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authorGerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>2018-09-14 08:30:31 -0700
committerAnders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>2018-09-25 13:24:17 +0000
commit50dbe4df7fd7a5e4e1a27fd5046981486d350994 (patch)
treeb671e5f91ee62fd7f38836e656ff1c5952afb454 /epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c
parent8e594bb4579b628f23315dcb07d6850826b663f4 (diff)
Rename packet-ssl* to packet-tls*
Rename packet-ssl{,-utils}.[ch] to packet-tls{,-utils}.[ch]. Change-Id: I4732162ec131ddf0734b3dd191ccc9e48a76ce06 Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/29659 Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Petri-Dish: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot Reviewed-by: Anders Broman <a.broman58@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c')
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c8928
1 files changed, 8928 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..931f84a4e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,8928 @@
+/* packet-tls-utils.c
+ * ssl manipulation functions
+ * By Paolo Abeni <paolo.abeni@email.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
+ *
+ * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+ * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+#define ZLIB_CONST
+#include <zlib.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <epan/packet.h>
+#include <epan/strutil.h>
+#include <epan/addr_resolv.h>
+#include <epan/ipv6.h>
+#include <epan/expert.h>
+#include <epan/asn1.h>
+#include <epan/proto_data.h>
+#include <epan/oids.h>
+
+#include <wsutil/filesystem.h>
+#include <wsutil/file_util.h>
+#include <wsutil/str_util.h>
+#include <wsutil/report_message.h>
+#include <wsutil/pint.h>
+#include <wsutil/strtoi.h>
+#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h>
+#include <wsutil/rsa.h>
+#include <version_info.h>
+#include "packet-ber.h"
+#include "packet-x509af.h"
+#include "packet-x509if.h"
+#include "packet-tls-utils.h"
+#include "packet-ocsp.h"
+#include "packet-tls.h"
+#include "packet-dtls.h"
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
+#endif
+#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 /* 1.6.0 */
+/* Whether to provide support for authentication in addition to decryption. */
+#define HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+#endif
+#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010700 /* 1.7.0 */
+/* Whether AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 can be supported. */
+#define HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+#endif
+
+/* Lookup tables {{{ */
+const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = {
+ { SSLV2_VERSION, "SSLv2" },
+ { SSLV3_VERSION, "SSLv3" },
+ { TLSV1_VERSION, "TLSv1" },
+ { TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLSv1.1" },
+ { TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLSv1.2" },
+ { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLSv1.3" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLSv1.0" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLSv1.2" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_versions[] = {
+ { SSLV2_VERSION, "SSL 2.0" },
+ { SSLV3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0" },
+ { TLSV1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0" },
+ { TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1" },
+ { TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2" },
+ { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLS 1.3" },
+ { 0x7F0E, "TLS 1.3 (draft 14)" },
+ { 0x7F0F, "TLS 1.3 (draft 15)" },
+ { 0x7F10, "TLS 1.3 (draft 16)" },
+ { 0x7F11, "TLS 1.3 (draft 17)" },
+ { 0x7F12, "TLS 1.3 (draft 18)" },
+ { 0x7F13, "TLS 1.3 (draft 19)" },
+ { 0x7F14, "TLS 1.3 (draft 20)" },
+ { 0x7F15, "TLS 1.3 (draft 21)" },
+ { 0x7F16, "TLS 1.3 (draft 22)" },
+ { 0x7F17, "TLS 1.3 (draft 23)" },
+ { 0x7F18, "TLS 1.3 (draft 24)" },
+ { 0x7F19, "TLS 1.3 (draft 25)" },
+ { 0x7F1A, "TLS 1.3 (draft 26)" },
+ { 0x7F1B, "TLS 1.3 (draft 27)" },
+ { 0x7F1C, "TLS 1.3 (draft 28)" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0" },
+ { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = {
+ { SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" },
+ { SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" },
+ { SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" },
+ { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
+/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string-ext can do a binary search */
+static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = {
+ { 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
+ { 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
+ { 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
+#if 0
+ { 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+#endif
+ /* RFC 2712 */
+ { 0x00001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x000023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x000024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x000025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x000026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x000027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x000028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x000029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x00002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x00002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ /* RFC 4785 */
+ { 0x00002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5246 */
+ { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x000040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x000068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x000069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ /* 0x00,0x6E-83 Unassigned */
+ { 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 4279 */
+ { 0x00008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x000093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 4162 */
+ { 0x000096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5288 */
+ { 0x00009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 5487 */
+ { 0x0000A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x0000B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ /* From RFC 5932 */
+ { 0x0000BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0000C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ /* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */
+ { 0x0000FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
+ /* 0x01-BF,* Unassigned */
+ /* From RFC 4492 */
+ { 0x00c001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00c019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5054 */
+ { 0x00C01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5589 */
+ { 0x00C023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 5489 */
+ { 0x00C033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00C039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x00C03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ /* 0xC0,0x3C-FF Unassigned
+ 0xC1-FD,* Unassigned
+ 0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
+ 0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
+ 0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
+ */
+
+ /* old numbers used in the beginning
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
+ { 0x00CC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+
+ /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305 */
+ { 0x00CCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00CCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+
+ /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
+ { 0x00E410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0x00E41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+
+ /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
+ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
+ { 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ { 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ /* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in
+ * a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte
+ * tls cipher suite id
+ */
+
+ { 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" },
+ { 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" },
+
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+value_string_ext ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_20_cipher_suites);
+
+
+/*
+ * Supported Groups (formerly named "EC Named Curve").
+ * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
+ */
+const value_string ssl_extension_curves[] = {
+ { 1, "sect163k1" },
+ { 2, "sect163r1" },
+ { 3, "sect163r2" },
+ { 4, "sect193r1" },
+ { 5, "sect193r2" },
+ { 6, "sect233k1" },
+ { 7, "sect233r1" },
+ { 8, "sect239k1" },
+ { 9, "sect283k1" },
+ { 10, "sect283r1" },
+ { 11, "sect409k1" },
+ { 12, "sect409r1" },
+ { 13, "sect571k1" },
+ { 14, "sect571r1" },
+ { 15, "secp160k1" },
+ { 16, "secp160r1" },
+ { 17, "secp160r2" },
+ { 18, "secp192k1" },
+ { 19, "secp192r1" },
+ { 20, "secp224k1" },
+ { 21, "secp224r1" },
+ { 22, "secp256k1" },
+ { 23, "secp256r1" },
+ { 24, "secp384r1" },
+ { 25, "secp521r1" },
+ { 26, "brainpoolP256r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
+ { 27, "brainpoolP384r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
+ { 28, "brainpoolP512r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */
+ { 29, "x25519" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */
+ { 30, "x448" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */
+ { 256, "ffdhe2048" }, /* RFC 7919 */
+ { 257, "ffdhe3072" }, /* RFC 7919 */
+ { 258, "ffdhe4096" }, /* RFC 7919 */
+ { 259, "ffdhe6144" }, /* RFC 7919 */
+ { 260, "ffdhe8192" }, /* RFC 7919 */
+ { 2570, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 6682, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 10794, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 14906, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 19018, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 23130, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 27242, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 31354, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 35466, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 39578, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 43690, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 47802, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 51914, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 56026, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 60138, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 64250, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves" },
+ { 0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_curve_types[] = {
+ { 1, "explicit_prime" },
+ { 2, "explicit_char2" },
+ { 3, "named_curve" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_extension_ec_point_formats[] = {
+ { 0, "uncompressed" },
+ { 1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime" },
+ { 2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = {
+ { 0x00, "N/A" },
+ { 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = {
+ { 20, "Change Cipher Spec" },
+ { 21, "Alert" },
+ { 22, "Handshake" },
+ { 23, "Application Data" },
+ { 24, "Heartbeat" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec
+ message. */
+const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = {
+ { 1, "Change Cipher Spec" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+#endif
+
+const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = {
+ { 1, "Warning" },
+ { 2, "Fatal" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = {
+ { 0, "Close Notify" },
+ { 1, "End of Early Data" },
+ { 10, "Unexpected Message" },
+ { 20, "Bad Record MAC" },
+ { 21, "Decryption Failed" },
+ { 22, "Record Overflow" },
+ { 30, "Decompression Failure" },
+ { 40, "Handshake Failure" },
+ { 41, "No Certificate" },
+ { 42, "Bad Certificate" },
+ { 43, "Unsupported Certificate" },
+ { 44, "Certificate Revoked" },
+ { 45, "Certificate Expired" },
+ { 46, "Certificate Unknown" },
+ { 47, "Illegal Parameter" },
+ { 48, "Unknown CA" },
+ { 49, "Access Denied" },
+ { 50, "Decode Error" },
+ { 51, "Decrypt Error" },
+ { 60, "Export Restriction" },
+ { 70, "Protocol Version" },
+ { 71, "Insufficient Security" },
+ { 80, "Internal Error" },
+ { 86, "Inappropriate Fallback" },
+ { 90, "User Canceled" },
+ { 100, "No Renegotiation" },
+ { 109, "Missing Extension" },
+ { 110, "Unsupported Extension" },
+ { 111, "Certificate Unobtainable" },
+ { 112, "Unrecognized Name" },
+ { 113, "Bad Certificate Status Response" },
+ { 114, "Bad Certificate Hash Value" },
+ { 115, "Unknown PSK Identity" },
+ { 116, "Certificate Required" },
+ { 120, "No application Protocol" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" },
+ { SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" },
+ { SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" },
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "Hello Verify Request"},
+ { SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "New Session Ticket" },
+ { SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, "End of Early Data" },
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, "Hello Retry Request" },
+ { SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" },
+ { SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" },
+ { SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" },
+ { SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" },
+ { SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_URL, "Client Certificate URL" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS, "Certificate Status" },
+ { SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, "Supplemental Data" },
+ { SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE, "Key Update" },
+ { SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS, "Encrypted Extensions" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_heartbeat_type[] = {
+ { 1, "Request" },
+ { 2, "Response" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_heartbeat_mode[] = {
+ { 1, "Peer allowed to send requests" },
+ { 2, "Peer not allowed to send requests" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = {
+ { 0, "null" },
+ { 1, "DEFLATE" },
+ { 64, "LZS" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be
+ seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */
+const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "RSA" },
+ { 1, "Diffie Hellman" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "Anonymous" },
+ { 1, "RSA" },
+ { 2, "DSA" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+#endif
+
+const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = {
+ { 1, "RSA Sign" },
+ { 2, "DSS Sign" },
+ { 3, "RSA Fixed DH" },
+ { 4, "DSS Fixed DH" },
+ /* GOST certificate types */
+ /* Section 3.5 of draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04 */
+ { 21, "GOST R 34.10-94" },
+ { 22, "GOST R 34.10-2001" },
+ /* END GOST certificate types */
+ { 64, "ECDSA Sign" },
+ { 65, "RSA Fixed ECDH" },
+ { 66, "ECDSA Fixed ECDH" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be
+ seen in a client key exchange message. */
+const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = {
+ { 0, "Implicit" },
+ { 1, "Explicit" },
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+#endif
+
+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */
+/* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string_ext fcns can do a binary search */
+static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = {
+ /* RFC 2246, RFC 4346, RFC 5246 */
+ { 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" },
+ { 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" },
+ { 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+
+ { 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" },
+#if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe
+ to remove according to David Hopwood <david.hopwood@zetnet.co.uk>
+ of the ietf-tls list */
+ { 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+#endif
+ /* RFC 2712 */
+ { 0x001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" },
+ { 0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" },
+ { 0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" },
+ { 0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" },
+ { 0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" },
+ /* RFC 4785 */
+ { 0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5246 */
+ { 0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ /* RFC 4132 */
+ { 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* 0x00,0x60-66 Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations */
+ /* --- ??? --- */
+ { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" },
+ { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" },
+ /* draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt */
+ { 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" },
+ { 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ /* --- ??? ---*/
+ { 0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ /* draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04.txt */
+ { 0x0080, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
+ { 0x0081, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" },
+ { 0x0082, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
+ { 0x0083, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" },
+ /* RFC 4132 */
+ { 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 4279 */
+ { 0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 4162 */
+ { 0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5288 */
+ { 0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 5487 */
+ { 0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ /* From RFC 5932 */
+ { 0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" },
+ /* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */
+ /* From RFC 5746 */
+ { 0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0x0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ /* RFC 8446 */
+ { 0x1301, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x1302, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0x1303, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0x1304, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0x1305, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0x1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ /* From RFC 7507 */
+ { 0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0x5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0x9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0xAAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0xBABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ /* From RFC 4492 */
+ { 0xc001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xc002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xc003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xc007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xc008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xc011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xc012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xc016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xc017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xc019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5054 */
+ { 0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ /* RFC 5589 */
+ { 0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 5489 */
+ { 0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" },
+ { 0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" },
+ { 0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 6209 */
+ { 0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 6367 */
+ { 0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ { 0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" },
+ { 0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" },
+ /* RFC 6655 */
+ { 0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
+ { 0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
+ { 0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
+ { 0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
+ /* RFC 7251 */
+ { 0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" },
+ { 0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ { 0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" },
+ /* https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01.txt */
+ { 0xC0FF, "TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0xCACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+/*
+0xC0,0xAB-FF Unassigned
+0xC1-FD,* Unassigned
+0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned
+0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen]
+0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246]
+*/
+ /* old numbers used in the beginning
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */
+ { 0xCC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ /* RFC 7905 */
+ { 0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ { 0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead */
+ { 0xD001, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" },
+ { 0xD002, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" },
+ { 0xD003, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" },
+ { 0xD005, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0xDADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */
+ { 0xE410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ { 0xE41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" },
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { 0xEAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ { 0xFAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" },
+ /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
+ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */
+ { 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ { 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" },
+ { 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"},
+ /* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */
+ { 0x00, NULL }
+};
+
+value_string_ext ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_31_ciphersuite);
+
+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-1 */
+const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME, "server_name" }, /* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, "max_fragment_length" },/* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, "client_certificate_url" }, /* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, "trusted_ca_keys" }, /* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, "truncated_hmac" }, /* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, "status_request" }, /* RFC 6066 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USER_MAPPING, "user_mapping" }, /* RFC 4681 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_AUTHZ, "client_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_AUTHZ, "server_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE, "cert_type" }, /* RFC 6091 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, "supported_groups" }, /* RFC 4492, RFC 7919 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS, "ec_point_formats" }, /* RFC 4492 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SRP, "srp" }, /* RFC 5054 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS, "signature_algorithms" }, /* RFC 5246 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP, "use_srtp" }, /* RFC 5764 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT, "heartbeat" }, /* RFC 6520 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN, "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" }, /* RFC 7301 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2, "status_request_v2" }, /* RFC 6961 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, "signed_certificate_timestamp" }, /* RFC 6962 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE, "client_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE, "server_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING, "padding" }, /* RFC 7685 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, "encrypt_then_mac" }, /* RFC 7366 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, "extended_master_secret" }, /* RFC 7627 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TOKEN_BINDING, "token_binding" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CACHED_INFO, "cached_info" }, /* RFC 7924 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS, "session_ticket" }, /* RFC 5077 / RFC 8447 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE_OLD, "Reserved (key_share)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22 (removed in -23) */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, "pre_shared_key" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA, "early_data" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, "supported_versions" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE, "cookie" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, "psk_key_exchange_modes" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO, "Reserved (ticket_early_data_info)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 (removed in -19) */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, "certificate_authorities" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS, "oid_filters" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, "post_handshake_auth" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT, "signature_algorithms_cert" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE, "key_share" }, /* RFC 8446 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN, "next_protocol_negotiation"}, /* https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03.html */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID_OLD, "channel_id_old" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-00
+ https://twitter.com/ericlaw/status/274237352531083264 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID, "channel_id" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01
+ https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslt.h&l=209 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, "renegotiation_info" }, /* RFC 5746 */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_AAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_BABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_CACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_DADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_EAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_FAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS, "quic_transports_parameters" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls */
+ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPTED_SERVER_NAME, "encrypted_server_name" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-01 */
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs[] = {
+ { 0, "host_name" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.9 */
+const value_string tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode[] = {
+ { 0, "PSK-only key establishment (psk_ke)" },
+ { 1, "PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment (psk_dhe_ke)" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls13_key_update_request[] = {
+ { 0, "update_not_requested" },
+ { 1, "update_requested" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4.1 */
+const value_string tls_hash_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "None" },
+ { 1, "MD5" },
+ { 2, "SHA1" },
+ { 3, "SHA224" },
+ { 4, "SHA256" },
+ { 5, "SHA384" },
+ { 6, "SHA512" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_signature_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0, "Anonymous" },
+ { 1, "RSA" },
+ { 2, "DSA" },
+ { 3, "ECDSA" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.3 */
+const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[] = {
+ { 0x0201, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" },
+ { 0x0203, "ecdsa_sha1" },
+ { 0x0401, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" },
+ { 0x0403, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" },
+ { 0x0501, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" },
+ { 0x0503, "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" },
+ { 0x0601, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" },
+ { 0x0603, "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" },
+ { 0x0804, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" },
+ { 0x0805, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384" },
+ { 0x0806, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" },
+ { 0x0807, "ed25519" },
+ { 0x0808, "ed448" },
+ { 0x0809, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" },
+ { 0x080a, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" },
+ { 0x080b, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* RFC 6091 3.1 */
+const value_string tls_certificate_type[] = {
+ { 0, "X.509" },
+ { 1, "OpenPGP" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, "Raw Public Key" }, /* RFC 7250 */
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_cert_chain_type[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_INDIVIDUAL_CERT, "Individual Certificates" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_PKIPATH, "PKI Path" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string tls_cert_status_type[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP, "OCSP" },
+ { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI, "OCSP Multi" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Generated by tools/make-tls-ct-logids.py
+ * Last-Modified Mon, 06 Mar 2017 15:27:22 GMT, 24 entries. */
+static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = {
+ { "\xa4\xb9\x09\x90\xb4\x18\x58\x14\x87\xbb\x13\xa2\xcc\x67\x70\x0a"
+ "\x3c\x35\x98\x04\xf9\x1b\xdf\xb8\xe3\x77\xcd\x0e\xc8\x0d\xdc\x10", 32,
+ "Google 'Pilot' log" },
+ { "\x68\xf6\x98\xf8\x1f\x64\x82\xbe\x3a\x8c\xee\xb9\x28\x1d\x4c\xfc"
+ "\x71\x51\x5d\x67\x93\xd4\x44\xd1\x0a\x67\xac\xbb\x4f\x4f\xfb\xc4", 32,
+ "Google 'Aviator' log" },
+ { "\x56\x14\x06\x9a\x2f\xd7\xc2\xec\xd3\xf5\xe1\xbd\x44\xb2\x3e\xc7"
+ "\x46\x76\xb9\xbc\x99\x11\x5c\xc0\xef\x94\x98\x55\xd6\x89\xd0\xdd", 32,
+ "DigiCert Log Server" },
+ { "\xee\x4b\xbd\xb7\x75\xce\x60\xba\xe1\x42\x69\x1f\xab\xe1\x9e\x66"
+ "\xa3\x0f\x7e\x5f\xb0\x72\xd8\x83\x00\xc4\x7b\x89\x7a\xa8\xfd\xcb", 32,
+ "Google 'Rocketeer' log" },
+ { "\xcd\xb5\x17\x9b\x7f\xc1\xc0\x46\xfe\xea\x31\x13\x6a\x3f\x8f\x00"
+ "\x2e\x61\x82\xfa\xf8\x89\x6f\xec\xc8\xb2\xf5\xb5\xab\x60\x49\x00", 32,
+ "Certly.IO log" },
+ { "\x74\x61\xb4\xa0\x9c\xfb\x3d\x41\xd7\x51\x59\x57\x5b\x2e\x76\x49"
+ "\xa4\x45\xa8\xd2\x77\x09\xb0\xcc\x56\x4a\x64\x82\xb7\xeb\x41\xa3", 32,
+ "Izenpe log" },
+ { "\xdd\xeb\x1d\x2b\x7a\x0d\x4f\xa6\x20\x8b\x81\xad\x81\x68\x70\x7e"
+ "\x2e\x8e\x9d\x01\xd5\x5c\x88\x8d\x3d\x11\xc4\xcd\xb6\xec\xbe\xcc", 32,
+ "Symantec log" },
+ { "\xac\x3b\x9a\xed\x7f\xa9\x67\x47\x57\x15\x9e\x6d\x7d\x57\x56\x72"
+ "\xf9\xd9\x81\x00\x94\x1e\x9b\xde\xff\xec\xa1\x31\x3b\x75\x78\x2d", 32,
+ "Venafi log" },
+ { "\x9e\x4f\xf7\x3d\xc3\xce\x22\x0b\x69\x21\x7c\x89\x9e\x46\x80\x76"
+ "\xab\xf8\xd7\x86\x36\xd5\xcc\xfc\x85\xa3\x1a\x75\x62\x8b\xa8\x8b", 32,
+ "WoSign log" },
+ { "\x41\xb2\xdc\x2e\x89\xe6\x3c\xe4\xaf\x1b\xa7\xbb\x29\xbf\x68\xc6"
+ "\xde\xe6\xf9\xf1\xcc\x04\x7e\x30\xdf\xfa\xe3\xb3\xba\x25\x92\x63", 32,
+ "WoSign ctlog" },
+ { "\xbc\x78\xe1\xdf\xc5\xf6\x3c\x68\x46\x49\x33\x4d\xa1\x0f\xa1\x5f"
+ "\x09\x79\x69\x20\x09\xc0\x81\xb4\xf3\xf6\x91\x7f\x3e\xd9\xb8\xa5", 32,
+ "Symantec VEGA log" },
+ { "\xa5\x77\xac\x9c\xed\x75\x48\xdd\x8f\x02\x5b\x67\xa2\x41\x08\x9d"
+ "\xf8\x6e\x0f\x47\x6e\xc2\x03\xc2\xec\xbe\xdb\x18\x5f\x28\x26\x38", 32,
+ "CNNIC CT log" },
+ { "\xc9\xcf\x89\x0a\x21\x10\x9c\x66\x6c\xc1\x7a\x3e\xd0\x65\xc9\x30"
+ "\xd0\xe0\x13\x5a\x9f\xeb\xa8\x5a\xf1\x42\x10\xb8\x07\x24\x21\xaa", 32,
+ "Wang Shengnan GDCA log" },
+ { "\xa8\x99\xd8\x78\x0c\x92\x90\xaa\xf4\x62\xf3\x18\x80\xcc\xfb\xd5"
+ "\x24\x51\xe9\x70\xd0\xfb\xf5\x91\xef\x75\xb0\xd9\x9b\x64\x56\x81", 32,
+ "Google 'Submariner' log" },
+ { "\x89\x41\x44\x9c\x70\x74\x2e\x06\xb9\xfc\x9c\xe7\xb1\x16\xba\x00"
+ "\x24\xaa\x36\xd5\x9a\xf4\x4f\x02\x04\x40\x4f\x00\xf7\xea\x85\x66", 32,
+ "Izenpe 2nd log" },
+ { "\x34\xbb\x6a\xd6\xc3\xdf\x9c\x03\xee\xa8\xa4\x99\xff\x78\x91\x48"
+ "\x6c\x9d\x5e\x5c\xac\x92\xd0\x1f\x7b\xfd\x1b\xce\x19\xdb\x48\xef", 32,
+ "StartCom CT log" },
+ { "\xbb\xd9\xdf\xbc\x1f\x8a\x71\xb5\x93\x94\x23\x97\xaa\x92\x7b\x47"
+ "\x38\x57\x95\x0a\xab\x52\xe8\x1a\x90\x96\x64\x36\x8e\x1e\xd1\x85", 32,
+ "Google 'Skydiver' log" },
+ { "\x29\x3c\x51\x96\x54\xc8\x39\x65\xba\xaa\x50\xfc\x58\x07\xd4\xb7"
+ "\x6f\xbf\x58\x7a\x29\x72\xdc\xa4\xc3\x0c\xf4\xe5\x45\x47\xf4\x78", 32,
+ "Google 'Icarus' log" },
+ { "\x92\x4a\x30\xf9\x09\x33\x6f\xf4\x35\xd6\x99\x3a\x10\xac\x75\xa2"
+ "\xc6\x41\x72\x8e\x7f\xc2\xd6\x59\xae\x61\x88\xff\xad\x40\xce\x01", 32,
+ "GDCA log" },
+ { "\x1d\x02\x4b\x8e\xb1\x49\x8b\x34\x4d\xfd\x87\xea\x3e\xfc\x09\x96"
+ "\xf7\x50\x6f\x23\x5d\x1d\x49\x70\x61\xa4\x77\x3c\x43\x9c\x25\xfb", 32,
+ "Google 'Daedalus' log" },
+ { "\xe0\x12\x76\x29\xe9\x04\x96\x56\x4e\x3d\x01\x47\x98\x44\x98\xaa"
+ "\x48\xf8\xad\xb1\x66\x00\xeb\x79\x02\xa1\xef\x99\x09\x90\x62\x73", 32,
+ "PuChuangSiDa log" },
+ { "\x03\x01\x9d\xf3\xfd\x85\xa6\x9a\x8e\xbd\x1f\xac\xc6\xda\x9b\xa7"
+ "\x3e\x46\x97\x74\xfe\x77\xf5\x79\xfc\x5a\x08\xb8\x32\x8c\x1d\x6b", 32,
+ "Venafi Gen2 CT log" },
+ { "\x15\x97\x04\x88\xd7\xb9\x97\xa0\x5b\xeb\x52\x51\x2a\xde\xe8\xd2"
+ "\xe8\xb4\xa3\x16\x52\x64\x12\x1a\x9f\xab\xfb\xd5\xf8\x5a\xd9\x3f", 32,
+ "Symantec SIRIUS log" },
+ { "\x87\x75\xbf\xe7\x59\x7c\xf8\x8c\x43\x99\x5f\xbd\xf3\x6e\xff\x56"
+ "\x8d\x47\x56\x36\xff\x4a\xb5\x60\xc1\xb4\xea\xff\x5e\xa0\x83\x0f", 32,
+ "DigiCert CT2 log" },
+ { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) dissector tables.
