diff options
author | Robert Cragie <Robert.Cragie@arm.com> | 2017-03-17 11:52:27 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net> | 2017-04-10 20:26:25 +0000 |
commit | ded9ad7017a9b04a9f63c9ea91961d19ff6b395e (patch) | |
tree | 44d3a78733c75d4b79910ce9153f3930ae19685a /epan/dissectors | |
parent | 2321a92ccc339cd2103f75f190df045d7c631051 (diff) |
IEEE 802.15.4: Add support for Thread, MLE and ZigBee IP
Enhancements to security processing add support for Thread, MLE and ZigBee
IP. Thread and ZigBee IP use a hash for key derivation for MAC and MLE
security processing. Thread additionally uses a sequence counter.
Ping-Bug: 13495
Change-Id: Ib8351b21e5615cd44880f5126f59fd0dc0a11742
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/20585
Petri-Dish: Stig Bjørlykke <stig@bjorlykke.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Stig Bjørlykke <stig@bjorlykke.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors')
-rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c | 559 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.h | 57 |
2 files changed, 446 insertions, 170 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c index ea12d2c312..ee7d326dcb 100644 --- a/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c @@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ /* Include files */ #include "config.h" - - #include <epan/packet.h> #include <epan/decode_as.h> #include <epan/exceptions.h> @@ -73,7 +71,6 @@ #include <epan/to_str.h> #include <epan/show_exception.h> #include <epan/proto_data.h> - #include <wsutil/pint.h> /* Use libgcrypt for cipher libraries. */ @@ -99,17 +96,15 @@ static gboolean ieee802154_cc24xx = FALSE; /* boolean value set if the FCS must be ok before payload is dissected */ static gboolean ieee802154_fcs_ok = TRUE; -/* User string with the decryption key. */ -static const gchar *ieee802154_key_str = NULL; -static gboolean ieee802154_key_valid; -static guint8 ieee802154_key[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; static const char *ieee802154_user = "User"; +static wmem_tree_t* mac_key_hash_handlers; + /* * Address Hash Tables * */ -static ieee802154_map_tab_t ieee802154_map = { NULL, NULL }; +ieee802154_map_tab_t ieee802154_map = { NULL, NULL }; /* * Static Address Mapping UAT @@ -156,6 +151,111 @@ UAT_HEX_CB_DEF(addr_uat, addr16, static_addr_t) UAT_HEX_CB_DEF(addr_uat, pan, static_addr_t) UAT_BUFFER_CB_DEF(addr_uat, eui64, static_addr_t, eui64, eui64_len) +/* + * Key Decryption UAT + * + */ + +/* UAT variables */ +static uat_t *ieee802154_key_uat = NULL; +static ieee802154_key_t *ieee802154_keys = NULL; +static guint num_ieee802154_keys = 0; + +static void ieee802154_key_post_update_cb(void) +{ + guint i; + GByteArray *bytes; + + for (i = 0; i < num_ieee802154_keys; i++) + { + switch (ieee802154_keys[i].hash_type) { + case KEY_HASH_NONE: + case KEY_HASH_ZIP: + /* Get the IEEE 802.15.4 decryption key. */ + bytes = g_byte_array_new(); + if (hex_str_to_bytes(ieee802154_keys[i].pref_key, bytes, FALSE)) + { + if (ieee802154_keys[i].hash_type == KEY_HASH_ZIP) { + char digest[32]; + + if (!ws_hmac_buffer(GCRY_MD_SHA256, digest, "ZigBeeIP", 8, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE)) { + /* Copy upper hashed bytes to the key */ + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].key, &digest[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE], IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + /* Copy lower hashed bytes to the MLE key */ + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].mle_key, digest, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + } else { + /* Just copy the keys verbatim */ + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].key, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].mle_key, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + } + } else { + /* Just copy the keys verbatim */ + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].key, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + memcpy(ieee802154_keys[i].mle_key, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + } + } + g_byte_array_free(bytes, TRUE); + break; + case KEY_HASH_THREAD: + /* XXX - TODO? */ + break; + } + } +} + +static gboolean ieee802154_key_update_cb(void *r, char **err) +{ + ieee802154_key_t* rec = (ieee802154_key_t*)r; + GByteArray *bytes; + + switch (rec->hash_type) { + case KEY_HASH_NONE: + case KEY_HASH_ZIP: + bytes = g_byte_array_new(); + if (hex_str_to_bytes(rec->pref_key, bytes, FALSE) == FALSE) + { + *err = g_strdup("Invalid key"); + g_byte_array_free(bytes, TRUE); + return FALSE; + } + + if (bytes->len < IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE) + { + *err = g_strdup_printf("Key must be at least %d bytes", IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + g_byte_array_free(bytes, TRUE); + return FALSE; + } + g_byte_array_free(bytes, TRUE); + break; + case KEY_HASH_THREAD: + /* XXX - TODO? */ + break; + } + + return TRUE; +} + +static void* ieee802154_key_copy_cb(void* n, const void* o, size_t siz _U_) { + ieee802154_key_t* new_record = (ieee802154_key_t*)n; + const ieee802154_key_t* old_record = (const ieee802154_key_t*)o; + + new_record->pref_key = g_strdup(old_record->pref_key); + + return new_record; +} + +static void ieee802154_key_free_cb(void*r) { + ieee802154_key_t* rec = (ieee802154_key_t *)r; + + g_free(rec->pref_key); +} + +/* Field callbacks. */ +UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(key_uat, pref_key, ieee802154_key_t) +UAT_DEC_CB_DEF(key_uat, key_index, ieee802154_key_t) +UAT_VS_DEF(key_uat, hash_type, ieee802154_key_t, ieee802154_key_hash, KEY_HASH_NONE, "No hash") + + /*------------------------------------- * Dissector Function Prototypes *------------------------------------- @@ -190,22 +290,9 @@ static void dissect_ieee802154_realign (tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, proto static void dissect_ieee802154_gtsreq (tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, proto_tree *, ieee802154_packet *); /* Decryption helpers. */ -typedef enum { - DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED, - DECRYPT_NOT_ENCRYPTED, - DECRYPT_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED, - DECRYPT_PACKET_TOO_SMALL, - DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_EXT_SRC_ADDR, - DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_KEY, - DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED, - DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED -} ws_decrypt_status; - -static tvbuff_t *dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *, guint, packet_info *, ieee802154_packet *, - ws_decrypt_status *); -static void ccm_init_block (gchar *, gboolean, gint, guint64, ieee802154_packet *, gint); -static gboolean ccm_ctr_encrypt (const gchar *, const gchar *, gchar *, gchar *, gint); -static gboolean ccm_cbc_mac (const gchar *, const gchar *, const gchar *, gint, const gchar *, gint, gchar *); +static tvbuff_t *dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *, guint, packet_info *, ieee802154_packet *, ieee802154_payload_info_t*); + +static gboolean ieee802154_set_mac_key(ieee802154_packet *packet, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *alt_key, ieee802154_key_t* uat_key); /* Initialize Protocol and Registered fields */ static int proto_ieee802154_nonask_phy = -1; @@ -343,13 +430,17 @@ static int hf_ieee802154_pending16 = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_pending64 = -1; /* Registered fields for Auxiliary Security Header */ +static int hf_ieee802154_aux_security_header = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_security_control_field = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_security_level = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_key_id_mode = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_reserved = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_frame_counter = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source = -1; +static int hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source_bytes = -1; static int hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_index = -1; +static int hf_ieee802154_mic = -1; +static int hf_ieee802154_key_number = -1; /* 802.15.4-2003 security */ static int hf_ieee802154_sec_frame_counter = -1; @@ -517,6 +608,14 @@ static const enum_val_t ieee802154_2003_sec_suite_enums[] = { { NULL, NULL, 0 } }; +/* Enumeration for key generation */ +static const value_string ieee802154_key_hash_vals[] = { + { KEY_HASH_NONE, "No hash"}, + { KEY_HASH_ZIP, "ZigBee IP hash" }, + { KEY_HASH_THREAD, "Thread hash" }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + static const value_string ieee802154_ie_types[] = { { 0, "Header" }, { 1, "Payload" }, @@ -760,6 +859,114 @@ dissect_ieee802154_fcf(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, ieee *offset += 2; } /* dissect_ieee802154_fcf */ +void register_ieee802154_mac_key_hash_handler(guint hash_identifier, ieee802154_set_mac_key_func key_func) +{ + /* Ensure no duplication */ + DISSECTOR_ASSERT(wmem_tree_lookup32(mac_key_hash_handlers, hash_identifier) == NULL); + + wmem_tree_insert32(mac_key_hash_handlers, hash_identifier, (void*)key_func); +} + +void dissect_ieee802154_aux_sec_header_and_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree, ieee802154_packet *packet, guint *offset) +{ + proto_tree *field_tree, *header_tree; + proto_item *ti, *hidden_item; + guint8 security_control; + guint aux_length = 5; /* Minimum length of the auxiliary header. */ + static const int * security_fields[] = { + &hf_ieee802154_security_level, + &hf_ieee802154_key_id_mode, + &hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_reserved, + NULL + }; + + /* Parse the security control field. */ + security_control = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, *offset); + packet->security_level = (ieee802154_security_level)(security_control & IEEE802154_AUX_SEC_LEVEL_MASK); + packet->key_id_mode = (ieee802154_key_id_mode)((security_control & IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_ID_MODE_MASK) >> IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_ID_MODE_SHIFT); + + /* Compute the length of the auxiliary header and create a subtree. */ + if (packet->key_id_mode != KEY_ID_MODE_IMPLICIT) aux_length++; + if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_4) aux_length += 4; + if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_8) aux_length += 8; + + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_security_header, tvb, *offset, aux_length, ENC_NA); + header_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ieee802154_auxiliary_security); + + /* Security Control Field */ + proto_tree_add_bitmask(header_tree, tvb, *offset, hf_ieee802154_security_control_field, ett_ieee802154_aux_sec_control, security_fields, ENC_NA); + (*offset)++; + + /* Frame