/* packet-ssl.c * Routines for ssl dissection * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro * * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer * By Gerald Combs * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. * * See * * http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html * * for SSL 2.0 specs. * * See * * http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt * * for SSL 3.0 specs. * * See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs. * * See (among other places) * * http://www.graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm * * for PCT 1 draft specs. * * See * * http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-05.txt * * for Elliptic Curve Cryptography cipher suites. * * See * * http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-camellia-04.txt * * for Camellia-based cipher suites. * * Notes: * * - Does not support dissection * of frames that would require state maintained between frames * (e.g., single ssl records spread across multiple tcp frames) * * - Identifies, but does not fully dissect the following messages: * * - SSLv3/TLS (These need more state from previous handshake msgs) * - Certificate Verify * * - SSLv2 (These don't appear in the clear) * - Error * - Client Finished * - Server Verify * - Server Finished * - Request Certificate * - Client Certificate * * - Decryption needs to be performed 'sequentially', so it's done * at packet reception time. This may cause a significant packet capture * slow down. This also causes dissection of some ssl info that in previous * dissector versions was dissected only when a proto_tree context was * available * * We are at Packet reception if time pinfo->fd->flags.visited == 0 * */ #include "config.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet-tcp.h" #include "packet-x509af.h" #include "packet-ocsp.h" #include "packet-ssl.h" #include "packet-ssl-utils.h" void proto_register_ssl(void); static ssldecrypt_assoc_t *sslkeylist_uats = NULL; static guint nssldecrypt = 0; static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE; static gboolean ssl_desegment_app_data = TRUE; gboolean ssl_ignore_mac_failed = FALSE; /********************************************************************* * * Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures * *********************************************************************/ /* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */ static gint ssl_tap = -1; static gint exported_pdu_tap = -1; static gint proto_ssl = -1; static gint hf_ssl_record = -1; static gint hf_ssl_record_content_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl_record_version = -1; static gint hf_ssl_record_length = -1; static gint hf_ssl_record_appdata = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1; static gint hf_pct_msg_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl_alert_message = -1; static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_level = -1; static gint hf_ssl_alert_message_description = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_protocol = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_length = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_server_cert = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1; static gint hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1; static gint hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1; /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ static int hf_ssl_pct_client_version = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_pad = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_session_id_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_challenge_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_ch_offset = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_cipher_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_hash_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_cert_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_exch_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_iv_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_encryption_key_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_mac_key_length_in_bits = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_iv_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_server_version = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_sh_restart_session_ok_flag = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_sh_client_auth_req_flag = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_connection_id_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_server_certificate_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_sig_specs_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_response_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_signature = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_server_response = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_client_certificate_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_response_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_server_session_id_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_server_response_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_error_information_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cipher = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_hash = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cert = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_exch = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_cert = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_sig = -1; static int hf_ssl_pct_error_information_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_reassembled_in = -1; static int hf_ssl_reassembled_length = -1; static int hf_ssl_reassembled_data = -1; static int hf_ssl_segments = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_overlap = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_error = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_count = -1; static int hf_ssl_segment_data = -1; static gint hf_ssl_heartbeat_message = -1; static gint hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload_length = -1; static gint hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload = -1; static gint hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_padding = -1; static ssl_hfs_t ssl_hfs = { -1, -1 }; /* Initialize the subtree pointers */ static gint ett_ssl = -1; static gint ett_ssl_record = -1; static gint ett_ssl_alert = -1; static gint ett_ssl_handshake = -1; static gint ett_ssl_heartbeat = -1; static gint ett_ssl_certs = -1; static gint ett_ssl_cert_status = -1; static gint ett_ssl_ocsp_resp = -1; static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1; static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1; static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1; static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1; static gint ett_ssl_segments = -1; static gint ett_ssl_segment = -1; static expert_field ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length = EI_INIT; /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ static expert_field ei_ssl_pct_ch_offset = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_ssl_pct_server_version = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_ssl_ignored_unknown_record = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_ssl_pct_client_version = EI_INIT; /* not all of the hf_fields below make sense for SSL but we have to provide them anyways to comply with the api (which was aimed for ip fragment reassembly) */ static const fragment_items ssl_segment_items = { &ett_ssl_segment, &ett_ssl_segments, &hf_ssl_segments, &hf_ssl_segment, &hf_ssl_segment_overlap, &hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict, &hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails, &hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment, &hf_ssl_segment_error, &hf_ssl_segment_count, &hf_ssl_reassembled_in, &hf_ssl_reassembled_length, &hf_ssl_reassembled_data, "Segments" }; static SSL_COMMON_LIST_T(dissect_ssl3_hf); static void ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data( proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, gint length, const gchar *prefix) { proto_tree_add_bytes_format( tree, hf_ssl_segment_data, tvb, offset, length, NULL, "%sSSL segment data (%u %s)", prefix != NULL ? prefix : "", length, plurality(length, "byte", "bytes")); } static ssl_master_key_map_t ssl_master_key_map; /* used by "Export SSL Session Keys" */ GHashTable *ssl_session_hash; GHashTable *ssl_crandom_hash; static GHashTable *ssl_key_hash = NULL; static wmem_stack_t *key_list_stack = NULL; static dissector_table_t ssl_associations = NULL; static dissector_handle_t ssl_handle = NULL; static StringInfo ssl_compressed_data = {NULL, 0}; static StringInfo ssl_decrypted_data = {NULL, 0}; static gint ssl_decrypted_data_avail = 0; static FILE *ssl_keylog_file = NULL; static uat_t *ssldecrypt_uat = NULL; static const gchar *ssl_keys_list = NULL; static ssl_common_options_t ssl_options = { NULL, NULL}; /* List of dissectors to call for SSL data */ static heur_dissector_list_t ssl_heur_subdissector_list; #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT static const gchar *ssl_debug_file_name = NULL; #endif /* Forward declaration we need below */ void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void); /* Desegmentation of SSL streams */ /* table to hold defragmented SSL streams */ static reassembly_table ssl_reassembly_table; /* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */ static void ssl_init(void) { module_t *ssl_module = prefs_find_module("ssl"); pref_t *keys_list_pref; ssl_common_init(&ssl_master_key_map, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_compressed_data); reassembly_table_init(&ssl_reassembly_table, &addresses_ports_reassembly_table_functions); ssl_debug_flush(); /* for "Export SSL Session Keys" */ ssl_session_hash = ssl_master_key_map.session; ssl_crandom_hash = ssl_master_key_map.crandom; /* We should have loaded "keys_list" by now. Mark it obsolete */ if (ssl_module) { keys_list_pref = prefs_find_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list"); if (! prefs_get_preference_obsolete(keys_list_pref)) { prefs_set_preference_obsolete(keys_list_pref); } } } static void ssl_cleanup(void) { if (key_list_stack != NULL) { wmem_destroy_stack(key_list_stack); key_list_stack = NULL; } reassembly_table_destroy(&ssl_reassembly_table); ssl_common_cleanup(&ssl_master_key_map, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_compressed_data); /* should not be needed since the UI code prevents this from being accessed * when no file is open. Clear it anyway just to be sure. */ ssl_session_hash = NULL; ssl_crandom_hash = NULL; } /* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */ static void ssl_parse_uat(void) { guint i; guint16 port; dissector_handle_t handle; ssl_set_debug(ssl_debug_file_name); if (ssl_key_hash) { g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash); } /* remove only associations created from key list */ if (key_list_stack != NULL) { while (wmem_stack_count(key_list_stack) > 0) { port = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(wmem_stack_pop(key_list_stack)); handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, port); if (handle != NULL) ssl_association_remove("ssl.port", ssl_handle, handle, port, FALSE); } } /* parse private keys string, load available keys and put them in key hash*/ ssl_key_hash = g_hash_table_new_full(ssl_private_key_hash, ssl_private_key_equal, g_free, ssl_private_key_free); if (nssldecrypt > 0) { if (key_list_stack == NULL) key_list_stack = wmem_stack_new(NULL); for (i = 0; i < nssldecrypt; i++) { ssldecrypt_assoc_t *ssl_uat = &(sslkeylist_uats[i]); ssl_parse_key_list(ssl_uat, ssl_key_hash, "ssl.port", ssl_handle, TRUE); if (key_list_stack && ws_strtou16(ssl_uat->port, NULL, &port) && port > 0) wmem_stack_push(key_list_stack, GUINT_TO_POINTER(port)); } } ssl_debug_flush(); } static void ssl_parse_old_keys(void) { gchar **old_keys, **parts, *err; gchar *uat_entry; guint i; /* Import old-style keys */ if (ssldecrypt_uat && ssl_keys_list && ssl_keys_list[0]) { old_keys = wmem_strsplit(NULL, ssl_keys_list, ";", 0); for (i = 0; old_keys[i] != NULL; i++) { parts = wmem_strsplit(NULL, old_keys[i], ",", 5); if (parts[0] && parts[1] && parts[2] && parts[3]) { gchar *path = uat_esc(parts[3], (guint)strlen(parts[3])); const gchar *password = parts[4] ? parts[4] : ""; uat_entry = wmem_strdup_printf(NULL, "\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\"", parts[0], parts[1], parts[2], path, password); g_free(path); if (!uat_load_str(ssldecrypt_uat, uat_entry, &err)) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_parse_old_keys: Can't load UAT string %s: %s\n", uat_entry, err); g_free(err); } wmem_free(NULL, uat_entry); } wmem_free(NULL, parts); } wmem_free(NULL, old_keys); } } static gboolean ssl_follow_tap_listener(void *tapdata, packet_info *pinfo, epan_dissect_t *edt _U_, const void *ssl) { follow_info_t * follow_info = (follow_info_t*) tapdata; follow_record_t * follow_record = NULL; const SslDataInfo * appl_data = NULL; const SslPacketInfo * pi = (const SslPacketInfo*)ssl; show_stream_t from = FROM_CLIENT; /* Skip packets without decrypted payload data. */ if (!pi || !pi->appl_data) return FALSE; /* Compute the packet's sender. */ if (follow_info->client_port == 0) { follow_info->client_port = pinfo->srcport; copy_address(&follow_info->client_ip, &pinfo->src); } if (addresses_equal(&follow_info->client_ip, &pinfo->src) && follow_info->client_port == pinfo->srcport) { from = FROM_CLIENT; } else { from = FROM_SERVER; } for (appl_data = pi->appl_data; appl_data != NULL; appl_data = appl_data->next) { /* TCP segments that contain the end of two or more SSL PDUs will be queued to SSL taps for each of those PDUs. Therefore a single packet could be processed by this SSL tap listener multiple times. The following test handles that scenario by treating the follow_info->bytes_written[] values as the next expected appl_data->seq. Any appl_data instances that fall below that have already been processed and must be skipped. */ if (appl_data->seq < follow_info->bytes_written[from]) continue; /* Allocate a follow_record_t to hold the current appl_data instance's decrypted data. Even though it would be possible to consolidate multiple appl_data instances into a single record, it is beneficial to use a one-to-one mapping. This affords the Follow Stream dialog view modes (ASCII, EBCDIC, Hex Dump, C Arrays, Raw) the opportunity to accurately reflect SSL PDU boundaries. Currently the Hex Dump view does by starting a new line, and the C Arrays view does by starting a new array declaration. */ follow_record = g_new(follow_record_t,1); follow_record->is_server = (from == FROM_SERVER); follow_record->packet_num = pinfo->num; follow_record->data = g_byte_array_sized_new(appl_data->plain_data.data_len); follow_record->data = g_byte_array_append(follow_record->data, appl_data->plain_data.data, appl_data->plain_data.data_len); /* Append the record to the follow_info structure. */ follow_info->payload = g_list_append(follow_info->payload, follow_record); follow_info->bytes_written[from] += appl_data->plain_data.data_len; } return FALSE; } /********************************************************************* * * Forward Declarations * *********************************************************************/ /* * SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors * */ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *conv_data, const gboolean first_record_in_frame); /* alert message dissector */ static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session); /* handshake protocol dissector */ static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 record_length, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *conv_data, const guint8 content_type, const guint16 version); /* heartbeat message dissector */ static void dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session, guint32 record_length, gboolean decrypted); static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_status(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo); static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* * SSL version 2 dissectors * */ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean first_record_in_frame); /* client hello dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl); static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* client master key dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* server hello dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo); static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo); static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* * Support Functions * */ static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(const guint16 version); static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length); static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length); /********************************************************************* * * Main dissector * *********************************************************************/ /* * Code to actually dissect the packets */ static int dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_) { conversation_t *conversation; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *ssl_tree; guint32 offset; gboolean first_record_in_frame; gboolean need_desegmentation; SslDecryptSession *ssl_session; SslSession *session; gint is_from_server; ti = NULL; ssl_tree = NULL; offset = 0; first_record_in_frame = TRUE; ssl_session = NULL; if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) > 4) { const guint8 *tmp = tvb_get_ptr(tvb, 0, 4); if (g_ascii_isprint(tmp[0]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[1]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[2]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[3])) { /* it is extremely unlikely that real SSL traffic starts with four * printable ascii characters; this looks like it's unencrypted * text, so assume it's not ours (SSL does have some unencrypted * text fields in certain packets, but you'd have to get very * unlucky with TCP fragmentation to have one of those fields at the * beginning of a TCP payload at the beginning of the capture where * reassembly hasn't started yet) */ return 0; } } ssl_debug_printf("\ndissect_ssl enter frame #%u (%s)\n", pinfo->num, (pinfo->fd->flags.visited)?"already visited":"first time"); /* Track the version using conversations to reduce the * chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or * v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows * us to more frequently set the protocol column properly * for continuation data frames. * * Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy, * so that we don't have to search the conversation * table every time we want the version; when setting * the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation * in addition to conv_version */ conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); ssl_session = ssl_get_session(conversation, ssl_handle); session = &ssl_session->session; is_from_server = ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo); if (session->last_nontls_frame != 0 && session->last_nontls_frame >= pinfo->num) { /* This conversation started at a different protocol and STARTTLS was * used, but this packet comes too early. */ return 0; } /* try decryption only the first time we see this packet * (to keep cipher synchronized) */ if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited) ssl_session = NULL; ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl_session); /* Initialize the protocol column; we'll override it later when we * detect a different version or flavor of SSL (assuming we don't * throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); /* clear the the info column */ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); /* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal. * A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl * record may be spread across multiple tcp packets. * * This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single * frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp * packets. * * Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets * may be possible using wireshark conversations, but * probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream * reassembly. */ /* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */ if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA); ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl); } /* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */ while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 0) { ssl_debug_printf(" record: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); /* * Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation. */ need_desegmentation = FALSE; /* first try to dispatch off the cached version * known to be associated with the conversation */ switch (session->version) { case SSLV2_VERSION: case PCT_VERSION: offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, first_record_in_frame); break; case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: /* SSLv3/TLS record headers need at least 1+2+2 = 5 bytes. */ if (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) < 5) { if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; need_desegmentation = TRUE; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb); } break; } /* the version tracking code works too well ;-) * at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after * we already know the version of the connection; * work around that here by detecting and calling * the v2 dissector instead */ if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset)) { offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, first_record_in_frame); } else { offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, first_record_in_frame); } break; /* that failed, so apply some heuristics based * on this individual packet */ default: if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset)) { /* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */ offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, first_record_in_frame); } else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset)) { /* looks like sslv3 or tls */ offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, first_record_in_frame); } else { /* on second and subsequent records per frame * add a delimiter on info column */ if (!first_record_in_frame) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } /* looks like something unknown, so lump into * continuation data */ offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb); col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data"); } break; } /* Desegmentation return check */ if (need_desegmentation) { ssl_debug_printf(" need_desegmentation: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); tap_queue_packet(ssl_tap, pinfo, p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_ssl, 0)); return tvb_captured_length(tvb); } /* set up for next record in frame, if any */ first_record_in_frame = FALSE; } col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); ssl_debug_flush(); tap_queue_packet(ssl_tap, pinfo, p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_ssl, 0)); return tvb_captured_length(tvb); } static gint decrypt_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 record_length, guint8 content_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean save_plaintext) { gint ret; gint direction; StringInfo *data_for_iv; gint data_for_iv_len; SslDecoder *decoder; ret = 0; /* if we can decrypt and decryption was a success * add decrypted data to this packet info */ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: app_data len %d, ssl state 0x%02X\n", record_length, ssl->state); direction = ssl_packet_from_server(&ssl->session, ssl_associations, pinfo); /* retrieve decoder for this packet direction */ if (direction != 0) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using server decoder\n"); decoder = ssl->server; } else { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using client decoder\n"); decoder = ssl->client; } /* save data to update IV if decoder is available or updated later */ data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv; data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24; ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (const guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len); if (!decoder) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n"); return ret; } /* run decryption and add decrypted payload to protocol data, if decryption * is successful*/ ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len; if (ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, decoder, content_type, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length), record_length, &ssl_compressed_data, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0) ret = 1; /* */ if (!ret) { /* save data to update IV if valid session key is obtained later */ data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv; data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24; ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (const guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len); } if (ret && save_plaintext) { ssl_add_data_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset, decoder->flow); } return ret; } static void process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port); static void desegment_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, guint32 seq, guint32 nxtseq, SslSession *session, proto_tree *root_tree, proto_tree *tree, SslFlow *flow, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port) { fragment_head *ipfd_head; gboolean must_desegment; gboolean called_dissector; int another_pdu_follows; gboolean another_segment_in_frame = FALSE; int deseg_offset; guint32 deseg_seq; gint nbytes; proto_item *item; proto_item *frag_tree_item; proto_item *ssl_tree_item; struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp; again: ipfd_head = NULL; must_desegment = FALSE; called_dissector = FALSE; another_pdu_follows = 0; msp = NULL; /* * Initialize these to assume no desegmentation. * If that's not the case, these will be set appropriately * by the subdissector. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = 0; pinfo->desegment_len = 0; /* * Initialize this to assume that this segment will just be * added to the middle of a desegmented chunk of data, so * that we should show it all as data. * If that's not the case, it will be set appropriately. */ deseg_offset = offset; /* If we've seen this segment before (e.g., it's a retransmission), * there's nothing for us to do. Certainly, don't add it to the list * of multisegment_pdus (that would cause subsequent lookups to find * the retransmission instead of the original transmission, breaking * dissection of the desegmented pdu if we'd already seen the end of * the pdu). */ if ((msp = (struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *)wmem_tree_lookup32(flow->multisegment_pdus, seq))) { const char *prefix; if (msp->first_frame == pinfo->num) { prefix = ""; col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]"); } else { prefix = "Retransmitted "; } nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, nbytes, prefix); return; } /* Else, find the most previous PDU starting before this sequence number */ msp = (struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *)wmem_tree_lookup32_le(flow->multisegment_pdus, seq-1); if (msp && msp->seq <= seq && msp->nxtpdu > seq) { int len; if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { msp->last_frame = pinfo->num; msp->last_frame_time = pinfo->abs_ts; } /* OK, this PDU was found, which means the segment continues * a higher-level PDU and that we must desegment it. */ if (msp->flags & MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT) { /* The dissector asked for the entire segment */ len = MAX(0, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); } else { len = MIN(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu) - seq; } ipfd_head = fragment_add(&ssl_reassembly_table, tvb, offset, pinfo, msp->first_frame, NULL, seq - msp->seq, len, (LT_SEQ (nxtseq,msp->nxtpdu))); if (msp->flags & MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT) { msp->flags &= (~MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT); /* If we consumed the entire segment there is no * other pdu starting anywhere inside this segment. * So update nxtpdu to point at least to the start * of the next segment. * (If the subdissector asks for even more data we * will advance nxtpdu even further later down in * the code.) */ msp->nxtpdu = nxtseq; } if ( (msp->nxtpdu < nxtseq) && (msp->nxtpdu >= seq) && (len > 0)) { another_pdu_follows = msp->nxtpdu - seq; } } else { /* This segment was not found in our table, so it doesn't * contain a continuation of a higher-level PDU. * Call the normal subdissector. */ process_ssl_payload(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port); called_dissector = TRUE; /* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment some more data * before it could handle the packet? * If so we have to create some structures in our table but * this is something we only do the first time we see this * packet. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len) { if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) must_desegment = TRUE; /* * Set "deseg_offset" to the offset in "tvb" * of the first byte of data that the * subdissector didn't process. */ deseg_offset = offset + pinfo->desegment_offset; } /* Either no desegmentation is necessary, or this is * segment contains the beginning but not the end of * a higher-level PDU and thus isn't completely * desegmented. */ ipfd_head = NULL; } /* is it completely desegmented? */ if (ipfd_head) { /* * Yes, we think it is. * We only call subdissector for the last segment. * Note that the last segment may include more than what * we needed. */ if (ipfd_head->reassembled_in == pinfo->num && nxtseq < ipfd_head->datalen) { /* * This is *not* the last segment. It is part of a PDU in the same * frame, so no another PDU can follow this one. * Do not reassemble SSL yet, it will be done in the final segment. * Clear the Info column and avoid displaying [SSL segment of a * reassembled PDU], the payload dissector will typically set it. * (This is needed here for the second pass.) */ another_pdu_follows = 0; col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); another_segment_in_frame = TRUE; } else if (ipfd_head->reassembled_in == pinfo->num) { /* * OK, this is the last segment of the PDU and also the * last segment in this frame. * Let's call the subdissector with the desegmented * data. */ tvbuff_t *next_tvb; int old_len; /* * Reset column in case multiple SSL segments form the * PDU and this last SSL segment is not in the first TCP segment of * this frame. * XXX prevent clearing the column if the last layer is not SSL? */ /* Clear column during the first pass. */ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); /* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */ next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, ipfd_head->tvb_data); /* add desegmented data to the data source list */ add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Reassembled SSL"); /* call subdissector */ process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port); called_dissector = TRUE; /* * OK, did the subdissector think it was completely * desegmented, or does it think we need even more * data? */ old_len = (int)(tvb_reported_length(next_tvb) - tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); if (pinfo->desegment_len && pinfo->desegment_offset <= old_len) { /* * "desegment_len" isn't 0, so it needs more * data for something - and "desegment_offset" * is before "old_len", so it needs more data * to dissect the stuff we thought was * completely desegmented (as opposed to the * stuff at the beginning being completely * desegmented, but the stuff at the end * being a new higher-level PDU that also * needs desegmentation). */ fragment_set_partial_reassembly(&ssl_reassembly_table, pinfo, msp->first_frame, NULL); /* Update msp->nxtpdu to point to the new next * pdu boundary. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT) { /* We want reassembly of at least one * more segment so set the nxtpdu * boundary to one byte into the next * segment. * This means that the next segment * will complete reassembly even if it * is only one single byte in length. */ msp->nxtpdu = seq + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1; msp->flags |= MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT; } else { msp->nxtpdu = seq + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + pinfo->desegment_len; } /* Since we need at least some more data * there can be no pdu following in the * tail of this segment. */ another_pdu_follows = 0; } else { /* * Show the stuff in this TCP segment as * just raw TCP segment data. */ nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, nbytes, NULL); /* * The subdissector thought it was completely * desegmented (although the stuff at the * end may, in turn, require desegmentation), * so we show a tree with all segments. */ show_fragment_tree(ipfd_head, &ssl_segment_items, root_tree, pinfo, next_tvb, &frag_tree_item); /* * The toplevel fragment subtree is now * behind all desegmented data; move it * right behind the TCP tree. */ ssl_tree_item = proto_tree_get_parent(tree); if (frag_tree_item && ssl_tree_item) { proto_tree_move_item(root_tree, ssl_tree_item, frag_tree_item); } /* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment * some more data? This means that the data * at the beginning of this segment completed * a higher-level PDU, but the data at the * end of this segment started a higher-level * PDU but didn't complete it. * * If so, we have to create some structures * in our table, but this is something we * only do the first time we see this packet. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len) { if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) must_desegment = TRUE; /* The stuff we couldn't dissect * must have come from this segment, * so it's all in "tvb". * * "pinfo->desegment_offset" is * relative to the beginning of * "next_tvb"; we want an offset * relative to the beginning of "tvb". * * First, compute the offset relative * to the *end* of "next_tvb" - i.e., * the number of bytes before the end * of "next_tvb" at which the * subdissector stopped. That's the * length of "next_tvb" minus the * offset, relative to the beginning * of "next_tvb, at which the * subdissector stopped. */ deseg_offset = ipfd_head->datalen - pinfo->desegment_offset; /* "tvb" and "next_tvb" end at the * same byte of data, so the offset * relative to the end of "next_tvb" * of the byte at which we stopped * is also the offset relative to * the end of "tvb" of the byte at * which we stopped. * * Convert that back into an offset * relative to the beginning of * "tvb", by taking the length of * "tvb" and subtracting the offset * relative to the end. */ deseg_offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb) - deseg_offset; } } } } if (must_desegment) { /* If the dissector requested "reassemble until FIN" * just set this flag for the flow and let reassembly * proceed at normal. We will check/pick up these * reassembled PDUs later down in dissect_tcp() when checking * for the FIN flag. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN) { flow->flags |= TCP_FLOW_REASSEMBLE_UNTIL_FIN; } /* * The sequence number at which the stuff to be desegmented * starts is the sequence number of the byte at an offset * of "deseg_offset" into "tvb". * * The sequence number of the byte at an offset of "offset" * is "seq", i.e. the starting sequence number of this * segment, so the sequence number of the byte at * "deseg_offset" is "seq + (deseg_offset - offset)". */ deseg_seq = seq + (deseg_offset - offset); if (((nxtseq - deseg_seq) <= 1024*1024) && (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo))) { if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT) { /* The subdissector asked to reassemble using the * entire next segment. * Just ask reassembly for one more byte * but set this msp flag so we can pick it up * above. */ msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo, deseg_seq, nxtseq+1, flow->multisegment_pdus); msp->flags |= MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT; } else { msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo, deseg_seq, nxtseq+pinfo->desegment_len, flow->multisegment_pdus); } /* add this segment as the first one for this new pdu */ fragment_add(&ssl_reassembly_table, tvb, deseg_offset, pinfo, msp->first_frame, NULL, 0, nxtseq - deseg_seq, LT_SEQ(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu)); } } if (!called_dissector || pinfo->desegment_len != 0) { if (ipfd_head != NULL && ipfd_head->reassembled_in != 0 && !(ipfd_head->flags & FD_PARTIAL_REASSEMBLY)) { /* * We know what frame this PDU is reassembled in; * let the user know. */ item=proto_tree_add_uint(tree, *ssl_segment_items.hf_reassembled_in, tvb, 0, 0, ipfd_head->reassembled_in); PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(item); } /* * Either we didn't call the subdissector at all (i.e., * this is a segment that contains the middle of a * higher-level PDU, but contains neither the beginning * nor the end), or the subdissector couldn't dissect it * all, as some data was missing (i.e., it set * "pinfo->desegment_len" to the amount of additional * data it needs). */ if (!another_segment_in_frame && pinfo->desegment_offset == 0) { /* * It couldn't, in fact, dissect any of it (the * first byte it couldn't dissect is at an offset * of "pinfo->desegment_offset" from the beginning * of the payload, and that's 0). * Just mark this as SSL. */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[SSL segment of a reassembled PDU]"); } /* * Show what's left in the packet as just raw TCP segment * data. * XXX - remember what protocol the last subdissector * was, and report it as a continuation of that, instead? */ nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, deseg_offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, deseg_offset, nbytes, NULL); } pinfo->can_desegment = 0; pinfo->desegment_offset = 0; pinfo->desegment_len = 0; if (another_pdu_follows) { /* there was another pdu following this one. */ pinfo->can_desegment=2; /* we also have to prevent the dissector from changing the * PROTOCOL and INFO colums since what follows may be an * incomplete PDU and we don't want it be changed back from * to */ col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); col_set_writable(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, FALSE); offset += another_pdu_follows; seq += another_pdu_follows; goto again; } } static void export_pdu_packet(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint8 tag, const gchar *name) { exp_pdu_data_t *exp_pdu_data = export_pdu_create_common_tags(pinfo, name, tag); exp_pdu_data->tvb_captured_length = tvb_captured_length(tvb); exp_pdu_data->tvb_reported_length = tvb_reported_length(tvb); exp_pdu_data->pdu_tvb = tvb; tap_queue_packet(exported_pdu_tap, pinfo, exp_pdu_data); } static void process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port) { tvbuff_t *next_tvb; heur_dtbl_entry_t *hdtbl_entry; guint16 saved_match_port; next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); /* If the appdata proto is not yet known (no STARTTLS), try heuristics * first, then ports-based dissectors. Port 443 is too overloaded... */ if (!session->app_handle) { /* The heuristics dissector should set the app_handle if it wants to be * called in the future. */ if (dissector_try_heuristic(ssl_heur_subdissector_list, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree), &hdtbl_entry, &session->app_handle)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: found heuristics dissector %s, app_handle is %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, hdtbl_entry->short_name, (void *)session->app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); if (have_tap_listener(exported_pdu_tap)) { export_pdu_packet(next_tvb, pinfo, EXP_PDU_TAG_HEUR_PROTO_NAME, hdtbl_entry->short_name); } return; } if (app_handle_port) { /* Heuristics failed, just try the port-based dissector. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s: no heuristics dissector, falling back to " "handle %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *)app_handle_port, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle_port)); session->app_handle = app_handle_port; } else { /* No heuristics, no port-based proto, unknown protocol. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s: no appdata dissector found\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } } ssl_debug_printf("%s: found handle %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *)session->app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); if (have_tap_listener(exported_pdu_tap)) { export_pdu_packet(next_tvb, pinfo, EXP_PDU_TAG_PROTO_NAME, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); } saved_match_port = pinfo->match_uint; if (ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)) { pinfo->match_uint = pinfo->srcport; } else { pinfo->match_uint = pinfo->destport; } call_dissector(session->app_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree)); pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_port; } static void dissect_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port) { gboolean save_fragmented; guint16 save_can_desegment; SslDataInfo *appl_data; tvbuff_t *next_tvb; /* Preserve current desegmentation ability to prevent the subdissector * from messing up the ssl desegmentation */ save_can_desegment = pinfo->can_desegment; /* show decrypted data info, if available */ appl_data = ssl_get_data_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); if (!appl_data || !appl_data->plain_data.data_len) return; /* try to dissect decrypted data*/ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record decrypted len %d\n", appl_data->plain_data.data_len); ssl_print_data("decrypted app data fragment", appl_data->plain_data.data, appl_data->plain_data.data_len); /* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */ next_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, appl_data->plain_data.data, appl_data->plain_data.data_len, appl_data->plain_data.data_len); /* add desegmented data to the data source list */ add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Decrypted SSL data"); /* Can we desegment this segment? */ if (ssl_desegment_app_data) { /* Yes. */ pinfo->can_desegment = 2; desegment_ssl(next_tvb, pinfo, 0, appl_data->seq, appl_data->nxtseq, session, proto_tree_get_root(tree), tree, appl_data->flow, app_handle_port); } else if (session->app_handle || app_handle_port) { /* No - just call the subdissector. Mark this as fragmented, so if somebody throws an exception, we don't report it as a malformed frame. */ pinfo->can_desegment = 0; save_fragmented = pinfo->fragmented; pinfo->fragmented = TRUE; process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port); pinfo->fragmented = save_fragmented; } /* restore desegmentation ability */ pinfo->can_desegment = save_can_desegment; } /********************************************************************* * * SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines * *********************************************************************/ static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl, const gboolean first_record_in_frame) { /* * struct { * uint8 major, minor; * } ProtocolVersion; * * * enum { * change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22), * application_data(23), (255) * } ContentType; * * struct { * ContentType type; * ProtocolVersion version; * uint16 length; * opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length]; * } TLSPlaintext; */ guint32 record_length; guint16 version; guint8 content_type; guint8 next_byte; proto_tree *ti; proto_tree *ssl_record_tree; proto_item *pi; guint32 available_bytes; ti = NULL; ssl_record_tree = NULL; available_bytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); /* TLS 1.0/1.1 just ignores unknown records - RFC 2246 chapter 6. The TLS Record Protocol */ if ((session->version==TLSV1_VERSION || session->version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || session->version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION) && (available_bytes >=1 ) && !ssl_is_valid_content_type(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset))) { proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_ssl_ignored_unknown_record, tvb, offset, available_bytes); /* on second and subsequent records per frame * add a delimiter on info column */ if (!first_record_in_frame) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Ignored Unknown Record"); return offset + available_bytes; } /* * Is the record header split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < 5) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and that we need * "some more data." Don't tell it exactly how many bytes we * need because if/when we ask for even more (after the header) * that will break reassembly. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } /* * Get the record layer fields of interest */ content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3); if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) { /* * Is the record split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many * more bytes we need, and return. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; /* Don't use: * pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; * it avoids some minor display glitches when a frame contains * the continuation of a previous PDU together with a full new * PDU, but it completely breaks dissection for jumbo SSL frames */ pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } } else { /* on second and subsequent records per frame * add a delimiter on info column */ if (!first_record_in_frame) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } /* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense * continuing any further */ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data"); return offset + 5 + record_length; } /* add the record layer subtree header */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record, tvb, offset, 5 + record_length, ENC_NA); ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record); /* show the one-byte content type */ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_content_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; /* add the version */ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* add the length */ pi = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb, offset, 2, record_length); if (record_length > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH) { expert_add_info(pinfo, pi, &dissect_ssl3_hf.ei.record_length_invalid); } offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */ /* * if we don't already have a version set for this conversation, * but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's * not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation * structure and print the column version. If the message is not authorative * (i.e. it is a Client Hello), then this version will still be used for * display purposes only (it will not be stored in the conversation). */ next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { ssl_try_set_version(session, ssl, content_type, next_byte, FALSE, version); /* Version has possibly changed, adjust the column accordingly. */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); } else { version = session->version; } /* on second and subsequent records per frame * add a delimiter on info column */ if (!first_record_in_frame) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } /* * now dissect the next layer */ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record: content_type %d %s\n",content_type, val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown")); /* PAOLO try to decrypt each record (we must keep ciphers "in sync") * store plain text only for app data */ switch ((ContentType) content_type) { case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC: col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec"); ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, ssl); if (ssl) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); ssl_finalize_decryption(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map); ssl_change_cipher(ssl, ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)); } /* Heuristic: any later ChangeCipherSpec is not a resumption of this * session. Set the flag after ssl_finalize_decryption such that it has * a chance to use resume using Session Tickets. */ if (is_from_server) session->is_session_resumed = FALSE; break; case SSL_ID_ALERT: { tvbuff_t *decrypted; if (ssl&&decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset, record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE)) ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); /* try to retrieve and use decrypted alert record, if any. */ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(tvb, proto_ssl, pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); if (decrypted) { add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted SSL record"); dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, session); } else { dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, session); } break; } case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE: { tvbuff_t *decrypted; ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(ssl, tvb, offset, record_length); /* try to decrypt handshake record, if possible. Store decrypted * record for later usage. The offset is used as 'key' to identify * this record in the packet (we can have multiple handshake records * in the same frame) */ if (ssl && decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset, record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE)) ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); /* try to retrieve and use decrypted handshake record, if any. */ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(tvb, proto_ssl, pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); if (decrypted) { /* add desegmented data to the data source list */ add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted SSL record"); dissect_ssl3_handshake(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, tvb_reported_length(decrypted), session, is_from_server, ssl, content_type, version); } else { dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, record_length, session, is_from_server, ssl, content_type, version); } break; } case SSL_ID_APP_DATA: { dissector_handle_t app_handle; if (ssl){ decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset, record_length, content_type, ssl, TRUE); /* if application data desegmentation is allowed and needed */ /* if (ssl_desegment_app_data && *need_desegmentation) ssl_desegment_ssl_app_data(ssl,pinfo); */ } /* show on info column what we are decoding */ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data"); /* app_handle discovery is done here instead of dissect_ssl_payload() * because the protocol name needs to be displayed below. */ app_handle = session->app_handle; if (!app_handle) { /* Unknown protocol handle, ssl_starttls_ack was not called before. * Try to find a port-based protocol and use it if there is no * heuristics dissector (see process_ssl_payload). */ app_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport); if (!app_handle) app_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, pinfo->destport); } proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), app_handle ? dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle) : "Application Data"); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata, tvb, offset, record_length, ENC_NA); dissect_ssl_payload(tvb, pinfo, offset, tree, session, app_handle); /* Set app proto again in case the heuristics found a different proto. */ if (session->app_handle && session->app_handle != app_handle) proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); break; } case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT: { tvbuff_t *decrypted; if (ssl && decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset, record_length, content_type, ssl, FALSE)) ssl_add_record_info(proto_ssl, pinfo, ssl_decrypted_data.data, ssl_decrypted_data_avail, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); /* try to retrieve and use decrypted handshake record, if any. */ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(tvb, proto_ssl, pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset); if (decrypted) { add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted SSL record"); dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, session, tvb_reported_length (decrypted), TRUE); } else { gboolean plaintext = TRUE; /* heartbeats before ChangeCipherSpec are unencrypted */ if (ssl) { if (ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)) { plaintext = ssl->server == NULL; } else { plaintext = ssl->client == NULL; } } dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, session, record_length, plaintext); } break; } } offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */ return offset; } /* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */ static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session) { /* struct { * AlertLevel level; * AlertDescription description; * } Alert; */ proto_tree *ti; proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree; const gchar *level; const gchar *desc; guint8 byte; ssl_alert_tree = NULL; if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_alert_message, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_NA); ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_alert); } /* * set the record layer label */ /* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */ level = try_val_to_str(byte, ssl_31_alert_level); byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */ desc = try_val_to_str(byte, ssl_31_alert_description); /* now set the text in the record layer line */ if (level && desc) { col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)", level, desc); } else { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert"); } if (tree) { if (level && desc) { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert " "(Level: %s, Description: %s)", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), level, desc); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_level, tvb, offset++, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_description, tvb, offset++, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } else { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree, "Alert Message: Encrypted Alert"); } } } /* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */ static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 record_length, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *ssl, const guint8 content_type, const guint16 version) { /* struct { * HandshakeType msg_type; * uint24 length; * select (HandshakeType) { * case hello_request: HelloRequest; * case client_hello: ClientHello; * case server_hello: ServerHello; * case certificate: Certificate; * case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange; * case certificate_request: CertificateRequest; * case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone; * case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify; * case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange; * case finished: Finished; * case certificate_url: CertificateURL; * case certificate_status: CertificateStatus; * case encrypted_extensions:NextProtocolNegotiationEncryptedExtension; * } body; * } Handshake; */ proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree; const gchar *msg_type_str; guint8 msg_type; guint32 length; gboolean first_iteration; proto_item *ti; ssl_hand_tree = NULL; first_iteration = TRUE; /* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there * can be multiple messages per record as long as they have * the same content type * * we really only care about this for handshake messages */ /* set record_length to the max offset */ record_length += offset; while (offset < record_length) { msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1); /* Check the length in the handshake message. Assume it's an * encrypted handshake message if the message would pass * the record_length boundary. This is a workaround for the * situation where the first octet of the encrypted handshake * message is actually a known handshake message type. */ if (offset + length <= record_length) msg_type_str = try_val_to_str(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type); else msg_type_str = NULL; ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake iteration %d type %d offset %d length %d " "bytes, remaining %d \n", first_iteration, msg_type, offset, length, record_length); if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration) { /* only dissect / report messages if they're * either the first message in this record * or they're a valid message type */ return; } /* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */ if (!first_iteration) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } /* * Update our info string */ col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, (msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message"); /* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */ if (first_iteration) { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), (msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message"); } else { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), "Multiple Handshake Messages"); } /* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, tvb, offset, length + 4, ENC_NA); ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_handshake); /* set the text label on the subtree node */ proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s", (msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message"); /* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */ if (!msg_type_str) return; /* add nodes for the message type and message length */ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_type, tvb, offset, 1, msg_type); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_length, tvb, offset, 3, length); offset += 3; /* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */ switch ((HandshakeType) msg_type) { case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST: /* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */ break; case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: if (ssl) { /* ClientHello is first packet so set direction */ ssl_set_server(session, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, pinfo->destport); } ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session, ssl, NULL); break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session, ssl, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: /* only valid for DTLS */ break; case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: /* no need to load keylog file here as it only links a previous * master key with this Session Ticket */ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, ssl, ssl_master_key_map.tickets); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session, ssl, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo, session, ssl, ssl_key_hash, is_from_server); break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG: ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo, session); break; case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE: /* This is not an abbreviated handshake, it is certainly not resumed. */ session->is_session_resumed = FALSE; break; case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY: ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, session); break; case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG: ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session); if (!ssl) break; ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); /* try to find master key from pre-master key */ if (!ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(ssl, length, tvb, offset, ssl_options.psk, &ssl_master_key_map)) { ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't generate pre master secret\n"); } break; case SSL_HND_FINISHED: ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, session, &ssl_hfs); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_URL: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS: dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_status(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, pinfo); break; case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA: /* TODO: dissect this? */ break; case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS: dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); break; } offset += length; first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */ } } /* dissects the heartbeat message, filling in the tree */ static void dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session, guint32 record_length, gboolean decrypted) { /* struct { * HeartbeatMessageType type; * uint16 payload_length; * opaque payload; * opaque padding; * } HeartbeatMessage; */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *tls_heartbeat_tree; const gchar *type; guint8 byte; guint16 payload_length; guint16 padding_length; tls_heartbeat_tree = NULL; if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_heartbeat_message, tvb, offset, record_length, ENC_NA); tls_heartbeat_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_heartbeat); } /* * set the record layer label */ /* first lookup the names for the message type and the payload length */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); type = try_val_to_str(byte, tls_heartbeat_type); payload_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); padding_length = record_length - 3 - payload_length; /* assume plaintext if the (expected) record size is smaller than the type * (1), length (2)[, payload] and padding (16) fields combined */ if (record_length <= 19u || 3u + payload_length + 16 <= record_length) { decrypted = TRUE; } /* now set the text in the record layer line */ if (type && decrypted) { col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Heartbeat %s", type); } else { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Heartbeat"); } if (type && decrypted) { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Heartbeat " "%s", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), type); proto_tree_add_item(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload_length, tvb, offset, 2, payload_length); offset += 2; if (3u + payload_length + 16 > record_length) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length, "Invalid heartbeat payload length (%d)", payload_length); /* There is no room for padding... truncate the payload such that * the field can be selected (for the interested). */ payload_length = record_length - 3; padding_length = 0; proto_item_append_text (ti, " (invalid, using %u to decode payload)", payload_length); } proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload, tvb, offset, payload_length, NULL, "Payload (%u byte%s)", payload_length, plurality(payload_length, "", "s")); offset += payload_length; if (padding_length) proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_padding, tvb, offset, padding_length, NULL, "Padding and HMAC (%u byte%s)", padding_length, plurality(padding_length, "", "s")); } else { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Heartbeat", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); proto_item_set_text(tls_heartbeat_tree, "Encrypted Heartbeat Message"); } } static guint dissect_ssl3_ocsp_response(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo) { guint cert_status_len; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *cert_status_tree; cert_status_len = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status, tvb, offset, cert_status_len + 3, ENC_NA); cert_status_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cert_status); proto_tree_add_item(cert_status_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_len, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; if (cert_status_len > 0) { proto_item *ocsp_resp; proto_tree *ocsp_resp_tree; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; ocsp_resp = proto_tree_add_item(cert_status_tree, proto_ocsp, tvb, offset, cert_status_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_set_text(ocsp_resp, "OCSP Response"); ocsp_resp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ocsp_resp, ett_ssl_ocsp_resp); asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1); offset += cert_status_len; } return offset; } static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_status(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo) { guint8 cert_status_type; cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; switch (cert_status_type) { case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP: dissect_ssl3_ocsp_response(tvb, tree, offset, pinfo); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI: { gint32 list_len; list_len = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset); offset += 3; while (list_len > 0) { guint32 prev_offset = offset; offset = dissect_ssl3_ocsp_response(tvb, tree, offset, pinfo); list_len -= offset - prev_offset; } break; } } } /* based on https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04 */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint8 selected_protocol_len; guint8 padding_len; selected_protocol_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol, tvb, offset, selected_protocol_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); offset += selected_protocol_len; padding_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding, tvb, offset, padding_len, ENC_NA); } /********************************************************************* * * SSL version 2 Dissectors * *********************************************************************/ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean first_record_in_frame) { guint32 initial_offset; guint8 byte; guint8 record_length_length; guint32 record_length; gint is_escape; gint16 padding_length; guint8 msg_type; const gchar *msg_type_str; guint32 available_bytes; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *ssl_record_tree; initial_offset = offset; record_length = 0; is_escape = -1; padding_length = -1; msg_type_str = NULL; ssl_record_tree = NULL; /* pull first byte; if high bit is unset, then record * length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise * record length is two bytes */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3; available_bytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); /* * Is the record header split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < record_length_length) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and that we need * "some more data." Don't tell it exactly how many bytes we * need because if/when we ask for even more (after the header) * that will break reassembly. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } /* parse out the record length */ switch (record_length_length) { case 2: /* two-byte record length */ record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); record_length += byte; break; case 3: /* three-byte record length */ is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE; record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); record_length += byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); padding_length = byte; } /* * Is the record split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) { /* * Yes - Can we do reassembly? */ if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many * more bytes we need, and return. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length) - available_bytes; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } offset += record_length_length; /* on second and subsequent records per frame * add a delimiter on info column */ if (!first_record_in_frame) { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); } /* add the record layer subtree header */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset, record_length_length + record_length, ENC_NA); ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record); /* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length); /* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set * this to sslv2 */ if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, (initial_offset + record_length_length), record_length)) { session->version = PCT_VERSION; } else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8) { session->version = SSLV2_VERSION; } } /* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the * conversation, then set a version for just this frame * (e.g., on a client hello) */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, (session->version == PCT_VERSION) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2"); /* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is * probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail */ msg_type_str = try_val_to_str(msg_type, (session->version == PCT_VERSION) ? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types); if (!msg_type_str || ((session->version != PCT_VERSION) && !ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length, record_length)) || ((session->version == PCT_VERSION) && !ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length, record_length))) { if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", (session->version == PCT_VERSION) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2", "Encrypted Data"); /* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a * version field. To make it possible to filter on record * layer version we create a generated field with ssl * record layer version 0x0002 */ ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb, initial_offset, 0, 0x0002); PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti); } col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data"); return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length; } else { col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str); if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", (session->version == PCT_VERSION) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2", msg_type_str); } } /* We have a valid message type, so move forward, filling in the * tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length, * if present in the original packet */ if (ssl_record_tree) { /* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a * version field. To make it possible to filter on record * layer version we create a generated field with ssl * record layer version 0x0002 */ ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb, initial_offset, 0, 0x0002); PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti); /* add the record length */ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length_length); proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb, initial_offset, record_length_length, record_length); } if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1) { proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb, initial_offset, 1, is_escape); } if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1) { proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb, initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length); } /* * dissect the record data */ /* jump forward to the start of the record data */ offset = initial_offset + record_length_length; /* add the message type */ if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, (session->version == PCT_VERSION) ? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } offset += 1; /* move past msg_type byte */ if (session->version != PCT_VERSION) { /* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */ switch (msg_type) { case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, ssl); break; case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo); break; case SSL2_HND_ERROR: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED: case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: /* unimplemented */ break; default: /* unknown */ break; } } else { /* dissect the message */ switch (msg_type) { case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO: dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO: dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo); break; case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY: dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; case PCT_MSG_ERROR: dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; default: /* unknown */ break; } } return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length); } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * Version version; * uint16 cipher_spec_length; * uint16 session_id_length; * uint16 challenge_length; * V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length]; * opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length]; * Random challenge; * } V2ClientHello; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version * */ guint16 version; guint16 cipher_spec_length; guint16 session_id_length; guint16 challenge_length; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *cs_tree; cs_tree=0; version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) { /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ return; } if (ssl) { ssl_set_server(&ssl->session, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, pinfo->destport); } /* show the version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_client_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); if (session_id_length > SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error, "Session ID length (%u) must be less than %u.", session_id_length, SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES); return; } offset += 2; challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); if (tree) proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (tree) { /* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_cipher_suites, tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, "Cipher Specs (%u specs)", cipher_spec_length/3); /* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, dissect_ssl3_hf.ett.cipher_suites); if (!cs_tree) { cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */ } } /* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */ while (cipher_spec_length > 0) { if (cs_tree) proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */ cipher_spec_length -= 3; } /* if there's a session id, show it */ if (session_id_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_session_id, tvb, offset, session_id_length, NULL, "Session ID (%u byte%s)", session_id_length, plurality(session_id_length, "", "s")); /* PAOLO: get session id and reset session state for key [re]negotiation */ if (ssl) { tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset, session_id_length); ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length; ssl->state &= ~(SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY|SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET| SSL_CIPHER|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM); } offset += session_id_length; } /* if there's a challenge, show it */ if (challenge_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, tvb, offset, challenge_length, ENC_NA); if (ssl) { /* PAOLO: get client random data; we get at most 32 bytes from challenge */ gint max; max = challenge_length > 32? 