+ */
+static dissector_table_t ssl_alpn_dissector_table;
+static dissector_table_t dtls_alpn_dissector_table;
+
+/*
+ * Special cases for prefix matching of the ALPN, if the ALPN includes
+ * a version number for a draft or protocol revision.
+ */
+typedef struct ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol {
+ const char *proto_prefix;
+ const char *dissector_name;
+} ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t;
+
+static const ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols[] = {
+ /* SPDY moves so fast, just 1, 2 and 3 are registered with IANA but there
+ * already exists 3.1 as of this writing... match the prefix. */
+ { "spdy/", "spdy" },
+ /* draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-16 */
+ { "h2-", "http2" }, /* draft versions */
+};
+
+const value_string quic_transport_parameter_id[] = {
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL, "initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA, "initial_max_data" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_BIDI_STREAMS, "initial_max_bidi_streams" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_IDLE_TIMEOUT, "idle_timeout" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_PREFERRED_ADDRESS, "preferred_address" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, "max_packet_size" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN, "stateless_reset_token" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACK_DELAY_EXPONENT, "ack_delay_exponent" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_UNI_STREAMS, "initial_max_uni_streams" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_DISABLE_MIGRATION, "disable_migration" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE, "initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote" },
+ { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI, "initial_max_stream_data_uni" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+const value_string quic_tp_preferred_address_vals[] = {
+ { 4, "IPv4" },
+ { 6, "IPv6" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Lookup tables }}} */
+
+/* we keep this internal to packet-tls-utils, as there should be
+ no need to access it any other way.
+
+ This also allows us to hide the dependency on zlib.
+*/
+struct _SslDecompress {
+ gint compression;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+ z_stream istream;
+#endif
+};
+
+/* To assist in parsing client/server key exchange messages
+ 0 indicates unknown */
+gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher)
+{
+ /* Map Cipher suite number to Key Exchange algorithm {{{ */
+ switch(cipher) {
+ case 0x0017:
+ case 0x0018:
+ case 0x0019:
+ case 0x001a:
+ case 0x001b:
+ case 0x0034:
+ case 0x003a:
+ case 0x0046:
+ case 0x006c:
+ case 0x006d:
+ case 0x0089:
+ case 0x009b:
+ case 0x00a6:
+ case 0x00a7:
+ case 0x00bf:
+ case 0x00c5:
+ case 0xc084:
+ case 0xc085:
+ return KEX_DH_ANON;
+ case 0x000b:
+ case 0x000c:
+ case 0x000d:
+ case 0x0030:
+ case 0x0036:
+ case 0x003e:
+ case 0x0042:
+ case 0x0068:
+ case 0x0085:
+ case 0x0097:
+ case 0x00a4:
+ case 0x00a5:
+ case 0x00bb:
+ case 0x00c1:
+ case 0xc082:
+ case 0xc083:
+ return KEX_DH_DSS;
+ case 0x000e:
+ case 0x000f:
+ case 0x0010:
+ case 0x0031:
+ case 0x0037:
+ case 0x003f:
+ case 0x0043:
+ case 0x0069:
+ case 0x0086:
+ case 0x0098:
+ case 0x00a0:
+ case 0x00a1:
+ case 0x00bc:
+ case 0x00c2:
+ case 0xc07e:
+ case 0xc07f:
+ return KEX_DH_RSA;
+ case 0x0011:
+ case 0x0012:
+ case 0x0013:
+ case 0x0032:
+ case 0x0038:
+ case 0x0040:
+ case 0x0044:
+ case 0x0063:
+ case 0x0065:
+ case 0x0066:
+ case 0x006a:
+ case 0x0087:
+ case 0x0099:
+ case 0x00a2:
+ case 0x00a3:
+ case 0x00bd:
+ case 0x00c3:
+ case 0xc080:
+ case 0xc081:
+ return KEX_DHE_DSS;
+ case 0x002d:
+ case 0x008e:
+ case 0x008f:
+ case 0x0090:
+ case 0x0091:
+ case 0x00aa:
+ case 0x00ab:
+ case 0x00b2:
+ case 0x00b3:
+ case 0x00b4:
+ case 0x00b5:
+ case 0xc090:
+ case 0xc091:
+ case 0xc096:
+ case 0xc097:
+ case 0xc0a6:
+ case 0xc0a7:
+ case 0xc0aa:
+ case 0xc0ab:
+ case 0xccad:
+ case 0xe41c:
+ case 0xe41d:
+ return KEX_DHE_PSK;
+ case 0x0014:
+ case 0x0015:
+ case 0x0016:
+ case 0x0033:
+ case 0x0039:
+ case 0x0045:
+ case 0x0067:
+ case 0x006b:
+ case 0x0088:
+ case 0x009a:
+ case 0x009e:
+ case 0x009f:
+ case 0x00be:
+ case 0x00c4:
+ case 0xc07c:
+ case 0xc07d:
+ case 0xc09e:
+ case 0xc09f:
+ case 0xc0a2:
+ case 0xc0a3:
+ case 0xccaa:
+ case 0xe41e:
+ case 0xe41f:
+ return KEX_DHE_RSA;
+ case 0xc015:
+ case 0xc016:
+ case 0xc017:
+ case 0xc018:
+ case 0xc019:
+ return KEX_ECDH_ANON;
+ case 0xc001:
+ case 0xc002:
+ case 0xc003:
+ case 0xc004:
+ case 0xc005:
+ case 0xc025:
+ case 0xc026:
+ case 0xc02d:
+ case 0xc02e:
+ case 0xc074:
+ case 0xc075:
+ case 0xc088:
+ case 0xc089:
+ return KEX_ECDH_ECDSA;
+ case 0xc00b:
+ case 0xc00c:
+ case 0xc00d:
+ case 0xc00e:
+ case 0xc00f:
+ case 0xc029:
+ case 0xc02a:
+ case 0xc031:
+ case 0xc032:
+ case 0xc078:
+ case 0xc079:
+ case 0xc08c:
+ case 0xc08d:
+ return KEX_ECDH_RSA;
+ case 0xc006:
+ case 0xc007:
+ case 0xc008:
+ case 0xc009:
+ case 0xc00a:
+ case 0xc023:
+ case 0xc024:
+ case 0xc02b:
+ case 0xc02c:
+ case 0xc072:
+ case 0xc073:
+ case 0xc086:
+ case 0xc087:
+ case 0xc0ac:
+ case 0xc0ad:
+ case 0xc0ae:
+ case 0xc0af:
+ case 0xcca9:
+ case 0xe414:
+ case 0xe415:
+ return KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA;
+ case 0xc033:
+ case 0xc034:
+ case 0xc035:
+ case 0xc036:
+ case 0xc037:
+ case 0xc038:
+ case 0xc039:
+ case 0xc03a:
+ case 0xc03b:
+ case 0xc09a:
+ case 0xc09b:
+ case 0xccac:
+ case 0xe418:
+ case 0xe419:
+ return KEX_ECDHE_PSK;
+ case 0xc010:
+ case 0xc011:
+ case 0xc012:
+ case 0xc013:
+ case 0xc014:
+ case 0xc027:
+ case 0xc028:
+ case 0xc02f:
+ case 0xc030:
+ case 0xc076:
+ case 0xc077:
+ case 0xc08a:
+ case 0xc08b:
+ case 0xcca8:
+ case 0xe412:
+ case 0xe413:
+ return KEX_ECDHE_RSA;
+ case 0x001e:
+ case 0x001f:
+ case 0x0020:
+ case 0x0021:
+ case 0x0022:
+ case 0x0023:
+ case 0x0024:
+ case 0x0025:
+ case 0x0026:
+ case 0x0027:
+ case 0x0028:
+ case 0x0029:
+ case 0x002a:
+ case 0x002b:
+ return KEX_KRB5;
+ case 0x002c:
+ case 0x008a:
+ case 0x008b:
+ case 0x008c:
+ case 0x008d:
+ case 0x00a8:
+ case 0x00a9:
+ case 0x00ae:
+ case 0x00af:
+ case 0x00b0:
+ case 0x00b1:
+ case 0xc064:
+ case 0xc065:
+ case 0xc08e:
+ case 0xc08f:
+ case 0xc094:
+ case 0xc095:
+ case 0xc0a4:
+ case 0xc0a5:
+ case 0xc0a8:
+ case 0xc0a9:
+ case 0xccab:
+ case 0xe416:
+ case 0xe417:
+ return KEX_PSK;
+ case 0x0001:
+ case 0x0002:
+ case 0x0003:
+ case 0x0004:
+ case 0x0005:
+ case 0x0006:
+ case 0x0007:
+ case 0x0008:
+ case 0x0009:
+ case 0x000a:
+ case 0x002f:
+ case 0x0035:
+ case 0x003b:
+ case 0x003c:
+ case 0x003d:
+ case 0x0041:
+ case 0x0060:
+ case 0x0061:
+ case 0x0062:
+ case 0x0064:
+ case 0x0084:
+ case 0x0096:
+ case 0x009c:
+ case 0x009d:
+ case 0x00ba:
+ case 0x00c0:
+ case 0xc07a:
+ case 0xc07b:
+ case 0xc09c:
+ case 0xc09d:
+ case 0xc0a0:
+ case 0xc0a1:
+ case 0xe410:
+ case 0xe411:
+ case 0xfefe:
+ case 0xfeff:
+ case 0xffe0:
+ case 0xffe1:
+ return KEX_RSA;
+ case 0x002e:
+ case 0x0092:
+ case 0x0093:
+ case 0x0094:
+ case 0x0095:
+ case 0x00ac:
+ case 0x00ad:
+ case 0x00b6:
+ case 0x00b7:
+ case 0x00b8:
+ case 0x00b9:
+ case 0xc092:
+ case 0xc093:
+ case 0xc098:
+ case 0xc099:
+ case 0xccae:
+ case 0xe41a:
+ case 0xe41b:
+ return KEX_RSA_PSK;
+ case 0xc01a:
+ case 0xc01d:
+ case 0xc020:
+ return KEX_SRP_SHA;
+ case 0xc01c:
+ case 0xc01f:
+ case 0xc022:
+ return KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS;
+ case 0xc01b:
+ case 0xc01e:
+ case 0xc021:
+ return KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA;
+ case 0xc0ff:
+ return KEX_ECJPAKE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ /* }}} */
+}
+
+
+/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions {{{ */
+
+gint
+ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len)
+{
+ str->data = (guchar *)g_malloc(len);
+ /* the allocator can return a null pointer for a size equal to 0,
+ * and that must be allowed */
+ if (len > 0 && !str->data)
+ return -1;
+ str->data_len = (guint) len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const guchar* data, guint len)
+{
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(data);
+ memcpy(str->data, data, len);
+ str->data_len = len;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, guint len)
+{
+ str->data = (guchar *)g_realloc(str->data, len);
+ if (!str->data)
+ return -1;
+ str->data_len = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static StringInfo *
+ssl_data_clone(StringInfo *str)
+{
+ StringInfo *cloned_str;
+ cloned_str = (StringInfo *) wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(),
+ sizeof(StringInfo) + str->data_len);
+ cloned_str->data = (guchar *) (cloned_str + 1);
+ ssl_data_set(cloned_str, str->data, str->data_len);
+ return cloned_str;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src)
+{
+ if (dst->data_len < src->data_len) {
+ if (ssl_data_realloc(dst, src->data_len))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(dst->data, src->data, src->data_len);
+ dst->data_len = src->data_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* from_hex converts |hex_len| bytes of hex data from |in| and sets |*out| to
+ * the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns TRUE on
+ * success. */
+static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) {
+ gsize i;
+
+ if (hex_len & 1)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ out->data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2);
+ for (i = 0; i < hex_len / 2; i++) {
+ int a = ws_xton(in[i*2]);
+ int b = ws_xton(in[i*2 + 1]);
+ if (a == -1 || b == -1)
+ return FALSE;
+ out->data[i] = a << 4 | b;
+ }
+ out->data_len = (guint)hex_len / 2;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+/* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions }}} */
+
+
+/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations {{{ */
+/* hmac abstraction layer */
+#define SSL_HMAC gcry_md_hd_t
+
+static inline gint
+ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len, gint algo)
+{
+ gcry_error_t err;
+ const char *err_str, *err_src;
+
+ err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
+ err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_hmac_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ gcry_md_setkey (*(md), key, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, gint len)
+{
+ gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
+{
+ gint algo;
+ guint len;
+
+ algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
+ len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo);
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(len <= *datalen);
+ memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
+ *datalen = len;
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_hmac_cleanup(SSL_HMAC* md)
+{
+ gcry_md_close(*(md));
+}
+
+/* message digest abstraction layer*/
+#define SSL_MD gcry_md_hd_t
+
+static inline gint
+ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo)
+{
+ gcry_error_t err;
+ const char *err_str, *err_src;
+ err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, 0);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ err_str = gcry_strerror(err);
+ err_src = gcry_strsource(err);
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_md_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, gint len)
+{
+ gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen)
+{
+ gint algo;
+ gint len;
+ algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md));
+ len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
+ memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len);
+ *datalen = len;
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md_cleanup(SSL_MD* md)
+{
+ gcry_md_close(*(md));
+}
+
+/* md5 /sha abstraction layer */
+#define SSL_SHA_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
+#define SSL_MD5_CTX gcry_md_hd_t
+
+static inline void
+ssl_sha_init(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
+{
+ gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
+{
+ gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_sha_final(guchar* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
+{
+ memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_SHA1),
+ gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA1));
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_sha_cleanup(SSL_SHA_CTX* md)
+{
+ gcry_md_close(*(md));
+}
+
+static inline gint
+ssl_md5_init(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
+{
+ return gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len)
+{
+ gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len);
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md5_final(guchar* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
+{
+ memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_MD5),
+ gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_MD5));
+}
+static inline void
+ssl_md5_cleanup(SSL_MD5_CTX* md)
+{
+ gcry_md_close(*(md));
+}
+/* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations }}} */
+
+/* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation {{{ */
+gint
+ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len)
+{
+ gint ret;
+#if 0
+ guchar *ivp;
+ gint i;
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t c;
+ c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher;
+#endif
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+#if 0
+ for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
+ i++;
+ }
+#endif
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ ret = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, iv_len);
+#if 0
+ for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ )
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]);
+ i++;
+ }
+#endif
+ ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ return ret;
+}
+/* stream cipher abstraction layer*/
+static gint
+ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk,
+ guchar* iv, gint mode)
+{
+ gint gcry_modes[] = {
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM,
+#else
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR,
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305,
+#else
+ -1, /* AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is unsupported. */
+#endif
+ };
+ gint err;
+ if (algo == -1) {
+ /* NULL mode */
+ *(cipher) = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ err = gcry_cipher_open(cipher, algo, gcry_modes[mode], 0);
+ if (err !=0)
+ return -1;
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey(*(cipher), sk, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo));
+ if (err != 0)
+ return -1;
+ /* AEAD cipher suites will set the nonce later. */
+ if (mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(algo));
+ if (err != 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline gint
+ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl,
+ const guchar * in, gint inl)
+{
+ if ((*cipher) == (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
+ {
+ if (in && inl)
+ memcpy(out, in, outl < inl ? outl : inl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return gcry_cipher_decrypt ( *(cipher), out, outl, in, inl);
+}
+static inline gint
+ssl_get_digest_by_name(const gchar*name)
+{
+ return gcry_md_map_name(name);
+}
+static inline gint
+ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const gchar* name)
+{
+ return gcry_cipher_map_name(name);
+}
+
+static inline void
+ssl_cipher_cleanup(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher)
+{
+ if ((*cipher) != (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1)
+ gcry_cipher_close(*cipher);
+ *cipher = NULL;
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry {{{ */
+static const SslDigestAlgo digests[]={
+ {"MD5", 16},
+ {"SHA1", 20},
+ {"SHA256", 32},
+ {"SHA384", 48},
+ {"Not Applicable", 0},
+};
+
+#define DIGEST_MAX_SIZE 48
+
+/* get index digest index */
+static const SslDigestAlgo *
+ssl_cipher_suite_dig(const SslCipherSuite *cs) {
+ return &digests[cs->dig - DIG_MD5];
+}
+
+static const gchar *ciphers[]={
+ "DES",
+ "3DES",
+ "ARCFOUR", /* libgcrypt does not support rc4, but this should be 100% compatible*/
+ "RFC2268_128", /* libgcrypt name for RC2 with a 128-bit key */
+ "IDEA",
+ "AES",
+ "AES256",
+ "CAMELLIA128",
+ "CAMELLIA256",
+ "SEED",
+ "CHACHA20", /* since Libgcrypt 1.7.0 */
+ "*UNKNOWN*"
+};
+
+static const SslCipherSuite cipher_suites[]={
+ {0x0001,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 */
+ {0x0002,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0x0003,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
+ {0x0004,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
+ {0x0005,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0x0006,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
+ {0x0007,KEX_RSA, ENC_IDEA, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0008,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0009,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000A,KEX_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000B,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000C,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000D,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x000F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0010,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0011,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0012,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0013,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0014,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0015,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0016,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0017,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
+ {0x0018,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */
+ {0x0019,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x001A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x001B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x002C,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0x002D,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0x002E,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0x002F,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0030,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0031,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0032,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0033,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0034,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0035,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0036,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0037,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0038,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0039,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x003A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x003B,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
+ {0x003C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x003D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x003E,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x003F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x0040,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x0041,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0042,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0043,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0044,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0045,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0046,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0060,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
+ {0x0061,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
+ {0x0062,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0063,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0064,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
+ {0x0065,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
+ {0x0066,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0x0067,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x0068,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x0069,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x006A,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x006B,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x006C,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x006D,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x0084,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0085,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0086,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0087,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0088,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0089,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x008A,KEX_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0x008B,KEX_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x008C,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x008D,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x008E,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0x008F,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0x0093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0094,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0095,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0096,KEX_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0097,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0098,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x0099,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x009A,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x009B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */
+ {0x009C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x009D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x009E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x009F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00A0,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00A1,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00A2,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00A3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00A4,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00A5,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00A6,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00A7,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00AC,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x00AD,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x00AE,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00AF,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0x00B0,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
+ {0x00B1,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
+ {0x00B2,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00B3,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0x00B4,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
+ {0x00B5,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
+ {0x00B6,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00B7,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0x00B8,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
+ {0x00B9,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
+ {0x00BA,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00BB,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00BC,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00BD,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00BE,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00BF,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C0,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C1,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C2,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C4,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0x00C5,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */
+
+ /* NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are incompatible with TLS 1.2. */
+ {0x1301,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x1302,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0x1303,KEX_TLS13, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0x1304,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */
+ {0x1305,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */
+
+ {0xC001,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC002,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC003,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC004,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC005,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC006,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC007,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC008,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC009,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC00A,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC00B,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC00C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC00D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC00E,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC00F,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC0FF,KEX_ECJPAKE, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC010,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC011,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC012,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC013,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC014,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC015,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC016,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC017,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC018,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC019,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC023,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC024,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC025,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC026,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC027,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC028,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC029,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC02A,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC02B,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC02C,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC02D,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC02E,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC02F,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC030,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC031,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC032,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC033,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ {0xC034,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC035,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC036,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ {0xC037,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC038,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC039,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */
+ {0xC03A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */
+ {0xC03B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */
+ {0xC072,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC073,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC074,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC075,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC076,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC077,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC078,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC079,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC07A,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC07B,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC07C,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC07D,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC07E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC07F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC080,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC081,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC082,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC083,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC084,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC085,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC086,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC087,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC088,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC089,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC08A,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC08B,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC08C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC08D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC08E,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC08F,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */
+ {0xC093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */
+ {0xC094,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC095,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC096,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC097,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC098,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC099,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC09A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */
+ {0xC09B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */
+ {0xC09C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
+ {0xC09D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
+ {0xC09E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
+ {0xC09F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
+ {0xC0A0,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0A1,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0A2,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0A3,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0A4,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
+ {0xC0A5,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
+ {0xC0A6,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
+ {0xC0A7,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
+ {0xC0A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0AC,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */
+ {0xC0AD,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */
+ {0xC0AE,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */
+ {0xC0AF,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */
+ {0xCCA8,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCA9,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCAA,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCAB,KEX_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCAC,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCAD,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {0xCCAE,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */
+ {-1, 0, 0, 0, MODE_STREAM}
+};
+
+#define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
+
+const SslCipherSuite *
+ssl_find_cipher(int num)
+{
+ const SslCipherSuite *c;
+ for(c=cipher_suites;c->number!=-1;c++){
+ if(c->number==num){
+ return c;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+ssl_get_cipher_algo(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return gcry_cipher_map_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]);
+}
+
+guint
+ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite)
+{
+ gint cipher_algo;
+ if (cipher_suite->mode != MODE_CBC) return 0;
+ cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]);
+ return (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num)
+{
+ switch (cipher_suite_num) {
+ /* See RFC 6101 (SSL 3.0), Table 2, column Key Material. */
+ case 0x0003: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
+ case 0x0006: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */
+ case 0x0008: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x000B: /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x000E: /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x0011: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x0014: /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x0017: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */
+ case 0x0019: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */
+ return 5;
+
+ /* not defined in below draft, but "implemented by several vendors",
+ * https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00036.html */
+ case 0x0060: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */
+ case 0x0061: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */
+ return 7;
+
+ /* Note: the draft states that DES_CBC needs 8 bytes, but Wireshark always
+ * used 7. Until a pcap proves 8, let's use the old value. Link:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01 */
+ case 0x0062: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x0063: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */
+ case 0x0064: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
+ case 0x0065: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */
+ return 7;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry }}} */
+
+
+/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function {{{ */
+static void
+tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md,
+ StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
+{
+ /* RFC 2246 5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function
+ * '+' denotes concatenation.
+ * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
+ * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + ...
+ * A(0) = seed
+ * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i - 1))
+ */
+ guint8 *ptr;
+ guint left, tocpy;
+ guint8 *A;
+ guint8 _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
+ guint A_l, tmp_l;
+ SSL_HMAC hm;
+
+ ptr = out->data;
+ left = out_len;
+
+ ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash secret", secret);
+ ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash seed", seed);
+ /* A(0) = seed */
+ A = seed->data;
+ A_l = seed->data_len;
+
+ while (left) {
+ /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
+ ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
+ A_l = sizeof(_A); /* upper bound len for hash output */
+ ssl_hmac_final(&hm, _A, &A_l);
+ ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
+ A = _A;
+
+ /* HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed) */
+ ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm, seed->data, seed->data_len);
+ tmp_l = sizeof(tmp); /* upper bound len for hash output */
+ ssl_hmac_final(&hm, tmp, &tmp_l);
+ ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
+
+ /* ssl_hmac_final puts the actual digest output size in tmp_l */
+ tocpy = MIN(left, tmp_l);
+ memcpy(ptr, tmp, tocpy);
+ ptr += tocpy;
+ left -= tocpy;
+ }
+ out->data_len = out_len;
+
+ ssl_print_string("hash out", out);
+}
+
+static gboolean
+tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage,
+ StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
+{
+ StringInfo seed, sha_out, md5_out;
+ guint8 *ptr;
+ StringInfo s1, s2;
+ guint i,s_l;
+ size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
+ gboolean success = FALSE;
+ usage_len = strlen(usage);
+ rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
+
+ /* initalize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&sha_out, MAX(out_len, 20)) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate sha out\n");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&md5_out, MAX(out_len, 16)) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate md5 out\n");
+ goto free_sha;
+ }
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate rnd %d\n",
+ (int) (usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len));
+ goto free_md5;
+ }
+
+ ptr=seed.data;
+ memcpy(ptr,usage,usage_len);
+ ptr+=usage_len;
+ memcpy(ptr,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
+ if (rnd2_len > 0) {
+ ptr+=rnd1->data_len;
+ memcpy(ptr,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
+ /*ptr+=rnd2->data_len;*/
+ }
+
+ /* initalize buffer for client/server seeds*/
+ s_l=secret->data_len/2 + secret->data_len%2;
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&s1, s_l) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret %d\n", s_l);
+ goto free_seed;
+ }
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&s2, s_l) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret(2) %d\n", s_l);
+ goto free_s1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s1.data,secret->data,s_l);
+ memcpy(s2.data,secret->data + (secret->data_len - s_l),s_l);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(md5 secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", s1.data_len, seed.data_len);
+ tls_hash(&s1, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("MD5"), &md5_out, out_len);
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(sha)\n");
+ tls_hash(&s2, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("SHA1"), &sha_out, out_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++)
+ out->data[i] = md5_out.data[i] ^ sha_out.data[i];
+ /* success, now store the new meaningful data length */
+ out->data_len = out_len;
+ success = TRUE;
+
+ ssl_print_string("PRF out",out);
+ g_free(s2.data);
+free_s1:
+ g_free(s1.data);
+free_seed:
+ g_free(seed.data);
+free_md5:
+ g_free(md5_out.data);
+free_sha:
+ g_free(sha_out.data);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
+ StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
+{
+ StringInfo label_seed;
+ size_t usage_len, rnd2_len;
+ rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0;
+
+ usage_len = strlen(usage);
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(&label_seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: can't allocate label_seed\n");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ memcpy(label_seed.data, usage, usage_len);
+ memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len, rnd1->data, rnd1->data_len);
+ if (rnd2_len > 0)
+ memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len+rnd1->data_len, rnd2->data, rnd2->data_len);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: tls_hash(hash_alg %s secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", gcry_md_algo_name(md), secret->data_len, label_seed.data_len);
+ tls_hash(secret, &label_seed, md, out, out_len);
+ g_free(label_seed.data);
+ ssl_print_string("PRF out", out);
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void
+ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2,
+ StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
+{
+ SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
+ guint8 tmp[16];
+
+ ssl_md5_init(&md5);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,r1->data,r1->data_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,r2->data,r2->data_len);
+ ssl_md5_final(tmp,&md5);
+ ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
+
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len <= sizeof(tmp));
+ ssl_data_set(out, tmp, out_len);
+ ssl_print_string("export iv", out);
+}
+
+static gboolean
+ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage,
+ StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len)
+{
+ SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
+ SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
+ guint off;
+ gint i = 0,j;
+ guint8 buf[20];
+
+ for (off = 0; off < out_len; off += 16) {
+ guchar outbuf[16];
+ i++;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: sha1_hash(%d)\n",i);
+ /* A, BB, CCC, ... */
+ for(j=0;j<i;j++){
+ buf[j]=64+i;
+ }
+
+ ssl_sha_init(&sha);
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,buf,i);
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,secret->data,secret->data_len);
+
+ if(!strcmp(usage,"client write key") || !strcmp(usage,"server write key")){
+ if (rnd2)
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len);
+ if (rnd2)
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len);
+ }
+
+ ssl_sha_final(buf,&sha);
+ ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: md5_hash(%d) datalen %d\n",i,
+ secret->data_len);
+ ssl_md5_init(&md5);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,secret->data,secret->data_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,buf,20);
+ ssl_md5_final(outbuf,&md5);
+ ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
+
+ memcpy(out->data + off, outbuf, MIN(out_len - off, 16));
+ }
+ out->data_len = out_len;
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* out_len is the wanted output length for the pseudorandom function.
+ * Ensure that ssl->cipher_suite is set. */
+static gboolean
+prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage,
+ StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len)
+{
+ switch (ssl->session.version) {
+ case SSLV3_VERSION:
+ return ssl3_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
+
+ case TLSV1_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
+ return tls_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len);
+
+ default: /* TLSv1.2 */
+ switch (ssl->cipher_suite->dig) {
+ case DIG_SHA384:
+ return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA384, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
+ out, out_len);
+ default:
+ return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA256, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2,
+ out, out_len);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out)
+{
+ SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
+ SSL_SHA_CTX sha;
+
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(out, 36) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ ssl_md5_init(&md5);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
+ ssl_md5_final(out->data,&md5);
+ ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
+
+ ssl_sha_init(&sha);
+ ssl_sha_update(&sha,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
+ ssl_sha_final(out->data+16,&sha);
+ ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* out)
+{
+ SSL_MD mc;
+ guint8 tmp[48];
+ guint len;
+
+ ssl_md_init(&mc, md);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len);
+ ssl_md_final(&mc, tmp, &len);
+ ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
+
+ if (ssl_data_alloc(out, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(out->data, tmp, len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtains the label prefix used in HKDF-Expand-Label. This function can be
+ * inlined and removed once support for draft 19 and before is dropped.
+ */
+static inline const char *
+tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(guint8 tls13_draft_version)
+{
+ if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) {
+ return "TLS 1.3, ";
+ } else {
+ return "tls13 ";
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Hash(context_value), Length) with a
+ * custom label prefix. If "context_hash" is NULL, then an empty context is
+ * used. Otherwise it must have the same length as the hash algorithm output.
+ */
+gboolean
+tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
+ const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
+ const guint8 *context_hash, guint8 context_length,
+ guint16 out_len, guchar **out)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 7.1:
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
+ * HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
+ * struct {
+ * uint16 length = Length;
+ * opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; // "tls13 " is label prefix.
+ * opaque context<0..255> = Context;
+ * } HkdfLabel;
+ *
+ * RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF):
+ * HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
+ */
+ gcry_error_t err;
+ const guint label_prefix_length = (guint) strlen(label_prefix);
+ const guint label_length = (guint) strlen(label);
+
+ /* Some sanity checks */
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(label_length > 0 && label_prefix_length + label_length <= 255);
+
+ /* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, context } */
+ GByteArray *info = g_byte_array_new();
+ const guint16 length = g_htons(out_len);
+ g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)&length, sizeof(length));
+
+ const guint8 label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length;
+ g_byte_array_append(info, &label_vector_length, 1);
+ g_byte_array_append(info, label_prefix, label_prefix_length);
+ g_byte_array_append(info, label, label_length);
+
+ g_byte_array_append(info, &context_length, 1);
+ if (context_length) {
+ g_byte_array_append(info, context_hash, context_length);
+ }
+
+ *out = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len);
+ err = hkdf_expand(md, secret->data, secret->data_len, info->data, info->len, *out, out_len);
+ g_byte_array_free(info, TRUE);
+
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed %d: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, md, gcry_strerror(err));
+ wmem_free(NULL, *out);
+ *out = NULL;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int md, const StringInfo *secret,
+ const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
+ guint16 out_len, guchar **out)
+{
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(md, secret, label_prefix, label, NULL, 0, out_len, out);
+}
+/* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function }}} */
+
+/* Record Decompression (after decryption) {{{ */
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+/* memory allocation functions for zlib initialization */
+static void* ssl_zalloc(void* opaque _U_, unsigned int no, unsigned int size)
+{
+ return g_malloc0(no*size);
+}
+static void ssl_zfree(void* opaque _U_, void* addr)
+{
+ g_free(addr);
+}
+#endif
+
+static SslDecompress*
+ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression)
+{
+ SslDecompress *decomp;
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+ int err;
+#endif
+
+ if (compression == 0) return NULL;
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: compression method %d\n", compression);
+ decomp = (SslDecompress *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecompress));
+ decomp->compression = compression;
+ switch (decomp->compression) {
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+ case 1: /* DEFLATE */
+ decomp->istream.zalloc = ssl_zalloc;
+ decomp->istream.zfree = ssl_zfree;
+ decomp->istream.opaque = Z_NULL;
+ decomp->istream.next_in = Z_NULL;
+ decomp->istream.next_out = Z_NULL;
+ decomp->istream.avail_in = 0;
+ decomp->istream.avail_out = 0;
+ err = inflateInit(&decomp->istream);
+ if (err != Z_OK) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: inflateInit_() failed - %d\n", err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return decomp;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+static int
+ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const guchar* in, guint inl, StringInfo* out_str, guint* outl)
+{
+ gint err;
+
+ switch (decomp->compression) {
+ case 1: /* DEFLATE */
+ err = Z_OK;
+ if (out_str->data_len < 16384) { /* maximal plain length */
+ ssl_data_realloc(out_str, 16384);
+ }
+#ifdef z_const
+ decomp->istream.next_in = in;
+#else
+DIAG_OFF(cast-qual)
+ decomp->istream.next_in = (Bytef *)in;
+DIAG_ON(cast-qual)
+#endif
+ decomp->istream.avail_in = inl;
+ decomp->istream.next_out = out_str->data;
+ decomp->istream.avail_out = out_str->data_len;
+ if (inl > 0)
+ err = inflate(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+ if (err != Z_OK) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: inflate() failed - %d\n", err);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *outl = out_str->data_len - decomp->istream.avail_out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+int
+ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const guchar* in _U_, guint inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, guint* outl _U_)
+{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression);
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
+/* Record Decompression (after decryption) }}} */
+
+/* Create a new structure to store decrypted chunks. {{{ */
+static SslFlow*
+ssl_create_flow(void)
+{
+ SslFlow *flow;
+
+ flow = (SslFlow *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslFlow));
+ flow->byte_seq = 0;
+ flow->flags = 0;
+ flow->multisegment_pdus = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope());
+ return flow;
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+/* Use the negotiated security parameters for decryption. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server)
+{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_change_cipher %s\n", (server)?"SERVER":"CLIENT");
+ if (server) {
+ ssl_session->server = ssl_session->server_new;
+ ssl_session->server_new = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ssl_session->client = ssl_session->client_new;
+ ssl_session->client_new = NULL;
+ }
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+/* Init cipher state given some security parameters. {{{ */
+static gboolean
+ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *, wmem_cb_event_t, void *);
+
+static SslDecoder*
+ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo,
+ gint compression, guint8 *mk, guint8 *sk, guint8 *iv, guint iv_length)
+{
+ SslDecoder *dec;
+ ssl_cipher_mode_t mode = cipher_suite->mode;
+
+ dec = (SslDecoder *)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecoder));
+ /* init mac buffer: mac storage is embedded into decoder struct to save a
+ memory allocation and waste samo more memory*/
+ dec->cipher_suite=cipher_suite;
+ dec->compression = compression;
+ if ((mode == MODE_STREAM && mk != NULL) || mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ // AEAD ciphers use no MAC key, but stream and block ciphers do. Note
+ // the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficieny
+ // keying material (including MAC key), we will can still create
+ // decoders since "decryption" is easy for such ciphers.
+ dec->mac_key.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
+ ssl_data_set(&dec->mac_key, mk, ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
+ } else if (mode == MODE_GCM || mode == MODE_CCM || mode == MODE_CCM_8 || mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
+ // Input for the nonce, to be used with AEAD ciphers.
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(iv_length <= sizeof(dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv));
+ dec->write_iv.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv;
+ ssl_data_set(&dec->write_iv, iv, iv_length);
+ }
+ dec->seq = 0;
+ dec->decomp = ssl_create_decompressor(compression);
+ wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_decoder_destroy_cb, dec);
+
+ if (ssl_cipher_init(&dec->evp,cipher_algo,sk,iv,cipher_suite->mode) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't create cipher id:%d mode:%d\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ cipher_algo, cipher_suite->mode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("decoder initialized (digest len %d)\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
+ return dec;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data)
+{
+ SslDecoder *dec = (SslDecoder *) user_data;
+
+ if (dec->evp)
+ ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB
+ if (dec->decomp != NULL && dec->decomp->compression == 1 /* DEFLATE */)
+ inflateEnd(&dec->decomp->istream);
+#endif
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+tls13_cipher_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data)
+{
+ tls13_cipher *cipher = (tls13_cipher *) user_data;
+
+ gcry_cipher_close(cipher->hd);
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+tls13_cipher *
+tls13_cipher_create(const char *label_prefix, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, int hash_algo, const StringInfo *secret, const gchar **error)
+{
+ tls13_cipher *cipher = NULL;
+ guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL;
+ guint key_length, iv_length;
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = NULL;
+ gcry_error_t err;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate traffic keys based on RFC 8446 Section 7.
+ */
+ key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
+ iv_length = TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH;
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) {
+ *error = "Key expansion (key) failed";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) {
+ *error = "Key expansion (IV) failed";
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ err = gcry_cipher_open(&hd, cipher_algo, cipher_mode, 0);
+ if (err) {
+ *error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (initialization) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, write_key, key_length);
+ if (err) {
+ *error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (setkey) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err));
+ gcry_cipher_close(hd);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ cipher = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher);
+ wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher_destroy_cb, cipher);
+ cipher->hd = hd;
+ memcpy(cipher->iv, write_iv, iv_length);
+ *error = NULL;
+
+end:
+ wmem_free(NULL, write_key);
+ wmem_free(NULL, write_iv);
+ return cipher;
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations {{{ */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
+static int
+ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
+ StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master,
+ gcry_sexp_t pk);
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
+
+static gboolean
+ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
+ gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key);
+
+gboolean
+ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session,
+ guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
+ const gchar *ssl_psk,
+ const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
+{
+ /* check for required session data */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, state %X\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->state);
+ if ((ssl_session->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) !=
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: not enough data to generate key (required state %X)\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3 which has no pre-master secrets\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* check to see if the PMS was provided to us*/
+ if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", TRUE,
+ mk_map->pms, &ssl_session->client_random)) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_PSK)
+ {
+ /* calculate pre master secret*/
+ StringInfo pre_master_secret;
+ guint psk_len, pre_master_len;
+
+ if (!ssl_psk || (ssl_psk[0] == 0)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't find pre-shared-key\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* convert hex string into char*/
+ if (!from_hex(&ssl_session->psk, ssl_psk, strlen(ssl_psk))) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk contains invalid hex\n",
+ G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ psk_len = ssl_session->psk.data_len;
+ if (psk_len >= (2 << 15)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk must not be larger than 2^15 - 1\n",
+ G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+
+ pre_master_len = psk_len * 2 + 4;
+
+ pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len);
+ pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
+ /* 2 bytes psk_len*/
+ pre_master_secret.data[0] = psk_len >> 8;
+ pre_master_secret.data[1] = psk_len & 0xFF;
+ /* psk_len bytes times 0*/
+ memset(&pre_master_secret.data[2], 0, psk_len);
+ /* 2 bytes psk_len*/
+ pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 2] = psk_len >> 8;
+ pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 3] = psk_len & 0xFF;
+ /* psk*/
+ memcpy(&pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 4], ssl_session->psk.data, psk_len);
+
+ ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = pre_master_secret.data;
+ ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len;
+ /*ssl_debug_printf("pre master secret",&ssl->pre_master_secret);*/
+
+ /* Remove the master secret if it was there.