Counter Field */ + proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(header_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_frame_counter, tvb, *offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN, &packet->frame_counter); + (*offset) +=4; + + /* Key identifier field(s). */ + if (packet->key_id_mode != KEY_ID_MODE_IMPLICIT) { + /* Create a subtree. */ + field_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(header_tree, tvb, *offset, 1, + ett_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_id, &ti, "Key Identifier Field"); /* Will fix length later. */ + /* Add key source, if it exists. */ + if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_4) { + packet->key_source.addr32 = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, *offset); + proto_tree_add_uint64(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source, tvb, *offset, 4, packet->key_source.addr32); + hidden_item = proto_tree_add_item(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source_bytes, tvb, *offset, 4, ENC_NA); + PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item); + proto_item_set_len(ti, 1 + 4); + (*offset) += 4; + } + if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_8) { + packet->key_source.addr64 = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, *offset); + proto_tree_add_uint64(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source, tvb, *offset, 8, packet->key_source.addr64); + hidden_item = proto_tree_add_item(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source_bytes, tvb, *offset, 8, ENC_NA); + PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item); + proto_item_set_len(ti, 1 + 8); + (*offset) += 8; + } + /* Add key identifier. */ + packet->key_index = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, *offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_index, tvb, *offset,1, packet->key_index); + (*offset)++; + } +} + +tvbuff_t *dissect_ieee802154_payload(tvbuff_t * tvb, guint offset, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree* key_tree, + ieee802154_packet * packet, ieee802154_payload_info_t* payload_info, + ieee802154_set_key_func set_key_func, ieee802154_payload_func payload_func) +{ + proto_item* ti; + unsigned char key[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; + unsigned char alt_key[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; + tvbuff_t * payload_tvb = NULL; + + /* Lookup the key. */ + for (payload_info->key_number = 0; payload_info->key_number < num_ieee802154_keys; payload_info->key_number++) { + if (set_key_func(packet, key, alt_key, &ieee802154_keys[payload_info->key_number])) { + /* Try with the initial key */ + payload_info->key = key; + payload_tvb = payload_func(tvb, offset, pinfo, packet, payload_info); + if (!((*payload_info->status == DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED) || (*payload_info->status == DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED))) { + break; + } + /* Try with the alternate key */ + payload_info->key = alt_key; + payload_tvb = payload_func(tvb, offset, pinfo, packet, payload_info); + if (!((*payload_info->status == DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED) || (*payload_info->status == DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED))) { + break; + } + } + } + if (payload_info->key_number == num_ieee802154_keys) { + /* None of the stored keys seemed to work */ + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_KEY; + } + + /* Store the key number used for retrieval */ + ti = proto_tree_add_uint(key_tree, hf_ieee802154_key_number, tvb, 0, 0, payload_info->key_number); + PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(ti); + return payload_tvb; +} + /* *Dissector for IEEE 802.15.4 non-ASK PHY packet with an FCS containing a 16-bit CRC value. * @@ -948,18 +1155,21 @@ dissect_ieee802154_cc24xx(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, v static void dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint options) { - tvbuff_t *volatile payload_tvb; + tvbuff_t *volatile payload_tvb = NULL; proto_tree *volatile ieee802154_tree = NULL; proto_item *volatile proto_root = NULL; proto_item *hidden_item; proto_item *ti; + proto_item *mic_item = NULL; + proto_tree *header_tree = NULL; guint offset = 0; volatile gboolean fcs_ok = TRUE; const char *saved_proto; ws_decrypt_status status; gboolean dstPanPresent = FALSE; gboolean srcPanPresent = FALSE; - + unsigned char rx_mic[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; + guint rx_mic_len = 0; ieee802154_packet *packet = wmem_new0(wmem_packet_scope(), ieee802154_packet); ieee802154_short_addr addr16; ieee802154_hints_t *ieee_hints; @@ -976,6 +1186,9 @@ dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, g ieee_hints = (ieee802154_hints_t *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_ieee802154, 0); } + /* Save a pointer to the whole packet */ + ieee_hints->packet = packet; + /* Create the protocol tree. */ if (tree) { proto_root = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree, proto_ieee802154, tvb, 0, tvb_captured_length(tvb), "IEEE 802.15.4"); @@ -1397,60 +1610,7 @@ dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, g /* Existance of the Auxiliary Security Header is controlled by the Security Enabled Field */ if ((packet->security_enable) && (packet->version != IEEE802154_VERSION_2003)) { - proto_tree *header_tree, *field_tree; - guint8 security_control; - guint aux_length = 5; /* Minimum length of the auxiliary header. */ - static const int * security_fields[] = { - &hf_ieee802154_security_level, - &hf_ieee802154_key_id_mode, - &hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_reserved, - NULL - }; - - /* Parse the security control field. */ - security_control = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); - packet->security_level = (ieee802154_security_level)(security_control & IEEE802154_AUX_SEC_LEVEL_MASK); - packet->key_id_mode = (ieee802154_key_id_mode)((security_control & IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_ID_MODE_MASK) >> IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_ID_MODE_SHIFT); - - /* Compute the length of the auxiliary header and create a subtree. */ - if (packet->key_id_mode != KEY_ID_MODE_IMPLICIT) aux_length++; - if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_4) aux_length += 4; - if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_8) aux_length += 8; - header_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(ieee802154_tree, tvb, offset, aux_length, - ett_ieee802154_auxiliary_security, NULL, "Auxiliary Security Header"); - - /* Security Control Field */ - proto_tree_add_bitmask(header_tree, tvb, offset, hf_ieee802154_security_control_field, ett_ieee802154_aux_sec_control, security_fields, ENC_NA); - offset++; - - /* Frame Counter Field */ - packet->frame_counter = tvb_get_letohl (tvb, offset); - proto_tree_add_uint(header_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_frame_counter, tvb, offset,4, packet->frame_counter); - offset +=4; - - /* Key identifier field(s). */ - if (packet->key_id_mode != KEY_ID_MODE_IMPLICIT) { - /* Create a subtree. */ - field_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(header_tree, tvb, offset, 1, - ett_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_id, &ti, "Key Identifier Field"); /* Will fix length later. */ - /* Add key source, if it exists. */ - if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_4) { - packet->key_source.addr32 = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); - proto_tree_add_uint64(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source, tvb, offset, 4, packet->key_source.addr32); - proto_item_set_len(ti, 1 + 4); - offset += (int)sizeof (guint32); - } - if (packet->key_id_mode == KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_8) { - packet->key_source.addr64 = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset); - proto_tree_add_uint64(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source, tvb, offset, 8, packet->key_source.addr64); - proto_item_set_len(ti, 1 + 8); - offset += 8; - } - /* Add key identifier. */ - packet->key_index = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); - proto_tree_add_uint(field_tree, hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_index, tvb, offset,1, packet->key_index); - offset++; - } + dissect_ieee802154_aux_sec_header_and_key(tvb, pinfo, ieee802154_tree, packet, &offset); } /* @@ -1506,7 +1666,15 @@ dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, g /* Encrypted Payload. */ if (packet->security_enable) { - payload_tvb = dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvb, offset, pinfo, packet, &status); + ieee802154_payload_info_t payload_info; + + payload_info.rx_mic = rx_mic; + payload_info.rx_mic_length = &rx_mic_len; + payload_info.status = &status; + payload_info.key = NULL; /* payload function will fill that in */ + + payload_tvb = dissect_ieee802154_payload(tvb, offset, pinfo, header_tree, packet, &payload_info, + ieee802154_set_mac_key, dissect_ieee802154_decrypt); /* Get the unencrypted data if decryption failed. */ if (!payload_tvb) { @@ -1517,11 +1685,18 @@ dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, g payload_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length_caplen(tvb, offset, captured_len, reported_len); } + /* Display the MIC. */ + if (rx_mic_len) { + mic_item = proto_tree_add_bytes(header_tree, hf_ieee802154_mic, tvb, 0, rx_mic_len, rx_mic); + PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(mic_item); + } + /* Display the reason for failure, and abort if the error was fatal. */ switch (status) { case DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED: case DECRYPT_NOT_ENCRYPTED: - /* No problem. */ + /* No problem */ + proto_item_append_text(mic_item, " [correct (key no. %d)]", payload_info.key_number); break; case DECRYPT_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED: @@ -1552,6 +1727,7 @@ dissect_ieee802154_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, g case DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED: expert_add_info_format(pinfo, proto_root, &ei_ieee802154_decrypt_error, "MIC check failed"); + proto_item_append_text(mic_item, " [incorrect]"); /* * Abort only if the payload was encrypted, in which case we * probably didn't decrypt the packet right (eg: wrong key). @@ -2958,18 +3134,19 @@ dissect_ieee802154_command(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, *@param pinfo Packet info structure. *@param offset Offset where the ciphertext 'c' starts. *@param packet IEEE 802.15.4 packet information. - *@param status status of decryption returned through here on failure. *@return decrypted payload. */ static tvbuff_t * -dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee802154_packet *packet, ws_decrypt_status *status) +dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, + guint offset, + packet_info *pinfo, + ieee802154_packet *packet, + ieee802154_payload_info_t* payload_info) { tvbuff_t *ptext_tvb; gboolean have_mic = FALSE; guint64 srcAddr; - unsigned char key[16]; - unsigned char tmp[16]; - unsigned char rx_mic[16]; + unsigned char tmp[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; guint M; gint captured_len; gint reported_len; @@ -2983,7 +3160,7 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee * we do afterwards, which uses that information, is doable. */ if ((packet->version != IEEE802154_VERSION_2006) && (packet->version != IEEE802154_VERSION_2003)) { - *status = DECRYPT_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED; + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED; return NULL; } @@ -2991,9 +3168,11 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee /* Get the captured and on-the-wire length of the payload. */ M = IEEE802154_MIC_LENGTH(packet->security_level); + *payload_info->rx_mic_length = M; + reported_len = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) - IEEE802154_FCS_LEN - M; if (reported_len < 0) { - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_TOO_SMALL; return NULL; } /* Check of the payload is truncated. */ @@ -3007,55 +3186,43 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee /* Check if the MIC is present in the captured data. */ have_mic = tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, offset + reported_len, M); if (have_mic) { - tvb_memcpy(tvb, rx_mic, offset + reported_len, M); + tvb_memcpy(tvb, payload_info->rx_mic, offset + reported_len, M); } /* * Key Lookup - Need to find the appropriate key. * */ - /* - * Oh God! The specification is so bad. This is the worst - * case of design-by-committee I've ever seen in my life. - * The IEEE has created an unintelligible mess in order - * to decipher which key is used for which message. - * - * Let's hope it's simpler to implement for dissecting only. - * - * Also need to find the extended address of the sender. - */ - if (packet->src_addr_mode == IEEE802154_FCF_ADDR_EXT) { - /* The source EUI-64 is included in the headers. */ - srcAddr = packet->src64; - } - else if (ieee_hints && ieee_hints->map_rec && ieee_hints->map_rec->addr64) { - /* Use the hint */ - srcAddr = ieee_hints->map_rec->addr64; - } - else { - /* Lookup failed. */ - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_EXT_SRC_ADDR; - return NULL; - } - - /* Lookup the key. */ - /* - * TODO: What this dissector really needs is a UAT to store multiple keys - * and a variety of key configuration data. However, a single shared key - * should be sufficient to get packet encryption off to a start. - */ - if (!ieee802154_key_valid) { - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_KEY; - return NULL; + if ((packet->key_index == IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_KEY_INDEX) && + (packet->key_source.addr32 == IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_KEY_SRC)) + { + /* Use the well-known extended address */ + srcAddr = IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_EXT_ADDR; + } else { + if (packet->src_addr_mode == IEEE802154_FCF_ADDR_EXT) { + /* The source EUI-64 is included in the headers. */ + srcAddr = packet->src64; + } + else if (ieee_hints && ieee_hints->map_rec && ieee_hints->map_rec->addr64) { + /* Use the hint */ + srcAddr = ieee_hints->map_rec->addr64; + } + else { + /* Lookup failed. */ + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_EXT_SRC_ADDR; + return NULL; + } } - memcpy(key, ieee802154_key, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); /* * CCM* - CTR mode payload encryption * */ /* Create the CCM* initial block for decryption (Adata=0, M=0, counter=0). */ - ccm_init_block(tmp, FALSE, 0, srcAddr, packet, 0); + if (packet->version == IEEE802154_VERSION_2003) + ccm_init_block(tmp, FALSE, 0, srcAddr, packet->frame_counter, packet->key_sequence_counter, 0); + else + ccm_init_block(tmp, FALSE, 0, srcAddr, packet->frame_counter, packet->security_level, 0); /* Decrypt the ciphertext, and place the plaintext in a new tvb. */ if (IEEE802154_IS_ENCRYPTED(packet->security_level) && captured_len) { @@ -3069,28 +3236,28 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee text = (guint8 *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, captured_len); /* Perform CTR-mode transformation. */ - if (!ccm_ctr_encrypt(key, tmp, rx_mic, text, captured_len)) { + if (!ccm_ctr_encrypt(payload_info->key, tmp, payload_info->rx_mic, text, captured_len)) { g_free(text); - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED; + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED; return NULL; } /* Create a tvbuff for the plaintext. */ ptext_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, text, captured_len, reported_len); add_new_data_source(pinfo, ptext_tvb, "Decrypted IEEE 802.15.4 payload"); - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED; + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED; } /* There is no ciphertext. Wrap the plaintext in a new tvb. */ else { /* Decrypt the MIC (if present). */ - if ((have_mic) && (!ccm_ctr_encrypt(key, tmp, rx_mic, NULL, 0))) { - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED; + if ((have_mic) && (!ccm_ctr_encrypt(payload_info->key, tmp, payload_info->rx_mic, NULL, 0))) { + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED; return NULL; } /* Create a tvbuff for the plaintext. This might result in a zero-length tvbuff. */ ptext_tvb = tvb_new_subset_length_caplen(tvb, offset, captured_len, reported_len); - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED; + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED; } /* @@ -3113,7 +3280,10 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee /* Create the CCM* initial block for authentication (Adata!