ipcomp_cpi, tvb, 2, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &comp_cpi);

    col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "IPComp (CPI=%s)", val_to_str(comp_cpi, cpi2val, "0x%04x"));

    data = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, 4);
    export_ipsec_pdu(data_handle, pinfo, data);
    call_dissector(data_handle, data, pinfo, ipcomp_tree);

    /*
     * try to uncompress as if it were DEFLATEd.  With negotiated
     * CPIs, we don't know the algorithm beforehand; if we get it
     * wrong, tvb_child_uncompress() returns NULL and nothing is displayed.
     */
    decomp = tvb_child_uncompress(data, data, 0, tvb_captured_length(data));
    if (decomp) {
        add_new_data_source(pinfo, decomp, "IPcomp inflated data");
        saved_match_uint  = pinfo->match_uint;
        dissector_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ip_dissector_table, comp_nxt);
        if (dissector_handle) {
          pinfo->match_uint = comp_nxt;
        } else {
          dissector_handle = data_handle;
        }
        export_ipsec_pdu(dissector_handle, pinfo, decomp);
        call_dissector(dissector_handle, decomp, pinfo, tree);
        pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_uint;
    }

        return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
}

static void ipsec_cleanup_protocol(void)
{
  /* Free any SA records added by other dissectors */
  guint n;
  for (n=0; n < extra_esp_sa_records.num_records; n++) {
    uat_esp_sa_record_free_cb(&(extra_esp_sa_records.records[n]));
  }

  /* Free overall block of records */
  g_free(extra_esp_sa_records.records);
  extra_esp_sa_records.records = NULL;
  extra_esp_sa_records.num_records = 0;
}

void
proto_register_ipsec(void)
{
  static hf_register_info hf_ah[] = {
    { &hf_ah_next_header,
      { "Next header", "ah.next_header", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC | BASE_EXT_STRING, &ipproto_val_ext, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_ah_length,
      { "Length", "ah.length", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_ah_reserved,
      { "Reserved", "ah.reserved", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_ah_spi,
      { "AH SPI", "ah.spi", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Authentication Header Security Parameters Index", HFILL }},
    { &hf_ah_iv,
      { "AH ICV", "ah.icv", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Authentication Header Integrity Check Value", HFILL }},
    { &hf_ah_sequence,
      { "AH Sequence", "ah.sequence", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Authentication Header Sequence Number", HFILL }}
  };

  static hf_register_info hf_esp[] = {
    { &hf_esp_spi,
      { "ESP SPI", "esp.spi", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Security Parameters Index", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_sequence,
      { "ESP Sequence", "esp.sequence", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Sequence Number", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_pad,
      { "Pad", "esp.pad", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_pad_len,
      { "ESP Pad Length", "esp.pad_len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Pad Length", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_protocol,
      { "ESP Next Header", "esp.protocol", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Next Header", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_iv,
      { "ESP IV", "esp.iv", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Initialization Vector", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_encrypted_data,
      { "ESP Encrypted Data", "esp.encrypted_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Encrypted Data", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_decrypted_data,
      { "ESP Decrypted Data", "esp.decrypted_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Decrypted Data", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_contained_data,
      { "ESP Contained Data", "esp.contained_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Contained Data", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_icv,
      { "ESP ICV", "esp.icv", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Encapsulating Security Payload Integrity Check Value", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_icv_good,
      { "Good", "esp.icv_good", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE,  NULL, 0x0,
        "True: ICV matches packet content; False: doesn't match content or not checked", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_icv_bad,
      { "Bad", "esp.icv_bad", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE,  NULL, 0x0,
        "True: ICV doesn't match packet content; False: matches content or not checked", HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_sequence_analysis_expected_sn,
      { "Expected SN", "esp.sequence-analysis.expected-sn", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,  NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_esp_sequence_analysis_previous_frame,
      { "Previous Frame", "esp.sequence-analysis.previous-frame", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE,  NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
  };