32: challenge_length; ssl_debug_printf("client random len: %d padded to 32\n", challenge_length); /* client random is padded with zero and 'right' aligned */ memset(ssl->client_random.data, 0, 32 - max); tvb_memcpy(tvb, &ssl->client_random.data[32 - max], offset, max); ssl->client_random.data_len = 32; ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello found CLIENT RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } } } static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH; proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, *ti; proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree; gint i; CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); if (CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1) expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl_pct_client_version, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_pad, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_session_id_data, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); offset += 32; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_challenge_data, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); offset += 32; CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_ch_offset, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); if (CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1) expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl_pct_ch_offset, "should be %d in PCT version 1", PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1); offset += 2; CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_cipher_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_hash_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_cert_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_exch_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_iv_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) { CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, ENC_NA); CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites); for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) { proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_ssl_pct_encryption_key_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_uint(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_ssl_pct_mac_key_length_in_bits, tvb, offset, 1, tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64); offset += 1; } } if (CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) { CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, ENC_NA); CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites); for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } } if (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) { CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, ENC_NA); CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites); for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } } if (CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) { CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, ENC_NA); CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites); for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } } if (CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_iv_data, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo) { /* structure: char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO char SH_PAD char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4] char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2] char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2] char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2] char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32] char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] */ guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; proto_item* ti; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_pad, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); if (SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1) expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl_pct_server_version, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_sh_restart_session_ok_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_sh_client_auth_req_flag, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_encryption_key_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_pct_mac_key_length_in_bits, tvb, offset, 1, tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_connection_id_data, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); offset += 32; SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_certificate_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_sig_specs_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_response_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (SH_CERT_LENGTH) { dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf_pct_handshake_server_cert); offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH; } if (SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH; } if (SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_signature, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH; } if (SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_response, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_pad, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_iv_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_response_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_data, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH; } if (CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_data, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH; } if (CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_iv_data, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH; } if (CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_data, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, ENC_NA); offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE; } if (CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_client_certificate_data, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, ENC_NA); offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH; } if (CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_response_data, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_pad, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_session_id_data, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); offset += 32; SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_response_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_server_response, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN; ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_error_information_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cipher, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_hash, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cert, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_exch, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_cert, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_sig, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); } else if (INFO_LEN) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_pct_error_information_data, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * V2Cipherspec cipher; * uint16 clear_key_length; * uint16 encrypted_key_length; * uint16 key_arg_length; * opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length]; * opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length]; * opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length]; * } V2ClientMasterKey; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher */ guint16 clear_key_length; guint16 encrypted_key_length; guint16 key_arg_length; /* at this point, everything we do involves the tree, * so quit now if we don't have one ;-) */ if (!tree) { return; } /* show the selected cipher */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; /* get the fixed fields */ clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* show the variable length fields */ if (clear_key_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, tvb, offset, clear_key_length, ENC_NA); offset += clear_key_length; } if (encrypted_key_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, ENC_NA); offset += encrypted_key_length; } if (key_arg_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, tvb, offset, key_arg_length, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * uint8 session_id_hit; * uint8 certificate_type; * uint16 server_version; * uint16 certificate_length; * uint16 cipher_specs_length; * uint16 connection_id_length; * opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length]; * opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length]; * opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length]; * } V2ServerHello; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit */ guint16 certificate_length; guint16 cipher_spec_length; guint16 connection_id_length; guint16 version; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); /* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so * quit now if we don't have one */ if (!tree) { return; } version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) { /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ return; } /* is there a hit? */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; /* what type of certificate is this? */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; /* now the server version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* get the fixed fields */ certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_certificate_len, tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length); offset += 2; cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length); offset += 2; connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length); offset += 2; /* now the variable length fields */ if (certificate_length > 0) { (void)dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_certificate); offset += certificate_length; } if (cipher_spec_length > 0) { /* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_cipher_suites, tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, "Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)", cipher_spec_length/3, plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, dissect_ssl3_hf.ett.cipher_suites); if (!subtree) { subtree = tree; } /* iterate through the cipher specs */ while (cipher_spec_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; cipher_spec_length -= 3; } } if (connection_id_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, tvb, offset, connection_id_length, ENC_NA); } } void ssl_set_master_secret(guint32 frame_num, address *addr_srv, address *addr_cli, port_type ptype, guint32 port_srv, guint32 port_cli, guint32 version, gint cipher, const guchar *_master_secret, const guchar *_client_random, const guchar *_server_random, guint32 client_seq, guint32 server_seq) { conversation_t *conversation; SslDecryptSession *ssl; guint iv_len; ssl_debug_printf("\nssl_set_master_secret enter frame #%u\n", frame_num); conversation = find_conversation(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, ptype, port_srv, port_cli, 0); if (!conversation) { /* create a new conversation */ conversation = conversation_new(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, ptype, port_srv, port_cli, 0); ssl_debug_printf(" new conversation = %p created\n", (void *)conversation); } ssl = ssl_get_session(conversation, ssl_handle); ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl); ssl_set_server(&ssl->session, addr_srv, ptype, port_srv); /* version */ if ((ssl->session.version==SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) && (version!=SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)) { switch (version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: ssl->session.version = version; ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION; ssl_debug_printf("%s set version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version, ssl->state); break; default: /* API change: version number is no longer an internal value * (SSL_VER_*) but the ProtocolVersion from wire (*_VERSION) */ ssl_debug_printf("%s WARNING must pass ProtocolVersion, not 0x%04x!\n", G_STRFUNC, version); break; } } /* cipher */ if (cipher > 0) { ssl->session.cipher = cipher; if (!(ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(ssl->session.cipher))) { ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't find cipher suite 0x%X\n", ssl->session.cipher); } else { ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CIPHER 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->session.cipher, ssl->state); } } /* client random */ if (_client_random) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->client_random, _client_random, 32); ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CLIENT RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } /* server random */ if (_server_random) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->server_random, _server_random, 32); ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set SERVER RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } /* master secret */ if (_master_secret) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, _master_secret, 48); ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set MASTER SECRET -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret trying to generate keys\n"); if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't generate keyring material\n"); return; } /* change ciphers immediately */ ssl_change_cipher(ssl, TRUE); ssl_change_cipher(ssl, FALSE); /* update seq numbers if available */ if (ssl->client && (client_seq != (guint32)-1)) { ssl->client->seq = client_seq; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret client->seq updated to %u\n", ssl->client->seq); } if (ssl->server && (server_seq != (guint32)-1)) { ssl->server->seq = server_seq; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret server->seq updated to %u\n", ssl->server->seq); } /* update IV from last data */ iv_len = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(ssl->cipher_suite); if (ssl->client && ((ssl->client->seq > 0) || (ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) { ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->client->evp, ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret client IV updated",ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); } if (ssl->server && ((ssl->server->seq > 0) || (ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) { ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->server->evp, ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret server IV updated",ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); } } /********************************************************************* * * Support Functions * *********************************************************************/ static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(const guint16 version) { const gchar *version_str; version_str = try_val_to_str(version, ssl_versions); return version_str != NULL; } static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { guint8 byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */ { return 0; } byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2); if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */ { return 0; } /* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */ return 1; } /* this applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a * valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible, * but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway. */ static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { /* here's the current approach: * * we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can * assume that there is not padding. This means that the * first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2 * msg_type in the third byte */ /* get the first byte; must have high bit set */ guint8 byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (byte < 0x80) { return 0; } /* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about * unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for * encrypted messages), we just check against that list */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); switch (byte) { case