=0, M!=0, counter=l(m)). */ - ccm_init_block(tmp, TRUE, M, srcAddr, packet, l_m); + if (packet->version == IEEE802154_VERSION_2003) + ccm_init_block(tmp, TRUE, M, srcAddr, packet->frame_counter, packet->key_sequence_counter, l_m); + else + ccm_init_block(tmp, TRUE, M, srcAddr, packet->frame_counter, packet->security_level, l_m); /* Compute CBC-MAC authentication tag. */ /* @@ -3123,12 +3293,12 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee * already points to contiguous memory, since we just allocated it in * decryption phase. */ - if (!ccm_cbc_mac(key, tmp, (const gchar *)tvb_memdup(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, 0, l_a), l_a, tvb_get_ptr(ptext_tvb, 0, l_m), l_m, dec_mic)) { - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED; + if (!ccm_cbc_mac(payload_info->key, tmp, (const gchar *)tvb_memdup(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, 0, l_a), l_a, tvb_get_ptr(ptext_tvb, 0, l_m), l_m, dec_mic)) { + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED; } /* Compare the received MIC with the one we generated. */ - else if (memcmp(rx_mic, dec_mic, M) != 0) { - *status = DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED; + else if (memcmp(payload_info->rx_mic, dec_mic, M) != 0) { + *payload_info->status = DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED; } } @@ -3143,11 +3313,12 @@ dissect_ieee802154_decrypt(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint offset, packet_info *pinfo, ieee *@param adata TRUE if additional auth data is present *@param M CCM* parameter M. *@param addr Source extended address. - *@param packet IEEE 802.15.4 packet information. + *@param frame_counter Packet frame counter + *@param level Security level or key_sequence_counter for 802.15.4-2003 *@param ctr_val Value in the last L bytes of the block. */ -static void -ccm_init_block(gchar *block, gboolean adata, gint M, guint64 addr, ieee802154_packet *packet, gint ctr_val) +void +ccm_init_block(gchar *block, gboolean adata, gint M, guint64 addr, guint32 frame_counter, guint8 level, gint ctr_val) { gint i = 0; @@ -3166,14 +3337,11 @@ ccm_init_block(gchar *block, gboolean adata, gint M, guint64 addr, ieee802154_pa block[i++] = (guint8)((addr >> 16) & 0xff); block[i++] = (guint8)((addr >> 8) & 0xff); block[i++] = (guint8)((addr >> 0) & 0xff); - block[i++] = (guint8)((packet->frame_counter >> 24) & 0xff); - block[i++] = (guint8)((packet->frame_counter >> 16) & 0xff); - block[i++] = (guint8)((packet->frame_counter >> 8) & 0xff); - block[i++] = (guint8)((packet->frame_counter >> 0) & 0xff); - if (packet->version == IEEE802154_VERSION_2003) - block[i++] = packet->key_sequence_counter; - else - block[i++] = packet->security_level; + block[i++] = (guint8)((frame_counter >> 24) & 0xff); + block[i++] = (guint8)((frame_counter >> 16) & 0xff); + block[i++] = (guint8)((frame_counter >> 8) & 0xff); + block[i++] = (guint8)((frame_counter >> 0) & 0xff); + block[i++] = level; /* Plaintext length. */ block[i++] = (guint8)((ctr_val >> 8) & 0xff); block[i] = (guint8)((ctr_val >> 0) & 0xff); @@ -3189,7 +3357,7 @@ ccm_init_block(gchar *block, gboolean adata, gint M, guint64 addr, ieee802154_pa *@param length Length of the buffer. *@return TRUE on SUCCESS, FALSE on error. */ -static gboolean +gboolean ccm_ctr_encrypt(const gchar *key, const gchar *iv, gchar *mic, gchar *data, gint length) { gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd; @@ -3236,18 +3404,18 @@ ccm_ctr_encrypt(const gchar *key, const gchar *iv, gchar *mic, gchar *data, gint *@param mic Output for CBC-MAC. *@return TRUE on SUCCESS, FALSE on error. */ -static gboolean +gboolean ccm_cbc_mac(const gchar *key, const gchar *iv, const gchar *a, gint a_len, const gchar *m, gint m_len, gchar *mic) { gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd; guint i = 0; - unsigned char block[16]; + unsigned char block[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; /* Open the cipher. */ if (gcry_cipher_open(&cipher_hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, GCRY_CIPHER_CBC_MAC)) return FALSE; /* Set the key. */ - if (gcry_cipher_setkey(cipher_hd, key, 16)) { + if (gcry_cipher_setkey(cipher_hd, key, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE)) { gcry_cipher_close(cipher_hd); return FALSE; } @@ -3359,6 +3527,25 @@ gboolean ieee802154_long_addr_equal(gconstpointer a, gconstpointer b) return (((const ieee802154_long_addr *)a)->addr == ((const ieee802154_long_addr *)b)->addr); } +/* Set MAC key function. */ +static gboolean ieee802154_set_mac_key(ieee802154_packet *packet, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *alt_key, ieee802154_key_t* uat_key) +{ + ieee802154_set_mac_key_func func = (ieee802154_set_mac_key_func)wmem_tree_lookup32(mac_key_hash_handlers, uat_key->hash_type); + + if (func != NULL) + return func(packet, key, alt_key, uat_key); + + /* Right now, KEY_HASH_NONE and KEY_HASH_ZIP are not