+ This forces keying material regeneration in
+ case we're renegotiating */
+ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
+ ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ StringInfo encrypted_pre_master;
+ guint encrlen, skip;
+ encrlen = length;
+ skip = 0;
+
+ /* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes
+ * (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2)
+ * in case of rsa1024 that would be 128 + 2 = 130; for psk not necessary
+ */
+ if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_RSA &&
+ (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1_VERSION ||
+ ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION ||
+ ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
+ ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
+ ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION))
+ {
+ encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ skip = 2;
+ if (encrlen > length - 2)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, encrlen, length);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ /* the valid lower bound is higher than 8, but it is sufficient for the
+ * ssl keylog file below */
+ if (encrlen < 8) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: invalid encrypted pre-master key length %d\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, encrlen);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ encrypted_pre_master.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), encrlen);
+ encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen;
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
+ if (ssl_session->private_key) {
+ /* try to decrypt encrypted pre-master with RSA key */
+ if (ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl_session,
+ &encrypted_pre_master, ssl_session->private_key))
+ return TRUE;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't decrypt pre-master secret\n",
+ G_STRFUNC);
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
+
+ /* try to find the pre-master secret from the encrypted one. The
+ * ssl key logfile stores only the first 8 bytes, so truncate it */
+ encrypted_pre_master.data_len = 8;
+ if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Encrypted pre-master secret",
+ TRUE, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master))
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Used for (D)TLS 1.2 and earlier versions (not with TLS 1.3). */
+int
+ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session)
+{
+ StringInfo key_block = { NULL, 0 };
+ guint8 _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ guint8 _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ gint needed;
+ gint cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */
+ guint encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0;
+ gboolean is_export_cipher;
+ guint8 *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL;
+ guint8 *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL;
+ const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */
+ if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3. Should not have been called!\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* check for enough info to proced */
+ guint need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION;
+ guint need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+ if (((ssl_session->state & need_all) != need_all) || ((ssl_session->state & need_any) == 0)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_generate_keyring_material not enough data to generate key "
+ "(0x%02X required 0x%02X or 0x%02X)\n", ssl_session->state,
+ need_all|SSL_MASTER_SECRET, need_all|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET);
+ /* Special case: for NULL encryption, allow dissection of data even if
+ * the Client Hello is missing (MAC keys are now skipped though). */
+ need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_VERSION;
+ if ((ssl_session->state & need_all) == need_all &&
+ cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s NULL cipher found, will create a decoder but "
+ "skip MAC validation as keys are missing.\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto create_decoders;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* if master key is not available, generate is from the pre-master secret */
+ if (!(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
+ if ((ssl_session->state & SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) == SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) {
+ StringInfo handshake_hashed_data;
+ gint ret;
+
+ handshake_hashed_data.data = NULL;
+ handshake_hashed_data.data_len = 0;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret_extended)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len > 0);
+
+ switch(ssl_session->session.version) {
+ case TLSV1_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
+ ret = tls_handshake_hash(ssl_session, &handshake_hashed_data);
+ break;
+ default:
+ switch (cipher_suite->dig) {
+ case DIG_SHA384:
+ ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA384, &handshake_hashed_data);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA256, &handshake_hashed_data);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate handshake hash\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data);
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data = NULL;
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len = 0;
+
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "extended master secret",
+ &handshake_hashed_data,
+ NULL, &ssl_session->master_secret,
+ SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data);
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
+ ssl_print_string("client random",&ssl_session->client_random);
+ ssl_print_string("server random",&ssl_session->server_random);
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "master secret",
+ &ssl_session->client_random,
+ &ssl_session->server_random, &ssl_session->master_secret,
+ SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ ssl_print_string("master secret",&ssl_session->master_secret);
+
+ /* the pre-master secret has been 'consumend' so we must clear it now */
+ ssl_session->state &= ~SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+ ssl_session->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
+ if (cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
+ const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
+ cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
+ if (cipher_algo == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Export ciphers consume less material from the key block. */
+ encr_key_len = ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(cipher_suite->number);
+ is_export_cipher = encr_key_len > 0;
+ if (!is_export_cipher && cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
+ encr_key_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ write_iv_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo);
+ } else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
+ /* account for a four-byte salt for client and server side (from
+ * client_write_IV and server_write_IV), see GCMNonce (RFC 5288) */
+ write_iv_len = 4;
+ } else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
+ /* RFC 7905: SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length is twelve bytes */
+ write_iv_len = 12;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the key block. First figure out how much data we need */
+ needed = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len*2; /* MAC key */
+ needed += 2 * encr_key_len; /* encryption key */
+ needed += 2 * write_iv_len; /* write IV */
+
+ key_block.data = (guchar *)g_malloc(needed);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s sess key generation\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->master_secret, "key expansion",
+ &ssl_session->server_random,&ssl_session->client_random,
+ &key_block, needed)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate key_block\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ssl_print_string("key expansion", &key_block);
+
+ ptr=key_block.data;
+ /* client/server write MAC key (for non-AEAD ciphers) */
+ if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ c_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
+ s_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len;
+ }
+ /* client/server write encryption key */
+ c_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
+ s_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len;
+ /* client/server write IV (used as IV (for CBC) or salt (for AEAD)) */
+ if (write_iv_len > 0) {
+ c_iv=ptr; ptr += write_iv_len;
+ s_iv=ptr; /* ptr += write_iv_len; */
+ }
+
+ /* export ciphers work with a smaller key length */
+ if (is_export_cipher) {
+ if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
+
+ /* We only have room for MAX_BLOCK_SIZE bytes IVs, but that's
+ all we should need. This is a sanity check */
+ if (write_iv_len > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s cipher suite block must be at most %d nut is %d\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, write_iv_len);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if(ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
+ /* The length of these fields are ignored by this caller */
+ StringInfo iv_c, iv_s;
+ iv_c.data = _iv_c;
+ iv_s.data = _iv_s;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random,
+ &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv(2)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random,
+ &ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len);
+ }
+ else{
+ guint8 _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
+ StringInfo iv_block;
+ StringInfo key_null;
+ guint8 _key_null;
+
+ key_null.data = &_key_null;
+ key_null.data_len = 0;
+
+ iv_block.data = _iv_block;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s prf(iv_block)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &key_null, "IV block",
+ &ssl_session->client_random,
+ &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_block,
+ write_iv_len * 2)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tls31 iv block\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(_iv_c, iv_block.data, write_iv_len);
+ memcpy(_iv_s, iv_block.data + write_iv_len, write_iv_len);
+ }
+
+ c_iv=_iv_c;
+ s_iv=_iv_s;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
+
+ SSL_MD5_CTX md5;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(client_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+
+ ssl_md5_init(&md5);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,c_wk,encr_key_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
+ ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
+ ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
+ ssl_md5_final(_key_c,&md5);
+ ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
+ c_wk=_key_c;
+
+ ssl_md5_init(&md5);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(server_random)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,s_wk,encr_key_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data,
+ ssl_session->server_random.data_len);
+ ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data,
+ ssl_session->client_random.data_len);
+ ssl_md5_final(_key_s,&md5);
+ ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5);
+ s_wk=_key_s;
+ }
+ else{
+ StringInfo key_c, key_s, k;
+ key_c.data = _key_c;
+ key_s.data = _key_s;
+
+ k.data = c_wk;
+ k.data_len = encr_key_len;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_c)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "client write key",
+ &ssl_session->client_random,
+ &ssl_session->server_random, &key_c, sizeof(_key_c))) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 server key \n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ c_wk=_key_c;
+
+ k.data = s_wk;
+ k.data_len = encr_key_len;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_s)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "server write key",
+ &ssl_session->client_random,
+ &ssl_session->server_random, &key_s, sizeof(_key_s))) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 client key \n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ s_wk=_key_s;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* show key material info */
+ if (c_mk != NULL) {
+ ssl_print_data("Client MAC key",c_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
+ ssl_print_data("Server MAC key",s_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len);
+ }
+ ssl_print_data("Client Write key", c_wk, encr_key_len);
+ ssl_print_data("Server Write key", s_wk, encr_key_len);
+ /* used as IV for CBC mode and the AEAD implicit nonce (salt) */
+ if (write_iv_len > 0) {
+ ssl_print_data("Client Write IV", c_iv, write_iv_len);
+ ssl_print_data("Server Write IV", s_iv, write_iv_len);
+ }
+
+create_decoders:
+ /* create both client and server ciphers*/
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(client)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, c_iv, write_iv_len);
+ if (!ssl_session->client_new) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(server)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, s_iv, write_iv_len);
+ if (!ssl_session->server_new) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Continue the SSL stream after renegotiation with new keys. */
+ ssl_session->client_new->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
+ ssl_session->server_new->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: client seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ", server seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->client_new->seq, ssl_session->server_new->seq);
+ g_free(key_block.data);
+ ssl_session->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY;
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ g_free(key_block.data);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Generated the key material based on the given secret. */
+gboolean
+tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server)
+{
+ gboolean success = FALSE;
+ guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL;
+ SslDecoder *decoder;
+ guint key_length, iv_length;
+ int hash_algo;
+ const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite;
+ int cipher_algo;
+
+ if (ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s only usable for TLS 1.3, not %#x!\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ ssl_session->session.version);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_suite == NULL) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Unknown cipher\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (cipher_suite->kex != KEX_TLS13) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite 0x%04x spotted!\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_suite->number);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */
+ const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30];
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
+ cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name);
+ if (cipher_algo == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
+ hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
+ if (!hash_algo) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find hash function %s\n", G_STRFUNC, hash_name);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
+ /* AES-GCM/AES-CCM/Poly1305-ChaCha20 all have N_MIN=N_MAX = 12. */
+ iv_length = 12;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s key_length %u iv_length %u\n", G_STRFUNC, key_length, iv_length);
+
+ const char *label_prefix = tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version);
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s write_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s write_iv expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write Key" : "Client Write Key", write_key, key_length);
+ ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write IV" : "Client Write IV", write_iv, iv_length);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
+ decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, write_iv, iv_length);
+ if (!decoder) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init %s decoder\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Continue the TLS session with new keys, but reuse old flow to keep things
+ * like "Follow SSL" working (by linking application data records). */
+ if (is_from_server) {
+ decoder->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow();
+ ssl_session->server = decoder;
+ } else {
+ decoder->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow();
+ ssl_session->client = decoder;
+ }
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s %s ready using cipher suite 0x%04x (cipher %s hash %s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ is_from_server ? "Server" : "Client", cipher_suite->number, cipher_name, hash_name);
+ success = TRUE;
+
+end:
+ wmem_free(NULL, write_key);
+ wmem_free(NULL, write_iv);
+ return success;
+}
+/* (Pre-)master secrets calculations }}} */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
+/* Decrypt RSA pre-master secret using RSA private key. {{{ */
+static gboolean
+ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session,
+ StringInfo* encrypted_pre_master, gcry_sexp_t pk)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ char *err;
+
+ if (!encrypted_pre_master)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (KEX_IS_DH(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: session uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange "
+ "(cipher suite 0x%04X %s) and cannot be decrypted "
+ "using a RSA private key file.\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.cipher,
+ val_to_str_ext_const(ssl_session->session.cipher,
+ &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"));
+ return FALSE;
+ } else if(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex != KEX_RSA) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s key exchange %d different from KEX_RSA (%d)\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex, KEX_RSA);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* with tls key loading will fail if not rsa type, so no need to check*/
+ ssl_print_string("pre master encrypted",encrypted_pre_master);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: RSA_private_decrypt\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ i=rsa_decrypt_inplace(encrypted_pre_master->data_len,
+ encrypted_pre_master->data, pk, TRUE, &err);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("rsa_decrypt_inplace: %s\n", err);
+ g_free(err);
+ }
+
+ if (i!=48) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong pre_master_secret length (%zd, expected "
+ "%d)\n", G_STRFUNC, i, 48);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* the decrypted data has been written into the pre_master key buffer */
+ ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = encrypted_pre_master->data;
+ ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len=48;
+ ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret);
+
+ /* Remove the master secret if it was there.
+ This forces keying material regeneration in
+ case we're renegotiating */
+ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
+ ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+ return TRUE;
+} /* }}} */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */
+
+/* Decryption integrity check {{{ */
+
+static gint
+tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data,
+ guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC hm;
+ gint md;
+ guint32 len;
+ guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
+ gint16 temp;
+
+ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
+ ssl_debug_printf("tls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
+ ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
+
+ if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* hash sequence number */
+ phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
+
+ decoder->seq++;
+
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
+
+ /* hash content type */
+ buf[0]=ct;
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
+
+ /* hash version,data length and data*/
+ /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */
+ temp = g_htons(ver);
+ memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+
+ /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
+ temp = g_htons(datalen);
+ memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
+
+ /* get digest and digest len*/
+ len = sizeof(buf);
+ ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
+ ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
+ ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
+ if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data,
+ guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
+{
+ SSL_MD mc;
+ gint md;
+ guint32 len;
+ guint8 buf[64],dgst[20];
+ gint pad_ct;
+ gint16 temp;
+
+ pad_ct=(decoder->cipher_suite->dig==DIG_SHA)?40:48;
+
+ /* get cipher used for digest comptuation */
+ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
+ if (ssl_md_init(&mc,md) !=0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* do hash computation on data && padding */
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
+
+ /* hash padding*/
+ memset(buf,0x36,pad_ct);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
+
+ /* hash sequence number */
+ phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
+ decoder->seq++;
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,8);
+
+ /* hash content type */
+ buf[0]=ct;
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,1);
+
+ /* hash data length in network byte order and data*/
+ /* *((gint16* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */
+ temp = g_htons(datalen);
+ memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,2);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,data,datalen);
+
+ /* get partial digest */
+ ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
+ ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
+
+ ssl_md_init(&mc,md);
+
+ /* hash mac key */
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len);
+
+ /* hash padding and partial digest*/
+ memset(buf,0x5c,pad_ct);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct);
+ ssl_md_update(&mc,dgst,len);
+
+ ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len);
+ ssl_md_cleanup(&mc);
+
+ if(memcmp(mac,dgst,len))
+ return -1;
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+static gint
+dtls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct,int ver, guint8* data,
+ guint32 datalen, guint8* mac)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC hm;
+ gint md;
+ guint32 len;
+ guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
+ gint16 temp;
+
+ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name);
+ ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n",
+ ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md);
+
+ if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac seq: %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " epoch: %d\n",decoder->seq,decoder->epoch);
+ /* hash sequence number */
+ phton64(buf, decoder->seq);
+ buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8;
+ buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch;
+
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8);
+
+ /* hash content type */
+ buf[0]=ct;
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1);
+
+ /* hash version,data length and data */
+ temp = g_htons(ver);
+ memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+
+ temp = g_htons(datalen);
+ memcpy(buf, &temp, 2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2);
+ ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen);
+ /* get digest and digest len */
+ len = sizeof(buf);
+ ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len);
+ ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm);
+ ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len);
+ if(memcmp(mac,buf,len))
+ return -1;
+
+ return(0);
+}
+/* Decryption integrity check }}} */
+
+
+static gboolean
+tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder,
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
+#else
+ guint8 ct _U_, guint16 record_version _U_,
+#endif
+ gboolean ignore_mac_failed
+#ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ _U_
+#endif
+ ,
+ const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
+{
+ /* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) 6.2.3.3 defines the TLSCipherText.fragment as:
+ * GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
+ * In TLS 1.3 this explicit nonce is gone.
+ * With AES GCM/CCM, "[content]" is actually the concatenation of the
+ * ciphertext and authentication tag.
+ */
+ const guint16 version = ssl->session.version;
+ const gboolean is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION;
+ gcry_error_t err;
+ const guchar *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext;
+ guint ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len;
+ guchar nonce[12];
+ const ssl_cipher_mode_t cipher_mode = decoder->cipher_suite->mode;
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ const guint8 draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version;
+ const guchar *auth_tag_wire;
+ guchar auth_tag_calc[16];
+#else
+ guchar nonce_with_counter[16] = { 0 };
+#endif
+
+ switch (cipher_mode) {
+ case MODE_GCM:
+ case MODE_CCM:
+ case MODE_POLY1305:
+ auth_tag_len = 16;
+ break;
+ case MODE_CCM_8:
+ auth_tag_len = 8;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s unsupported cipher!\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse input into explicit nonce (TLS 1.2 only), ciphertext and tag. */
+ if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) {
+ if (inl < EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + auth_tag_len) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d is too small for explicit nonce %d and auth tag %d\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, inl, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, auth_tag_len);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ explicit_nonce = in;
+ ciphertext = explicit_nonce + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN;
+ ciphertext_len = inl - EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN - auth_tag_len;
+ } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
+ if (inl < auth_tag_len) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d has no space for auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, auth_tag_len);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ ciphertext = in;
+ ciphertext_len = inl - auth_tag_len;
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Unexpected TLS version %#x\n", G_STRFUNC, version);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ auth_tag_wire = ciphertext + ciphertext_len;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Nonce construction is version-specific. Note that AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ * (RFC 7905) uses a nonce construction similar to TLS 1.3.
+ */
+ if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) {
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
+ /* Implicit (4) and explicit (8) part of nonce. */
+ memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
+ memcpy(nonce + IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, explicit_nonce, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ if (cipher_mode == MODE_GCM) {
+ /* NIST SP 800-38D, sect. 7.2 says that the 32-bit counter part starts
+ * at 1, and gets incremented before passing to the block cipher. */
+ memcpy(nonce_with_counter, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
+ nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 2;
+ } else if (cipher_mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
+ /* The nonce for CCM and GCM are the same, but the nonce is used as input
+ * in the CCM algorithm described in RFC 3610. The nonce generated here is
+ * the one from RFC 3610 sect 2.3. Encryption. */
+ /* Flags: (L-1) ; L = 16 - 1 - nonceSize */
+ nonce_with_counter[0] = 3 - 1;
+ memcpy(nonce_with_counter + 1, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
+ /* struct { opaque salt[4]; opaque nonce_explicit[8] } CCMNonce (RFC 6655) */
+ nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 1;
+ } else {
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+#endif
+ } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) {
+ /*
+ * Technically the nonce length must be at least 8 bytes, but for
+ * AES-GCM, AES-CCM and Poly1305-ChaCha20 the nonce length is exact 12.
+ */
+ const guint nonce_len = 12;
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == nonce_len);
+ memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, decoder->write_iv.data_len);
+ /* Sequence number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */
+ phton64(nonce + nonce_len - 8, pntoh64(nonce + nonce_len - 8) ^ decoder->seq);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n", G_STRFUNC, decoder->seq);
+ }
+
+ /* Set nonce and additional authentication data */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ gcry_cipher_reset(decoder->evp);
+ ssl_print_data("nonce", nonce, 12);
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, nonce, 12);
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set nonce: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) {
+ /* size of plaintext, additional authenticated data and auth tag. */
+ guint64 lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, is_v12 ? 13 : 0, auth_tag_len };
+ gcry_cipher_ctl(decoder->evp, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, lengths, sizeof(lengths));
+ }
+
+ /* (D)TLS 1.2 needs specific AAD, TLS 1.3 (before -25) uses empty AAD. */
+ if (is_v12) {
+ guchar aad[13];
+ phton64(aad, decoder->seq); /* record sequence number */
+ if (version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION) {
+ phton16(aad, decoder->epoch); /* DTLS 1.2 includes epoch. */
+ }
+ aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */
+ phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */
+ phton16(aad + 11, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */
+ ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad));
+ err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad));
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ } else if (draft_version >= 25 || draft_version == 0) {
+ guchar aad[5];
+ aad[0] = ct; /* TLSCiphertext.opaque_type (23) */
+ phton16(aad + 1, record_version); /* TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version (0x0303) */
+ phton16(aad + 3, inl); /* TLSCiphertext.length */
+ ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad));
+ err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad));
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ err = gcry_cipher_setctr(decoder->evp, nonce_with_counter, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: failed to set CTR: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Decrypt now that nonce and AAD are set. */
+ err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypt failed: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Check authentication tag for authenticity (replaces MAC) */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD
+ err = gcry_cipher_gettag(decoder->evp, auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
+ if (err == 0 && !memcmp(auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len)) {
+ ssl_print_data("auth_tag(OK)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
+ } else {
+ if (err) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s cannot obtain tag: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err));
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s auth tag mismatch\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_print_data("auth_tag(expect)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len);
+ ssl_print_data("auth_tag(actual)", auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len);
+ }
+ if (ignore_mac_failed) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: auth check failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ } else {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt is older than 1.6, unable to verify auth tag!\n");
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Increment the (implicit) sequence number for TLS 1.2/1.3. This is done
+ * after successful authentication to ensure that early data is skipped when
+ * CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET keys are unavailable.
+ */
+ if (version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ decoder->seq++;
+ }
+
+ ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, ciphertext_len);
+ *outl = ciphertext_len;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters {{{ */
+/* Assume that we are called only for a non-NULL decoder which also means that
+ * we have a non-NULL decoder->cipher_suite. */
+int
+ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version,
+ gboolean ignore_mac_failed,
+ const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl)
+{
+ guint pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0;
+ guint8 *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl);
+ ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl);
+
+ if ((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite for the protocol version!\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */
+ if (inl > out_str->data_len)
+ {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: allocating %d bytes for decrypt data (old len %d)\n",
+ inl + 32, out_str->data_len);
+ ssl_data_realloc(out_str, inl + 32);
+ }
+
+ /* AEAD ciphers (GenericAEADCipher in TLS 1.2; TLS 1.3) have no padding nor
+ * a separate MAC, so use a different routine for simplicity. */
+ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM ||
+ decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM ||
+ decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8 ||
+ decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305 ||
+ ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+
+ if (!tls_decrypt_aead_record(ssl, decoder, ct, record_version, ignore_mac_failed, in, inl, out_str, &worklen)) {
+ /* decryption failed */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ goto skip_mac;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 6101/2246: SSLCipherText/TLSCipherText has two structures for types:
+ * (notation: { unencrypted, [ encrypted ] })
+ * GenericStreamCipher: { [content, mac] }
+ * GenericBlockCipher: { IV (TLS 1.1+), [content, mac, padding, padding_len] }
+ * RFC 5426 (TLS 1.2): TLSCipherText has additionally:
+ * GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] }
+ * RFC 4347 (DTLS): based on TLS 1.1, only GenericBlockCipher is supported.
+ * RFC 6347 (DTLS 1.2): based on TLS 1.2, includes GenericAEADCipher too.
+ */
+
+ maclen = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->len;
+
+ /* (TLS 1.1 and later, DTLS) Extract explicit IV for GenericBlockCipher */
+ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ guint blocksize = 0;
+
+ switch (ssl->session.version) {
+ case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
+ blocksize = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(decoder->cipher_suite);
+ if (inl < blocksize) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input %d has no space for IV %d\n",
+ inl, blocksize);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pad = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, in, blocksize);
+ if (pad != 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: failed to set IV: %s %s\n",
+ gcry_strsource (pad), gcry_strerror (pad));
+ }
+
+ inl -= blocksize;
+ in += blocksize;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt-then-MAC for (D)TLS (RFC 7366) */
+ if (ssl->state & SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
+ /*
+ * MAC is calculated over (IV + ) ENCRYPTED contents:
+ *
+ * MAC(MAC_write_key, ... +
+ * IV + // for TLS 1.1 or greater
+ * TLSCiphertext.enc_content);
+ */
+ if (inl < maclen) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: input %d has no space for MAC %d\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, inl, maclen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ inl -= maclen;
+ mac = (guint8 *)in + inl;
+ mac_frag = (guint8 *)in - blocksize;
+ mac_fraglen = blocksize + inl;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* First decrypt*/
+ if ((pad = ssl_cipher_decrypt(&decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, in, inl)) != 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: ssl_cipher_decrypt: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad),
+ gcry_strerror (pad));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, inl);
+ worklen=inl;
+
+
+ /* strip padding for GenericBlockCipher */
+ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) {
+ if (inl < 1) { /* Should this check happen earlier? */
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input length %d too small\n", inl);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pad=out_str->data[inl-1];
+ if (worklen <= pad) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: padding %d too large for work %d\n",
+ pad, worklen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ worklen-=(pad+1);
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record found padding %d final len %d\n",
+ pad, worklen);
+ }
+
+ /* MAC for GenericStreamCipher and GenericBlockCipher.
