/* packet-ssl-utils.c * ssl manipulation functions * By Paolo Abeni * * Copyright (c) 2013, Hauke Mehrtens * Copyright (c) 2014, Peter Wu * * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer * By Gerald Combs * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. */ #include "config.h" #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB #define ZLIB_CONST #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet-ber.h" #include "packet-x509af.h" #include "packet-x509if.h" #include "packet-ssl-utils.h" #include "packet-ocsp.h" #include "packet-ssl.h" #include "packet-dtls.h" #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) #include #endif #if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 /* 1.6.0 */ /* Whether to provide support for authentication in addition to decryption. */ #define HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD #endif #if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010700 /* 1.7.0 */ /* Whether AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 can be supported. */ #define HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_CHACHA20_POLY1305 #endif /* Lookup tables {{{ */ const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = { { SSL_VER_UNKNOWN, "SSL" }, { SSLV2_VERSION, "SSLv2" }, { SSLV3_VERSION, "SSLv3" }, { TLSV1_VERSION, "TLSv1" }, { TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLSv1.1" }, { TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLSv1.2" }, { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLSv1.3" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLSv1.0" }, { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLSv1.2" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" }, { PCT_VERSION, "PCT" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_versions[] = { { SSLV2_VERSION, "SSL 2.0" }, { SSLV3_VERSION, "SSL 3.0" }, { TLSV1_VERSION, "TLS 1.0" }, { TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "TLS 1.1" }, { TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "TLS 1.2" }, { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLS 1.3" }, { 0x7F0E, "TLS 1.3 (draft 14)" }, { 0x7F0F, "TLS 1.3 (draft 15)" }, { 0x7F10, "TLS 1.3 (draft 16)" }, { 0x7F11, "TLS 1.3 (draft 17)" }, { 0x7F12, "TLS 1.3 (draft 18)" }, { 0x7F13, "TLS 1.3 (draft 19)" }, { 0x7F14, "TLS 1.3 (draft 20)" }, { 0x7F15, "TLS 1.3 (draft 21)" }, { 0x7F16, "TLS 1.3 (draft 22)" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0" }, { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLS 1.2" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = { { SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" }, { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" }, { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" }, { SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, { SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" }, { SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" }, { SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" }, { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; /* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */ /* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string-ext can do a binary search */ static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = { { 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" }, { 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" }, { 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, { 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, { 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" }, #if 0 { 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, #endif /* RFC 2712 */ { 0x00001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x000021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x000023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x000024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x000025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x000026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" }, { 0x000027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" }, { 0x000028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" }, { 0x000029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x00002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x00002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, /* RFC 4785 */ { 0x00002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, /* RFC 5246 */ { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x00003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x000040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" }, { 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" }, { 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, { 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, { 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x000067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x000068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x000069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, /* 0x00,0x6E-83 Unassigned */ { 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 4279 */ { 0x00008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x000093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 4162 */ { 0x000096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5288 */ { 0x00009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, /* RFC 5487 */ { 0x0000A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x0000AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x0000AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x0000B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x0000B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, { 0x0000B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x0000B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x0000B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, { 0x0000B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x0000B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x0000B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, /* From RFC 5932 */ { 0x0000BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0000C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, /* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */ { 0x0000FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" }, /* 0x01-BF,* Unassigned */ /* From RFC 4492 */ { 0x00c001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00c002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00c003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00c007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00c008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00c00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00c00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00c011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00c012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00c016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00c017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00c019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5054 */ { 0x00C01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5589 */ { 0x00C023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00C025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00C027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00C029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00C02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00C02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00C02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00C02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00C02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00C030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00C031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00C032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, /* RFC 5489 */ { 0x00C033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x00C034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00C037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00C039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x00C03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x00C03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, /* 0xC0,0x3C-FF Unassigned 0xC1-FD,* Unassigned 0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned 0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen] 0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246] */ /* old numbers used in the beginning * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */ { 0x00CC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305 */ { 0x00CCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x00CCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */ { 0x00E410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0x00E41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */ { 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, { 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, /* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in * a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte * tls cipher suite id */ { 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, { 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" }, /* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's book "SSL and TLS" */ { 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" }, { 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" }, { 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" }, { 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" }, { 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" }, { 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" }, { 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" }, { 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" }, { 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; value_string_ext ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_20_cipher_suites); /* * Supported Groups (formerly named "EC Named Curve"). * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 */ const value_string ssl_extension_curves[] = { { 1, "sect163k1" }, { 2, "sect163r1" }, { 3, "sect163r2" }, { 4, "sect193r1" }, { 5, "sect193r2" }, { 6, "sect233k1" }, { 7, "sect233r1" }, { 8, "sect239k1" }, { 9, "sect283k1" }, { 10, "sect283r1" }, { 11, "sect409k1" }, { 12, "sect409r1" }, { 13, "sect571k1" }, { 14, "sect571r1" }, { 15, "secp160k1" }, { 16, "secp160r1" }, { 17, "secp160r2" }, { 18, "secp192k1" }, { 19, "secp192r1" }, { 20, "secp224k1" }, { 21, "secp224r1" }, { 22, "secp256k1" }, { 23, "secp256r1" }, { 24, "secp384r1" }, { 25, "secp521r1" }, { 26, "brainpoolP256r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */ { 27, "brainpoolP384r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */ { 28, "brainpoolP512r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */ { 29, "x25519" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis */ { 30, "x448" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis */ { 256, "ffdhe2048" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 257, "ffdhe3072" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 258, "ffdhe4096" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 259, "ffdhe6144" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 260, "ffdhe8192" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 2570, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 6682, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 10794, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 14906, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 19018, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 23130, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 27242, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 31354, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 35466, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 39578, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 43690, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 47802, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 51914, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 56026, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 60138, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 64250, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0xFF01, "arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves" }, { 0xFF02, "arbitrary_explicit_char2_curves" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_curve_types[] = { { 1, "explicit_prime" }, { 2, "explicit_char2" }, { 3, "named_curve" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_extension_ec_point_formats[] = { { 0, "uncompressed" }, { 1, "ansiX962_compressed_prime" }, { 2, "ansiX962_compressed_char2" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = { { 0x00, "N/A" }, { 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = { { 20, "Change Cipher Spec" }, { 21, "Alert" }, { 22, "Handshake" }, { 23, "Application Data" }, { 24, "Heartbeat" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #if 0 /* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec message. */ const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = { { 1, "Change Cipher Spec" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #endif const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = { { 1, "Warning" }, { 2, "Fatal" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = { { 0, "Close Notify" }, { 1, "End of Early Data" }, { 10, "Unexpected Message" }, { 20, "Bad Record MAC" }, { 21, "Decryption Failed" }, { 22, "Record Overflow" }, { 30, "Decompression Failure" }, { 40, "Handshake Failure" }, { 41, "No Certificate" }, { 42, "Bad Certificate" }, { 43, "Unsupported Certificate" }, { 44, "Certificate Revoked" }, { 45, "Certificate Expired" }, { 46, "Certificate Unknown" }, { 47, "Illegal Parameter" }, { 48, "Unknown CA" }, { 49, "Access Denied" }, { 50, "Decode Error" }, { 51, "Decrypt Error" }, { 60, "Export Restriction" }, { 70, "Protocol Version" }, { 71, "Insufficient Security" }, { 80, "Internal Error" }, { 86, "Inappropriate Fallback" }, { 90, "User Canceled" }, { 100, "No Renegotiation" }, { 109, "Missing Extension" }, { 110, "Unsupported Extension" }, { 111, "Certificate Unobtainable" }, { 112, "Unrecognized Name" }, { 113, "Bad Certificate Status Response" }, { 114, "Bad Certificate Hash Value" }, { 115, "Unknown PSK Identity" }, { 116, "Certificate Required" }, { 120, "No application Protocol" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = { { SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" }, { SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, { SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, { SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, "Hello Verify Request"}, { SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET, "New Session Ticket" }, { SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, "End of Early Data" }, { SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, "Hello Retry Request" }, { SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, "Encrypted Extensions" }, { SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" }, { SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" }, { SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" }, { SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" }, { SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_URL, "Client Certificate URL" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS, "Certificate Status" }, { SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, "Supplemental Data" }, { SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE, "Key Update" }, { SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS, "Encrypted Extensions" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string tls_heartbeat_type[] = { { 1, "Request" }, { 2, "Response" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string tls_heartbeat_mode[] = { { 1, "Peer allowed to send requests" }, { 2, "Peer not allowed to send requests" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = { { 0, "null" }, { 1, "DEFLATE" }, { 64, "LZS" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #if 0 /* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */ const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = { { 0, "RSA" }, { 1, "Diffie Hellman" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = { { 0, "Anonymous" }, { 1, "RSA" }, { 2, "DSA" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #endif const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = { { 1, "RSA Sign" }, { 2, "DSS Sign" }, { 3, "RSA Fixed DH" }, { 4, "DSS Fixed DH" }, /* GOST certificate types */ /* Section 3.5 of draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04 */ { 21, "GOST R 34.10-94" }, { 22, "GOST R 34.10-2001" }, /* END GOST certificate types */ { 64, "ECDSA Sign" }, { 65, "RSA Fixed ECDH" }, { 66, "ECDSA Fixed ECDH" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #if 0 /* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchange keys, as would be seen in a client key exchange message. */ const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = { { 0, "Implicit" }, { 1, "Explicit" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; #endif /* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */ /* Note: sorted by ascending value so value_string_ext fcns can do a binary search */ static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = { /* RFC 2246, RFC 4346, RFC 5246 */ { 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" }, { 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" }, { 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, { 