  static hf_register_info hf_ipcomp[] = {
    { &hf_ipcomp_next_header,
      { "Next Header", "ipcomp.next_header", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
        NULL, HFILL }},
    { &hf_ipcomp_flags,
      { "IPComp Flags", "ipcomp.flags", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
        "IP Payload Compression Protocol Flags", HFILL }},
    { &hf_ipcomp_cpi,
      { "IPComp CPI", "ipcomp.cpi", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(cpi2val), 0x0,
        "IP Payload Compression Protocol Compression Parameter Index", HFILL }},
  };

  static gint *ett[] = {
    &ett_ah,
    &ett_esp,
    &ett_esp_icv,
    &ett_esp_decrypted_data,
    &ett_ipcomp,
  };

  static ei_register_info ei[] = {
    { &ei_esp_sequence_analysis_wrong_sequence_number, { "esp.sequence-analysis.wrong-sequence-number", PI_SEQUENCE, PI_WARN, "Wrong Sequence Number", EXPFILL }}
  };

  static const value_string esp_proto_type_vals[] = {
    { IPSEC_SA_IPV4, "IPv4" },
    { IPSEC_SA_IPV6, "IPv6" },
    { 0x00, NULL }
  };

  static const value_string esp_sn_length_vals[] = {
    { IPSEC_SA_SN,  "32-bit" },
    { IPSEC_SA_ESN, "64-bit" },
    { 0x00, NULL }
  };

  static uat_field_t esp_uat_flds[] = {
      UAT_FLD_VS(uat_esp_sa_records, protocol, "Protocol", esp_proto_type_vals, "Protocol used"),
      UAT_FLD_CSTRING(uat_esp_sa_records, srcIP, "Src IP", "Source Address"),
      UAT_FLD_CSTRING(uat_esp_sa_records, dstIP, "Dest IP", "Destination Address"),
      UAT_FLD_CSTRING(uat_esp_sa_records, spi, "SPI", "SPI"),
      UAT_FLD_VS(uat_esp_sa_records, encryption_algo, "Encryption", esp_encryption_type_vals, "Encryption algorithm"),
      UAT_FLD_CSTRING(uat_esp_sa_records, encryption_key_string, "Encryption Key", "Encryption Key"),
      UAT_FLD_VS(uat_esp_sa_records, authentication_algo, "Authentication", esp_authentication_type_vals, "Authentication algorithm"),
      UAT_FLD_CSTRING(uat_esp_sa_records, authentication_key_string, "Authentication Key", "Authentication Key"),
      UAT_FLD_VS(uat_esp_sa_records, sn_length, "SN", esp_sn_length_vals, "Sequence Number length"),
      UAT_FLD_HEX(uat_esp_sa_records, sn_upper, "ESN High Bits", "Extended Sequence Number upper 32 bits (hex)"),
      UAT_END_FIELDS
    };

  static build_valid_func ah_da_build_value[1] = {ah_value};
  static decode_as_value_t ah_da_values = {ah_prompt, 1, ah_da_build_value};
  static decode_as_t ah_da = {"ah", "ip.proto", 1, 0, &ah_da_values, NULL, NULL,
                                  decode_as_default_populate_list, decode_as_default_reset, decode_as_default_change, NULL};

  module_t *ah_module;
  module_t *esp_module;

  expert_module_t* expert_esp;

  proto_ah = proto_register_protocol("Authentication Header", "AH", "ah");
  proto_register_field_array(proto_ah, hf_ah, array_length(hf_ah));

  proto_esp = proto_register_protocol("Encapsulating Security Payload", "ESP", "esp");
  proto_register_field_array(proto_esp, hf_esp, array_length(hf_esp));

  proto_ipcomp = proto_register_protocol("IP Payload Compression", "IPComp", "ipcomp");
  proto_register_field_array(proto_ipcomp, hf_ipcomp, array_length(hf_ipcomp));

  proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));

  expert_esp = expert_register_protocol(proto_esp);
  expert_register_field_array(expert_esp, ei, array_length(ei));

  ah_module = prefs_register_protocol_obsolete(proto_ah);

  prefs_register_obsolete_preference(ah_module, "place_ah_payload_in_subtree");

  esp_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_esp, NULL);