+ * (normal case without Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366) extension. */
+ if (!mac) {
+ /*
+ * MAC is calculated over the DECRYPTED contents:
+ *
+ * MAC(MAC_write_key, ... + TLSCompressed.fragment);
+ */
+ if (worklen < maclen) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong record len/padding outlen %d\n work %d\n", G_STRFUNC, *outl, worklen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ worklen -= maclen;
+ mac = out_str->data + worklen;
+ mac_frag = out_str->data;
+ mac_fraglen = worklen;
+ }
+
+ /* If NULL encryption active and no keys are available, do not bother
+ * checking the MAC. We do not have keys for that. */
+ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM &&
+ decoder->cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL &&
+ !(ssl->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("MAC check skipped due to missing keys\n");
+ goto skip_mac;
+ }
+
+ /* Now check the MAC */
+ ssl_debug_printf("checking mac (len %d, version %X, ct %d seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")\n",
+ worklen, ssl->session.version, ct, decoder->seq);
+ if(ssl->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){
+ if(ssl3_check_mac(decoder,ct,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac) < 0) {
+ if(ignore_mac_failed) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else if(ssl->session.version==TLSV1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION){
+ if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)< 0) {
+ if(ignore_mac_failed) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else if(ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION ||
+ ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
+ ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION){
+ /* Try rfc-compliant mac first, and if failed, try old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac */
+ if(dtls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n");
+ }
+ else if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,TLSV1_VERSION,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: dtls rfc-compliant mac failed, but old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac ok\n");
+ }
+ else if(ignore_mac_failed) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n");
+ }
+ else{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+skip_mac:
+
+ *outl = worklen;
+
+ if (decoder->compression > 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: compression method %d\n", decoder->compression);
+ ssl_data_copy(comp_str, out_str);
+ ssl_print_data("Plaintext compressed", comp_str->data, worklen);
+ if (!decoder->decomp) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ssl_decompress_record(decoder->decomp, comp_str->data, worklen, out_str, &uncomplen) < 0) return -1;
+ ssl_print_data("Plaintext uncompressed", out_str->data, uncomplen);
+ *outl = uncomplen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+/* Record decryption glue based on security parameters }}} */
+
+
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+
+/* RSA private key file processing {{{ */
+static void
+ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(SslDecryptSession *ssl, GHashTable *key_hash,
+ gnutls_datum_t *subjectPublicKeyInfo)
+{
+ gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey = NULL;
+ guchar key_id[20];
+ size_t key_id_len = sizeof(key_id);
+ int r;
+
+ if (!subjectPublicKeyInfo->size) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: could not find SubjectPublicKeyInfo\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ r = gnutls_pubkey_init(&pubkey);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to init pubkey: %s\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ r = gnutls_pubkey_import(pubkey, subjectPublicKeyInfo, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to import pubkey from handshake: %s\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate a 20-byte SHA-1 hash. */
+ r = gnutls_pubkey_get_key_id(pubkey, 0, key_id, &key_id_len);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to extract key id from pubkey: %s\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r));
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl_print_data("lookup(KeyID)", key_id, key_id_len);
+ ssl->private_key = (gcry_sexp_t)g_hash_table_lookup(key_hash, key_id);
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: lookup result: %p\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *) ssl->private_key);
+
+end:
+ gnutls_pubkey_deinit(pubkey);
+}
+
+/* RSA private key file processing }}} */
+#endif /* ! defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) */
+
+/*--- Start of dissector-related code below ---*/
+
+/* get ssl data for this session. if no ssl data is found allocate a new one*/
+SslDecryptSession *
+ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t tls_handle)
+{
+ void *conv_data;
+ SslDecryptSession *ssl_session;
+ int proto_ssl;
+
+ proto_ssl = dissector_handle_get_protocol_index(tls_handle);
+ conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl);
+ if (conv_data != NULL)
+ return (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data;
+
+ /* no previous SSL conversation info, initialize it. */
+ ssl_session = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecryptSession);
+
+ /* data_len is the part that is meaningful, not the allocated length */
+ ssl_session->master_secret.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->master_secret.data = ssl_session->_master_secret;
+ ssl_session->session_id.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->session_id.data = ssl_session->_session_id;
+ ssl_session->client_random.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->client_random.data = ssl_session->_client_random;
+ ssl_session->server_random.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->server_random.data = ssl_session->_server_random;
+ ssl_session->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->session_ticket.data = NULL; /* will be re-alloced as needed */
+ ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_server_data_for_iv;
+ ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_client_data_for_iv;
+ ssl_session->app_data_segment.data = NULL;
+ ssl_session->app_data_segment.data_len = 0;
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data=NULL;
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len=0;
+
+ /* Initialize parameters which are not necessary specific to decryption. */
+ ssl_session->session.version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN;
+ clear_address(&ssl_session->session.srv_addr);
+ ssl_session->session.srv_ptype = PT_NONE;
+ ssl_session->session.srv_port = 0;
+
+ conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session);
+ return ssl_session;
+}
+
+/* Resets the decryption parameters for the next decoder. */
+static void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_client)
+{
+ if (ssl) {
+ /* Ensure that secrets are not restored using stale identifiers. Split
+ * between client and server in case the packets somehow got out of order. */
+ gint clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+
+ if (is_client) {
+ clear_flags |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ ssl->session_id.data_len = 0;
+ ssl->session_ticket.data_len = 0;
+ ssl->master_secret.data_len = 0;
+ ssl->client_random.data_len = 0;
+ ssl->has_early_data = FALSE;
+ } else {
+ clear_flags |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ ssl->server_random.data_len = 0;
+ ssl->pre_master_secret.data_len = 0;
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+ ssl->private_key = NULL;
+#endif
+ ssl->psk.data_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->state & clear_flags) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s detected renegotiation, clearing 0x%02x (%s side)\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, ssl->state & clear_flags, is_client ? "client" : "server");
+ ssl->state &= ~clear_flags;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* These flags might be used for non-decryption purposes and may affect the
+ * dissection, so reset them as well. */
+ if (is_client) {
+ session->client_cert_type = 0;
+ } else {
+ session->compression = 0;
+ session->server_cert_type = 0;
+ /* session->is_session_resumed is already handled in the ServerHello dissection. */
+ }
+}
+
+static guint32
+ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
+ dissector_handle_t app_handle, guint32 last_nontls_frame)
+{
+ conversation_t *conversation;
+ SslSession *session;
+
+ /* Ignore if the TLS dissector is disabled. */
+ if (!tls_handle)
+ return 0;
+ /* The caller should always pass a valid handle to its own dissector. */
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(app_handle);
+
+ conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo);
+ session = &ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle)->session;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: old frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ session->last_nontls_frame,
+ (void *)session->app_handle,
+ dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle));
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: current frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ pinfo->num, (void *)app_handle,
+ dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle));
+
+ /* Do not switch again if a dissector did it before. */
+ if (session->last_nontls_frame) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: not overriding previous app handle!\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return session->last_nontls_frame;
+ }
+
+ session->app_handle = app_handle;
+ /* The TLS dissector should be called first for this conversation. */
+ conversation_set_dissector(conversation, tls_handle);
+ /* TLS starts after this frame. */
+ session->last_nontls_frame = last_nontls_frame;
+ return 0;
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* ssl_starttls_ack: mark future frames as encrypted. {{{ */
+guint32
+ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
+ dissector_handle_t app_handle)
+{
+ return ssl_starttls(tls_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num);
+}
+
+guint32
+ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo,
+ dissector_handle_t app_handle)
+{
+ return ssl_starttls(tls_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num - 1);
+}
+
+dissector_handle_t
+ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name)
+{
+ /* Accept 'http' for backwards compatibility and sanity. */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "http"))
+ name = "http-over-tls";
+ return find_dissector(name);
+}
+
+/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. {{{ */
+static gint
+ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
+{
+ const StringInfo *val1;
+ const StringInfo *val2;
+ val1 = (const StringInfo *)v;
+ val2 = (const StringInfo *)v2;
+
+ if (val1->data_len == val2->data_len &&
+ !memcmp(val1->data, val2->data, val2->data_len)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_hash (gconstpointer v)
+{
+ guint l,hash;
+ const StringInfo* id;
+ const guint* cur;
+ hash = 0;
+ id = (const StringInfo*) v;
+
+ /* id and id->data are mallocated in ssl_save_master_key(). As such 'data'
+ * should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a guint as
+ * is done below). The intermediate void* cast is to prevent "cast
+ * increases required alignment of target type" warnings on CPUs (such
+ * as SPARCs) that do not allow misaligned memory accesses.
+ */
+ cur = (const guint*)(void*) id->data;
+
+ for (l=4; (l < id->data_len); l+=4, cur++)
+ hash = hash ^ (*cur);
+
+ return hash;
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssl_private_key_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2)
+{
+ /* key ID length (SHA-1 hash, per GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1) */
+ return !memcmp(v, v2, 20);
+}
+
+guint
+ssl_private_key_hash (gconstpointer v)
+{
+ guint l, hash = 0;
+ const guint8 *cur = (const guint8 *)v;
+
+ /* The public key' SHA-1 hash (which maps to a private key) has a uniform
+ * distribution, hence simply xor'ing them should be sufficient. */
+ for (l = 0; l < 20; l += 4, cur += 4)
+ hash ^= pntoh32(cur);
+
+ return hash;
+}
+/* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. }}} */
+
+/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
+{
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(main_handle);
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(subdissector_handle);
+ /* Registration is required for Export PDU feature to work properly. */
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT_HINT(dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(subdissector_handle),
+ "SSL appdata dissectors must register with register_dissector()!");
+ ssl_debug_printf("association_add %s port %d handle %p\n", dissector_table_name, port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
+
+ if (port) {
+ dissector_add_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
+ if (tcp)
+ dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", port, main_handle);
+ else
+ dissector_add_uint("udp.port", port, main_handle);
+ dissector_add_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
+ } else {
+ dissector_add_for_decode_as(dissector_table_name, subdissector_handle);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp)
+{
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove removing %s %u - handle %p\n",
+ tcp?"TCP":"UDP", port, (void *)subdissector_handle);
+ if (main_handle) {
+ dissector_delete_uint(tcp?"tcp.port":"udp.port", port, main_handle);
+ dissector_delete_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle);
+ }
+
+ if (port) {
+ dissector_delete_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port)
+{
+ copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &session->srv_addr, addr);
+ session->srv_ptype = ptype;
+ session->srv_port = port;
+}
+
+int
+ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo)
+{
+ gint ret;
+ if (session->srv_addr.type != AT_NONE) {
+ ret = (session->srv_ptype == pinfo->ptype) &&
+ (session->srv_port == pinfo->srcport) &&
+ addresses_equal(&session->srv_addr, &pinfo->src);
+ } else {
+ ret = (dissector_get_uint_handle(table, pinfo->srcport) != 0);
+ }
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("packet_from_server: is from server - %s\n", (ret)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+ return ret;
+}
+/* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. }}} */
+
+
+/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. {{{ */
+/**
+ * Remembers the decrypted TLS record fragment (TLSInnerPlaintext in TLS 1.3) to
+ * avoid the need for a decoder in the second pass. Additionally, it remembers
+ * sequence numbers (for reassembly and Follow SSL Stream).
+ *
+ * @param proto The protocol identifier (proto_ssl or proto_dtls).
+ * @param pinfo The packet where the record originates from.
+ * @param data Decrypted data to store in the record.
+ * @param data_len Length of decrypted record data.
+ * @param record_id The identifier for this record within the current packet.
+ * @param flow Information about sequence numbers, etc.
+ * @param type TLS Content Type (such as handshake or application_data).
+ * @param curr_layer_num_ssl The layer identifier for this TLS session.
+ */
+void
+ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl)
+{
+ SslRecordInfo* rec, **prec;
+ SslPacketInfo* pi;
+
+ pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl);
+ if (!pi)
+ {
+ pi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslPacketInfo);
+ pi->srcport = pinfo->srcport;
+ pi->destport = pinfo->destport;
+ p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl, pi);
+ }
+
+ rec = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslRecordInfo);
+ rec->plain_data = (guchar *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len);
+ rec->data_len = data_len;
+ rec->id = record_id;
+ rec->type = type;
+ rec->next = NULL;
+
+ /* TODO allow Handshake records also to be reassembled. There needs to be
+ * one "flow" for each record type (appdata, handshake). "seq" for the
+ * record should then be relative within this flow. */
+ if (flow && type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA) {
+ rec->seq = flow->byte_seq;
+ rec->flow = flow;
+ flow->byte_seq += data_len;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s stored decrypted record seq=%d nxtseq=%d flow=%p\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, rec->seq, rec->seq + data_len, (void*)flow);
+ }
+
+ /* Remember decrypted records. */
+ prec = &pi->records;
+ while (*prec) prec = &(*prec)->next;
+ *prec = rec;
+}
+
+/* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */
+tvbuff_t*
+ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record)
+{
+ SslRecordInfo* rec;
+ SslPacketInfo* pi;
+ pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl);
+
+ if (!pi)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (rec = pi->records; rec; rec = rec->next)
+ if (rec->id == record_id) {
+ *matched_record = rec;
+ /* link new real_data_tvb with a parent tvb so it is freed when frame dissection is complete */
+ return tvb_new_child_real_data(parent_tvb, rec->plain_data, rec->data_len, rec->data_len);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+/* Links SSL records with the real packet data. }}} */
+
+/* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache). {{{ */
+void
+ssl_common_init(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
+ StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
+{
+ mk_map->session = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tickets = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->crandom = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->pre_master = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->pms = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_client_early = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_client_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_server_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_client_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_server_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_early_exporter = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->tls13_exporter = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ ssl_data_alloc(decrypted_data, 32);
+ ssl_data_alloc(compressed_data, 32);
+
+ /* QUIC keys. */
+ mk_map->quic_client_early = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->quic_client_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->quic_server_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->quic_client_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+ mk_map->quic_server_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file,
+ StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data)
+{
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->session);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tickets);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->crandom);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pre_master);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pms);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_early);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_handshake);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_handshake);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_appdata);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_appdata);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_early_exporter);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_exporter);
+
+ g_free(decrypted_data->data);
+ g_free(compressed_data->data);
+
+ /* QUIC keys */
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->quic_client_early);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->quic_client_handshake);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->quic_server_handshake);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->quic_client_appdata);
+ g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->quic_server_appdata);
+
+ /* close the previous keylog file now that the cache are cleared, this
+ * allows the cache to be filled with the full keylog file contents. */
+ if (*ssl_keylog_file) {
+ fclose(*ssl_keylog_file);
+ *ssl_keylog_file = NULL;
+ }
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+/* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+/* Load a single RSA key file item from preferences. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp)
+{
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key;
+ gcry_sexp_t private_key;
+ FILE* fp = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ size_t key_id_len = 20;
+ guchar *key_id = NULL;
+ char *err = NULL;
+ dissector_handle_t handle;
+ /* try to load keys file first */
+ fp = ws_fopen(uats->keyfile, "rb");
+ if (!fp) {
+ report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, FALSE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((gint)strlen(uats->password) == 0) {
+ priv_key = rsa_load_pem_key(fp, &err);
+ } else {
+ priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, uats->password, &err);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if (!priv_key) {
+ if (err) {
+ report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: %s",
+ uats->keyfile, err);
+ g_free(err);
+ } else
+ report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: unknown error",
+ uats->keyfile);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ report_failure("Load of private key from %s \"succeeded\" with error %s",
+ uats->keyfile, err);
+ g_free(err);
+ }
+
+ key_id = (guchar *) g_malloc0(key_id_len);
+ ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_get_key_id(priv_key, 0, key_id, &key_id_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ report_failure("Can't calculate public key ID for %s: %s",
+ uats->keyfile, gnutls_strerror(ret));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl_print_data("KeyID", key_id, key_id_len);
+
+ private_key = rsa_privkey_to_sexp(priv_key, &err);
+ if (!private_key) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", err);
+ g_free(err);
+ report_failure("Can't extract private key parameters for %s", uats->keyfile);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ g_hash_table_replace(key_hash, key_id, private_key);
+ key_id = NULL; /* used in key_hash, do not free. */
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init private key file %s successfully loaded.\n", uats->keyfile);
+
+ handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(uats->protocol);
+ if (handle) {
+ /* Port to subprotocol mapping */
+ guint16 port = 0;
+ if (ws_strtou16(uats->port, NULL, &port)) {
+ if (port > 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init port '%d' filename '%s' password(only for p12 file) '%s'\n",
+ port, uats->keyfile, uats->password);
+
+ ssl_association_add(dissector_table_name, main_handle, handle, port, tcp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (strcmp(uats->port, "start_tls"))
+ ssl_debug_printf("invalid ssl_init_port: %s\n", uats->port);
+ }
+ }
+
+end:
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
+ g_free(key_id);
+}
+/* }}} */
+#else
+void
+ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats _U_, GHashTable *key_hash _U_, const char* dissector_table_name _U_, dissector_handle_t main_handle _U_, gboolean tcp _U_)
+{
+ report_failure("Can't load private key files, support is not compiled in.");
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. {{{ */
+/** store a known (pre-)master secret into cache */
+static void
+ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key,
+ StringInfo *mk)
+{
+ StringInfo *ht_key, *master_secret;
+
+ if (key->data_len == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: not saving empty %s!\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mk->data_len == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s not saving empty (pre-)master secret for %s!\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, label);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for guint access
+ * so be careful in changing how it is allocated. */
+ ht_key = ssl_data_clone(key);
+ master_secret = ssl_data_clone(mk);
+ g_hash_table_insert(ht, ht_key, master_secret);
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s inserted (pre-)master secret for %s\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
+ ssl_print_string("stored key", ht_key);
+ ssl_print_string("stored (pre-)master secret", master_secret);
+}
+
+/** restore a (pre-)master secret given some key in the cache */
+static gboolean
+ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label,
+ gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key)
+{
+ StringInfo *ms;
+
+ if (key->data_len == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't restore %smaster secret using an empty %s\n",
+ G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ ms = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(ht, key);
+ if (!ms) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find %smaster secret by %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* (pre)master secret found, clear knowledge of other keys and set it in the
+ * current conversation */
+ ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET |
+ SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
+ if (is_pre_master) {
+ /* unlike master secret, pre-master secret has a variable size (48 for
+ * RSA, varying for PSK) and is therefore not statically allocated */
+ ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(),
+ ms->data_len);
+ ssl_data_set(&ssl->pre_master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
+ ssl->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET;
+ } else {
+ ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len);
+ ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET;
+ }
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s %smaster secret retrieved using %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label);
+ ssl_print_string(label, key);
+ ssl_print_string("(pre-)master secret", ms);
+ return TRUE;
+}
+/* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. }}} */
+
+/* Should be called when all parameters are ready (after ChangeCipherSpec), and
+ * the decoder should be attempted to be initialized. {{{*/
+void
+ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
+{
+ if (ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 implementations only provide secrets derived from the master
+ * secret which are loaded in tls13_change_key. No master secrets can be
+ * loaded here, so just return. */
+ return;
+ }
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s state = 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
+ if (ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY) {
+ ssl_debug_printf(" session key already available, nothing to do.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!(ssl->state & SSL_CIPHER)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf(" Cipher suite (Server Hello) is missing!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* for decryption, there needs to be a master secret (which can be derived
+ * from pre-master secret). If missing, try to pick a master key from cache
+ * (an earlier packet in the capture or key logfile). */
+ if (!(ssl->state & (SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET)) &&
+ !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", FALSE,
+ mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id) &&
+ (!ssl->session.is_session_resumed ||
+ !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", FALSE,
+ mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket)) &&
+ !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", FALSE,
+ mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random)) {
+ if (ssl->cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) {
+ /* how unfortunate, the master secret could not be found */
+ ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret\n");
+ return;
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret, continuing anyway "
+ "because of a NULL cipher\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl) < 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate keyring material\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Save Client Random/ Session ID for "SSL Export Session keys" */
+ ssl_save_master_key("Client Random", mk_map->crandom,
+ &ssl->client_random, &ssl->master_secret);
+ ssl_save_master_key("Session ID", mk_map->session,
+ &ssl->session_id, &ssl->master_secret);
+ /* Only save the new secrets if the server sent the ticket. The client
+ * ticket might have become stale. */
+ if (ssl->state & SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+ ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", mk_map->tickets,
+ &ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
+ }
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* Load the traffic key secret from the keylog file. */
+StringInfo *
+tls13_load_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
+ gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type)
+{
+ GHashTable *key_map;
+ const char *label;
+
+ if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s TLS version %#x is not 1.3\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->client_random.data_len == 0) {
+ /* May happen if Hello message is missing and Finished is found. */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s missing Client Random\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP:
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!is_from_server);
+ label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
+ key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_early;
+ break;
+ case TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE:
+ if (is_from_server) {
+ label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
+ key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_handshake;
+ } else {
+ label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
+ key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_handshake;
+ }
+ break;
+ case TLS_SECRET_APP:
+ if (is_from_server) {
+ label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
+ key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_appdata;
+ } else {
+ label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
+ key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_appdata;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+
+ /* Transitioning to new keys, mark old ones as unusable. */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s transitioning to new key, old state 0x%02x\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state);
+ ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY);
+
+ StringInfo *secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl->client_random);
+ if (!secret) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot find %s, decryption impossible\n", G_STRFUNC, label);
+ /* Disable decryption, the keys are invalid. */
+ if (is_from_server) {
+ ssl->server = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ssl->client = NULL;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 secret found, set new keys. */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Retrieved TLS 1.3 traffic secret.\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl_print_string("Client Random", &ssl->client_random);
+ ssl_print_string(label, secret);
+ return secret;
+}
+
+/* Load the new key. */
+void
+tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map,
+ gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type)
+{
+ if (ssl->state & SSL_QUIC_RECORD_LAYER) {
+ /*
+ * QUIC does not use the TLS record layer for message protection.
+ * The required keys will be extracted later by QUIC.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ StringInfo *secret = tls13_load_secret(ssl, mk_map, is_from_server, type);
+ if (!secret) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (tls13_generate_keys(ssl, secret, is_from_server)) {
+ /*
+ * Remember the application traffic secret to support Key Update. The
+ * other secrets cannot be used for this purpose, so free them.
+ */
+ SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
+ StringInfo *app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret;
+ if (type == TLS_SECRET_APP) {
+ app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
+ app_secret->data,
+ secret->data_len);
+ ssl_data_set(app_secret, secret->data, secret->data_len);
+ } else {
+ wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data);
+ app_secret->data = NULL;
+ app_secret->data_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Update to next application data traffic secret for TLS 1.3. The previous
+ * secret should have been set by tls13_change_key.
+ */
+void
+tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 7.2:
+ * application_traffic_secret_N+1 =
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(application_traffic_secret_N,
+ * "traffic upd", "", Hash.length)
+ *
+ * Both application_traffic_secret_N are of the same length (Hash.length).
+ */
+ const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl->cipher_suite;
+ SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client;
+ StringInfo *app_secret = decoder ? &decoder->app_traffic_secret : NULL;
+ guint8 tls13_draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version;
+
+ if (!cipher_suite || !app_secret || app_secret->data_len == 0) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot perform Key Update due to missing info\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Previous traffic secret is available, so find the hash function,
+ * expand the new traffic secret and generate new keys.
+ */
+ const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name;
+ int hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name);
+ const guint hash_len = app_secret->data_len;
+ guchar *new_secret;
+ const char *label = "traffic upd";
+ if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) {
+ label = "application traffic secret";
+ }
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, app_secret,
+ tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(tls13_draft_version),
+ label, hash_len, &new_secret)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s traffic_secret_N+1 expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+ ssl_data_set(app_secret, new_secret, hash_len);
+ wmem_free(NULL, new_secret);
+ tls13_generate_keys(ssl, app_secret, is_from_server);
+}
+
+/** SSL keylog file handling. {{{ */
+
+static GRegex *
+ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(void)
+{
+#define OCTET "(?:[[:xdigit:]]{2})"
+ const gchar *pattern =
+ "(?:"
+ /* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
+ "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random_pms>" OCTET "{32}) "
+ /* Matches first part of encrypted RSA pre-master secret */
+ "|RSA (?<encrypted_pmk>" OCTET "{8}) "
+ /* Pre-Master-Secret is given, it is 48 bytes for RSA,
+ but it can be of any length for DHE */
+ ")(?<pms>" OCTET "+)"
+ "|(?:"
+ /* Matches Server Hellos having a Session ID */
+ "RSA Session-ID:(?<session_id>" OCTET "+) Master-Key:"
+ /* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */
+ "|CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random>" OCTET "{32}) "
+ /* Master-Secret is given, its length is fixed */
+ ")(?<master_secret>" OCTET "{" G_STRINGIFY(SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) "})"
+ "|(?"