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, { 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" }, #if 0 /* Because it clashes with KRB5, is never used any more, and is safe to remove according to David Hopwood of the ietf-tls list */ { 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, #endif /* RFC 2712 */ { 0x001E, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x001F, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0020, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x0021, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0022, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x0023, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x0024, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, { 0x0025, "TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5" }, { 0x0026, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA" }, { 0x0027, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA" }, { 0x0028, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA" }, { 0x0029, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x002A, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, { 0x002B, "TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, /* RFC 4785 */ { 0x002C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x002D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0x002E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, /* RFC 5246 */ { 0x002F, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x003B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x003C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x003D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x003E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x003F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0040, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, /* RFC 4132 */ { 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, /* 0x00,0x60-66 Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations */ /* --- ??? --- */ { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" }, { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt */ { 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, { 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, { 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, /* --- ??? ---*/ { 0x0067, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0068, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x0069, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x006A, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x006B, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x006C, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x006D, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256" }, /* draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-04.txt */ { 0x0080, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" }, { 0x0081, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT" }, { 0x0082, "TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" }, { 0x0083, "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411" }, /* RFC 4132 */ { 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 4279 */ { 0x008A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x008B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x008C, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x008D, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x008E, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x008F, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0x0093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0094, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0095, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 4162 */ { 0x0096, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0097, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0098, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x0099, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x009A, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, { 0x009B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5288 */ { 0x009C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x009D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x009E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x009F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00A0, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00A1, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00A2, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00A3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00A4, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00A5, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00A6, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00A7, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, /* RFC 5487 */ { 0x00A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00AA, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00AB, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00AC, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x00AD, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x00AE, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00AF, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00B0, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x00B1, "TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, { 0x00B2, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00B3, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00B4, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x00B5, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, { 0x00B6, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00B7, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0x00B8, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0x00B9, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, /* From RFC 5932 */ { 0x00BA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00BB, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00BC, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00BD, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00BE, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00BF, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C1, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C2, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C3, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C4, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0x00C5, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256" }, /* 0x00,0xC6-FE Unassigned */ /* From RFC 5746 */ { 0x00FF, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0x0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { 0x1301, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0x1302, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0x1303, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0x1304, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" }, { 0x1305, "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0x1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* From RFC 7507 */ { 0x5600, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0x5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0x9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0xAAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0xBABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* From RFC 4492 */ { 0xc001, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xc002, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xc003, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc004, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc005, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc006, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xc007, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xc008, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc009, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc00a, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc00b, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xc00c, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xc00d, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc00e, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc00f, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc010, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xc011, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xc012, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc013, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc014, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc015, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xc016, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xc017, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc018, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xc019, "TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5054 */ { 0xC01A, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC01B, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC01C, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC01D, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC01E, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC01F, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC020, "TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC021, "TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC022, "TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, /* RFC 5589 */ { 0xC023, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC024, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC025, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC026, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC027, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC028, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC029, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC02A, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC02B, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC02C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC02D, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC02E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC02F, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC030, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC031, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC032, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, /* RFC 5489 */ { 0xC033, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, { 0xC034, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC035, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC036, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xC037, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC038, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC039, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, { 0xC03A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256" }, { 0xC03B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384" }, /* RFC 6209 */ { 0xC03C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC03D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC03E, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC03F, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC040, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC041, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC042, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC043, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC044, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC047, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC048, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC049, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC04A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC04B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC04C, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC04D, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC04E, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC04F, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC050, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC051, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC052, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC053, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC054, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC055, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC056, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC057, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC058, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC059, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC05A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC05B, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC05C, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC05D, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC05E, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC05F, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC060, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC061, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC062, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC063, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC064, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC065, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC066, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC067, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC068, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC069, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC06A, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC06B, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC06C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC06D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC06E, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC06F, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC070, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC071, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, /* RFC 6367 */ { 0xC072, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC073, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC074, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC075, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC076, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC077, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC078, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC079, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC07A, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC07B, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC07C, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC07D, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC07E, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC07F, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC080, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC081, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC082, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC083, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC084, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC085, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC086, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC087, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC088, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC089, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC08A, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC08B, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC08C, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC08D, "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC08E, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC08F, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC090, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC091, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC092, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xC093, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xC094, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC095, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC096, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC097, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC098, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC099, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, { 0xC09A, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256" }, { 0xC09B, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384" }, /* RFC 6655 */ { 0xC09C, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" }, { 0xC09D, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" }, { 0xC09E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" }, { 0xC09F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" }, { 0xC0A0, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0A1, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0A2, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0A3, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0A4, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" }, { 0xC0A5, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" }, { 0xC0A6, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM" }, { 0xC0A7, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM" }, { 0xC0A8, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0A9, "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0AA, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0AB, "TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" }, /* RFC 7251 */ { 0xC0AC, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" }, { 0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" }, { 0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" }, { 0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0xCACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* 0xC0,0xAB-FF Unassigned 