diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c | 43 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c index d4cb6e8078..fa89fb5057 100644 --- a/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-isakmp.c @@ -1797,7 +1797,7 @@ decrypt_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, const guint8 *buf, guint buf_ return NULL; if (decr->iv_list == NULL) { /* First packet */ - ivd = g_malloc(sizeof(iv_data_t)); + ivd = (iv_data_t *)g_malloc(sizeof(iv_data_t)); ivd->frame_num = pinfo->fd->num; ivd->iv_len = digest_size; decr->last_message_id = hdr->message_id; @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ decrypt_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, const guint8 *buf, guint buf_ iv_len = ivd->iv_len; memcpy(iv, ivd->iv, iv_len); } else if (decr->last_cbc_len >= cbc_block_size) { - ivd = g_malloc(sizeof(iv_data_t)); + ivd = (iv_data_t *)g_malloc(sizeof(iv_data_t)); ivd->frame_num = pinfo->fd->num; if (hdr->message_id != decr->last_message_id) { if (decr->last_p1_cbc_len == 0) { @@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ decrypt_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, const guint8 *buf, guint buf_ if (gcry_cipher_setkey(decr_ctx, decr->secret, decr->secret_len)) return NULL; - decrypted_data = g_malloc(buf_len); + decrypted_data = (guint8 *)g_malloc(buf_len); if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(decr_ctx, decrypted_data, buf_len, buf, buf_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR) { g_free(decrypted_data); @@ -2734,8 +2734,8 @@ dissect_isakmp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree) decr = (decrypt_data_t*) g_hash_table_lookup(isakmp_hash, i_cookie); if (! decr) { - ic_key = g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); - decr = g_slice_alloc(sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); + ic_key = (guint8 *)g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); + decr = (decrypt_data_t *)g_slice_alloc(sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); memcpy(ic_key, i_cookie, COOKIE_SIZE); memset(decr, 0, sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); SET_ADDRESS(&decr->initiator, AT_NONE, 0, NULL); @@ -2765,11 +2765,11 @@ dissect_isakmp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree) hash_key.spii_len = COOKIE_SIZE; hash_key.spir_len = COOKIE_SIZE; - ike_sa_data = g_hash_table_lookup(ikev2_key_hash, &hash_key); + ike_sa_data = (ikev2_uat_data_t *)g_hash_table_lookup(ikev2_key_hash, &hash_key); if (ike_sa_data) { guint8 initiator_flag; initiator_flag = hdr.flags & I_FLAG; - ikev2_dec_data = ep_alloc(sizeof(ikev2_decrypt_data_t)); + ikev2_dec_data = ep_new(ikev2_decrypt_data_t); ikev2_dec_data->encr_key = initiator_flag ? ike_sa_data->sk_ei : ike_sa_data->sk_er; ikev2_dec_data->auth_key = initiator_flag ? ike_sa_data->sk_ai : ike_sa_data->sk_ar; ikev2_dec_data->encr_spec = ike_sa_data->encr_spec; @@ -3586,11 +3586,11 @@ _U_ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT if (decr && decr->gi_len == 0 && ADDRESSES_EQUAL(&decr->initiator, &pinfo->src)) { - decr->gi = g_malloc(length); + decr->gi = (gchar *)g_malloc(length); tvb_memcpy(tvb, decr->gi, offset, length); decr->gi_len = length; } else if (decr && decr->gr_len == 0 && !ADDRESSES_EQUAL(&decr->initiator, &pinfo->src)) { - decr->gr = g_malloc(length); + decr->gr = (gchar *)g_malloc(length); tvb_memcpy(tvb, decr->gr, offset, length); decr->gr_len = length; } @@ -4615,7 +4615,7 @@ dissect_enc(tvbuff_t *tvb, if (iv_len) { iv_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_iv, tvb, offset, iv_len, ENC_NA); proto_item_append_text(iv_item, " (%d bytes)", iv_len); - iv = ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, iv_len); + iv = (guchar *)ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, iv_len); offset += iv_len; } @@ -4625,7 +4625,7 @@ dissect_enc(tvbuff_t *tvb, */ encr_data_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_isakmp_enc_data, tvb, offset, encr_data_len, ENC_NA); proto_item_append_text(encr_data_item, " (%d