+ /* TLS 1.3 Client Random to Derived Secrets mapping. */
+ ":CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_early>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<client_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<server_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<client_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<server_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET (?<early_exporter>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|EXPORTER_SECRET (?<exporter>" OCTET "{32})"
+ /* QUIC (draft >= -13) Client Random to Derived Secrets mapping.
+ * EXPERIMENTAL, subject to change based on QUIC changes! */
+ "|QUIC_CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<quic_client_early>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|QUIC_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<quic_client_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|QUIC_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?<quic_server_handshake>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|QUIC_CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<quic_client_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
+ "|QUIC_SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?<quic_server_appdata>" OCTET "{32})"
+ ") (?<derived_secret>" OCTET "+)";
+#undef OCTET
+ static GRegex *regex = NULL;
+ GError *gerr = NULL;
+
+ if (!regex) {
+ regex = g_regex_new(pattern,
+ (GRegexCompileFlags)(G_REGEX_OPTIMIZE | G_REGEX_ANCHORED),
+ G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &gerr);
+ if (gerr) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to compile regex: %s\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ gerr->message);
+ g_error_free(gerr);
+ regex = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return regex;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+file_needs_reopen(FILE *fp, const char *filename)
+{
+ ws_statb64 open_stat, current_stat;
+
+ /* consider a file deleted when stat fails for either file,
+ * or when the residing device / inode has changed. */
+ if (0 != ws_fstat64(ws_fileno(fp), &open_stat))
+ return TRUE;
+ if (0 != ws_stat64(filename, &current_stat))
+ return TRUE;
+
+ /* Note: on Windows, ino may be 0. Existing files cannot be deleted on
+ * Windows, but hopefully the size is a good indicator when a file got
+ * removed and recreated */
+ return open_stat.st_dev != current_stat.st_dev ||
+ open_stat.st_ino != current_stat.st_ino ||
+ open_stat.st_size > current_stat.st_size;
+}
+
+typedef struct ssl_master_key_match_group {
+ const char *re_group_name;
+ GHashTable *master_key_ht;
+} ssl_master_key_match_group_t;
+
+void
+ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *ssl_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file,
+ const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+ GRegex *regex;
+ ssl_master_key_match_group_t mk_groups[] = {
+ { "encrypted_pmk", mk_map->pre_master },
+ { "session_id", mk_map->session },
+ { "client_random", mk_map->crandom },
+ { "client_random_pms", mk_map->pms },
+ /* TLS 1.3 map from Client Random to derived secret. */
+ { "client_early", mk_map->tls13_client_early },
+ { "client_handshake", mk_map->tls13_client_handshake },
+ { "server_handshake", mk_map->tls13_server_handshake },
+ { "client_appdata", mk_map->tls13_client_appdata },
+ { "server_appdata", mk_map->tls13_server_appdata },
+ { "early_exporter", mk_map->tls13_early_exporter },
+ { "exporter", mk_map->tls13_exporter },
+ /* QUIC map from Client Random to derived secret. */
+ { "quic_client_early", mk_map->quic_client_early },
+ { "quic_client_handshake", mk_map->quic_client_handshake },
+ { "quic_server_handshake", mk_map->quic_server_handshake },
+ { "quic_client_appdata", mk_map->quic_client_appdata },
+ { "quic_server_appdata", mk_map->quic_server_appdata },
+ };
+ /* no need to try if no key log file is configured. */
+ if (!ssl_keylog_filename || !*ssl_keylog_filename) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s dtls/ssl.keylog_file is not configured!\n",
+ G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* The format of the file is a series of records with one of the following formats:
+ * - "RSA xxxx yyyy"
+ * Where xxxx are the first 8 bytes of the encrypted pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
+ * Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
+ * (this is the original format introduced with bug 4349)
+ *
+ * - "RSA Session-ID:xxxx Master-Key:yyyy"
+ * Where xxxx is the SSL session ID (hex-encoded)
+ * Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
+ * (added to support openssl s_client Master-Key output)
+ * This is somewhat is a misnomer because there's nothing RSA specific
+ * about this.
+ *
+ * - "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
+ * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
+ * Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded)
+ * (This format allows SSL connections to be decrypted, if a user can
+ * capture the PMS but could not recover the MS for a specific session
+ * with a SSL Server.)
+ *
+ * - "CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy"
+ * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
+ * Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded)
+ * (This format allows non-RSA SSL connections to be decrypted, i.e.
+ * ECDHE-RSA.)
+ *
+ * - "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
+ * - "EXPORTER_SECRET xxxx yyyy"
+ * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded)
+ * Where yyyy is the secret (hex-encoded) derived from the early,
+ * handshake or master secrets. (This format is introduced with TLS 1.3
+ * and supported by BoringSSL, OpenSSL, etc. See bug 12779.)
+ */
+ regex = ssl_compile_keyfile_regex();
+ if (!regex)
+ return;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("trying to use SSL keylog in %s\n", ssl_keylog_filename);
+
+ /* if the keylog file was deleted, re-open it */
+ if (*keylog_file && file_needs_reopen(*keylog_file, ssl_keylog_filename)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s file got deleted, trying to re-open\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ fclose(*keylog_file);
+ *keylog_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (*keylog_file == NULL) {
+ *keylog_file = ws_fopen(ssl_keylog_filename, "r");
+ if (!*keylog_file) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to open SSL keylog\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ char buf[512], *line;
+ gsize bytes_read;
+ GMatchInfo *mi;
+
+ line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), *keylog_file);
+ if (!line) {
+ if (feof(*keylog_file)) {
+ /* Ensure that newly appended keys can be read in the future. */
+ clearerr(*keylog_file);
+ } else if (ferror(*keylog_file)) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Error while reading key log file, closing it!\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ fclose(*keylog_file);
+ *keylog_file = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ bytes_read = strlen(line);
+ /* fgets includes the \n at the end of the line. */
+ if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\n') {
+ line[bytes_read - 1] = 0;
+ bytes_read--;
+ }
+ if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\r') {
+ line[bytes_read - 1] = 0;
+ bytes_read--;
+ }
+
+ ssl_debug_printf(" checking keylog line: %s\n", line);
+ if (g_regex_match(regex, line, G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &mi)) {
+ gchar *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms;
+ StringInfo *key = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
+ StringInfo *pre_ms_or_ms = NULL;
+ GHashTable *ht = NULL;
+
+ /* Is the PMS being supplied with the PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM
+ * otherwise we will use the Master Secret
+ */
+ hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "master_secret");
+ if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
+ g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
+ hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "pms");
+ }
+ if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) {
+ g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
+ hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "derived_secret");
+ }
+ /* There is always a match, otherwise the regex is wrong. */
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hex_pre_ms_or_ms && strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
+
+ /* convert from hex to bytes and save to hashtable */
+ pre_ms_or_ms = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo);
+ from_hex(pre_ms_or_ms, hex_pre_ms_or_ms, strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms));
+ g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms);
+
+ /* Find a master key from any format (CLIENT_RANDOM, SID, ...) */
+ for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(mk_groups); i++) {
+ ssl_master_key_match_group_t *g = &mk_groups[i];
+ hex_key = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, g->re_group_name);
+ if (hex_key && *hex_key) {
+ ssl_debug_printf(" matched %s\n", g->re_group_name);
+ ht = g->master_key_ht;
+ from_hex(key, hex_key, strlen(hex_key));
+ g_free(hex_key);
+ break;
+ }
+ g_free(hex_key);
+ }
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ht); /* Cannot be reached, or regex is wrong. */
+
+ g_hash_table_insert(ht, key, pre_ms_or_ms);
+
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf(" unrecognized line\n");
+ }
+ /* always free match info even if there is no match. */
+ g_match_info_free(mi);
+ }
+}
+/** SSL keylog file handling. }}} */
+
+#ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG /* {{{ */
+
+static FILE* ssl_debug_file=NULL;
+
+void
+ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name)
+{
+ static gint debug_file_must_be_closed;
+ gint use_stderr;
+
+ use_stderr = name?(strcmp(name, SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR) == 0):0;
+
+ if (debug_file_must_be_closed)
+ fclose(ssl_debug_file);
+
+ if (use_stderr)
+ ssl_debug_file = stderr;
+ else if (!name || (strcmp(name, "") ==0))
+ ssl_debug_file = NULL;
+ else
+ ssl_debug_file = ws_fopen(name, "w");
+
+ if (!use_stderr && ssl_debug_file)
+ debug_file_must_be_closed = 1;
+ else
+ debug_file_must_be_closed = 0;
+
+ ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark SSL debug log \n\n");
+ ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark version: %s\n", get_ws_vcs_version_info());
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS
+ ssl_debug_printf("GnuTLS version: %s\n", gnutls_check_version(NULL));
+#endif
+ ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt version: %s\n", gcry_check_version(NULL));
+ ssl_debug_printf("\n");
+}
+
+void
+ssl_debug_flush(void)
+{
+ if (ssl_debug_file)
+ fflush(ssl_debug_file);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ if (!ssl_debug_file)
+ return;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfprintf(ssl_debug_file, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i, j, k;
+ if (!ssl_debug_file)
+ return;
+ fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%s[%d]:\n",name, (int) len);
+ for (i=0; i<len; i+=16) {
+ fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"| ");
+ for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k)
+ fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%.2x ",data[j]);
+ for (; k<16; ++k)
+ fprintf(ssl_debug_file," ");
+ fputc('|', ssl_debug_file);
+ for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k) {
+ guchar c = data[j];
+ if (!g_ascii_isprint(c) || (c=='\t')) c = '.';
+ fputc(c, ssl_debug_file);
+ }
+ for (; k<16; ++k)
+ fputc(' ', ssl_debug_file);
+ fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"|\n");
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data)
+{
+ ssl_print_data(name, data->data, data->data_len);
+}
+#endif /* SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG }}} */
+
+/* UAT preferences callbacks. {{{ */
+/* checks for SSL and DTLS UAT key list fields */
+
+gboolean
+ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p _U_, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
+{
+ // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional.
+ *err = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
+{
+ if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
+ // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional.
+ *err = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(p, "start_tls") != 0){
+ guint16 port;
+ if (!ws_strtou16(p, NULL, &port)) {
+ *err = g_strdup("Invalid port given.");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *err = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err)
+{
+ ws_statb64 st;
+
+ if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) {
+ *err = g_strdup("No filename given.");
+ return FALSE;
+ } else {
+ if (ws_stat64(p, &st) != 0) {
+ *err = g_strdup_printf("File '%s' does not exist or access is denied.", p);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *err = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+ ssldecrypt_assoc_t* f = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+
+ if (p && (strlen(p) > 0u)) {
+ fp = ws_fopen(f->keyfile, "rb");
+ if (fp) {
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, p, &msg);
+ if (!priv_key) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ *err = g_strdup_printf("Could not load PKCS#12 key file: %s", msg);
+ g_free(msg);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ g_free(msg);
+ gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key);
+ fclose(fp);
+ } else {
+ *err = g_strdup_printf("Leave this field blank if the keyfile is not PKCS#12.");
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *err = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+#else
+ *err = g_strdup("Cannot load key files, support is not compiled in.");
+ return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+/* UAT preferences callbacks. }}} */
+
+/** maximum size of ssl_association_info() string */
+#define SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN 8192
+
+typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data
+{
+ gchar *str;
+ const char *table_protocol;
+} ssl_association_info_callback_data_t;
+
+/**
+ * callback function used by ssl_association_info() to traverse the SSL associations.
+ */
+static void
+ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_data)
+{
+ ssl_association_info_callback_data_t* data = (ssl_association_info_callback_data_t*)user_data;
+ const int l = (const int)strlen(data->str);
+ g_snprintf(data->str+l, SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN-l, "'%s' %s\n", dissector_handle_get_short_name((dissector_handle_t)handle), data->table_protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * @return an information string on the SSL protocol associations. The string has ephemeral lifetime/scope.
+ */
+gchar*
+ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol)
+{
+ ssl_association_info_callback_data_t data;
+
+ data.str = (gchar *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN);
+ data.table_protocol = table_protocol;
+ dissector_table_foreach_handle(dissector_table_name, ssl_association_info_, &data);
+ return data.str;
+}
+
+
+/** Begin of code related to dissection of wire data. */
+
+/* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */
+gboolean
+ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length,
+ int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value)
+{
+ guint veclen_size;
+ guint32 veclen_value;
+ proto_item *pi;
+
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(offset <= offset_end);
+ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(min_value <= max_value);
+
+ if (max_value > 0xffffff) {
+ veclen_size = 4;
+ } else if (max_value > 0xffff) {
+ veclen_size = 3;
+ } else if (max_value > 0xff) {
+ veclen_size = 2;
+ } else {
+ veclen_size = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (offset_end - offset < veclen_size) {
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
+ tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ "No more room for vector of length %u",
+ veclen_size);
+ *ret_length = 0;
+ return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */
+ }
+
+ pi = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_length, tvb, offset, veclen_size, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &veclen_value);
+ offset += veclen_size;
+
+ if (veclen_value < min_value) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
+ "Vector length %u is smaller than minimum %u",
+ veclen_value, min_value);
+ } else if (veclen_value > max_value) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length,
+ "Vector length %u is larger than maximum %u",
+ veclen_value, max_value);
+ }
+
+ if (offset_end - offset < veclen_value) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
+ "Vector length %u is too large, truncating it to %u",
+ veclen_value, offset_end - offset);
+ *ret_length = offset_end - offset;
+ return FALSE; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */
+ }
+
+ *ret_length = veclen_value;
+ return TRUE; /* Length is OK. */
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint offset, guint offset_end)
+{
+ if (offset < offset_end) {
+ guint trailing = offset_end - offset;
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_trailing_data,
+ tvb, offset, trailing,
+ "%u trailing byte%s unprocessed",
+ trailing, plurality(trailing, " was", "s were"));
+ return FALSE; /* unprocessed data warning */
+ } else if (offset > offset_end) {
+ /*
+ * Returned offset runs past the end. This should not happen and is
+ * possibly a dissector bug.
+ */
+ guint excess = offset - offset_end;
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small,
+ tvb, offset_end, excess,
+ "Dissector processed too much data (%u byte%s)",
+ excess, plurality(excess, "", "s"));
+ return FALSE; /* overflow error */
+ }
+
+ return TRUE; /* OK, offset matches. */
+}
+/** }}} */
+
+
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig);
+
+/* change_cipher_spec(20) dissection */
+void
+ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, SslSession *session,
+ gboolean is_from_server,
+ const SslDecryptSession *ssl)
+{
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
+ * } ChangeCipherSpec;
+ */
+ proto_item *ti;
+ proto_item_set_text(tree,
+ "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec",
+ val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"),
+ val_to_str_const(SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"));
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.change_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+
+ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ /* CCS is a dummy message in TLS 1.3, do not parse it further. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Remember frame number of first CCS */
+ guint32 *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame;
+ if (*ccs_frame == 0)
+ *ccs_frame = pinfo->num;
+
+ /* Use heuristics to detect an abbreviated handshake, assume that missing
+ * ServerHelloDone implies reusing previously negotiating keys. Then when
+ * a Session ID or ticket is present, it must be a resumed session.
+ * Normally this should be done at the Finished message, but that may be
+ * encrypted so we do it here, at the last cleartext message. */
+ if (is_from_server && ssl) {
+ if (session->is_session_resumed) {
+ const char *resumed = NULL;
+ if (ssl->session_ticket.data_len) {
+ resumed = "Session Ticket";
+ } else if (ssl->session_id.data_len) {
+ resumed = "Session ID";
+ }
+ if (resumed) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Session resumption using %s\n", G_STRFUNC, resumed);
+ } else {
+ /* Can happen if the capture somehow starts in the middle */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s No Session resumption, missing packets?\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s Not using Session resumption\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_from_server && session->is_session_resumed)
+ expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.resumed);
+}
+
+/** Begin of handshake(22) record dissections */
+
+/* Dissects a SignatureScheme (TLS 1.3) or SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (TLS 1.2).
+ * {{{ */
+static void
+tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint32 sighash, hashalg, sigalg;
+ proto_item *ti_sigalg;
+ proto_tree *sigalg_tree;
+
+ ti_sigalg = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sighash);
+ sigalg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_sigalg, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_alg);
+
+ /* TLS 1.2: SignatureAndHashAlgorithm { hash, signature } */
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_hash, tvb,
+ offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &hashalg);
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_sig, tvb,
+ offset + 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sigalg);
+
+ /* No TLS 1.3 SignatureScheme? Fallback to TLS 1.2 interpretation. */
+ if (!try_val_to_str(sighash, tls13_signature_algorithm)) {
+ proto_item_set_text(ti_sigalg, "Signature Algorithm: %s %s (0x%04x)",
+ val_to_str_const(hashalg, tls_hash_algorithm, "Unknown"),
+ val_to_str_const(sigalg, tls_signature_algorithm, "Unknown"),
+ sighash);
+ }
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* dissect a list of hash algorithms, return the number of bytes dissected
+ this is used for the signature algorithms extension and for the
+ TLS1.2 certificate request. {{{ */
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+ * struct {
+ * HashAlgorithm hash;
+ * SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+ * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ */
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ proto_item *ti;
+ guint sh_alg_length;
+ guint32 next_offset;
+
+ /* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sh_alg_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16 - 1)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + sh_alg_length;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_algs, tvb, offset, sh_alg_length,
+ "Signature Hash Algorithms (%u algorithm%s)",
+ sh_alg_length / 2, plurality(sh_alg_length / 2, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_algs);
+
+ while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
+ tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, subtree, offset);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* Dissection of DistinguishedName (for CertificateRequest and
+ * certificate_authorities extension). {{{ */
+static guint32
+tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ proto_item *ti;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ guint32 dnames_length, next_offset;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+
+
+ /* Note: minimum length is 0 for TLS 1.1/1.2 and 3 for earlier/later */
+ /* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &dnames_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + dnames_length;
+
+ if (dnames_length > 0) {
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_dnames,
+ tvb, offset, dnames_length,
+ "Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)",
+ dnames_length,
+ plurality(dnames_length, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.dnames);
+
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ /* get the length of the current certificate */
+ guint32 name_length;
+ /* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return next_offset;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx,
+ subtree, hf->hf.hs_dname);
+ offset += name_length;
+ }
+ }
+ return offset;
+} /* }}} */
+
+
+/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). {{{ */
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session,
+ gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1
+ * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
+ * } ProtocolNameList;
+ */
+ proto_tree *alpn_tree;
+ proto_item *ti;
+ guint32 next_offset, alpn_length, name_length;
+ guint8 *proto_name = NULL;
+
+ /* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alpn_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + alpn_length;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_list,
+ tvb, offset, alpn_length, ENC_NA);
+ alpn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_alpn);
+
+ /* Parse list (note missing check for end of vector, ssl_add_vector below
+ * ensures that data is always available.) */
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ /* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alpn_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return next_offset;
+ }
+ offset++;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(alpn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str,
+ tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
+ /* Remember first ALPN ProtocolName entry for server. */
+ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
+ /* '\0'-terminated string for dissector table match and prefix
+ * comparison purposes. */
+ proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset,
+ name_length, ENC_ASCII);
+ }
+ offset += name_length;
+ }
+
+ /* If ALPN is given in ServerHello, then ProtocolNameList MUST contain
+ * exactly one "ProtocolName". */
+ if (proto_name) {
+ dissector_handle_t handle;
+
+ if (is_dtls) {
+ handle = dissector_get_string_handle(dtls_alpn_dissector_table,
+ proto_name);
+ } else {
+ handle = dissector_get_string_handle(ssl_alpn_dissector_table,
+ proto_name);
+ if (handle == NULL) {
+ /* Try prefix matching */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols); i++) {
+ const ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocol_t *alpn_proto = &ssl_alpn_prefix_match_protocols[i];
+
+ /* string_string is inappropriate as it compares strings
+ * while "byte strings MUST NOT be truncated" (RFC 7301) */
+ if (g_str_has_prefix(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_prefix)) {
+ handle = find_dissector(alpn_proto->dissector_name);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (handle != NULL) {
+ /* ProtocolName match, so set the App data dissector handle.
+ * This may override protocols given via the UAT dialog, but
+ * since the ALPN hint is precise, do it anyway. */
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s: changing handle %p to %p (%s)", G_STRFUNC,
+ (void *)session->app_handle,
+ (void *)handle,
+ dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(handle));
+ session->app_handle = handle;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04#page-3
+ * The "extension_data" field of a "next_protocol_negotiation" extension
+ * in a "ServerHello" contains an optional list of protocols advertised
+ * by the server. Protocols are named by opaque, non-empty byte strings
+ * and the list of protocols is serialized as a concatenation of 8-bit,
+ * length prefixed byte strings. Implementations MUST ensure that the
+ * empty string is not included and that no byte strings are truncated.