0xC1-FD,* Unassigned 0xFE,0x00-FD Unassigned 0xFE,0xFE-FF Reserved to avoid conflicts with widely deployed implementations [Pasi_Eronen] 0xFF,0x00-FF Reserved for Private Use [RFC5246] */ /* old numbers used in the beginning * http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305 */ { 0xCC13, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCC14, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCC15, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, /* RFC 7905 */ { 0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead */ { 0xD001, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xD002, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xD003, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" }, { 0xD005, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0xDADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-salsa20-tls */ { 0xE410, "TLS_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE411, "TLS_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE412, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE413, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE414, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE415, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE416, "TLS_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE417, "TLS_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE418, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE419, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41A, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41B, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41C, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41D, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41E, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ESTREAM_SALSA20_SHA1" }, { 0xE41F, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SALSA20_SHA1" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { 0xEAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, { 0xFAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/ security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */ { 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, { 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, { 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, /* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */ { 0x00, NULL } }; value_string_ext ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext = VALUE_STRING_EXT_INIT(ssl_31_ciphersuite); const value_string pct_msg_types[] = { { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, { PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" }, { PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" }, { PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = { { PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" }, { PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" }, { PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" }, { PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" }, { PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" }, { PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_hash_type[] = { { PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" }, { PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"}, { PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"}, { PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"}, { PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"}, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_cert_type[] = { { PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" }, { PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" }, { PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_sig_type[] = { { PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" }, { PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" }, { PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" }, { PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_exch_type[] = { { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" }, { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" }, { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" }, { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" }, { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" }, { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" }, { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" }, { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" }, { PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; const value_string pct_error_code[] = { { PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" }, { PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" }, { PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" }, { PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" }, { PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" }, { PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; /* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#tls-extensiontype-values-1 */ const value_string tls_hello_extension_types[] = { { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME, "server_name" }, /* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, "max_fragment_length" },/* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, "client_certificate_url" }, /* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, "trusted_ca_keys" }, /* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, "truncated_hmac" }, /* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, "status_request" }, /* RFC 6066 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USER_MAPPING, "user_mapping" }, /* RFC 4681 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_AUTHZ, "client_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_AUTHZ, "server_authz" }, /* RFC 5878 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE, "cert_type" }, /* RFC 6091 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, "supported_groups" }, /* RFC 4492, RFC 7919 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS, "ec_point_formats" }, /* RFC 4492 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SRP, "srp" }, /* RFC 5054 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS, "signature_algorithms" }, /* RFC 5246 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP, "use_srtp" }, /* RFC 5764 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT, "heartbeat" }, /* RFC 6520 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN, "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" }, /* RFC 7301 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2, "status_request_v2" }, /* RFC 6961 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, "signed_certificate_timestamp" }, /* RFC 6962 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE, "client_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE, "server_certificate_type" }, /* RFC 7250 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING, "padding" }, /* RFC 7685 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, "encrypt_then_mac" }, /* RFC 7366 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, "extended_master_secret" }, /* RFC 7627 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TOKEN_BINDING, "token_binding" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CACHED_INFO, "cached_info" }, /* RFC 7924 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS, "quic_transports_parameters" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS, "SessionTicket TLS" }, /* RFC 4507 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE, "key_share" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, "pre_shared_key" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA, "early_data" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, "supported_versions" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE, "cookie" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, "psk_key_exchange_modes" }, /* TLS 1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO, "ticket_early_data_info" }, /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 (removed in -19) */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, "certificate_authorities" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.3.1 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS, "oid_filters" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.3.2.1 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, "post_handshake_auth" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20#section-4.2.5 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_0A0A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_1A1A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_2A2A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN, "next_protocol_negotiation"}, /* https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-03.html */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_3A3A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_4A4A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_5A5A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_6A6A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID_OLD, "channel_id_old" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-00 https://twitter.com/ericlaw/status/274237352531083264 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CHANNEL_ID, "channel_id" }, /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#chromium/src/net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslt.h&l=209 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, "renegotiation_info" }, /* RFC 5746 */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_7A7A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_8A8A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_9A9A, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_AAAA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_BABA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_CACA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_DADA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_EAEA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_GREASE_FAFA, "Reserved (GREASE)" }, /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-grease */ { SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_DRAFT_VERSION_TLS13, "Draft version of TLS 1.3" }, /* for experimentation only https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg20853.html */ { 0, NULL } }; const value_string tls_hello_ext_server_name_type_vs[] = { { 0, "host_name" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 4.2.6 */ const value_string tls_hello_ext_psk_ke_mode[] = { { 0, "PSK-only key establishment (psk_ke)" }, { 1, "PSK with (EC)DHE key establishment (psk_dhe_ke)" }, { 0, NULL } }; const value_string tls13_key_update_request[] = { { 0, "update_not_requested" }, { 1, "update_requested" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4.1 */ const value_string tls_hash_algorithm[] = { { 0, "None" }, { 1, "MD5" }, { 2, "SHA1" }, { 3, "SHA224" }, { 4, "SHA256" }, { 5, "SHA384" }, { 6, "SHA512" }, { 0, NULL } }; const value_string tls_signature_algorithm[] = { { 0, "Anonymous" }, { 1, "RSA" }, { 2, "DSA" }, { 3, "ECDSA" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21#section-4.2.3 */ const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[] = { { 0x0201, "rsa_pkcs1_sha1" }, { 0x0203, "ecdsa_sha1" }, { 0x0401, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" }, { 0x0403, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" }, { 0x0501, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" }, { 0x0503, "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" }, { 0x0601, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" }, { 0x0603, "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" }, { 0x0804, "rsa_pss_sha256" }, { 0x0805, "rsa_pss_sha384" }, { 0x0806, "rsa_pss_sha512" }, { 0x0807, "ed25519" }, { 0x0808, "ed448" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* RFC 6091 3.1 */ const value_string tls_certificate_type[] = { { 0, "X.509" }, { 1, "OpenPGP" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, "Raw Public Key" }, /* RFC 7250 */ { 0, NULL } }; const value_string tls_cert_chain_type[] = { { SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_INDIVIDUAL_CERT, "Individual Certificates" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_URL_TYPE_PKIPATH, "PKI Path" }, { 0, NULL } }; const value_string tls_cert_status_type[] = { { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP, "OCSP" }, { SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI, "OCSP Multi" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Generated by tools/make-tls-ct-logids.py * Last-Modified Mon, 06 Mar 2017 15:27:22 GMT, 24 entries. */ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { { "\xa4\xb9\x09\x90\xb4\x18\x58\x14\x87\xbb\x13\xa2\xcc\x67\x70\x0a" "\x3c\x35\x98\x04\xf9\x1b\xdf\xb8\xe3\x77\xcd\x0e\xc8\x0d\xdc\x10", 32, "Google 'Pilot' log" }, { "\x68\xf6\x98\xf8\x1f\x64\x82\xbe\x3a\x8c\xee\xb9\x28\x1d\x4c\xfc" "\x71\x51\x5d\x67\x93\xd4\x44\xd1\x0a\x67\xac\xbb\x4f\x4f\xfb\xc4", 32, "Google 'Aviator' log" }, { "\x56\x14\x06\x9a\x2f\xd7\xc2\xec\xd3\xf5\xe1\xbd\x44\xb2\x3e\xc7" "\x46\x76\xb9\xbc\x99\x11\x5c\xc0\xef\x94\x98\x55\xd6\x89\xd0\xdd", 32, "DigiCert Log Server" }, { "\xee\x4b\xbd\xb7\x75\xce\x60\xba\xe1\x42\x69\x1f\xab\xe1\x9e\x66" "\xa3\x0f\x7e\x5f\xb0\x72\xd8\x83\x00\xc4\x7b\x89\x7a\xa8\xfd\xcb", 32, "Google 'Rocketeer' log" }, { "\xcd\xb5\x17\x9b\x7f\xc1\xc0\x46\xfe\xea\x31\x13\x6a\x3f\x8f\x00" "\x2e\x61\x82\xfa\xf8\x89\x6f\xec\xc8\xb2\xf5\xb5\xab\x60\x49\x00", 32, "Certly.IO log" }, { "\x74\x61\xb4\xa0\x9c\xfb\x3d\x41\xd7\x51\x59\x57\x5b\x2e\x76\x49" "\xa4\x45\xa8\xd2\x77\x09\xb0\xcc\x56\x4a\x64\x82\xb7\xeb\x41\xa3", 32, "Izenpe log" }, { "\xdd\xeb\x1d\x2b\x7a\x0d\x4f\xa6\x20\x8b\x81\xad\x81\x68\x70\x7e" "\x2e\x8e\x9d\x01\xd5\x5c\x88\x8d\x3d\x11\xc4\xcd\xb6\xec\xbe\xcc", 32, "Symantec log" }, { "\xac\x3b\x9a\xed\x7f\xa9\x67\x47\x57\x15\x9e\x6d\x7d\x57\x56\x72" "\xf9\xd9\x81\x00\x94\x1e\x9b\xde\xff\xec\xa1\x31\x3b\x75\x78\x2d", 32, "Venafi log" }, { "\x9e\x4f\xf7\x3d\xc3\xce\x22\x0b\x69\x21\x7c\x89\x9e\x46\x80\x76" "\xab\xf8\xd7\x86\x36\xd5\xcc\xfc\x85\xa3\x1a\x75\x62\x8b\xa8\x8b", 32, "WoSign log" }, { "\x41\xb2\xdc\x2e\x89\xe6\x3c\xe4\xaf\x1b\xa7\xbb\x29\xbf\x68\xc6" "\xde\xe6\xf9\xf1\xcc\x04\x7e\x30\xdf\xfa\xe3\xb3\xba\x25\x92\x63", 32, "WoSign ctlog" }, { "\xbc\x78\xe1\xdf\xc5\xf6\x3c\x68\x46\x49\x33\x4d\xa1\x0f\xa1\x5f" "\x09\x79\x69\x20\x09\xc0\x81\xb4\xf3\xf6\x91\x7f\x3e\xd9\xb8\xa5", 32, "Symantec VEGA log" }, { "\xa5\x77\xac\x9c\xed\x75\x48\xdd\x8f\x02\x5b\x67\xa2\x41\x08\x9d" "\xf8\x6e\x0f\x47\x6e\xc2\x03\xc2\xec\xbe\xdb\x18\x5f\x28\x26\x38", 32, "CNNIC CT log" }, { "\xc9\xcf\x89\x0a\x21\x10\x9c\x66\x6c\xc1\x7a\x3e\xd0\x65\xc9\x30" "\xd0\xe0\x13\x5a\x9f\xeb\xa8\x5a\xf1\x42\x10\xb8\x07\x24\x21\xaa", 32, "Wang Shengnan GDCA log" }, { "\xa8\x99\xd8\x78\x0c\x92\x90\xaa\xf4\x62\xf3\x18\x80\xcc\xfb\xd5" "\x24\x51\xe9\x70\xd0\xfb\xf5\x91\xef\x75\xb0\xd9\x9b\x64\x56\x81", 32, "Google 'Submariner' log" }, { "\x89\x41\x44\x9c\x70\x74\x2e\x06\xb9\xfc\x9c\xe7\xb1\x16\xba\x00" "\x24\xaa\x36\xd5\x9a\xf4\x4f\x02\x04\x40\x4f\x00\xf7\xea\x85\x66", 32, "Izenpe 2nd log" }, { "\x34\xbb\x6a\xd6\xc3\xdf\x9c\x03\xee\xa8\xa4\x99\xff\x78\x91\x48" "\x6c\x9d\x5e\x5c\xac\x92\xd0\x1f\x7b\xfd\x1b\xce\x19\xdb\x48\xef", 32, "StartCom CT log" }, { "\xbb\xd9\xdf\xbc\x1f\x8a\x71\xb5\x93\x94\x23\x97\xaa\x92\x7b\x47" "\x38\x57\x95\x0a\xab\x52\xe8\x1a\x90\x96\x64\x36\x8e\x1e\xd1\x85", 32, "Google 'Skydiver' log" }, { "\x29\x3c\x51\x96\x54\xc8\x39\x65\xba\xaa\x50\xfc\x58\x07\xd4\xb7" "\x6f\xbf\x58\x7a\x29\x72\xdc\xa4\xc3\x0c\xf4\xe5\x45\x47\xf4\x78", 32, "Google 'Icarus' log" }, { "\x92\x4a\x30\xf9\x09\x33\x6f\xf4\x35\xd6\x99\x3a\x10\xac\x75\xa2" "\xc6\x41\x72\x8e\x7f\xc2\xd6\x59\xae\x61\x88\xff\xad\x40\xce\x01", 32, "GDCA log" }, { "\x1d\x02\x4b\x8e\xb1\x49\x8b\x34\x4d\xfd\x87\xea\x3e\xfc\x09\x96" "\xf7\x50\x6f\x23\x5d\x1d\x49\x70\x61\xa4\x77\x3c\x43\x9c\x25\xfb", 32, "Google 'Daedalus' log" }, { "\xe0\x12\x76\x29\xe9\x04\x96\x56\x4e\x3d\x01\x47\x98\x44\x98\xaa" "\x48\xf8\xad\xb1\x66\x00\xeb\x79\x02\xa1\xef\x99\x09\x90\x62\x73", 32, "PuChuangSiDa log" }, { "\x03\x01\x9d\xf3\xfd\x85\xa6\x9a\x8e\xbd\x1f\xac\xc6\xda\x9b\xa7" "\x3e\x46\x97\x74\xfe\x77\xf5\x79\xfc\x5a\x08\xb8\x32\x8c\x1d\x6b", 32, "Venafi Gen2 CT log" }, { "\x15\x97\x04\x88\xd7\xb9\x97\xa0\x5b\xeb\x52\x51\x2a\xde\xe8\xd2" "\xe8\xb4\xa3\x16\x52\x64\x12\x1a\x9f\xab\xfb\xd5\xf8\x5a\xd9\x3f", 32, "Symantec SIRIUS log" }, { "\x87\x75\xbf\xe7\x59\x7c\xf8\x8c\x43\x99\x5f\xbd\xf3\x6e\xff\x56" "\x8d\x47\x56\x36\xff\x4a\xb5\x60\xc1\xb4\xea\xff\x5e\xa0\x83\x0f", 32, "DigiCert CT2 log" }, { NULL, 0, NULL } }; /* string_string is inappropriate as it compares strings while * "byte strings MUST NOT be truncated" (RFC 7301) */ typedef struct ssl_alpn_protocol { const char *proto_name; gboolean match_exact; const char *dissector_name; } ssl_alpn_protocol_t; /* http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#alpn-protocol-ids */ static const ssl_alpn_protocol_t ssl_alpn_protocols[] = { { "http/1.1", TRUE, "http" }, /* SPDY moves so fast, just 1, 2 and 3 are registered with IANA but there * already exists 3.1 as of this writing... match the prefix. */ { "spdy/", FALSE, "spdy" }, { "stun.turn", TRUE, "turnchannel" }, { "stun.nat-discovery", TRUE, "stun" }, /* draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-16 */ { "h2-", FALSE, "http2" }, /* draft versions */ { "h2", TRUE, "http2" }, /* final version */ }; const value_string