  prefs_register_bool_preference(esp_module, "enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic",
                                 "Attempt to detect/decode NULL encrypted ESP payloads",
                                 "This is done only if the Decoding is not SET or the packet does not belong to a SA. "
                                 "Tries ICV lengths of 12, 16, 24, and 32 bytes, checks for valid padding, "
                                 "and attempts to decode based on the derived Next Header field. "
                                 "Does not detect ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC (i.e. assumes 0 length IV)",
                                 &g_esp_enable_null_encryption_decode_heuristic);

  prefs_register_bool_preference(esp_module, "do_esp_sequence_analysis",
                                 "Check sequence numbers of ESP frames",
                                 "Check that successive frames increase sequence number by 1 within an SPI.  This should work OK when only one host is sending frames on an SPI",
                                 &g_esp_do_sequence_analysis);

  prefs_register_bool_preference(esp_module, "enable_encryption_decode",
                                 "Attempt to detect/decode encrypted ESP payloads",
                                 "Attempt to decode based on the SAD described hereafter.",
                                 &g_esp_enable_encryption_decode);

  prefs_register_bool_preference(esp_module, "enable_authentication_check",
                                 "Attempt to Check ESP Authentication",
                                 "Attempt to Check ESP Authentication based on the SAD described hereafter.",
                                 &g_esp_enable_authentication_check);

  esp_uat = uat_new("ESP SAs",
            sizeof(uat_esp_sa_record_t),    /* record size */
            "esp_sa",                       /* filename */
            TRUE,                           /* from_profile */
            &uat_esp_sa_records,            /* data_ptr */
            &num_sa_uat,                    /* numitems_ptr */
            UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION,         /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */
            NULL,                           /* help */
            uat_esp_sa_record_copy_cb,      /* copy callback */
            uat_esp_sa_record_update_cb,    /* update callback */
            uat_esp_sa_record_free_cb,      /* free callback */
            NULL,                           /* post update callback */
            NULL,                           /* reset callback */
            esp_uat_flds);                  /* UAT field definitions */

  static const char *esp_uat_defaults_[] = {
        NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "32-bit", "0" };
  uat_set_default_values(esp_uat, esp_uat_defaults_);

  prefs_register_uat_preference(esp_module,
                                "sa_table",
                                "ESP SAs",
                                "Preconfigured ESP Security Associations",
                                esp_uat);

  esp_sequence_analysis_hash = wmem_map_new_autoreset(wmem_epan_scope(), wmem_file_scope(), g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal);
  esp_sequence_analysis_report_hash = wmem_map_new_autoreset(wmem_epan_scope(), wmem_file_scope(), g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal);
  register_cleanup_routine(&ipsec_cleanup_protocol);

  register_dissector("esp", dissect_esp, proto_esp);
  register_dissector("ah", dissect_ah, proto_ah);

  ipcomp_handle = register_dissector("ipcomp", dissect_ipcomp, proto_ipcomp);
  ah_cap_handle = register_capture_dissector("ah", capture_ah, proto_ah);

  register_decode_as(&ah_da);
}

void
proto_reg_handoff_ipsec(void)
{
  dissector_handle_t esp_handle, ah_handle;

  data_handle = find_dissector("data");
  ah_handle = find_dissector("ah");
  dissector_add_uint("ip.proto", IP_PROTO_AH, ah_handle);
  esp_handle = find_dissector("esp");
  dissector_add_uint("ip.proto", IP_PROTO_ESP, esp_handle);
  dissector_add_uint("ip.proto", IP_PROTO_IPCOMP, ipcomp_handle);

  ip_dissector_table = find_dissector_table("ip.proto");

  capture_dissector_add_uint("ip.proto", IP_PROTO_AH, ah_cap_handle);

  exported_pdu_tap = find_tap_id(EXPORT_PDU_TAP_NAME_LAYER_3);
}

/*
 * Editor modelines
 *
 * Local Variables:
 * c-basic-offset: 2
 * tab-width: 8
 * indent-tabs-mode: nil
 * End:
 *
 * ex: set shiftwidth=2 tabstop=8 expandtab:
 * :indentSize=2:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
 */