+ */
+ guint32 npn_length;
+ proto_tree *npn_tree;
+
+ /* List is optional, do not add tree if there are no entries. */
+ if (offset == offset_end) {
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ npn_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_npn, NULL, "Next Protocol Negotiation");
+
+ while (offset < offset_end) {
+ /* non-empty, 8-bit length prefixed strings means range 1..255 */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, npn_tree, offset, offset_end, &npn_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset++;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(npn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str,
+ tvb, offset, npn_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
+ offset += npn_length;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.2
+ * struct {
+ * opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>;
+ * } RenegotiationInfo;
+ *
+ */
+ proto_tree *reneg_info_tree;
+ guint32 reneg_info_length;
+
+ reneg_info_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, NULL, "Renegotiation Info extension");
+
+ /* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, reneg_info_tree, offset, offset_end, &reneg_info_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info_len, 0, 255)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset++;
+
+ if (reneg_info_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(reneg_info_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info, tvb, offset, reneg_info_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += reneg_info_length;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.8
+ * struct {
+ * NamedGroup group;
+ * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } KeyShareEntry;
+ */
+ guint32 key_exchange_length, group;
+ proto_tree *ks_tree;
+
+ ks_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, NULL, "Key Share Entry");
+
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &group);
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ": Group: %s", val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)"));
+
+ /* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ks_tree, offset, offset_end, &key_exchange_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end; /* Bad (possible truncated) length, skip to end of KeyShare extension. */
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_set_len(ks_tree, 2 + 2 + key_exchange_length);
+ proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ", Key Exchange length: %u", key_exchange_length);
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange, tvb, offset, key_exchange_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += key_exchange_length;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type)
+{
+ proto_tree *key_share_tree;
+ guint32 next_offset;
+ guint32 client_shares_length;
+
+ if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > guint32) */
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ key_share_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share, NULL, "Key Share extension");
+
+ switch(hnd_type){
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ /* KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end, &client_shares_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + client_shares_length;
+ while (offset + 4 <= next_offset) { /* (NamedGroup (2 bytes), key_exchange (1 byte for length, 1 byte minimum data) */
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ return next_offset;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ proto_tree_add_item(key_share_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_selected_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN );
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ default: /* no default */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11
+ * struct {
+ * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
+ * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
+ * } PskIdentity;
+ * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
+ * struct {
+ * select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ * case client_hello:
+ * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
+ * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
+ * case server_hello:
+ * uint16 selected_identity;
+ * };
+ * } PreSharedKeyExtension;
+ */
+
+ proto_tree *psk_tree;
+
+ psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_pre_shared_key, NULL, "Pre-Shared Key extension");
+
+ switch (hnd_type){
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: {
+ guint32 identities_length, identities_end, binders_length;
+
+ /* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &identities_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ identities_end = offset + identities_length;
+
+ while (offset < identities_end) {
+ guint32 identity_length;
+ proto_tree *identity_tree;
+
+ identity_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(psk_tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, NULL, "PSK Identity (");
+
+ /* opaque identity<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, identity_tree, offset, identities_end, &identity_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return identities_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_append_text(identity_tree, "length: %u)", identity_length);
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity, tvb, offset, identity_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += identity_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ proto_item_set_len(identity_tree, 2 + identity_length + 4);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, identities_end)) {
+ offset = identities_end;
+ }
+
+ /* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &binders_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders, tvb, offset, binders_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += binders_length;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: {
+ proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_selected, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end _U_,
+ guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.10
+ * struct {} Empty;
+ * struct {
+ * select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size;
+ * case client_hello: Empty;
+ * case encrypted_extensions: Empty;
+ * };
+ * } EarlyDataIndication;
+ */
+ switch (hnd_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ /* Remember that early_data will follow the handshake. */
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s found early_data extension\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl->has_early_data = TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_max_early_data_size, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session)
+{
+
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.1
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; // ClientHello
+ * } SupportedVersions;
+ * Note that ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest are handled by the caller.
+ */
+ guint32 versions_length, next_offset;
+ /* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &versions_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, 2, 254)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ next_offset = offset + versions_length;
+
+ guint version;
+ guint8 draft_version, max_draft_version = 0;
+ while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ draft_version = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
+ max_draft_version = MAX(draft_version, max_draft_version);
+ }
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX remove this when draft 19 support is dropped,
+ * this is only required for early data decryption. */
+ if (max_draft_version) {
+ session->tls13_draft_version = max_draft_version;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.2
+ * struct {
+ * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } Cookie;
+ */
+ guint32 cookie_length;
+ /* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie, tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += cookie_length;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.9
+ * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
+ * } PskKeyExchangeModes;
+ */
+ guint32 ke_modes_length, next_offset;
+
+ /* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ke_modes_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 1, 255)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ next_offset = offset + ke_modes_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_mode, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset++;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.4
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ * struct {
+ * DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateAuthoritiesExtension;
+ */
+ return tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.5
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>;
+ * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } OIDFilter;
+ * struct {
+ * OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } OIDFilterExtension;
+ */
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ guint32 filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+ const char *oid, *name;
+
+ /* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &filters_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ offset_end = offset + filters_length;
+
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+
+ while (offset < offset_end) {
+ subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ hf->ett.hs_ext_oid_filter, NULL, "OID Filter");
+
+ /* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &oid_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(FALSE, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, &oid);
+ offset += oid_length;
+
+ /* Append OID to tree label */
+ name = oid_resolved_from_string(wmem_packet_scope(), oid);
+ proto_item_append_text(subtree, " (%s)", name ? name : oid);
+
+ /* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &values_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_set_len(subtree, 1 + oid_length + 2 + values_length);
+ if (values_length > 0) {
+ value_offset = offset;
+ value_offset = dissect_ber_identifier(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ value_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL);
+ call_ber_oid_callback(oid, tvb, value_offset, pinfo, subtree, NULL);
+ }
+ offset += values_length;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * NameType name_type;
+ * select (name_type) {
+ * case host_name: HostName;
+ * } name;
+ * } ServerName;
+ *
+ * enum {
+ * host_name(0), (255)
+ * } NameType;
+ *
+ * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
+ * } ServerNameList;
+ */
+ proto_tree *server_name_tree;
+ guint32 list_length, server_name_length, next_offset;
+
+ /* The server SHALL include "server_name" extension with empty data. */
+ if (offset == offset_end) {
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ server_name_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_server_name, NULL, "Server Name Indication extension");
+
+ /* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + list_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset++;
+
+ /* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, next_offset, &server_name_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return next_offset;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name,
+ tvb, offset, server_name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
+ offset += server_name_length;
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl)
+{
+ guint ext_len = offset_end - offset;
+ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO && ssl && ext_len != 0) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ext_len);
+ /* Save the Session Ticket such that it can be used as identifier for
+ * restoring a previous Master Secret (in ChangeCipherSpec) */
+ ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
+ ssl->session_ticket.data, ext_len);
+ ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ext_len;
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ext_len);
+ }
+ proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
+ tvb, offset, ext_len, NULL,
+ "Data (%u byte%s)",
+ ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s"));
+ return offset + ext_len;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type, guint16 ext_type, SslSession *session)
+{
+ guint8 cert_list_length;
+ guint8 cert_type;
+ proto_tree *cert_list_tree;
+ proto_item *ti;
+
+ switch(hnd_type){
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ cert_list_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 1;
+ if (offset_end - offset != (guint32)cert_list_length)
+ return offset;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types, tvb, offset,
+ cert_list_length, cert_list_length);
+ proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%d)", cert_list_length);
+
+ /* make this a subtree */
+ cert_list_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_cert_types);
+
+ /* loop over all point formats */
+ while (cert_list_length > 0)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(cert_list_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ cert_list_length--;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
+ cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 1;
+ if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE) {
+ session->client_cert_type = cert_type;
+ }
+ if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE) {
+ session->server_cert_type = cert_type;
+ }
+ break;
+ default: /* no default */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_)
+{
+ guint32 quic_length, parameter_length, supported_versions_length, next_offset;
+
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-14#section-6.6
+ * uint32 QuicVersion;
+ * enum {
+ * initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local(0),
+ * initial_max_data(1),
+ * initial_max_bidi_streams(2),
+ * idle_timeout(3),
+ * preferred_address(4),
+ * max_packet_size(5),
+ * stateless_reset_token(6),
+ * ack_delay_exponent(7),
+ * initial_max_uni_streams(8),
+ * disable_migration(9),
+ * initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote(10),
+ * initial_max_stream_data_uni(11),
+ * (65535)
+ * } TransportParameterId;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * TransportParameterId parameter;
+ * opaque value<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } TransportParameter;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ * case client_hello:
+ * QuicVersion initial_version;
+ *
+ * case encrypted_extensions:
+ * QuicVersion negotiated_version;
+ * QuicVersion supported_versions<4..2^8-4>;
+ * };
+ * TransportParameter parameters<22..2^16-1>;
+ * } TransportParameters;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * enum { IPv4(4), IPv6(6), (15) } ipVersion;
+ * opaque ipAddress<4..2^8-1>;
+ * uint16 port;
+ * opaque connectionId<0..18>;
+ * opaque statelessResetToken[16];
+ * } PreferredAddress;
+ */
+ switch (hnd_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_initial_version,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_negotiated_version,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+ /* QuicVersion supported_versions<4..2^8-4>;*/
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &supported_versions_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions_len, 4, G_MAXUINT8-3)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 1;
+ next_offset = offset + supported_versions_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ /* TransportParameter parameters<22..2^16-1>; */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &quic_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, 22, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + quic_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ guint32 parameter_type;
+ proto_tree *parameter_tree;
+ guint32 parameter_end_offset;
+
+ parameter_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_quictp_parameter,
+ NULL, "Parameter");
+ /* TransportParameterId parameter */
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &parameter_type);
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, ": %s", val_to_str(parameter_type, quic_transport_parameter_id, "Unknown"));
+
+ /* opaque value<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, next_offset, &parameter_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return next_offset;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " (len=%u)", parameter_length);
+ proto_item_set_len(parameter_tree, 4 + parameter_length);
+ parameter_end_offset = offset + parameter_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_value,
+ tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA);
+
+ switch (parameter_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_data,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_BIDI_STREAMS:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_bidi_streams,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_IDLE_TIMEOUT:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_idle_timeout,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u secs", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_PREFERRED_ADDRESS: {
+ guint32 ipversion, ipaddress_length, connectionid_length;
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipversion,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &ipversion);
+ offset += 1;
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ipaddress_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipaddress_length, 4, G_MAXUINT8-1)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ offset += 1;
+ switch (ipversion){
+ case 4:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipaddress_ipv4,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ break;
+ case 6:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipaddress_ipv6,
+ tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipaddress,
+ tvb, offset, ipaddress_length);
+ break;
+ }
+ offset += ipaddress_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_port,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &connectionid_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_connectionid_length, 0, 18)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ offset += 1;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_connectionid,
+ tvb, offset, connectionid_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += connectionid_length;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_statelessresettoken,
+ tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 16;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_packet_size,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
+ /*TODO display expert info about invalid value (< 1252 or >65527) ? */
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_stateless_reset_token,
+ tvb, offset, 16, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 16;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ACK_DELAY_EXPONENT:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_ack_delay_exponent,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ /*TODO display multiplier (x8) and expert info about invalid value (> 20) ? */
+ offset += 1;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_UNI_STREAMS:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_uni_streams,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_DISABLE_MIGRATION:
+ /* No Payload */
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI:
+ proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data_uni,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset));
+ offset += 4;
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset += parameter_length;
+ /*TODO display expert info about unknown ? */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, parameter_end_offset)) {
+ /* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */
+ offset = parameter_end_offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean from_server, gboolean is_hrr)
+{
+ guint8 sessid_length;
+ proto_tree *rnd_tree;
+ proto_tree *ti_rnd;
+ guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
+
+ /* Prepare for renegotiation by resetting the state. */
+ ssl_reset_session(session, ssl, !from_server);
+
+ if (ssl) {
+ StringInfo *rnd;
+ if (from_server)
+ rnd = &ssl->server_random;
+ else
+ rnd = &ssl->client_random;
+
+ /* save provided random for later keyring generation */
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32);
+ rnd->data_len = 32;
+ if (from_server)
+ ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM;
+ else
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s found %s RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC,
+ from_server ? "SERVER" : "CLIENT", ssl->state);
+ }
+
+ ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_random, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA);
+
+ if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */
+
+ rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, hf->ett.hs_random);
+ /* show the time */
+ proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_time,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_TIME_SECS|ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* show the random bytes */
+ proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_bytes,
+ tvb, offset, 28, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 28;
+ } else {
+ if (is_hrr) {
+ proto_item_append_text(ti_rnd, " (HelloRetryRequest magic)");
+ }
+
+ offset += 32;
+ }
+
+ /* No Session ID with TLS 1.3 on Server Hello before draft -22 */
+ if (from_server == 0 || !(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) {
+ /* show the session id (length followed by actual Session ID) */
+ sessid_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+
+ if (ssl) {
+ /* save the authorative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec.
+ * (D)TLS restricts the SID to 32 chars, it does not make sense to
+ * save more, so ignore larger ones. */
+ if (from_server && sessid_length <= 32) {
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_id.data, offset, sessid_length);
+ ssl->session_id.data_len = sessid_length;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sessid_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id,
+ tvb, offset, sessid_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += sessid_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ gboolean has_length)
+{
+ /* TLS 1.2/1.3 status_request Client Hello Extension.
+ * TLS 1.2 status_request_v2 CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 type.
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 (status_request)
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2 (status_request_v2)
+ * struct {
+ * CertificateStatusType status_type;
+ * uint16 request_length; // for status_request_v2
+ * select (status_type) {
+ * case ocsp: OCSPStatusRequest;
+ * case ocsp_multi: OCSPStatusRequest;
+ * } request;
+ * } CertificateStatusRequest; // CertificateStatusRequestItemV2
+ *
+ * enum { ocsp(1), ocsp_multi(2), (255) } CertificateStatusType;
+ * struct {
+ * ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1>;
+ * Extensions request_extensions;
+ * } OCSPStatusRequest;
+ * opaque ResponderID<1..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ guint cert_status_type;
+
+ cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset++;
+
+ if (has_length) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+
+ switch (cert_status_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI:
+ {
+ guint32 responder_id_list_len;
+ guint32 request_extensions_len;
+
+ /* ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &responder_id_list_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ if (responder_id_list_len != 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
+ tvb, offset, responder_id_list_len,
+ "Responder ID list is not implemented, contact Wireshark"
+ " developers if you want this to be supported");
+ }
+ offset += responder_id_list_len;
+
+ /* opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &request_extensions_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ if (request_extensions_len != 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded,
+ tvb, offset, request_extensions_len,
+ "Request Extensions are not implemented, contact"
+ " Wireshark developers if you want this to be supported");
+ }
+ offset += request_extensions_len;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2
+ * struct {
+ * CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateStatusRequestListV2;
+ */
+ guint32 req_list_length, next_offset;
+
+ /* CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &req_list_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + req_list_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, TRUE);
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+tls_dissect_ocsp_response(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ guint32 response_length;
+ proto_item *ocsp_resp;
+ proto_tree *ocsp_resp_tree;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+
+ /* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>; */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &response_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 3;
+
+ ocsp_resp = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ocsp, tvb, offset,
+ response_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_item_set_text(ocsp_resp, "OCSP Response");
+ ocsp_resp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ocsp_resp, hf->ett.ocsp_response);
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+ dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1);
+ offset += response_length;;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+guint32
+tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* TLS 1.2 "CertificateStatus" handshake message.
+ * TLS 1.3 "status_request" Certificate extension.
+ * struct {
+ * CertificateStatusType status_type;
+ * select (status_type) {
+ * case ocsp: OCSPResponse;
+ * case ocsp_multi: OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2
+ * } response;
+ * } CertificateStatus;
+ * opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>;
+ * struct {
+ * OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1>;
+ * } OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2
+ */
+ guint32 status_type, resp_list_length, next_offset;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &status_type);
+ offset += 1;
+
+ switch (status_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP:
+ offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI:
+ /* OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &resp_list_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 3;
+ next_offset = offset + resp_list_length;
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.7
+ * enum { ..., (0xFFFF) } NamedGroup;
+ * struct {
+ * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>
+ * } NamedGroupList;
+ *
+ * NOTE: "NamedCurve" (RFC 4492) is renamed to "NamedGroup" (RFC 7919) and
+ * the extension itself from "elliptic_curves" to "supported_groups".
+ */
+ guint32 groups_length, next_offset;
+ proto_tree *groups_tree;
+ proto_item *ti;
+
+ /* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &groups_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + groups_length;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups,
+ tvb, offset, groups_length,
+ "Supported Groups (%d group%s)",
+ groups_length / 2,
+ plurality(groups_length/2, "", "s"));
+
+ /* make this a subtree */
+ groups_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_groups);
+
+ /* loop over all groups */
+ while (offset + 2 <= offset_end) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(groups_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, groups_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint8 ecpf_length;
+ proto_tree *ecpf_tree;
+ proto_item *ti;
+
+ ecpf_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+
+ offset += 1;
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats,
+ tvb, offset, ecpf_length,
+ "Elliptic curves point formats (%d)",
+ ecpf_length);
+
+ /* make this a subtree */
+ ecpf_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_curves_point_formats);
+
+ /* loop over all point formats */
+ while (ecpf_length > 0)
+ {
+ proto_tree_add_item(ecpf_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ ecpf_length--;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.2
+ * enum { v1(0), (255) } Version;
+ * struct {
+ * opaque key_id[32];
+ * } LogID;
+ * opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * struct {
+ * Version sct_version;
+ * LogID id;
+ * uint64 timestamp;
+ * CtExtensions extensions;
+ * digitally-signed struct { ... };
+ * } SignedCertificateTimestamp;
+ */
+ guint32 sct_version;
+ guint64 sct_timestamp_ms;
+ nstime_t sct_timestamp;
+ guint32 exts_len;
+ const gchar *log_name;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &sct_version);
+ offset++;
+ if (sct_version != 0) {
+ // TODO expert info about unknown SCT version?
+ return offset;
+ }
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_logid, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ log_name = bytesval_to_str(tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, 32), 32, ct_logids, "Unknown Log");
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%s)", log_name);
+ offset += 32;
+ sct_timestamp_ms = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset);
+ sct_timestamp.secs = (time_t)(sct_timestamp_ms / 1000);
+ sct_timestamp.nsecs = (int)((sct_timestamp_ms % 1000) * 1000000);
+ proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &sct_timestamp);
+ offset += 8;
+ /* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
+ hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ if (exts_len > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions, tvb, offset, exts_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += exts_len;
+ }
+ offset = ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
+ hf->hf.sct_sct_signature_length,
+ hf->hf.sct_sct_signature);
+ return offset;
+}
+
+guint32
+tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3
+ * opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>;
+ * struct {
+ * SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>;
+ * } SignedCertificateTimestampList;
+ */
+ guint32 list_length, sct_length, next_offset;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+
+ /* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length,
+ hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ while (offset < offset_end) {
+ subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.sct, NULL, "Signed Certificate Timestamp");
+
+ /* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &sct_length,
+ hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + sct_length;
+ proto_item_set_len(subtree, 2 + sct_length);
+ offset = tls_dissect_sct(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, version);
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_)
+{
+ guint32 record_digest_length, encrypted_sni_length;
+
+ switch (hnd_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * CipherSuite suite;
+ * KeyShareEntry key_share;
+ * opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } ClientEncryptedSNI;
+ */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+
+ /* opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &record_digest_length,
+ hf->hf.esni_record_digest_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ if (record_digest_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_record_digest, tvb, offset, record_digest_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += record_digest_length;
+ }
+
+ /* opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &encrypted_sni_length,
+ hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ if (encrypted_sni_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni, tvb, offset, encrypted_sni_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += encrypted_sni_length;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.esni_nonce, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 16;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+/** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). }}} */
+
+/* Whether the Content and Handshake Types are valid; handle Protocol Version. {{{ */
+gboolean
+ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type)
+{
+ switch ((ContentType) type) {
+ case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL_ID_ALERT:
+ case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE:
+ case SSL_ID_APP_DATA:
+ case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT:
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ switch ((HandshakeType) hs_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ /* hello_verify_request is DTLS-only */
+ return is_dtls;
+
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
+ case SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+ case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE:
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY:
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG:
+ case SSL_HND_FINISHED:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_URL:
+ case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS:
+ case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
+ case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE:
+ case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS:
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
+ gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ /* Consider all valid Handshake messages (except for Client Hello) and
+ * all other valid record types (other than Handshake) */
+ return (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(handshake_type, is_dtls) &&
+ handshake_type != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+ (content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE &&
+ ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Scan a Server Hello handshake message for the negotiated version. For TLS 1.3
+ * draft 22 and newer, it also checks whether it is a HelloRetryRequest.
+ */
+void
+tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 *server_version, gboolean *is_hrr)
+{
+ /* SHA256("HelloRetryRequest") */
+ static const guint8 tls13_hrr_random_magic[] = {
+ 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91,
+ 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
+ };
+ guint8 session_id_length;
+
+ *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+
+ /*
+ * Try to look for supported_versions extension. Minimum length:
+ * 2 + 32 + 1 = 35 (version, random, session id length)
+ * 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 (cipher suite, compression method, extensions length)
+ * 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 (ext type, ext len, version)
+ */
+ if (*server_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION && offset_end - offset >= 46) {
+ offset += 2;
+ *is_hrr = tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, tls13_hrr_random_magic, sizeof(tls13_hrr_random_magic)) == 0;
+ offset += 32;
+ session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ offset++;
+ if (offset_end - offset < session_id_length + 5u) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += session_id_length + 5;
+
+ while (offset_end - offset >= 6) {
+ guint16 ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ guint16 ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
+ if (offset_end - offset < 4u + ext_len) {
+ break; /* not enough data for type, length and data */
+ }
+ if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS && ext_len == 2) {
+ *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4);
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 4 + ext_len;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *is_hrr = FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type,
+ gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version)
+{
+ guint8 tls13_draft = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type,
+ is_dtls))
+ return;
+
+ if (handshake_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ tls13_draft = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
+ if (tls13_draft != 0) {
+ /* This is TLS 1.3 (a draft version). */
+ version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (version) {
+ case SSLV3_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION:
+ if (is_dtls)
+ return;
+ break;
+
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ if (!is_dtls)
+ return;
+ break;
+
+ default: /* invalid version number */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ session->tls13_draft_version = tls13_draft;
+ session->version = version;
+ if (ssl) {
+ ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, version, ssl->state);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo,
+ guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi,
+ guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb)
+{
+ guint max_expansion;
+ if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ /* TLS 1.3: Max length is 2^14 + 256 */
+ max_expansion = 256;
+ } else {
+ /* RFC 5246, Section 6.2.3: TLSCiphertext.fragment length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048 */
+ max_expansion = 2048;
+ }
+ if (record_length > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + max_expansion) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
+ "TLSCiphertext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + %u", max_expansion);
+ }
+ if (decrypted_tvb && tvb_captured_length(decrypted_tvb) > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid,
+ "TLSPlaintext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14");
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher)
+{
+ /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
+ ssl->session.cipher = cipher;
+
+ if (!(ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(cipher))) {
+ ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher suite 0x%04X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher);
+ } else {
+ /* Cipher found, save this for the delayed decoder init */
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER;
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s found CIPHER 0x%04X %s -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher,
+ val_to_str_ext_const(cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"),
+ ssl->state);
+ }
+}
+/* }}} */
+
+
+/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. {{{ */
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls);
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session,
+ SslDecryptSession *ssl, dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion client_version;
+ * Random random;
+ * SessionID session_id;
+ * opaque cookie<0..32>; //new field for DTLS
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
+ * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
+ * Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } ClientHello;
+ */
+ proto_item *ti;
+ proto_tree *cs_tree;
+ guint32 cipher_suite_length;
+ guint32 compression_methods_length;
+ guint8 compression_method;
+ guint32 next_offset;
+
+ /* show the client version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_client_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, FALSE, FALSE);
+
+ /* fields specific for DTLS (cookie_len, cookie) */
+ if (dtls_hfs != NULL) {
+ guint32 cookie_length;
+ /* opaque cookie<0..32> (for DTLS only) */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length,
+ dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len, 0, 32)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ if (cookie_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie,
+ tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += cookie_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + cipher_suite_length;
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites,
+ tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length,
+ "Cipher Suites (%d suite%s)",
+ cipher_suite_length / 2,
+ plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s"));
+ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cipher_suites);
+ while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, cs_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+
+ /* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compression_methods_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ next_offset = offset + compression_methods_length;
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_comp_methods,
+ tvb, offset, compression_methods_length,
+ "Compression Methods (%u method%s)",
+ compression_methods_length,
+ plurality(compression_methods_length,
+ "", "s"));
+ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.comp_methods);
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ /* TODO: make reserved/private comp meth. fields selectable */
+ if (compression_method < 64)
+ proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
+ tvb, offset, 1, compression_method);
+ else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193)
+ proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
+ compression_method, "Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)",
+ compression_method);
+ else
+ proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1,
+ compression_method, "Private use range (%u)",
+ compression_method);
+ offset++;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
+ if (offset < offset_end) {
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end, SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ session, ssl, dtls_hfs != NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls, gboolean is_hrr)
+{
+ /* struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * Random random;
+ * SessionID session_id; // TLS 1.2 and before
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+ * CompressionMethod compression_method; // TLS 1.2 and before
+ * Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerHello;
+ */
+ guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
+
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL,
+ val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"));
+
+ /* Initially assume that the session is resumed. If this is not the case, a
+ * ServerHelloDone will be observed before the ChangeCipherSpec message
+ * which will reset this flag. */
+ session->is_session_resumed = TRUE;
+
+ /* show the server version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, TRUE, is_hrr);
+
+ if (ssl) {
+ /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */
+ ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset));
+ }
+
+ /* now the server-selected cipher suite */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* No compression with TLS 1.3 before draft -22 */
+ if (!(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) {
+ if (ssl) {
+ /* store selected compression method for decryption */
+ ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ }
+ /* and the server-selected compression method */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */
+ if (offset < offset_end) {
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end,
+ is_hrr ? SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO,
+ session, ssl, is_dtls);
+ }
+}
+/* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. }}} */
+
+/* New Session Ticket dissection. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 (TLS >= 1.0):
+ * struct {
+ * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } NewSessionTicket;
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1 (TLS 1.3):
+ * struct {
+ * uint32 ticket_lifetime;
+ * uint32 ticket_age_add;
+ * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; // new in draft -21, updated in -22
+ * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
+ * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
+ * } NewSessionTicket;
+ */
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ proto_item *subitem;
+ guint32 ticket_len;
+ gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
+ guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
+ guint32 lifetime_hint;
+
+ subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ hf->ett.session_ticket, NULL,
+ "TLS Session Ticket");
+
+ /* ticket lifetime hint */
+ subitem = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &lifetime_hint);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ if (lifetime_hint >= 60) {
+ gchar *time_str = unsigned_time_secs_to_str(wmem_packet_scope(), lifetime_hint);
+ proto_item_append_text(subitem, " (%s)", time_str);
+ }
+
+ if (is_tls13) {
+
+ /* for TLS 1.3: ticket_age_add */
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_age_add,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* for TLS 1.3: ticket_nonce (coming with Draft 21)*/
+ if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 21) {
+ guint32 ticket_nonce_len;
+
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_nonce_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce_len, 0, 255)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce, tvb, offset, ticket_nonce_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += ticket_nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1> (with TLS 1.3 the minimum is 1) */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* Content depends on implementation, so just show data! */
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket,
+ tvb, offset, ticket_len, ENC_NA);
+ /* save the session ticket to cache for ssl_finalize_decryption */
+ if (ssl && !is_tls13) {
+ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ticket_len);
+ ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(),
+ ssl->session_ticket.data, ticket_len);
+ ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ticket_len;
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ticket_len);
+ /* NewSessionTicket is received after the first (client)
+ * ChangeCipherSpec, and before the second (server) ChangeCipherSpec.