registered because they + work with this "default" behavior */ + if (packet->key_index == uat_key->key_index) + { + memcpy(key, uat_key->key, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); + return TRUE; + } + + return FALSE; +} + /** *Creates a record that maps the given short address and pan to a long (extended) address. *@param short_addr 16-bit short address @@ -3505,8 +3692,7 @@ proto_cleanup_ieee802154(void) static void ieee802154_da_prompt(packet_info *pinfo _U_, gchar* result) { ieee802154_hints_t *hints; - hints = (ieee802154_hints_t *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, - proto_get_id_by_filter_name(IEEE802154_PROTOABBREV_WPAN), 0); + hints = (ieee802154_hints_t *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_ieee802154, 0); if (hints) g_snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "IEEE 802.15.4 PAN 0x%04x as", hints->src_pan); else @@ -3517,8 +3703,7 @@ static void ieee802154_da_prompt(packet_info *pinfo _U_, gchar* result) static gpointer ieee802154_da_value(packet_info *pinfo _U_) { ieee802154_hints_t *hints; - hints = (ieee802154_hints_t *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, - proto_get_id_by_filter_name(IEEE802154_PROTOABBREV_WPAN), 0); + hints = (ieee802154_hints_t *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_ieee802154, 0); if (hints) return GUINT_TO_POINTER((guint)(hints->src_pan)); else @@ -4033,6 +4218,9 @@ void proto_register_ieee802154(void) /* * Auxiliary Security Header Fields */ + { &hf_ieee802154_aux_security_header, + { "Auxiliary Security Header", "wpan.aux_sec.hdr", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, + 0x0, "The Auxiliary Security Header of the frame", HFILL }}, { &hf_ieee802154_security_level, { "Security Level", "wpan.aux_sec.sec_level", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, VALS(ieee802154_sec_level_names), @@ -4059,11 +4247,23 @@ void proto_register_ieee802154(void) { "Key Source", "wpan.aux_sec.key_source", FT_UINT64, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, "Key Source for processing of the protected frame", HFILL }}, + { &hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_source_bytes, + { "Key Source", "wpan.aux_sec.key_source.bytes", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Key Source for processing of the protected frame", HFILL }}, + { &hf_ieee802154_aux_sec_key_index, { "Key Index", "wpan.aux_sec.key_index", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, "Key Index for processing of the protected frame", HFILL }}, - /* IEEE 802.15.4-2003 Security Header Fields */ + { &hf_ieee802154_mic, + { "Decrypted MIC", "wpan.mic", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "The Decrypted MIC", HFILL }}, + + { &hf_ieee802154_key_number, + { "Key Number", "wpan.key_number", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Key number used to decode", HFILL }}, + + /* IEEE 802.15.4-2003 Security Header Fields */ { &hf_ieee802154_sec_frame_counter, { "Frame Counter", "wpan.sec_frame_counter", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, "Frame counter of the originator of the protected frame (802.15.4-2003)", HFILL }}, @@ -4174,6 +4374,15 @@ void proto_register_ieee802154(void) UAT_END_FIELDS }; + static uat_field_t key_uat_flds[] = { + UAT_FLD_CSTRING(key_uat,pref_key,"Decryption key", + "128-bit decryption key in hexadecimal format"), + UAT_FLD_DEC(key_uat,key_index,"Decryption key index", + "Key index in decimal format"), + UAT_FLD_VS(key_uat, hash_type, "Key hash", ieee802154_key_hash_vals, "Specifies which hash scheme is used to derived the key"), + UAT_END_FIELDS + }; + static build_valid_func ieee802154_da_build_value[1] = {ieee802154_da_value}; static decode_as_value_t ieee802154_da_values = {ieee802154_da_prompt, 1, ieee802154_da_build_value}; static decode_as_t ieee802154_da = { @@ -4242,10 +4451,28 @@ void proto_register_ieee802154(void) "A table of static address mappings between 16-bit short addressing and EUI-64 addresses", static_addr_uat); + /* Create a UAT for key management. */ + ieee802154_key_uat = uat_new("Keys", + sizeof(ieee802154_key_t), /* record size */ + "ieee802154_keys", /* filename */ + TRUE, /* from_profile */ + &ieee802154_keys, /* data_ptr */ + &num_ieee802154_keys, /* numitems_ptr */ + UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ + NULL, /* help */ + ieee802154_key_copy_cb, /* copy callback */ + ieee802154_key_update_cb, /* update callback */ + ieee802154_key_free_cb, /* free callback */ + ieee802154_key_post_update_cb, /* post update callback */ + NULL, /* reset callback */ + key_uat_flds); /* UAT field definitions */ + prefs_register_uat_preference(ieee802154_module, "ieee802154_keys", + "Decryption Keys", + "Decryption key configuration data", + ieee802154_key_uat); + /* Register preferences for a decryption key */ - /* TODO: Implement a UAT for multiple keys, and with more advanced key management. */ - prefs_register_string_preference(ieee802154_module, "802154_key", "Decryption key", - "128-bit decryption key in hexadecimal format", (const char **)&ieee802154_key_str); + prefs_register_obsolete_preference(ieee802154_module, "802154_key"); prefs_register_enum_preference(ieee802154_module, "802154_sec_suite", "Security Suite (802.15.4-2003)", @@ -4271,6 +4498,9 @@ void proto_register_ieee802154(void) register_dissector("wpan_cc24xx", dissect_ieee802154_cc24xx, proto_ieee802154); ieee802154_nonask_phy_handle = register_dissector("wpan-nonask-phy", dissect_ieee802154_nonask_phy, proto_ieee802154_nonask_phy); + /* setup registration for other dissectors to provide mac key hash algorithms */ + mac_key_hash_handlers = wmem_tree_new(wmem_epan_scope()); + /* Register a Decode-As handler. */ register_decode_as(&ieee802154_da); } /* proto_register_ieee802154 */ @@ -4285,8 +4515,6 @@ void proto_reg_handoff_ieee802154(void) { static gboolean prefs_initialized = FALSE; static unsigned int old_ieee802154_ethertype; - GByteArray *bytes; - gboolean res; if (!prefs_initialized){ /* Get the dissector handles. */ @@ -4306,15 +4534,6 @@ void proto_reg_handoff_ieee802154(void) old_ieee802154_ethertype = ieee802154_ethertype; - /* Get the IEEE 802.15.4 decryption key. */ - bytes = g_byte_array_new(); - res = hex_str_to_bytes(ieee802154_key_str, bytes, FALSE); - ieee802154_key_valid = (res && bytes->len >= IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); - if (ieee802154_key_valid) { - memcpy(ieee802154_key, bytes->data, IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE); - } - g_byte_array_free(bytes, TRUE); - /* Register dissector handles. */ dissector_add_uint("ethertype", ieee802154_ethertype, ieee802154_handle); } /* proto_reg_handoff_ieee802154 */ diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.h b/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.h index 442b2f8f8e..c46514b7a1 100644 --- a/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.h +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.h @@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ #define IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_ID_MODE_SHIFT 3 #define IEEE802154_AUX_KEY_RESERVED_MASK 0xE0 /* Reserved */ +/* Thread-specific well-known key support */ +#define IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_KEY_INDEX 0xff +#define IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_KEY_SRC 0xffffffff +#define IEEE802154_THR_WELL_KNOWN_EXT_ADDR 0x3506feb823d48712ULL + typedef enum { SECURITY_LEVEL_NONE = 0x00, SECURITY_LEVEL_MIC_32 = 0x01, @@ -212,6 +217,12 @@ typedef enum { KEY_ID_MODE_KEY_EXPLICIT_8 = 0x03 } ieee802154_key_id_mode; +typedef enum { + KEY_HASH_NONE = 0x00, + KEY_HASH_ZIP = 0x01, + KEY_HASH_THREAD = 0x02 +} ieee802154_key_hash; + /* Header IE Element ID */ #define IEEE802154_HEADER_VENDOR_SPECIFIC 0x00 /* Reserved 0x01-0x19 */ @@ -403,12 +414,56 @@ typedef struct { guint16 src16; guint16 dst16; ieee802154_map_rec *map_rec; + void *packet; } ieee802154_hints_t; +typedef enum { + DECRYPT_PACKET_SUCCEEDED, + DECRYPT_NOT_ENCRYPTED, + DECRYPT_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED, + DECRYPT_PACKET_TOO_SMALL, + DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_EXT_SRC_ADDR, + DECRYPT_PACKET_NO_KEY, + DECRYPT_PACKET_DECRYPT_FAILED, + DECRYPT_PACKET_MIC_CHECK_FAILED +} ws_decrypt_status; + +/* UAT key structure. */ +typedef struct { + gchar *pref_key; + guint key_index; + ieee802154_key_hash hash_type; + guint8 key[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; + guint8 mle_key[IEEE802154_CIPHER_SIZE]; +} ieee802154_key_t; + /* */ void dissect_ieee802154_superframe (tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, proto_tree *, guint *); void dissect_ieee802154_gtsinfo (tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, proto_tree *, guint *); void dissect_ieee802154_pendaddr (tvbuff_t *, packet_info *, proto_tree *, guint *); +void dissect_ieee802154_aux_sec_header_and_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, ieee802154_packet *packet, guint *offset); +void ccm_init_block(gchar *block, gboolean adata, gint M, guint64 addr, guint32 frame_counter, guint8 level, gint ctr_val); +gboolean ccm_ctr_encrypt(const gchar *key, const gchar *iv, gchar *mic, gchar *data, gint length); +gboolean ccm_cbc_mac(const gchar *key, const gchar *iv, const gchar *a, gint a_len, const gchar *m, gint m_len, gchar *mic); + +typedef struct { + unsigned char* rx_mic; + guint* rx_mic_length; + guint aux_offset; + guint aux_length; + ws_decrypt_status* status; + unsigned char *key; + guint key_number; +} ieee802154_payload_info_t; + +typedef gboolean (*ieee802154_set_key_func) (ieee802154_packet * packet, unsigned char* key, unsigned char* alt_key, ieee802154_key_t* key_info); +typedef tvbuff_t* (*ieee802154_payload_func) (tvbuff_t *, guint, packet_info *, ieee802154_packet *, ieee802154_payload_info_t*); +tvbuff_t *dissect_ieee802154_payload(tvbuff_t * tvb, guint offset, packet_info * pinfo, proto_tree* key_tree, ieee802154_packet * packet, + ieee802154_payload_info_t* payload_info, ieee802154_set_key_func set_key_func, ieee802154_payload_func payload_func); + + +typedef gboolean (*ieee802154_set_mac_key_func) (ieee802154_packet * packet, unsigned char* key, unsigned char* alt_key, ieee802154_key_t* uat_key); +extern void register_ieee802154_mac_key_hash_handler(guint hash_identifier, ieee802154_set_mac_key_func key_func); /* Short to Extended Address Prototypes */ extern ieee802154_map_rec *ieee802154_addr_update(ieee802154_map_tab_t *, guint16, guint16, guint64, @@ -421,4 +476,6 @@ extern gboolean ieee802154_long_addr_equal(gconstpointer a, gconstpointer b); extern gboolean ieee802154_short_addr_invalidate(guint16, guint16, guint); extern gboolean ieee802154_long_addr_invalidate(guint64, guint); +extern ieee802154_map_tab_t ieee802154_map; + #endif /* PACKET_IEEE802154_H */ |