SSL2_HND_ERROR: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: case PCT_MSG_ERROR: return 1; } return 0; } /* this applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a * valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable * than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol */ static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { /* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid * protocol version */ guint8 byte; guint16 version; /* see if the first byte is a valid content type */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte)) { return 0; } /* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); switch (version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: return 1; } return 0; } /* applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message. * since it isn't possible to completely tell random * data apart from a valid message without state, * we try to help the odds. */ static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length) { /* first byte should be a msg_type. * * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key, * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8 * chance of saying yes with random payload) * * - for those three types that we know about, do some * further validation to reduce the chance of an error */ guint8 msg_type; guint16 version; guint32 sum; gint ret = 0; /* fetch the msg_type */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); switch (msg_type) { case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1); ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); break; case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: /* version is three bytes after msg_type */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3); ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); break; case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: /* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length * must be less than record length */ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */ if (sum <= record_length) { ret = 1; } break; default: break; } return ret; } /* applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks * like a valid, unencrypted pct handshake message. * since it isn't possible to completely tell random * data apart from a valid message without state, * we try to help the odds. */ static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length) { /* first byte should be a msg_type. * * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key, * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8 * chance of saying yes with random payload) * * - for those three types that we know about, do some * further validation to reduce the chance of an error */ guint8 msg_type; guint16 version; guint32 sum; gint ret = 0; /* fetch the msg_type */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); switch (msg_type) { case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO: /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1); ret = (version == PCT_VERSION_1); break; case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO: /* version is one byte after msg_type */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2); ret = (version == PCT_VERSION_1); break; case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: /* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */ if (sum <= record_length) { ret = 1; } break; case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY: /* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */ if ((sum + 36) == record_length) { ret = 1; } break; default: break; } return ret; } /* UAT */ #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) && defined(HAVE_LIBGCRYPT) static void ssldecrypt_free_cb(void *r) { ssldecrypt_assoc_t *h = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r; g_free(h->ipaddr); g_free(h->port); g_free(h->protocol); g_free(h->keyfile); g_free(h->password); } static void* ssldecrypt_copy_cb(void *dest, const void *orig, size_t len _U_) { const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *o = (const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)orig; ssldecrypt_assoc_t *d = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)dest; d->ipaddr = g_strdup(o->ipaddr); d->port = g_strdup(o->port); d->protocol = g_strdup(o->protocol); d->keyfile = g_strdup(o->keyfile); d->password = g_strdup(o->password); return d; } UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,ipaddr,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,port,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,protocol,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_FILENAME_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,keyfile,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,password,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) static gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_protocol_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { *err = g_strdup("No protocol given."); return FALSE; } if (!ssl_find_appdata_dissector(p)) { if (proto_get_id_by_filter_name(p) != -1) { *err = g_strdup_printf("While '%s' is a valid dissector filter name, that dissector is not configured" " to support SSL decryption.\n\n" "If you need to decrypt '%s' over SSL, please contact the Wireshark development team.", p, p); } else { char* ssl_str = ssl_association_info("ssl.port", "TCP"); *err = g_strdup_printf("Could not find dissector for: '%s'\nCommonly used SSL dissectors include:\n%s", p, ssl_str); g_free(ssl_str); } return FALSE; } *err = NULL; return TRUE; } #endif static void ssl_src_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { g_snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "source (%u%s)", pinfo->srcport, UTF8_RIGHTWARDS_ARROW); } static gpointer ssl_src_value(packet_info *pinfo) { return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->srcport); } static void ssl_dst_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { g_snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "destination (%s%u)", UTF8_RIGHTWARDS_ARROW, pinfo->destport); } static gpointer ssl_dst_value(packet_info *pinfo) { return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->destport); } static void ssl_both_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { g_snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "both (%u%s%u)", pinfo->srcport, UTF8_LEFT_RIGHT_ARROW, pinfo->destport); } /********************************************************************* * * Standard Wireshark Protocol Registration and housekeeping * *********************************************************************/ void proto_register_ssl(void) { /* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/ static hf_register_info hf[] = { { &hf_ssl_record, { "Record Layer", "ssl.record", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_record_content_type, { "Content Type", "ssl.record.content_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0, NULL, HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl2_msg_type, { "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.handshake.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0, "SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL} }, { &hf_pct_msg_type, { "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.pct_handshake.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(pct_msg_types), 0x0, "PCT handshake message type", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl_record_version, { "Version", "ssl.record.version", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, "Record layer version", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_record_length, { "Length", "ssl.record.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of SSL record data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_record_appdata, { "Encrypted Application Data", "ssl.app_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Payload is encrypted application data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_record, { "SSLv2/PCT Record Header", "ssl.record", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "SSLv2/PCT record data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, { "Is Escape", "ssl.record.is_escape", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Indicates a security escape", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, { "Padding Length", "ssl.record.padding_length", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of padding at end of record", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_alert_message, { "Alert Message", "ssl.alert_message", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_alert_message_level, { "Level", "ssl.alert_message.level", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0, "Alert message level", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_alert_message_description, { "Description", "ssl.alert_message.desc", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0, "Alert message description", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, { "Handshake Protocol", "ssl.handshake", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Handshake protocol message", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_type, { "Handshake Type", "ssl.handshake.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0, "Type of handshake message", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_length, { "Length", "ssl.handshake.length", FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of handshake message", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, { "Cipher Spec", "ssl.handshake.cipherspec", FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext, 0x0, "Cipher specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status, { "Certificate Status", "ssl.handshake.cert_status", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Certificate Status Data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_type, { "Certificate Status Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_status_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_cert_status_type), 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_status_len, { "Certificate Status Length", "ssl.handshake.cert_status_len", FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of certificate status", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len, { "Selected Protocol Length", "ssl.handshake.npn_selected_protocol_len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_npn_selected_protocol, { "Selected Protocol", "ssl.handshake.npn_selected_protocol", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Protocol to be used for connection", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding_len, { "Padding Length", "ssl.handshake.npn_padding_len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_handshake_npn_padding, { "Padding", "ssl.handshake.npn_padding", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &ssl_hfs.hs_md5_hash, { "MD5 Hash", "ssl.handshake.md5_hash", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } }, { &ssl_hfs.hs_sha_hash, { "SHA-1 Hash", "ssl.handshake.sha_hash", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_heartbeat_message, { "Heartbeat Message", "ssl.heartbeat_message", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_type, { "Type", "ssl.heartbeat_message.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_heartbeat_type), 0x0, "Heartbeat message type", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload_length, { "Payload Length", "ssl.heartbeat_message.payload_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_payload, { "Payload Length", "ssl.heartbeat_message.payload", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl_heartbeat_message_padding, { "Payload Length", "ssl.heartbeat_message.padding", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, { "Challenge", "ssl.handshake.challenge", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, { "Cipher Spec Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_spec_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of cipher specs field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, { "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of session ID field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, { "Challenge Length", "ssl.handshake.challenge_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of challenge field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, { "Clear Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of clear key data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, { "Encrypted Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of encrypted key data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, { "Key Argument Length", "ssl.handshake.key_arg_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of key argument", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, { "Clear Key Data", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_data", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, { "Encrypted Key", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, { "Key Argument", "ssl.handshake.key_arg", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, { "Session ID Hit", "ssl.handshake.session_id_hit", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, { "Certificate Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, { "Connection ID Length", "ssl.handshake.connection_id_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of connection ID", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, { "Connection ID", "ssl.handshake.connection_id", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server's challenge to client", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, { "Cipher Spec", "ssl.pct.handshake.cipherspec", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "PCT Cipher specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_cipher, { "Cipher", "ssl.pct.handshake.cipher", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cipher_type), 0x0, "PCT Ciper", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, { "Hash Spec", "ssl.pct.handshake.hashspec", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "PCT Hash specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_hash, { "Hash", "ssl.pct.handshake.hash", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_hash_type), 0x0, "PCT Hash", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, { "Cert Spec", "ssl.pct.handshake.certspec", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "PCT Certificate specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_cert, { "Cert", "ssl.pct.handshake.cert", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cert_type), 0x0, "PCT Certificate", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, { "Exchange Spec", "ssl.pct.handshake.exchspec", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "PCT Exchange specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_exch, { "Exchange", "ssl.pct.handshake.exch", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_exch_type), 0x0, "PCT Exchange", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_sig, { "Sig Spec", "ssl.pct.handshake.sig", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_sig_type), 0x0, "PCT Signature", HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_msg_error_type, { "PCT Error Code", "ssl.pct.msg_error_code", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_error_code), 