+ * Since the second CCS has already the session key available it will
+ * just return. To ensure that the session ticket is mapped to a
+ * master key (from the first CCS), save the ticket here too. */
+ ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", session_hash,
+ &ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret);
+ ssl->state |= SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+ }
+ offset += ticket_len;
+
+ if (is_tls13) {
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end, SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET,
+ session, ssl, is_dtls);
+ }
+} /* }}} */
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.1.4
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * CipherSuite cipher_suite; // not before draft -19
+ * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
+ * } HelloRetryRequest;
+ * Note: no longer used since draft -22
+ */
+ guint32 version;
+ guint8 draft_version;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version);
+ draft_version = extract_tls13_draft_version(version);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ }
+
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end, SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ session, ssl, is_dtls);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.3.1
+ * struct {
+ * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } EncryptedExtensions;
+ */
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end, SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ session, ssl, is_dtls);
+}
+
+/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
+ guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_,
+ GHashTable *key_hash _U_, gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ /* opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;
+ *
+ * Before RFC 8446 (TLS <= 1.2):
+ * struct {
+ * select(certificate_type) {
+ *
+ * // certificate type defined in RFC 7250
+ * case RawPublicKey:
+ * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
+ *
+ * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246
+ * case X.509:
+ * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+ * };
+ * } Certificate;
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 (since draft -20):
+ * struct {
+ * select(certificate_type){
+ * case RawPublicKey:
+ * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
+ * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
+ *
+ * case X.509:
+ * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
+ * }
+ * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateEntry;
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+ * } Certificate;
+ */
+ enum { CERT_X509, CERT_RPK } cert_type;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+ gnutls_datum_t subjectPublicKeyInfo = { NULL, 0 };
+#endif
+ guint32 next_offset, certificate_list_length, cert_length;
+ proto_tree *subtree = tree;
+ guint certificate_index = 0;
+
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+
+ if ((is_from_server && session->server_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
+ (!is_from_server && session->client_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
+ cert_type = CERT_RPK;
+ } else {
+ cert_type = CERT_X509;
+ }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+ /* Ask the pkcs1 dissector to return the public key details */
+ if (ssl)
+ asn1_ctx.private_data = &subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+#endif
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
+ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ guint32 context_length;
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ if (context_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
+ tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += context_length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && cert_type == CERT_RPK) {
+ /* For RPK before TLS 1.3, the single RPK is stored directly without
+ * another "certificate_list" field. */
+ certificate_list_length = offset_end - offset;
+ next_offset = offset_end;
+ } else {
+ /* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &certificate_list_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificates_len, 0, G_MAXUINT24)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */
+ next_offset = offset + certificate_list_length;
+ }
+
+ /* RawPublicKey must have one cert, but X.509 can have multiple. */
+ if (certificate_list_length > 0 && cert_type == CERT_X509) {
+ proto_item *ti;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificates,
+ tvb, offset, certificate_list_length,
+ "Certificates (%u bytes)",
+ certificate_list_length);
+
+ /* make it a subtree */
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.certificates);
+ }
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ switch (cert_type) {
+ case CERT_RPK:
+ /* TODO add expert info if there is more than one RPK entry (certificate_index > 0) */
+ /* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 3;
+
+ dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
+ offset += cert_length;
+ break;
+ case CERT_X509:
+ /* opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset += 3;
+
+ dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate);
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS)
+ if (is_from_server && ssl && certificate_index == 0) {
+ ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(ssl, key_hash, &subjectPublicKeyInfo);
+ /* Only attempt to get the RSA modulus for the first cert. */
+ asn1_ctx.private_data = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ offset += cert_length;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) {
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset,
+ next_offset, SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE,
+ session, ssl, is_dtls);
+ }
+
+ certificate_index++;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ /* From SSL 3.0 and up (note that since TLS 1.1 certificate_authorities can be empty):
+ * enum {
+ * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
+ * (255)
+ * } ClientCertificateType;
+ *
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ *
+ *
+ * As per TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246) the format has changed to:
+ *
+ * enum {
+ * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
+ * rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(5), dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(6),
+ * fortezza_dms_RESERVED(20), (255)
+ * } ClientCertificateType;
+ *
+ * enum {
+ * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
+ * sha512(6), (255)
+ * } HashAlgorithm;
+ *
+ * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
+ * SignatureAlgorithm;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * HashAlgorithm hash;
+ * SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+ * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+ *
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
+ * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ *
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ *
+ * draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ * SignatureScheme
+ * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+ * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 (since draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19):
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ */
+ proto_item *ti;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ guint32 next_offset;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+ gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
+ guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version;
+
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+
+ if (is_tls13) {
+ guint32 context_length;
+ /* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length,
+ hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ if (context_length > 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context,
+ tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += context_length;
+ }
+ } else {
+ guint32 cert_types_count;
+ /* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_types_count,
+ hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ offset++;
+ next_offset = offset + cert_types_count;
+
+ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree,
+ hf->hf.hs_cert_types,
+ tvb, offset, cert_types_count,
+ "Certificate types (%u type%s)",
+ cert_types_count,
+ plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s"));
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cert_types);
+
+ while (offset < next_offset) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION ||
+ (is_tls13 && (draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 19))) {
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end);
+ }
+
+ if (is_tls13 && (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19)) {
+ /*
+ * TLS 1.3 draft 19 and newer: Extensions.
+ * SslDecryptSession pointer is NULL because Certificate Extensions
+ * should not influence decryption state.
+ */
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset,
+ offset_end, SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST,
+ session, NULL, is_dtls);
+ } else if (is_tls13 && draft_version <= 18) {
+ /*
+ * TLS 1.3 draft 18 and older: certificate_authorities and
+ * certificate_extensions (a vector of OID mappings).
+ */
+ offset = tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+ } else {
+ /* for TLS 1.2 and older, the certificate_authorities field. */
+ tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end);
+ }
+}
+/* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. }}} */
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version)
+{
+ ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
+ hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig);
+}
+
+/* Finished dissection. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs)
+{
+ /* For SSLv3:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque md5_hash[16];
+ * opaque sha_hash[20];
+ * } Finished;
+ *
+ * For (D)TLS:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque verify_data[12];
+ * } Finished;
+ *
+ * For TLS 1.3:
+ * struct {
+ * opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
+ * }
+ */
+ if (!tree)
+ return;
+
+ if (session->version == SSLV3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl_hfs != NULL) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_md5_hash,
+ tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_sha_hash,
+ tvb, offset + 16, 20, ENC_NA);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Length should be 12 for TLS before 1.3, assume this is the case. */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_finished,
+ tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, ENC_NA);
+ }
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* RFC 6066 Certificate URL handshake message dissection. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ guint16 url_hash_len;
+
+ /* enum {
+ * individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255)
+ * } CertChainType;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * CertChainType type;
+ * URLAndHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateURL;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque url<1..2^16-1>;
+ * unint8 padding;
+ * opaque SHA1Hash[20];
+ * } URLAndHash;
+ */
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_type,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset++;
+
+ url_hash_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ while (url_hash_len-- > 0) {
+ proto_item *urlhash_item;
+ proto_tree *urlhash_tree;
+ guint16 url_len;
+
+ urlhash_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item,
+ tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ urlhash_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(urlhash_item, hf->ett.urlhash);
+
+ url_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url,
+ tvb, offset, url_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
+ offset += url_len;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_padding,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+ offset++;
+ /* Note: RFC 6066 says that padding must be 0x01 */
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_sha1,
+ tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 20;
+ }
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* Dissection of TLS Extensions in Client Hello, Server Hello, etc. {{{ */
+static gint
+ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type,
+ SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl,
+ gboolean is_dtls)
+{
+ guint32 exts_len;
+ guint16 ext_type;
+ guint32 ext_len;
+ guint32 next_offset;
+ proto_tree *ext_tree;
+ gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION;
+
+ /* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2> (for TLS 1.3 HRR/CR min-length is 2) */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ offset_end = offset + exts_len;
+
+ while (offset_end - offset >= 4)
+ {
+ ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2);
+
+ ext_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len, hf->ett.hs_ext, NULL,
+ "Extension: %s (len=%u)", val_to_str(ext_type,
+ tls_hello_extension_types,
+ "Unknown type %u"), ext_len);
+
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_type,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ext_type);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1> */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, offset_end, &ext_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ next_offset = offset + ext_len;
+
+ switch (ext_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST:
+ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, FALSE);
+ } else if (is_tls13 && hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE) {
+ offset = tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
+ offset, next_offset,
+ hnd_type, ext_type,
+ session);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT: /* since TLS 1.3 draft -23 */
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(hf, tvb, ext_tree, pinfo, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP:
+ if (is_dtls) {
+ offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ } else {
+ // XXX expert info: This extension MUST only be used with DTLS, and not with TLS.
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT:
+ proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_heartbeat_mode,
+ tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, session, is_dtls);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2:
+ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO)
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP:
+ // TLS 1.3 note: SCT only appears in EE in draft -16 and before.
+ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS || hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE)
+ offset = tls_dissect_sct_list(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session->version);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree,
+ offset, next_offset,
+ hnd_type, ext_type,
+ session);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING:
+ proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_padding_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += ext_len;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
+ if (ssl && hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ ssl_debug_printf("%s enabling Encrypt-then-MAC\n", G_STRFUNC);
+ ssl->state |= SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
+ if (ssl) {
+ switch (hnd_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET;
+ break;
+ default: /* no default */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE_OLD: /* used before TLS 1.3 draft -23 */
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS:
+ switch (hnd_type) {
+ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO:
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
+ proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH:
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset);
+ break;
+ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPTED_SERVER_NAME:
+ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl);
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data,
+ tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += ext_len;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset)) {
+ /* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */
+ offset = next_offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if Extensions vector is correctly terminated. */
+ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end)) {
+ offset = offset_end;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+} /* }}} */
+
+
+/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 length)
+{
+ gint point_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
+
+ ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
+
+ /* point */
+ point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, tvb,
+ offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point, tvb,
+ offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
+{
+ gint yc_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
+
+ ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Client Params");
+
+ /* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic.dh_public (explicit) */
+ yc_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc, tvb,
+ offset + 2, yc_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 length, const SslSession *session)
+{
+ gint epms_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
+
+ ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret");
+
+ /* EncryptedPreMasterSecret.pre_master_secret */
+ switch (session->version) {
+ case SSLV2_VERSION:
+ case SSLV3_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION:
+ /* OpenSSL pre-0.9.8f DTLS and pre-TLS quirk: 2-octet length vector is
+ * not present. The handshake contents represents the EPMS, see:
+ * https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=10222 */
+ epms_len = length;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* TLS and DTLS include vector length before EPMS */
+ epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
+ offset, epms_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+
+/* Used in PSK cipher suites */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
+{
+ guint identity_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
+
+ ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Client Params");
+ /* identity */
+ identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb,
+ offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+
+/* Used in RSA PSK cipher suites */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset,
+ guint32 length)
+{
+ gint identity_len, epms_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
+
+ ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA PSK Client Params");
+
+ /* identity */
+ identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity,
+ tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + identity_len;
+
+ /* Yc */
+ epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb,
+ offset + 2, epms_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+/* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
+
+
+/* Dissects DigitallySigned (see RFC 5246 4.7 Cryptographic Attributes). {{{ */
+static guint32
+ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig)
+{
+ guint32 sig_len;
+
+ switch (version) {
+ case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION:
+ case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION:
+ tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, tree, offset);
+ offset += 2;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Sig */
+ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sig_len,
+ hf_sig_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) {
+ return offset_end;
+ }
+ offset += 2;
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_sig, tvb, offset, sig_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += sig_len;
+ return offset;
+} /* }}} */
+
+/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */
+
+/* dissects signed_params inside a ServerKeyExchange for some keyex algos */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version)
+{
+ /*
+ * TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246 sec 7.4.8)
+ * struct {
+ * digitally-signed struct {
+ * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
+ * }
+ * } CertificateVerify;
+ *
+ * TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1 (RFC 5436 sec 7.4.8 and 7.4.3) works essentially the same
+ * as TLSv1.2, but the hash algorithms are not explicit in digitally-signed.
+ *
+ * SSLv3 (RFC 6101 sec 5.6.8) essentially works the same as TLSv1.0 but it
+ * does more hashing including the master secret and padding.
+ */
+ ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version,
+ hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig_len,
+ hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig);
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version, gboolean anon)
+{
+ /*
+ * RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ECCurveType curve_type;
+ * select (curve_type) {
+ * case explicit_prime:
+ * ...
+ * case explicit_char2:
+ * ...
+ * case named_curve:
+ * NamedCurve namedcurve;
+ * };
+ * } ECParameters;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
+ * } ECPoint;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ *
+ * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
+ * case ec_diffie_hellman:
+ * ServerECDHParams params;
+ * Signature signed_params;
+ * } ServerKeyExchange;
+ */
+
+ gint curve_type;
+ gint point_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree;
+
+ ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
+
+ /* ECParameters.curve_type */
+ curve_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, tvb,
+ offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+ if (curve_type != 3)
+ return; /* only named_curves are supported */
+
+ /* case curve_type == named_curve; ECParameters.namedcurve */
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_named_curve, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ /* ECPoint.point */
+ point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, tvb,
+ offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point, tvb,
+ offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 1 + point_len;
+
+ /* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
+ if (!anon) {
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_ecdh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version, gboolean anon)
+{
+ gint p_len, g_len, ys_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree;
+
+ ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Server Params");
+
+ /* p */
+ p_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p, tvb,
+ offset + 2, p_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + p_len;
+
+ /* g */
+ g_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g, tvb,
+ offset + 2, g_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + g_len;
+
+ /* Ys */
+ ys_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ys_len);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys, tvb,
+ offset + 2, ys_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + ys_len;
+
+ /* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */
+ if (!anon) {
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_dh_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Only used in RSA-EXPORT cipher suites */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ guint16 version)
+{
+ gint modulus_len, exponent_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree;
+
+ ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA-EXPORT Server Params");
+
+ /* modulus */
+ modulus_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus, tvb,
+ offset + 2, modulus_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + modulus_len;
+
+ /* exponent */
+ exponent_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent_len,
+ tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent,
+ tvb, offset + 2, exponent_len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += 2 + exponent_len;
+
+ /* Signature */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_rsa_tree, offset, offset_end, version);
+}
+
+/* Used in RSA PSK and PSK cipher suites */
+static void
+dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
+{
+ guint hint_len;
+ proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree;
+
+ hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
+ if ((2 + hint_len) != length) {
+ /* Lengths don't line up (wasn't what we expected?) */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length,
+ hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Server Params");
+
+ /* hint */
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, tvb,
+ offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, tvb,
+ offset + 2, hint_len, ENC_NA);
+}
+/* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */
+
+/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. {{{ */
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length,
+ const SslSession *session)
+{
+ switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
+ case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DH_ANON: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
+ case KEX_DH_DSS:
+ case KEX_DH_RSA:
+ case KEX_DHE_DSS:
+ case KEX_DHE_RSA:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */
+ /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
+ case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
+ case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; ec_diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */
+ /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
+ break;
+ case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; krb5: KerberosWrapper */
+ /* XXX: implement support for KRB5 */
+ break;
+ case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk: psk_identity */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
+ break;
+ case KEX_RSA: /* RFC 5246; rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length, session);
+ break;
+ case KEX_RSA_PSK: /* RFC 4279; rsa_psk: psk_identity, EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length);
+ break;
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ClientSRPPublic */
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
+ /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake/ used in Thread Commissioning */
+ /* XXX: implement support for ECJPAKE */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end,
+ const SslSession *session)
+{
+ switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) {
+ case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; ServerDHParams */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
+ break;
+ case KEX_DH_DSS: /* RFC 5246; not allowed */
+ case KEX_DH_RSA:
+ /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHE_DSS: /* RFC 5246; dhe_dss, dhe_rsa: ServerDHParams, Signature */
+ case KEX_DHE_RSA:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
+ break;
+ case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity_hint, ServerDHParams */
+ /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams (without signature for anon) */
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE);
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; psk_identity_hint, ServerECDHParams */
+ /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams, Signature */
+ case KEX_ECDH_RSA:
+ case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ case KEX_ECDHE_RSA:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE);
+ break;
+ case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; not allowed */
+ /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */
+ break;
+ case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity*/
+ case KEX_RSA_PSK:
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end - offset);
+ break;
+ case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits*/
+ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version);
+ break;
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ServerSRPParams, Signature */
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS:
+ case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA:
+ /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */
+ break;
+ case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake/ used in Thread Commissioning */
+ /* XXX: implement support for ECJPAKE */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */
+ break;
+ }
+}
+/* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. }}} */
+
+void
+tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset)
+{
+ /* RFC 8446 Section 4.6.3
+ * enum {
+ * update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255)
+ * } KeyUpdateRequest;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * KeyUpdateRequest request_update;
+ * } KeyUpdate;
+ */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_key_update_request_update, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_common_register_ssl_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
+ const char *ui_name, const int proto)
+{
+ ssl_alpn_dissector_table = register_dissector_table(name, ui_name,
+ proto, FT_STRING, FALSE);
+ register_dissector_table_alias(ssl_alpn_dissector_table, "ssl.handshake.extensions_alpn_str");
+}
+
+void
+ssl_common_register_dtls_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name,
+ const char *ui_name, const int proto)
+{
+ dtls_alpn_dissector_table = register_dissector_table(name, ui_name,
+ proto, FT_STRING, FALSE);
+ register_dissector_table_alias(ssl_alpn_dissector_table, "dtls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str");
+}
+
+void
+ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options)
+{
+ prefs_register_string_preference(module, "psk", "Pre-Shared-Key",
+ "Pre-Shared-Key as HEX string. Should be 0 to 16 bytes.",
+ &(options->psk));
+
+ prefs_register_filename_preference(module, "keylog_file", "(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename",
+ "The name of a file which contains a list of \n"
+ "(pre-)master secrets in one of the following formats:\n"
+ "\n"
+ "RSA <EPMS> <PMS>\n"
+ "RSA Session-ID:<SSLID> Master-Key:<MS>\n"
+ "CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <MS>\n"
+ "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM <CRAND> <PMS>\n"
+ "\n"
+ "Where:\n"
+ "<EPMS> = First 8 bytes of the Encrypted PMS\n"
+ "<PMS> = The Pre-Master-Secret (PMS) used to derive the MS\n"
+ "<SSLID> = The SSL Session ID\n"
+ "<MS> = The Master-Secret (MS)\n"
+ "<CRAND> = The Client's random number from the ClientHello message\n"
+ "\n"
+ "(All fields are in hex notation)",
+ &(options->keylog_filename), FALSE);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length)
+{
+ if (ssl_session && ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && !(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) {
+ guint32 old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len;
+ ssl_debug_printf("Calculating hash with offset %d %d\n", offset, length);
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length);
+ if (tvb) {
+ tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, offset, length);
+ } else {
+ memset(ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, 0, length);
+ }
+ ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
+ *
+ * Local variables:
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 8
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ *
+ * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab:
+ * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true:
+ */
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