bytes)",encr_data_len); - encr_data = ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, encr_data_len); + encr_data = (guchar *)ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, offset, encr_data_len); offset += encr_data_len; /* @@ -4652,7 +4652,7 @@ dissect_enc(tvbuff_t *tvb, } /* Calculate hash over the bytes from the beginning of the ISAKMP header to the right before the ICD. */ - entire_message = ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, 0, offset); + entire_message = (guchar *)ep_tvb_memdup(tvb, 0, offset); gcry_md_write(md_hd, entire_message, offset); md = gcry_md_read(md_hd, 0); md_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(key_info->auth_spec->gcry_alg); @@ -4839,7 +4839,8 @@ static guint ikev2_key_hash_func(gconstpointer k) { } static gint ikev2_key_equal_func(gconstpointer k1, gconstpointer k2) { - const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2; + const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key1 = (const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *)k1; + const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *key2 = (const ikev2_uat_data_key_t *)k2; if (key1->spii_len != key2->spii_len) return 0; if (key1->spir_len != key2->spir_len) return 0; if (memcmp(key1->spii, key2->spii, key1->spii_len) != 0) return 0; @@ -4853,8 +4854,8 @@ static gint ikev2_key_equal_func(gconstpointer k1, gconstpointer k2) { static gboolean free_cookie(gpointer key_arg, gpointer value, gpointer user_data _U_) { - guint8 *ic_key = key_arg; - decrypt_data_t *decr = value; + guint8 *ic_key = (guint8 *)key_arg; + decrypt_data_t *decr = (decrypt_data_t *)value; g_slice_free1(COOKIE_SIZE, ic_key); g_slice_free1(sizeof(decrypt_data_t), decr); @@ -4880,8 +4881,8 @@ isakmp_init_protocol(void) { isakmp_hash = g_hash_table_new(isakmp_hash_func, isakmp_equal_func); for (i = 0; i < num_ikev1_uat_data; i++) { - ic_key = g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); - decr = g_slice_alloc(sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); + ic_key = (guint8 *)g_slice_alloc(COOKIE_SIZE); + decr = (decrypt_data_t *)g_slice_alloc(sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); memcpy(ic_key, ikev1_uat_data[i].icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); memset(decr, 0, sizeof(decrypt_data_t)); @@ -4915,7 +4916,7 @@ UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev1_users, icookie, ikev1_uat_data_key_t, icookie, icookie_l UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev1_users, key, ikev1_uat_data_key_t, key, key_len) static void ikev1_uat_data_update_cb(void* p, const char** err) { - ikev1_uat_data_key_t *ud = p; + ikev1_uat_data_key_t *ud = (ikev1_uat_data_key_t *)p; if (ud->icookie_len != COOKIE_SIZE) { *err = ep_strdup_printf("Length of Initiator's COOKIE must be %d octets (%d hex characters).", COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE * 2); @@ -4944,7 +4945,7 @@ UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(ikev2_users, sk_ar, ikev2_uat_data_t, sk_ar, sk_ar_len) UAT_VS_DEF(ikev2_users, auth_alg, ikev2_uat_data_t, guint, IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, IKEV2_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96_STR) static void ikev2_uat_data_update_cb(void* p, const char** err) { - ikev2_uat_data_t *ud = p; + ikev2_uat_data_t *ud = (ikev2_uat_data_t *)p; if (ud->key.spii_len != COOKIE_SIZE) { *err = ep_strdup_printf("Length of Initiator's SPI must be %d octets (%d hex characters).", COOKIE_SIZE, COOKIE_SIZE * 2); @@ -6119,7 +6120,7 @@ proto_register_isakmp(void) sizeof(ikev1_uat_data_key_t), "ikev1_decryption_table", TRUE, - (void*)&ikev1_uat_data, + (void**)&ikev1_uat_data, &num_ikev1_uat_data, UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ "ChIKEv1DecryptionSection", @@ -6139,7 +6140,7 @@ proto_register_isakmp(void) sizeof(ikev2_uat_data_t), "ikev2_decryption_table", TRUE, - (void*)&ikev2_uat_data, + (void**)&ikev2_uat_data, &num_ikev2_uat_data, UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ "ChIKEv2DecryptionSection", |