quic_transport_parameter_id[] = { { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA, "initial_max_stream_data" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA, "initial_max_data" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_ID, "initial_max_stream_id" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_IDLE_TIMEOUT, "idle_timeout" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_OMIT_CONNECTION_ID, "omit_connection_id" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, "max_packet_size" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN, "stateless_reset_token" }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Lookup tables }}} */ /* we keep this internal to packet-ssl-utils, as there should be no need to access it any other way. This also allows us to hide the dependency on zlib. */ struct _SslDecompress { gint compression; #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB z_stream istream; #endif }; /* To assist in parsing client/server key exchange messages 0 indicates unknown */ gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher) { /* Map Cipher suite number to Key Exchange algorithm {{{ */ switch(cipher) { case 0x0017: case 0x0018: case 0x0019: case 0x001a: case 0x001b: case 0x0034: case 0x003a: case 0x0046: case 0x006c: case 0x006d: case 0x0089: case 0x009b: case 0x00a6: case 0x00a7: case 0x00bf: case 0x00c5: case 0xc084: case 0xc085: return KEX_DH_ANON; case 0x000b: case 0x000c: case 0x000d: case 0x0030: case 0x0036: case 0x003e: case 0x0042: case 0x0068: case 0x0085: case 0x0097: case 0x00a4: case 0x00a5: case 0x00bb: case 0x00c1: case 0xc082: case 0xc083: return KEX_DH_DSS; case 0x000e: case 0x000f: case 0x0010: case 0x0031: case 0x0037: case 0x003f: case 0x0043: case 0x0069: case 0x0086: case 0x0098: case 0x00a0: case 0x00a1: case 0x00bc: case 0x00c2: case 0xc07e: case 0xc07f: return KEX_DH_RSA; case 0x0011: case 0x0012: case 0x0013: case 0x0032: case 0x0038: case 0x0040: case 0x0044: case 0x0063: case 0x0065: case 0x0066: case 0x006a: case 0x0087: case 0x0099: case 0x00a2: case 0x00a3: case 0x00bd: case 0x00c3: case 0xc080: case 0xc081: return KEX_DHE_DSS; case 0x002d: case 0x008e: case 0x008f: case 0x0090: case 0x0091: case 0x00aa: case 0x00ab: case 0x00b2: case 0x00b3: case 0x00b4: case 0x00b5: case 0xc090: case 0xc091: case 0xc096: case 0xc097: case 0xc0a6: case 0xc0a7: case 0xc0aa: case 0xc0ab: case 0xccad: case 0xe41c: case 0xe41d: return KEX_DHE_PSK; case 0x0014: case 0x0015: case 0x0016: case 0x0033: case 0x0039: case 0x0045: case 0x0067: case 0x006b: case 0x0088: case 0x009a: case 0x009e: case 0x009f: case 0x00be: case 0x00c4: case 0xc07c: case 0xc07d: case 0xc09e: case 0xc09f: case 0xc0a2: case 0xc0a3: case 0xccaa: case 0xe41e: case 0xe41f: return KEX_DHE_RSA; case 0xc015: case 0xc016: case 0xc017: case 0xc018: case 0xc019: return KEX_ECDH_ANON; case 0xc001: case 0xc002: case 0xc003: case 0xc004: case 0xc005: case 0xc025: case 0xc026: case 0xc02d: case 0xc02e: case 0xc074: case 0xc075: case 0xc088: case 0xc089: return KEX_ECDH_ECDSA; case 0xc00b: case 0xc00c: case 0xc00d: case 0xc00e: case 0xc00f: case 0xc029: case 0xc02a: case 0xc031: case 0xc032: case 0xc078: case 0xc079: case 0xc08c: case 0xc08d: return KEX_ECDH_RSA; case 0xc006: case 0xc007: case 0xc008: case 0xc009: case 0xc00a: case 0xc023: case 0xc024: case 0xc02b: case 0xc02c: case 0xc072: case 0xc073: case 0xc086: case 0xc087: case 0xc0ac: case 0xc0ad: case 0xc0ae: case 0xc0af: case 0xcca9: case 0xe414: case 0xe415: return KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA; case 0xc033: case 0xc034: case 0xc035: case 0xc036: case 0xc037: case 0xc038: case 0xc039: case 0xc03a: case 0xc03b: case 0xc09a: case 0xc09b: case 0xccac: case 0xe418: case 0xe419: return KEX_ECDHE_PSK; case 0xc010: case 0xc011: case 0xc012: case 0xc013: case 0xc014: case 0xc027: case 0xc028: case 0xc02f: case 0xc030: case 0xc076: case 0xc077: case 0xc08a: case 0xc08b: case 0xcca8: case 0xe412: case 0xe413: return KEX_ECDHE_RSA; case 0x001e: case 0x001f: case 0x0020: case 0x0021: case 0x0022: case 0x0023: case 0x0024: case 0x0025: case 0x0026: case 0x0027: case 0x0028: case 0x0029: case 0x002a: case 0x002b: return KEX_KRB5; case 0x002c: case 0x008a: case 0x008b: case 0x008c: case 0x008d: case 0x00a8: case 0x00a9: case 0x00ae: case 0x00af: case 0x00b0: case 0x00b1: case 0xc064: case 0xc065: case 0xc08e: case 0xc08f: case 0xc094: case 0xc095: case 0xc0a4: case 0xc0a5: case 0xc0a8: case 0xc0a9: case 0xccab: case 0xe416: case 0xe417: return KEX_PSK; case 0x0001: case 0x0002: case 0x0003: case 0x0004: case 0x0005: case 0x0006: case 0x0007: case 0x0008: case 0x0009: case 0x000a: case 0x002f: case 0x0035: case 0x003b: case 0x003c: case 0x003d: case 0x0041: case 0x0060: case 0x0061: case 0x0062: case 0x0064: case 0x0084: case 0x0096: case 0x009c: case 0x009d: case 0x00ba: case 0x00c0: case 0xc07a: case 0xc07b: case 0xc09c: case 0xc09d: case 0xc0a0: case 0xc0a1: case 0xe410: case 0xe411: case 0xfefe: case 0xfeff: case 0xffe0: case 0xffe1: return KEX_RSA; case 0x002e: case 0x0092: case 0x0093: case 0x0094: case 0x0095: case 0x00ac: case 0x00ad: case 0x00b6: case 0x00b7: case 0x00b8: case 0x00b9: case 0xc092: case 0xc093: case 0xc098: case 0xc099: case 0xccae: case 0xe41a: case 0xe41b: return KEX_RSA_PSK; case 0xc01a: case 0xc01d: case 0xc020: return KEX_SRP_SHA; case 0xc01c: case 0xc01f: case 0xc022: return KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS; case 0xc01b: case 0xc01e: case 0xc021: return KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA; default: break; } return 0; /* }}} */ } /* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions {{{ */ gint ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len) { str->data = (guchar *)g_malloc(len); /* the allocator can return a null pointer for a size equal to 0, * and that must be allowed */ if (len > 0 && !str->data) return -1; str->data_len = (guint) len; return 0; } void ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const guchar* data, guint len) { DISSECTOR_ASSERT(data); memcpy(str->data, data, len); str->data_len = len; } static gint ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, guint len) { str->data = (guchar *)g_realloc(str->data, len); if (!str->data) return -1; str->data_len = len; return 0; } static StringInfo * ssl_data_clone(StringInfo *str) { StringInfo *cloned_str; cloned_str = (StringInfo *) wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(StringInfo) + str->data_len); cloned_str->data = (guchar *) (cloned_str + 1); ssl_data_set(cloned_str, str->data, str->data_len); return cloned_str; } static gint ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src) { if (dst->data_len < src->data_len) { if (ssl_data_realloc(dst, src->data_len)) return -1; } memcpy(dst->data, src->data, src->data_len); dst->data_len = src->data_len; return 0; } /* from_hex converts |hex_len| bytes of hex data from |in| and sets |*out| to * the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns TRUE on * success. */ static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) { gsize i; if (hex_len & 1) return FALSE; out->data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2); for (i = 0; i < hex_len / 2; i++) { int a = ws_xton(in[i*2]); int b = ws_xton(in[i*2 + 1]); if (a == -1 || b == -1) return FALSE; out->data[i] = a << 4 | b; } out->data_len = (guint)hex_len / 2; return TRUE; } /* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions }}} */ /* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations {{{ */ /* hmac abstraction layer */ #define SSL_HMAC gcry_md_hd_t static inline gint ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len, gint algo) { gcry_error_t err; const char *err_str, *err_src; err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC); if (err != 0) { err_str = gcry_strerror(err); err_src = gcry_strsource(err); ssl_debug_printf("ssl_hmac_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src); return -1; } gcry_md_setkey (*(md), key, len); return 0; } static inline void ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, gint len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen) { gint algo; guint len; algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md)); len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(len <= *datalen); memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len); *datalen = len; } static inline void ssl_hmac_cleanup(SSL_HMAC* md) { gcry_md_close(*(md)); } /* message digest abstraction layer*/ #define SSL_MD gcry_md_hd_t static inline gint ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo) { gcry_error_t err; const char *err_str, *err_src; err = gcry_md_open(md,algo, 0); if (err != 0) { err_str = gcry_strerror(err); err_src = gcry_strsource(err); ssl_debug_printf("ssl_md_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src); return -1; } return 0; } static inline void ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, gint len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen) { gint algo; gint len; algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md)); len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo); memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len); *datalen = len; } static inline void ssl_md_cleanup(SSL_MD* md) { gcry_md_close(*(md)); } /* md5 /sha abstraction layer */ #define SSL_SHA_CTX gcry_md_hd_t #define SSL_MD5_CTX gcry_md_hd_t static inline void ssl_sha_init(SSL_SHA_CTX* md) { gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); } static inline void ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void ssl_sha_final(guchar* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md) { memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_SHA1), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA1)); } static inline void ssl_sha_cleanup(SSL_SHA_CTX* md) { gcry_md_close(*(md)); } static inline gint ssl_md5_init(SSL_MD5_CTX* md) { return gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0); } static inline void ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void ssl_md5_final(guchar* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md) { memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_MD5), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_MD5)); } static inline void ssl_md5_cleanup(SSL_MD5_CTX* md) { gcry_md_close(*(md)); } /* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations }}} */ /* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation {{{ */ gint ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len) { gint ret; #if 0 guchar *ivp; gint i; gcry_cipher_hd_t c; c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher; #endif ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------"); #if 0 for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ ) { ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]); i++; } #endif ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------"); ret = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, iv_len); #if 0 for(ivp=c->iv,i=0; i < iv_len; i++ ) { ssl_debug_printf("%d ",ivp[i]); i++; } #endif ssl_debug_printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------"); return ret; } /* stream cipher abstraction layer*/ static gint ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk, guchar* iv, gint mode) { gint gcry_modes[] = { GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, #else GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_CHACHA20_POLY1305 GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305, #else -1, /* AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is unsupported. */ #endif }; gint err; if (algo == -1) { /* NULL mode */ *(cipher) = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1; return 0; } err = gcry_cipher_open(cipher, algo, gcry_modes[mode], 0); if (err !=0) return -1; err = gcry_cipher_setkey(*(cipher), sk, gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (algo)); if (err != 0) return -1; /* AEAD cipher suites will set the nonce later. */ if (mode == MODE_CBC) { err = gcry_cipher_setiv(*(cipher), iv, gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(algo)); if (err != 0) return -1; } return 0; } static inline gint ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl, const guchar * in, gint inl) { if ((*cipher) == (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1) { if (in && inl) memcpy(out, in, outl < inl ? outl : inl); return 0; } return gcry_cipher_decrypt ( *(cipher), out, outl, in, inl); } static inline gint ssl_get_digest_by_name(const gchar*name) { return gcry_md_map_name(name); } static inline gint ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const gchar* name) { return gcry_cipher_map_name(name); } static inline void ssl_cipher_cleanup(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher) { if ((*cipher) != (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1) gcry_cipher_close(*cipher); *cipher = NULL; } /* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry {{{ */ static const SslDigestAlgo digests[]={ {"MD5", 16}, {"SHA1", 20}, {"SHA256", 32}, {"SHA384", 48}, {"Not Applicable", 0}, }; #define DIGEST_MAX_SIZE 48 /* get index digest index */ static const SslDigestAlgo * ssl_cipher_suite_dig(const SslCipherSuite *cs) { return &digests[cs->dig - DIG_MD5]; } static const gchar *ciphers[]={ "DES", "3DES", "ARCFOUR", /* libgcrypt does not support rc4, but this should be 100% compatible*/ "RFC2268_128", /* libgcrypt name for RC2 with a 128-bit key */ "IDEA", "AES", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", "CAMELLIA256", "SEED", "CHACHA20", /* since Libgcrypt 1.7.0 */ "*UNKNOWN*" }; static const SslCipherSuite cipher_suites[]={ {0x0001,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 */ {0x0002,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0x0003,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */ {0x0004,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ {0x0005,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0x0006,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */ {0x0007,KEX_RSA, ENC_IDEA, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA */ {0x0008,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x0009,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x000A,KEX_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x000B,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x000C,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x000D,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x000E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x000F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x0010,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x0011,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x0012,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x0013,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x0014,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x0015,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x0016,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x0017,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */ {0x0018,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ {0x0019,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ {0x001A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x001B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x002C,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0x002D,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0x002E,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0x002F,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0030,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0031,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0032,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0033,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0034,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0035,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0036,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0037,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0038,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0039,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x003A,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x003B,KEX_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */ {0x003C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x003D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x003E,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x003F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x0040,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x0041,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0042,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0043,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0044,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0045,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0046,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0060,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */ {0x0061,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC2, DIG_MD5, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */ {0x0062,KEX_RSA, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x0063,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ {0x0064,KEX_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */ {0x0065,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */ {0x0066,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0x0067,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x0068,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x0069,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x006A,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x006B,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x006C,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x006D,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x0084,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0085,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0086,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0087,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0088,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0089,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x008A,KEX_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0x008B,KEX_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x008C,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x008D,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x008E,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0x008F,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x0090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0x0093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0x0094,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0x0095,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0x0096,KEX_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x0097,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x0098,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x0099,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x009A,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x009B,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_SEED, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA */ {0x009C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x009D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x009E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x009F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00A0,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00A1,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00A2,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00A3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00A4,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00A5,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00A6,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00A7,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00AC,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x00AD,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x00AE,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00AF,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0x00B0,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */ {0x00B1,KEX_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */ {0x00B2,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00B3,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0x00B4,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */ {0x00B5,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */ {0x00B6,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00B7,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0x00B8,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */ {0x00B9,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */ {0x00BA,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00BB,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00BC,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00BD,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00BE,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00BF,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C0,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C1,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C2,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C3,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C4,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ {0x00C5,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 */ /* NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are incompatible with TLS 1.2. */ {0x1301,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0x1302,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0x1303,KEX_TLS13, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0x1304,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */ {0x1305,KEX_TLS13, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */ {0xC001,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC002,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC003,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC004,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC005,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC006,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC007,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC008,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC009,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC00A,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC00B,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC00C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC00D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC00E,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC00F,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC010,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC011,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC012,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC013,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC014,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC015,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC016,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC017,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC018,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC019,KEX_ECDH_ANON, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC023,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC024,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC025,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC026,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC027,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC028,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC029,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC02A,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC02B,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC02C,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC02D,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC02E,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC02F,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC030,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC031,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC032,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC033,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_RC4, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ {0xC034,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_3DES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */ {0xC035,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */ {0xC036,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */ {0xC037,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC038,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC039,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA */ {0xC03A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA256, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 */ {0xC03B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_NULL, DIG_SHA384, MODE_STREAM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 */ {0xC072,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC073,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC074,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC075,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC076,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC077,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC078,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC079,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC07A,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC07B,KEX_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC07C,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC07D,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC07E,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC07F,KEX_DH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC080,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC081,KEX_DHE_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC082,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC083,KEX_DH_DSS, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC084,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC085,KEX_DH_ANON, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC086,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC087,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC088,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC089,KEX_ECDH_ECDSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC08A,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC08B,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC08C,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC08D,KEX_ECDH_RSA, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC08E,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC08F,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC090,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC091,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC092,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 */ {0xC093,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 */ {0xC094,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC095,KEX_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC096,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC097,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC098,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC099,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC09A,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA128,DIG_SHA256, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 */ {0xC09B,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CAMELLIA256,DIG_SHA384, MODE_CBC }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ {0xC09C,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */ {0xC09D,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */ {0xC09E,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */ {0xC09F,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */ {0xC0A0,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ {0xC0A1,KEX_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */ {0xC0A2,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ {0xC0A3,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */ {0xC0A4,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */ {0xC0A5,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */ {0xC0A6,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM */ {0xC0A7,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM */ {0xC0A8,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ {0xC0A9,KEX_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */ {0xC0AA,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ {0xC0AB,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */ {0xC0AC,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM */ {0xC0AD,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM */ {0xC0AE,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 */ {0xC0AF,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_AES256, DIG_NA, MODE_CCM_8 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 */ {0xCCA8,KEX_ECDHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCA9,KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAA,KEX_DHE_RSA, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAB,KEX_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAC,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAD,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAE,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {-1, 0, 0, 0, MODE_STREAM} }; #define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 32 const SslCipherSuite * ssl_find_cipher(int num) { const SslCipherSuite *c; for(c=cipher_suites;c->number!=-1;c++){ if(c->number==num){ return c; } } return NULL; } guint ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite) { gint cipher_algo; if (cipher_suite->mode != MODE_CBC) return 0; cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - 0x30]); return (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); } static guint ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num) { switch (cipher_suite_num) { /* See RFC 6101 (SSL 3.0), Table 2, column Key Material. */ case 0x0003: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */ case 0x0006: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 */ case 0x0008: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ case 0x000B: /* TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ case 0x000E: /* TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ case 0x0011: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ case 0x0014: /* TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ case 0x0017: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 */ case 0x0019: /* TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA */ return 5; /* not defined in below draft, but "implemented by several vendors", * https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00036.html */ case 0x0060: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5 */ case 0x0061: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 */ return 7; /* Note: the draft states that DES_CBC needs 8 bytes, but Wireshark always * used 7. Until a pcap proves 8, let's use the old value. Link: * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01 */ case 0x0062: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ case 0x0063: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA */ case 0x0064: /* TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */ case 0x0065: /* TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA */ return 7; default: return 0; } } /* Digests, Ciphers and Cipher Suites registry }}} */ /* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function {{{ */ static void tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md, StringInfo *out, guint out_len) { /* RFC 2246 5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function * '+' denotes concatenation. * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + ... * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i - 1)) */ guint8 *ptr; guint left, tocpy; guint8 *A; guint8 _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; guint A_l, tmp_l; SSL_HMAC hm; ptr = out->data; left = out_len; ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash secret", secret); ssl_print_string("tls_hash: hash seed", seed); /* A(0) = seed */ A = seed->data; A_l = seed->data_len; while (left) { /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md); ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l); A_l = sizeof(_A); /* upper bound len for hash output */ ssl_hmac_final(&hm, _A, &A_l); ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm); A = _A; /* HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed) */ ssl_hmac_init(&hm, secret->data, secret->data_len, md); ssl_hmac_update(&hm, A, A_l); ssl_hmac_update(&hm, seed->data, seed->data_len); tmp_l = sizeof(tmp); /* upper bound len for hash output */ ssl_hmac_final(&hm, tmp, &tmp_l); ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm); /* ssl_hmac_final puts the actual digest output size in tmp_l */ tocpy = MIN(left, tmp_l); memcpy(ptr, tmp, tocpy); ptr += tocpy; left -= tocpy; } out->data_len = out_len; ssl_print_string("hash out", out); } static gboolean tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage, StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) { StringInfo seed, sha_out, md5_out; guint8 *ptr; StringInfo s1, s2; guint i,s_l; size_t usage_len, rnd2_len; gboolean success = FALSE; usage_len = strlen(usage); rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0; /* initalize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/ if (ssl_data_alloc(&sha_out, MAX(out_len, 20)) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate sha out\n"); return FALSE; } if (ssl_data_alloc(&md5_out, MAX(out_len, 16)) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate md5 out\n"); goto free_sha; } if (ssl_data_alloc(&seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate rnd %d\n", (int) (usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len)); goto free_md5; } ptr=seed.data; memcpy(ptr,usage,usage_len); ptr+=usage_len; memcpy(ptr,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len); if (rnd2_len > 0) { ptr+=rnd1->data_len; memcpy(ptr,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len); /*ptr+=rnd2->data_len;*/ } /* initalize buffer for client/server seeds*/ s_l=secret->data_len/2 + secret->data_len%2; if (ssl_data_alloc(&s1, s_l) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret %d\n", s_l); goto free_seed; } if (ssl_data_alloc(&s2, s_l) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret(2) %d\n", s_l); goto free_s1; } memcpy(s1.data,secret->data,s_l); memcpy(s2.data,secret->data + (secret->data_len - s_l),s_l); ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(md5 secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", s1.data_len, seed.data_len); tls_hash(&s1, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("MD5"), &md5_out, out_len); ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: tls_hash(sha)\n"); tls_hash(&s2, &seed, ssl_get_digest_by_name("SHA1"), &sha_out, out_len); for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) out->data[i] = md5_out.data[i] ^ sha_out.data[i]; /* success, now store the new meaningful data length */ out->data_len = out_len; success = TRUE; ssl_print_string("PRF out",out); g_free(s2.data); free_s1: g_free(s1.data); free_seed: g_free(seed.data); free_md5: g_free(md5_out.data); free_sha: g_free(sha_out.data); return success; } static gboolean tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) { StringInfo label_seed; size_t usage_len, rnd2_len; rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0; usage_len = strlen(usage); if (ssl_data_alloc(&label_seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: can't allocate label_seed\n"); return FALSE; } memcpy(label_seed.data, usage, usage_len); memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len, rnd1->data, rnd1->data_len); if (rnd2_len > 0) memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len+rnd1->data_len, rnd2->data, rnd2->data_len); ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: tls_hash(hash_alg %s secret_len %d seed_len %d )\n", gcry_md_algo_name(md), secret->data_len, label_seed.data_len); tls_hash(secret, &label_seed, md, out, out_len); g_free(label_seed.data); ssl_print_string("PRF out", out); return TRUE; } static void ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; guint8 tmp[16]; ssl_md5_init(&md5); ssl_md5_update(&md5,r1->data,r1->data_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,r2->data,r2->data_len); ssl_md5_final(tmp,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len <= sizeof(tmp)); ssl_data_set(out, tmp, out_len); ssl_print_string("export iv", out); } static gboolean ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; SSL_SHA_CTX sha; guint off; gint i = 0,j; guint8 buf[20]; for (off = 0; off < out_len; off += 16) { guchar outbuf[16]; i++; ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: sha1_hash(%d)\n",i); /* A, BB, CCC, ... */ for(j=0;jdata,secret->data_len); if(!strcmp(usage,"client write key") || !strcmp(usage,"server write key")){ if (rnd2) ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len); ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len); } else{ ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd1->data,rnd1->data_len); if (rnd2) ssl_sha_update(&sha,rnd2->data,rnd2->data_len); } ssl_sha_final(buf,&sha); ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha); ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: md5_hash(%d) datalen %d\n",i, secret->data_len); ssl_md5_init(&md5); ssl_md5_update(&md5,secret->data,secret->data_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,buf,20); ssl_md5_final(outbuf,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); memcpy(out->data + off, outbuf, MIN(out_len - off, 16)); } out->data_len = out_len; return TRUE; } /* out_len is the wanted output length for the pseudorandom function. * Ensure that ssl->cipher_suite is set. */ static gboolean prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage, StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len) { switch (ssl->session.version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: return ssl3_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len); case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: return tls_prf(secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len); default: /* TLSv1.2 */ switch (ssl->cipher_suite->dig) { case DIG_SHA384: return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA384, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len); default: return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA256, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len); } } } static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; SSL_SHA_CTX sha; if (ssl_data_alloc(out, 36) < 0) return -1; ssl_md5_init(&md5); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_md5_final(out->data,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); ssl_sha_init(&sha); ssl_sha_update(&sha,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_sha_final(out->data+16,&sha); ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha); return 0; } static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* out) { SSL_MD mc; guint8 tmp[48]; guint len; ssl_md_init(&mc, md); ssl_md_update(&mc,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_md_final(&mc, tmp, &len); ssl_md_cleanup(&mc); if (ssl_data_alloc(out, len) < 0) return -1; memcpy(out->data, tmp, len); return 0; } gboolean tls13_hkdf_expand_label(guchar draft_version, int md, const StringInfo *secret, const char *label, const char *hash_value, guint16 out_len, guchar **out) { /* draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20: * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) = * HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length) * struct { * uint16 length = Length; * opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; * opaque hash_value<0..255> = HashValue; * } HkdfLabel; * * RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF): * HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */ guchar lastoutput[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; gcry_md_hd_t h; gcry_error_t err; const guint label_length = (guint) strlen(label); const guint hash_value_length = (guint) strlen(hash_value); const guint hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md); /* Some sanity checks */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len > 0 && out_len <= 255 * hash_len); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(label_length > 0 && label_length <= 255 - 6); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hash_value_length <= 255); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hash_len > 0 && hash_len <= DIGEST_MAX_SIZE); err = gcry_md_open(&h, md, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to invoke hash func %d: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, md, gcry_strerror(err)); return FALSE; } *out = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len); for (guint offset = 0; offset < out_len; offset += hash_len) { gcry_md_reset(h); gcry_md_setkey(h, secret->data, secret->data_len); /* Set PRK */ if (offset > 0) { gcry_md_write(h, lastoutput, hash_len); /* T(1..N) */ } /* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, hash_value } */ gcry_md_putc(h, out_len >> 8); /* length */ gcry_md_putc(h, (guint8) out_len); if (draft_version && draft_version < 20) { /* Draft -19 and before use a different prefix. * TODO remove this once implementations are updated for D20. */ gcry_md_putc(h, 9 + label_length); /* label */ gcry_md_write(h, "TLS 1.3, ", 9); } else { gcry_md_putc(h, 6 + label_length); /* label */ gcry_md_write(h, "tls13 ", 6); } gcry_md_write(h, label, label_length); gcry_md_putc(h, hash_value_length); /* hash_value */ gcry_md_write(h, hash_value, hash_value_length); gcry_md_putc(h, (guint8) (offset / hash_len + 1)); /* constant 0x01..N */ memcpy(lastoutput, gcry_md_read(h, md), hash_len); memcpy(*out + offset, lastoutput, MIN(hash_len, out_len - offset)); } gcry_md_close(h); return TRUE; } /* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function }}} */ /* Record Decompression (after decryption) {{{ */ #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB /* memory allocation functions for zlib initialization */ static void* ssl_zalloc(void* opaque _U_, unsigned int no, unsigned int size) { return g_malloc0(no*size); } static void ssl_zfree(void* opaque _U_, void* addr) { g_free(addr); } #endif static SslDecompress* ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression) { SslDecompress *decomp; #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB int err; #endif if (compression == 0) return NULL; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: compression method %d\n", compression); decomp = (SslDecompress *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecompress)); decomp->compression = compression; switch (decomp->compression) { #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB case 1: /* DEFLATE */ decomp->istream.zalloc = ssl_zalloc; decomp->istream.zfree = ssl_zfree; decomp->istream.opaque = Z_NULL; decomp->istream.next_in = Z_NULL; decomp->istream.next_out = Z_NULL; decomp->istream.avail_in = 0; decomp->istream.avail_out = 0; err = inflateInit(&decomp->istream); if (err != Z_OK) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: inflateInit_() failed - %d\n", err); return NULL; } break; #endif default: ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression); return NULL; } return decomp; } #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB static int ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const guchar* in, guint inl, StringInfo* out_str, guint* outl) { gint err; switch (decomp->compression) { case 1: /* DEFLATE */ err = Z_OK; if (out_str->data_len < 16384) { /* maximal plain length */ ssl_data_realloc(out_str, 16384); } #ifdef z_const decomp->istream.next_in = in; #else DIAG_OFF(cast-qual) decomp->istream.next_in = (Bytef *)in; DIAG_ON(cast-qual) #endif decomp->istream.avail_in = inl; decomp->istream.next_out = out_str->data; decomp->istream.avail_out = out_str->data_len; if (inl > 0) err = inflate(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); if (err != Z_OK) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: inflate() failed - %d\n", err); return -1; } *outl = out_str->data_len - decomp->istream.avail_out; break; default: ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression); return -1; } return 0; } #else int ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const guchar* in _U_, guint inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, guint* outl _U_) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression); return -1; } #endif /* Record Decompression (after decryption) }}} */ /* Create a new structure to store decrypted chunks. {{{ */ static SslFlow* ssl_create_flow(void) { SslFlow *flow; flow = (SslFlow *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslFlow)); flow->byte_seq = 0; flow->flags = 0; flow->multisegment_pdus = wmem_tree_new(wmem_file_scope()); return flow; } /* }}} */ /* Use the negotiated security parameters for decryption. {{{ */ void ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_change_cipher %s\n", (server)?"SERVER":"CLIENT"); if (server) { ssl_session->server = ssl_session->server_new; ssl_session->server_new = NULL; } else { ssl_session->client = ssl_session->client_new; ssl_session->client_new = NULL; } } /* }}} */ /* Init cipher state given some security parameters. {{{ */ static gboolean ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *, wmem_cb_event_t, void *); static SslDecoder* ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo, gint compression, guint8 *mk, guint8 *sk, guint8 *iv, guint iv_length) { SslDecoder *dec; ssl_cipher_mode_t mode = cipher_suite->mode; dec = (SslDecoder *)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(SslDecoder)); /* init mac buffer: mac storage is embedded into decoder struct to save a memory allocation and waste samo more memory*/ dec->cipher_suite=cipher_suite; dec->compression = compression; if ((mode == MODE_STREAM && mk != NULL) || mode == MODE_CBC) { // AEAD ciphers use no MAC key, but stream and block ciphers do. Note // the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficieny // keying material (including MAC key), we will can still create // decoders since "decryption" is easy for such ciphers. dec->mac_key.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv; ssl_data_set(&dec->mac_key, mk, ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len); } else if (mode == MODE_GCM || mode == MODE_CCM || mode == MODE_CCM_8 || mode == MODE_POLY1305) { // Input for the nonce, to be used with AEAD ciphers. DISSECTOR_ASSERT(iv_length <= sizeof(dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv)); dec->write_iv.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv; ssl_data_set(&dec->write_iv, iv, iv_length); } dec->seq = 0; dec->decomp = ssl_create_decompressor(compression); wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_decoder_destroy_cb, dec); if (ssl_cipher_init(&dec->evp,cipher_algo,sk,iv,cipher_suite->mode) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't create cipher id:%d mode:%d\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_algo, cipher_suite->mode); return NULL; } ssl_debug_printf("decoder initialized (digest len %d)\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len); return dec; } static gboolean ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data) { SslDecoder *dec = (SslDecoder *) user_data; if (dec->evp) ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp); #ifdef HAVE_ZLIB if (dec->decomp != NULL && dec->decomp->compression == 1 /* DEFLATE */) inflateEnd(&dec->decomp->istream); #endif return FALSE; } /* }}} */ /* (Pre-)master secrets calculations {{{ */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static int ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master, gcry_sexp_t pk); #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ static gboolean ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key); gboolean ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, const gchar *ssl_psk, const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) { /* check for required session data */ ssl_debug_printf("%s: found SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, state %X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->state); if ((ssl_session->state & (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) != (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: not enough data to generate key (required state %X)\n", G_STRFUNC, (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)); return FALSE; } if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3 which has no pre-master secrets\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } /* check to see if the PMS was provided to us*/ if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", TRUE, mk_map->pms, &ssl_session->client_random)) { return TRUE; } if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_PSK) { /* calculate pre master secret*/ StringInfo pre_master_secret; guint psk_len, pre_master_len; if (!ssl_psk || (ssl_psk[0] == 0)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't find pre-shared-key\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } /* convert hex string into char*/ if (!from_hex(&ssl_session->psk, ssl_psk, strlen(ssl_psk))) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk contains invalid hex\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } psk_len = ssl_session->psk.data_len; if (psk_len >= (2 << 15)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk must not be larger than 2^15 - 1\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } pre_master_len = psk_len * 2 + 4; pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len); pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len; /* 2 bytes psk_len*/ pre_master_secret.data[0] = psk_len >> 8; pre_master_secret.data[1] = psk_len & 0xFF; /* psk_len bytes times 0*/ memset(&pre_master_secret.data[2], 0, psk_len); /* 2 bytes psk_len*/ pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 2] = psk_len >> 8; pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 3] = psk_len & 0xFF; /* psk*/ memcpy(&pre_master_secret.data[psk_len + 4], ssl_session->psk.data, psk_len); ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = pre_master_secret.data; ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len; /*ssl_debug_printf("pre master secret",&ssl->pre_master_secret);*/ /* Remove the master secret if it was there. This forces keying material regeneration in case we're renegotiating */ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; return TRUE; } else { StringInfo encrypted_pre_master; guint encrlen, skip; encrlen = length; skip = 0; /* get encrypted data, on tls1 we have to skip two bytes * (it's the encrypted len and should be equal to record len - 2) * in case of rsa1024 that would be 128 + 2 = 130; for psk not necessary */ if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_RSA && (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1_VERSION || ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION || ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION)) { encrlen = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); skip = 2; if (encrlen > length - 2) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n", G_STRFUNC, encrlen, length); return FALSE; } } /* the valid lower bound is higher than 8, but it is sufficient for the * ssl keylog file below */ if (encrlen < 8) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: invalid encrypted pre-master key length %d\n", G_STRFUNC, encrlen); return FALSE; } encrypted_pre_master.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), encrlen); encrypted_pre_master.data_len = encrlen; tvb_memcpy(tvb, encrypted_pre_master.data, offset+skip, encrlen); #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS if (ssl_session->private_key) { /* try to decrypt encrypted pre-master with RSA key */ if (ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl_session, &encrypted_pre_master, ssl_session->private_key)) return TRUE; ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't decrypt pre-master secret\n", G_STRFUNC); } #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ /* try to find the pre-master secret from the encrypted one. The * ssl key logfile stores only the first 8 bytes, so truncate it */ encrypted_pre_master.data_len = 8; if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Encrypted pre-master secret", TRUE, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master)) return TRUE; } return FALSE; } /* Used for (D)TLS 1.2 and earlier versions (not with TLS 1.3). */ int ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) { StringInfo key_block = { NULL, 0 }; guint8 _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; guint8 _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; gint needed; gint cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */ guint encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0; gboolean is_export_cipher; guint8 *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL; guint8 *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL; const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite; /* TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */ if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3. Should not have been called!