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_pct_handshake_server_cert, { "Server Cert", "ssl.pct.handshake.server_cert", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL , 0x0, "PCT Server Certificate", HFILL } }, /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ { &hf_ssl_pct_client_version, { "Client Version", "ssl.pct.client_version", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_pad, { "PAD", "ssl.pct.pad", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_session_id_data, { "Client Session ID Data", "ssl.pct.client_session_id_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_challenge_data, { "Challenge Data", "ssl.pct.challenge_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_ch_offset, { "CH_OFFSET", "ssl.pct.ch_offset", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_cipher_specs_length, { "CIPHER_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.cipher_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_hash_specs_length, { "HASH_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.hash_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_cert_specs_length, { "CERT_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.cert_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_exch_specs_length, { "EXCH_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.exch_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_iv_length, { "IV Length", "ssl.pct.iv_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_encryption_key_length, { "Encryption key length", "ssl.pct.encryption_key_length", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_mac_key_length_in_bits, { "MAC key length in bits", "ssl.pct.mac_key_length_in_bits", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_iv_data, { "IV data", "ssl.pct.iv_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_server_version, { "Server Version", "ssl.pct.server_version", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_sh_restart_session_ok_flag, { "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag", "ssl.pct.sh_restart_session_ok_flag", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_sh_client_auth_req_flag, { "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag", "ssl.pct.sh_client_auth_req_flag", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_connection_id_data, { "Connection ID Data", "ssl.connection_id_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_server_certificate_length, { "Server Certificate Length", "ssl.pct.server_certificate_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs_length, { "Client CERT_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.client_cert_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_sig_specs_length, { "Client SIG_SPECS Length", "ssl.pct.client_sig_specs_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_response_length, { "Response Length", "ssl.pct.response_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_specs, { "Client CERT_SPECS", "ssl.pct.client_cert_specs", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_signature, { "Client Signature", "ssl.pct.client_signature", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_server_response, { "Server Response", "ssl.pct.server_response", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_length, { "Clear Key Length", "ssl.pct.clear_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_length, { "Encrypted Key Length", "ssl.pct.encrypted_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_length, { "Verify Prelude Length", "ssl.pct.verify_prelude_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_cert_length, { "Client Cert Length", "ssl.pct.client_cert_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_clear_key_data, { "Clear Key data", "ssl.pct.clear_key_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_encrypted_key_data, { "Encrypted Key data", "ssl.pct.encrypted_key_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_verify_prelude_data, { "Verify Prelude data", "ssl.pct.verify_prelude_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_client_certificate_data, { "Client Certificate data", "ssl.pct.client_certificate_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_response_data, { "Response data", "ssl.pct.response_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_server_session_id_data, { "Server Session ID data", "ssl.pct.server_session_id_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_server_response_length, { "Server Response Length", "ssl.pct.server_response_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_error_information_length, { "Error Information Length", "ssl.pct.error_information_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cipher, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_cipher", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_hash, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_hash", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_cert, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_cert", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_exch, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_exch", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_cert, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_client_cert", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_specs_mismatch_client_sig, { "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG", "ssl.pct.specs_mismatch_client_sig", FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_pct_error_information_data, { "Error Information data", "ssl.pct.error_information_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_overlap, { "Segment overlap", "ssl.segment.overlap", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Segment overlaps with other segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_overlap_conflict, { "Conflicting data in segment overlap", "ssl.segment.overlap.conflict", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Overlapping segments contained conflicting data", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_multiple_tails, { "Multiple tail segments found", "ssl.segment.multipletails", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Several tails were found when reassembling the pdu", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_too_long_fragment, { "Segment too long", "ssl.segment.toolongfragment", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Segment contained data past end of the pdu", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_error, { "Reassembling error", "ssl.segment.error", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Reassembling error due to illegal segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_count, { "Segment count", "ssl.segment.count", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment, { "SSL segment", "ssl.segment", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segments, { "Reassembled SSL segments", "ssl.segments", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "SSL Segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_reassembled_in, { "Reassembled PDU in frame", "ssl.reassembled_in", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "The PDU that doesn't end in this segment is reassembled in this frame", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_reassembled_length, { "Reassembled PDU length", "ssl.reassembled.length", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "The total length of the reassembled payload", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_reassembled_data, { "Reassembled PDU data", "ssl.reassembled.data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, "The payload of multiple reassembled SSL segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_ssl_segment_data, { "SSL segment data", "ssl.segment.data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, "The payload of a single SSL segment", HFILL } }, SSL_COMMON_HF_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf, "ssl") }; /* Setup protocol subtree array */ static gint *ett[] = { &ett_ssl, &ett_ssl_record, &ett_ssl_alert, &ett_ssl_handshake, &ett_ssl_heartbeat, &ett_ssl_certs, &ett_ssl_cert_status, &ett_ssl_ocsp_resp, &ett_pct_cipher_suites, &ett_pct_hash_suites, &ett_pct_cert_suites, &ett_pct_exch_suites, &ett_ssl_segments, &ett_ssl_segment, SSL_COMMON_ETT_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf) }; static ei_register_info ei[] = { { &ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error, { "ssl.handshake.session_id_length.error", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Session ID length error", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length, { "ssl.heartbeat_message.payload_length.invalid", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Invalid heartbeat payload length", EXPFILL }}, /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ { &ei_ssl_ignored_unknown_record, { "ssl.ignored_unknown_record", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Ignored Unknown Record", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_ssl_pct_client_version, { "ssl.pct.client_version.invalid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Client Version invalid", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_ssl_pct_ch_offset, { "ssl.pct.ch_offset.invalid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "CH_OFFSET invalid", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_ssl_pct_server_version, { "ssl.pct.server_version.invalid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Server Version invalid", EXPFILL }}, SSL_COMMON_EI_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf, "ssl") }; static build_valid_func ssl_da_src_values[1] = {ssl_src_value}; static build_valid_func ssl_da_dst_values[1] = {ssl_dst_value}; static build_valid_func ssl_da_both_values[2] = {ssl_src_value, ssl_dst_value}; static decode_as_value_t ssl_da_values[3] = {{ssl_src_prompt, 1, ssl_da_src_values}, {ssl_dst_prompt, 1, ssl_da_dst_values}, {ssl_both_prompt, 2, ssl_da_both_values}}; static decode_as_t ssl_da = {"ssl", "Transport", "ssl.port", 3, 2, ssl_da_values, "TCP", "port(s) as", decode_as_default_populate_list, decode_as_default_reset, decode_as_default_change, NULL}; expert_module_t* expert_ssl; /* Register the protocol name and description */ proto_ssl = proto_register_protocol("Secure Sockets Layer", "SSL", "ssl"); ssl_associations = register_dissector_table("ssl.port", "SSL TCP Dissector", proto_ssl, FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC); /* Required function calls to register the header fields and * subtrees used */ proto_register_field_array(proto_ssl, hf, array_length(hf)); proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); expert_ssl = expert_register_protocol(proto_ssl); expert_register_field_array(expert_ssl, ei, array_length(ei)); { module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ssl, proto_reg_handoff_ssl); #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static uat_field_t sslkeylist_uats_flds[] = { UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, ipaddr, "IP address", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb, "IPv4 or IPv6 address"), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, port, "Port", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb, "Port Number"), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, protocol, "Protocol", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_protocol_chk_cb, "Protocol"), UAT_FLD_FILENAME_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, keyfile, "Key File", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb, "Private keyfile."), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, password,"Password", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb, "Password (for PCKS#12 keyfile)"), UAT_END_FIELDS }; ssldecrypt_uat = uat_new("SSL Decrypt", sizeof(ssldecrypt_assoc_t), "ssl_keys", /* filename */ TRUE, /* from_profile */ &sslkeylist_uats, /* data_ptr */ &nssldecrypt, /* numitems_ptr */ UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ NULL, /* Help section (currently a wiki page) */ ssldecrypt_copy_cb, NULL, ssldecrypt_free_cb, ssl_parse_uat, sslkeylist_uats_flds); prefs_register_uat_preference(ssl_module, "key_table", "RSA keys list", "A table of RSA keys for SSL decryption", ssldecrypt_uat); #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ prefs_register_filename_preference(ssl_module, "debug_file", "SSL debug file", "Redirect SSL debug to the file specified. Leave empty to disable debugging " "or use \"" SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "\" to redirect output to stderr.", &ssl_debug_file_name); prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list (deprecated)", "Semicolon-separated list of private RSA keys used for SSL decryption. " "Used by versions of Wireshark prior to 1.6", &ssl_keys_list); #endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */ prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "desegment_ssl_records", "Reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments", "Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL records spanning multiple TCP segments. " "To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.", &ssl_desegment); prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "desegment_ssl_application_data", "Reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records", "Whether the SSL dissector should reassemble SSL Application Data spanning multiple SSL records. ", &ssl_desegment_app_data); prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "ignore_ssl_mac_failed", "Message Authentication Code (MAC), ignore \"mac failed\"", "For troubleshooting ignore the mac check result and decrypt also if the Message Authentication Code (MAC) fails.", &ssl_ignore_mac_failed); ssl_common_register_options(ssl_module, &ssl_options); } /* heuristic dissectors for any premable e.g. CredSSP before RDP */ ssl_heur_subdissector_list = register_heur_dissector_list("ssl", proto_ssl); ssl_handle = register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl); register_init_routine(ssl_init); register_cleanup_routine(ssl_cleanup); register_decode_as(&ssl_da); ssl_tap = register_tap("ssl"); ssl_debug_printf("proto_register_ssl: registered tap %s:%d\n", "ssl", ssl_tap); register_follow_stream(proto_ssl, "ssl", tcp_follow_conv_filter, tcp_follow_index_filter, tcp_follow_address_filter, tcp_port_to_display, ssl_follow_tap_listener); } /* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration * routine. This format is required because a script is used to find * these routines and create the code that calls these routines. */ void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void) { /* parse key list */ ssl_parse_uat(); ssl_parse_old_keys(); exported_pdu_tap = find_tap_id(EXPORT_PDU_TAP_NAME_LAYER_7); } void ssl_dissector_add(guint port, dissector_handle_t handle) { ssl_association_add("ssl.port", ssl_handle, handle, port, TRUE); } void ssl_dissector_delete(guint port, dissector_handle_t handle) { ssl_association_remove("ssl.port", ssl_handle, handle, port, TRUE); } /* * Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html * * Local variables: * c-basic-offset: 4 * tab-width: 8 * indent-tabs-mode: nil * End: * * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab: * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true: */