\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } /* check for enough info to proced */ guint need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION; guint need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; if (((ssl_session->state & need_all) != need_all) || ((ssl_session->state & need_any) == 0)) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_generate_keyring_material not enough data to generate key " "(0x%02X required 0x%02X or 0x%02X)\n", ssl_session->state, need_all|SSL_MASTER_SECRET, need_all|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET); /* Special case: for NULL encryption, allow dissection of data even if * the Client Hello is missing (MAC keys are now skipped though). */ need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_VERSION; if ((ssl_session->state & need_all) == need_all && cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL) { ssl_debug_printf("%s NULL cipher found, will create a decoder but " "skip MAC validation as keys are missing.\n", G_STRFUNC); goto create_decoders; } return -1; } /* if master key is not available, generate is from the pre-master secret */ if (!(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) { if ((ssl_session->state & SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) == SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) { StringInfo handshake_hashed_data; gint ret; handshake_hashed_data.data = NULL; handshake_hashed_data.data_len = 0; ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret_extended)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len > 0); switch(ssl_session->session.version) { case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: ret = tls_handshake_hash(ssl_session, &handshake_hashed_data); break; default: switch (cipher_suite->dig) { case DIG_SHA384: ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA384, &handshake_hashed_data); break; default: ret = tls12_handshake_hash(ssl_session, GCRY_MD_SHA256, &handshake_hashed_data); break; } break; } if (ret) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate handshake hash\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data); ssl_session->handshake_data.data = NULL; ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len = 0; if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "extended master secret", &handshake_hashed_data, NULL, &ssl_session->master_secret, SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC); g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data); return -1; } g_free(handshake_hashed_data.data); } else { ssl_debug_printf("%s:PRF(pre_master_secret)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret); ssl_print_string("client random",&ssl_session->client_random); ssl_print_string("server random",&ssl_session->server_random); if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->pre_master_secret, "master secret", &ssl_session->client_random, &ssl_session->server_random, &ssl_session->master_secret, SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate master_secret\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } } ssl_print_string("master secret",&ssl_session->master_secret); /* the pre-master secret has been 'consumend' so we must clear it now */ ssl_session->state &= ~SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; ssl_session->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET; } /* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */ if (cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) { const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30]; ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name); cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name); if (cipher_algo == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name); return -1; } } /* Export ciphers consume less material from the key block. */ encr_key_len = ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(cipher_suite->number); is_export_cipher = encr_key_len > 0; if (!is_export_cipher && cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) { encr_key_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); } if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { write_iv_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); } else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) { /* account for a four-byte salt for client and server side (from * client_write_IV and server_write_IV), see GCMNonce (RFC 5288) */ write_iv_len = 4; } else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305) { /* RFC 7905: SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length is twelve bytes */ write_iv_len = 12; } /* Compute the key block. First figure out how much data we need */ needed = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len*2; /* MAC key */ needed += 2 * encr_key_len; /* encryption key */ needed += 2 * write_iv_len; /* write IV */ key_block.data = (guchar *)g_malloc(needed); ssl_debug_printf("%s sess key generation\n", G_STRFUNC); if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->master_secret, "key expansion", &ssl_session->server_random,&ssl_session->client_random, &key_block, needed)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate key_block\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } ssl_print_string("key expansion", &key_block); ptr=key_block.data; /* client/server write MAC key (for non-AEAD ciphers) */ if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { c_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len; s_mk=ptr; ptr+=ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len; } /* client/server write encryption key */ c_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len; s_wk=ptr; ptr += encr_key_len; /* client/server write IV (used as IV (for CBC) or salt (for AEAD)) */ if (write_iv_len > 0) { c_iv=ptr; ptr += write_iv_len; s_iv=ptr; /* ptr += write_iv_len; */ } /* export ciphers work with a smaller key length */ if (is_export_cipher) { if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { /* We only have room for MAX_BLOCK_SIZE bytes IVs, but that's all we should need. This is a sanity check */ if (write_iv_len > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) { ssl_debug_printf("%s cipher suite block must be at most %d nut is %d\n", G_STRFUNC, MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, write_iv_len); goto fail; } if(ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){ /* The length of these fields are ignored by this caller */ StringInfo iv_c, iv_s; iv_c.data = _iv_c; iv_s.data = _iv_s; ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random, &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len); ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv(2)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random, &ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len); } else{ guint8 _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2]; StringInfo iv_block; StringInfo key_null; guint8 _key_null; key_null.data = &_key_null; key_null.data_len = 0; iv_block.data = _iv_block; ssl_debug_printf("%s prf(iv_block)\n", G_STRFUNC); if (!prf(ssl_session, &key_null, "IV block", &ssl_session->client_random, &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_block, write_iv_len * 2)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tls31 iv block\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } memcpy(_iv_c, iv_block.data, write_iv_len); memcpy(_iv_s, iv_block.data + write_iv_len, write_iv_len); } c_iv=_iv_c; s_iv=_iv_s; } if (ssl_session->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){ SSL_MD5_CTX md5; ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(client_random)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_md5_init(&md5); ssl_md5_update(&md5,c_wk,encr_key_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data, ssl_session->client_random.data_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data, ssl_session->server_random.data_len); ssl_md5_final(_key_c,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); c_wk=_key_c; ssl_md5_init(&md5); ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(server_random)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_md5_update(&md5,s_wk,encr_key_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data, ssl_session->server_random.data_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data, ssl_session->client_random.data_len); ssl_md5_final(_key_s,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); s_wk=_key_s; } else{ StringInfo key_c, key_s, k; key_c.data = _key_c; key_s.data = _key_s; k.data = c_wk; k.data_len = encr_key_len; ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_c)\n", G_STRFUNC); if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "client write key", &ssl_session->client_random, &ssl_session->server_random, &key_c, sizeof(_key_c))) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 server key \n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } c_wk=_key_c; k.data = s_wk; k.data_len = encr_key_len; ssl_debug_printf("%s PRF(key_s)\n", G_STRFUNC); if (!prf(ssl_session, &k, "server write key", &ssl_session->client_random, &ssl_session->server_random, &key_s, sizeof(_key_s))) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate tll31 client key \n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } s_wk=_key_s; } } /* show key material info */ if (c_mk != NULL) { ssl_print_data("Client MAC key",c_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len); ssl_print_data("Server MAC key",s_mk,ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len); } ssl_print_data("Client Write key", c_wk, encr_key_len); ssl_print_data("Server Write key", s_wk, encr_key_len); /* used as IV for CBC mode and the AEAD implicit nonce (salt) */ if (write_iv_len > 0) { ssl_print_data("Client Write IV", c_iv, write_iv_len); ssl_print_data("Server Write IV", s_iv, write_iv_len); } create_decoders: /* create both client and server ciphers*/ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(client)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, c_iv, write_iv_len); if (!ssl_session->client_new) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(server)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, s_iv, write_iv_len); if (!ssl_session->server_new) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } /* Continue the SSL stream after renegotiation with new keys. */ ssl_session->client_new->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow(); ssl_session->server_new->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow(); ssl_debug_printf("%s: client seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ", server seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->client_new->seq, ssl_session->server_new->seq); g_free(key_block.data); ssl_session->state |= SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY; return 0; fail: g_free(key_block.data); return -1; } /* Generated the key material based on the given secret. */ static gboolean tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server) { gboolean success = FALSE; guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL; SslDecoder *decoder; guint key_length, iv_length; int hash_algo; const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite; int cipher_algo; if (ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s only usable for TLS 1.3, not %#x!\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.version); return FALSE; } if (cipher_suite == NULL) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Unknown cipher\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } if (cipher_suite->kex != KEX_TLS13) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite 0x%04x spotted!\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_suite->number); return FALSE; } /* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */ const char *cipher_name = ciphers[cipher_suite->enc-0x30]; ssl_debug_printf("%s CIPHER: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name); cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name); if (cipher_algo == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name); return FALSE; } const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name; hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name); if (!hash_algo) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find hash function %s\n", G_STRFUNC, hash_name); return FALSE; } key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); /* AES-GCM/AES-CCM/Poly1305-ChaCha20 all have N_MIN=N_MAX = 12. */ iv_length = 12; ssl_debug_printf("%s key_length %u iv_length %u\n", G_STRFUNC, key_length, iv_length); if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version, hash_algo, secret, "key", "", key_length, &write_key)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s write_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version, hash_algo, secret, "iv", "", iv_length, &write_iv)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s write_iv expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); goto end; } ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write Key" : "Client Write Key", write_key, key_length); ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write IV" : "Client Write IV", write_iv, iv_length); ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client"); decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, write_iv, iv_length); if (!decoder) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init %s decoder\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client"); goto end; } /* Continue the TLS session with new keys, but reuse old flow to keep things * like "Follow SSL" working (by linking application data records). */ if (is_from_server) { decoder->flow = ssl_session->server ? ssl_session->server->flow : ssl_create_flow(); ssl_session->server = decoder; } else { decoder->flow = ssl_session->client ? ssl_session->client->flow : ssl_create_flow(); ssl_session->client = decoder; } ssl_debug_printf("%s %s ready using cipher suite 0x%04x (cipher %s hash %s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "Server" : "Client", cipher_suite->number, cipher_name, hash_name); success = TRUE; end: wmem_free(NULL, write_key); wmem_free(NULL, write_iv); return success; } /* (Pre-)master secrets calculations }}} */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS /* Decrypt RSA pre-master secret using RSA private key. {{{ */ static gboolean ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session, StringInfo* encrypted_pre_master, gcry_sexp_t pk) { size_t i; char *err; if (!encrypted_pre_master) return FALSE; if (KEX_IS_DH(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: session uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange " "(cipher suite 0x%04X %s) and cannot be decrypted " "using a RSA private key file.\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.cipher, val_to_str_ext_const(ssl_session->session.cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown")); return FALSE; } else if(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex != KEX_RSA) { ssl_debug_printf("%s key exchange %d different from KEX_RSA (%d)\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex, KEX_RSA); return FALSE; } /* with tls key loading will fail if not rsa type, so no need to check*/ ssl_print_string("pre master encrypted",encrypted_pre_master); ssl_debug_printf("%s: RSA_private_decrypt\n", G_STRFUNC); i=rsa_decrypt_inplace(encrypted_pre_master->data_len, encrypted_pre_master->data, pk, TRUE, &err); if (i == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("rsa_decrypt_inplace: %s\n", err); g_free(err); } if (i!=48) { ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong pre_master_secret length (%zd, expected " "%d)\n", G_STRFUNC, i, 48); return FALSE; } /* the decrypted data has been written into the pre_master key buffer */ ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = encrypted_pre_master->data; ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len=48; ssl_print_string("pre master secret",&ssl_session->pre_master_secret); /* Remove the master secret if it was there. This forces keying material regeneration in case we're renegotiating */ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; return TRUE; } /* }}} */ #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ /* Decryption integrity check {{{ */ static gint tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data, guint32 datalen, guint8* mac) { SSL_HMAC hm; gint md; guint32 len; guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; gint16 temp; md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); ssl_debug_printf("tls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md); if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0) return -1; /* hash sequence number */ phton64(buf, decoder->seq); decoder->seq++; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8); /* hash content type */ buf[0]=ct; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1); /* hash version,data length and data*/ /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */ temp = g_htons(ver); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ temp = g_htons(datalen); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen); /* get digest and digest len*/ len = sizeof(buf); ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len); ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm); ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len); if(memcmp(mac,buf,len)) return -1; return 0; } static int ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data, guint32 datalen, guint8* mac) { SSL_MD mc; gint md; guint32 len; guint8 buf[64],dgst[20]; gint pad_ct; gint16 temp; pad_ct=(decoder->cipher_suite->dig==DIG_SHA)?40:48; /* get cipher used for digest comptuation */ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); if (ssl_md_init(&mc,md) !=0) return -1; /* do hash computation on data && padding */ ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len); /* hash padding*/ memset(buf,0x36,pad_ct); ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct); /* hash sequence number */ phton64(buf, decoder->seq); decoder->seq++; ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,8); /* hash content type */ buf[0]=ct; ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,1); /* hash data length in network byte order and data*/ /* *((gint16* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ temp = g_htons(datalen); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,2); ssl_md_update(&mc,data,datalen); /* get partial digest */ ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len); ssl_md_cleanup(&mc); ssl_md_init(&mc,md); /* hash mac key */ ssl_md_update(&mc,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len); /* hash padding and partial digest*/ memset(buf,0x5c,pad_ct); ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,pad_ct); ssl_md_update(&mc,dgst,len); ssl_md_final(&mc,dgst,&len); ssl_md_cleanup(&mc); if(memcmp(mac,dgst,len)) return -1; return(0); } static gint dtls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct,int ver, guint8* data, guint32 datalen, guint8* mac) { SSL_HMAC hm; gint md; guint32 len; guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; gint16 temp; md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name, md); if (ssl_hmac_init(&hm,decoder->mac_key.data,decoder->mac_key.data_len,md) != 0) return -1; ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac seq: %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " epoch: %d\n",decoder->seq,decoder->epoch); /* hash sequence number */ phton64(buf, decoder->seq); buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8; buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8); /* hash content type */ buf[0]=ct; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1); /* hash version,data length and data */ temp = g_htons(ver); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); temp = g_htons(datalen); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,data,datalen); /* get digest and digest len */ len = sizeof(buf); ssl_hmac_final(&hm,buf,&len); ssl_hmac_cleanup(&hm); ssl_print_data("Mac", buf, len); if(memcmp(mac,buf,len)) return -1; return(0); } /* Decryption integrity check }}} */ static gboolean tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD guint8 ct, guint16 record_version, #else guint8 ct _U_, guint16 record_version _U_, #endif const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl) { /* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) 6.2.3.3 defines the TLSCipherText.fragment as: * GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] } * In TLS 1.3 this explicit nonce is gone. * With AES GCM/CCM, "[content]" is actually the concatenation of the * ciphertext and authentication tag. */ const guint16 version = ssl->session.version; const gboolean is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION; gcry_error_t err; const guchar *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext; guint ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len; guchar nonce[12]; const ssl_cipher_mode_t cipher_mode = decoder->cipher_suite->mode; #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD const guchar *auth_tag_wire; guchar auth_tag_calc[16]; #else guchar nonce_with_counter[16] = { 0 }; #endif switch (cipher_mode) { case MODE_GCM: case MODE_CCM: case MODE_POLY1305: auth_tag_len = 16; break; case MODE_CCM_8: auth_tag_len = 8; break; default: ssl_debug_printf("%s unsupported cipher!\n", G_STRFUNC); return FALSE; } /* Parse input into explicit nonce (TLS 1.2 only), ciphertext and tag. */ if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) { if (inl < EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + auth_tag_len) { ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d is too small for explicit nonce %d and auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, auth_tag_len); return FALSE; } explicit_nonce = in; ciphertext = explicit_nonce + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN; ciphertext_len = inl - EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN - auth_tag_len; } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { if (inl < auth_tag_len) { ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d has no space for auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, auth_tag_len); return FALSE; } ciphertext = in; ciphertext_len = inl - auth_tag_len; } else { ssl_debug_printf("%s Unexpected TLS version %#x\n", G_STRFUNC, version); return FALSE; } #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD auth_tag_wire = ciphertext + ciphertext_len; #endif /* * Nonce construction is version-specific. Note that AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 * (RFC 7905) uses a nonce construction similar to TLS 1.3. */ if (is_v12 && cipher_mode != MODE_POLY1305) { DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); /* Implicit (4) and explicit (8) part of nonce. */ memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); memcpy(nonce + IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, explicit_nonce, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); #ifndef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD if (cipher_mode == MODE_GCM) { /* NIST SP 800-38D, sect. 7.2 says that the 32-bit counter part starts * at 1, and gets incremented before passing to the block cipher. */ memcpy(nonce_with_counter, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 2; } else if (cipher_mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_mode == MODE_CCM_8) { /* The nonce for CCM and GCM are the same, but the nonce is used as input * in the CCM algorithm described in RFC 3610. The nonce generated here is * the one from RFC 3610 sect 2.3. Encryption. */ /* Flags: (L-1) ; L = 16 - 1 - nonceSize */ nonce_with_counter[0] = 3 - 1; memcpy(nonce_with_counter + 1, nonce, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); /* struct { opaque salt[4]; opaque nonce_explicit[8] } CCMNonce (RFC 6655) */ nonce_with_counter[IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + 3] = 1; } else { g_assert_not_reached(); } #endif } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { /* * Technically the nonce length must be at least 8 bytes, but for * AES-GCM, AES-CCM and Poly1305-ChaCha20 the nonce length is exact 12. */ const guint nonce_len = 12; DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == nonce_len); memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, decoder->write_iv.data_len); /* Sequence number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */ phton64(nonce + nonce_len - 8, pntoh64(nonce + nonce_len - 8) ^ decoder->seq); ssl_debug_printf("%s seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT "\n", G_STRFUNC, decoder->seq); /* sequence number for TLS 1.2 is incremented when calculating AAD. */ if (!is_v12) { decoder->seq++; /* Implicit sequence number for TLS 1.3. */ } } /* Set nonce and additional authentication data */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD gcry_cipher_reset(decoder->evp); ssl_print_data("nonce", nonce, 12); err = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, nonce, 12); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set nonce: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); return FALSE; } if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) { /* size of plaintext, additional authenticated data and auth tag. */ guint64 lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, is_v12 ? 13 : 0, auth_tag_len }; gcry_cipher_ctl(decoder->evp, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, lengths, sizeof(lengths)); } /* (D)TLS 1.2 needs specific AAD, TLS 1.3 uses empty AAD. */ if (is_v12) { guchar aad[13]; phton64(aad, decoder->seq); /* record sequence number */ if (version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION) { decoder->seq++; /* Implicit sequence number for TLS 1.2. */ } else { phton16(aad, decoder->epoch); /* DTLS 1.2 includes epoch. */ } aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */ phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */ phton16(aad + 11, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */ ssl_print_data("AAD", aad, sizeof(aad)); err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, sizeof(aad)); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); return FALSE; } } #else err = gcry_cipher_setctr(decoder->evp, nonce_with_counter, 16); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: failed to set CTR: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); return FALSE; } #endif /* Decrypt now that nonce and AAD are set. */ err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypt failed: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); return FALSE; } /* Check authentication tag for authenticity (replaces MAC) */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGCRYPT_AEAD err = gcry_cipher_gettag(decoder->evp, auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len); if (err == 0 && !memcmp(auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len)) { ssl_print_data("auth_tag(OK)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len); } else { if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s cannot obtain tag: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); } else { ssl_debug_printf("%s auth tag mismatch\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_print_data("auth_tag(expect)", auth_tag_calc, auth_tag_len); ssl_print_data("auth_tag(actual)", auth_tag_wire, auth_tag_len); } if (ssl_ignore_mac_failed) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: auth check failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n", G_STRFUNC); } else { return FALSE; } } #else ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt is older than 1.6, unable to verify auth tag!\n"); #endif ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, ciphertext_len); *outl = ciphertext_len; return TRUE; } /* Record decryption glue based on security parameters {{{ */ /* Assume that we are called only for a non-NULL decoder which also means that * we have a non-NULL decoder->cipher_suite. */ int ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version, const guchar *in, guint16 inl, StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl) { guint pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0; guint8 *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl); ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl); if ((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite for the protocol version!\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } /* ensure we have enough storage space for decrypted data */ if (inl > out_str->data_len) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: allocating %d bytes for decrypt data (old len %d)\n", inl + 32, out_str->data_len); ssl_data_realloc(out_str, inl + 32); } /* AEAD ciphers (GenericAEADCipher in TLS 1.2; TLS 1.3) have no padding nor * a separate MAC, so use a different routine for simplicity. */ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8 || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305 || ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { if (!tls_decrypt_aead_record(ssl, decoder, ct, record_version, in, inl, out_str, &worklen)) { /* decryption failed */ return -1; } goto skip_mac; } /* RFC 6101/2246: SSLCipherText/TLSCipherText has two structures for types: * (notation: { unencrypted, [ encrypted ] }) * GenericStreamCipher: { [content, mac] } * GenericBlockCipher: { IV (TLS 1.1+), [content, mac, padding, padding_len] } * RFC 5426 (TLS 1.2): TLSCipherText has additionally: * GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] } * RFC 4347 (DTLS): based on TLS 1.1, only GenericBlockCipher is supported. * RFC 6347 (DTLS 1.2): based on TLS 1.2, includes GenericAEADCipher too. */ maclen = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->len; /* (TLS 1.1 and later, DTLS) Extract explicit IV for GenericBlockCipher */ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { guint blocksize = 0; switch (ssl->session.version) { case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: blocksize = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(decoder->cipher_suite); if (inl < blocksize) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input %d has no space for IV %d\n", inl, blocksize); return -1; } pad = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, in, blocksize); if (pad != 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: failed to set IV: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad), gcry_strerror (pad)); } inl -= blocksize; in += blocksize; break; } /* Encrypt-then-MAC for (D)TLS (RFC 7366) */ if (ssl->state & SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { /* * MAC is calculated over (IV + ) ENCRYPTED contents: * * MAC(MAC_write_key, ... + * IV + // for TLS 1.1 or greater * TLSCiphertext.enc_content); */ if (inl < maclen) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed: input %d has no space for MAC %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, maclen); return -1; } inl -= maclen; mac = (guint8 *)in + inl; mac_frag = (guint8 *)in - blocksize; mac_fraglen = blocksize + inl; } } /* First decrypt*/ if ((pad = ssl_cipher_decrypt(&decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, in, inl)) != 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: ssl_cipher_decrypt: %s %s\n", gcry_strsource (pad), gcry_strerror (pad)); return -1; } ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, inl); worklen=inl; /* strip padding for GenericBlockCipher */ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { if (inl < 1) { /* Should this check happen earlier? */ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: input length %d too small\n", inl); return -1; } pad=out_str->data[inl-1]; if (worklen <= pad) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record failed: padding %d too large for work %d\n", pad, worklen); return -1; } worklen-=(pad+1); ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record found padding %d final len %d\n", pad, worklen); } /* MAC for GenericStreamCipher and GenericBlockCipher. * (normal case without Encrypt-then-MAC (RFC 7366) extension. */ if (!mac) { /* * MAC is calculated over the DECRYPTED contents: * * MAC(MAC_write_key, ... + TLSCompressed.fragment); */ if (worklen < maclen) { ssl_debug_printf("%s wrong record len/padding outlen %d\n work %d\n", G_STRFUNC, *outl, worklen); return -1; } worklen -= maclen; mac = out_str->data + worklen; mac_frag = out_str->data; mac_fraglen = worklen; } /* If NULL encryption active and no keys are available, do not bother * checking the MAC. We do not have keys for that. */ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_STREAM && decoder->cipher_suite->enc == ENC_NULL && !(ssl->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) { ssl_debug_printf("MAC check skipped due to missing keys\n"); goto skip_mac; } /* Now check the MAC */ ssl_debug_printf("checking mac (len %d, version %X, ct %d seq %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")\n", worklen, ssl->session.version, ct, decoder->seq); if(ssl->session.version==SSLV3_VERSION){ if(ssl3_check_mac(decoder,ct,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac) < 0) { if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n"); } else{ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n"); return -1; } } else{ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n"); } } else if(ssl->session.version==TLSV1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || ssl->session.version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION){ if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)< 0) { if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n"); } else{ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n"); return -1; } } else{ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n"); } } else if(ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION || ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION || ssl->session.version==DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION){ /* Try rfc-compliant mac first, and if failed, try old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac */ if(dtls_check_mac(decoder,ct,ssl->session.version,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac ok\n"); } else if(tls_check_mac(decoder,ct,TLSV1_VERSION,mac_frag,mac_fraglen,mac)>= 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: dtls rfc-compliant mac failed, but old openssl's non-rfc-compliant mac ok\n"); } else if(ssl_ignore_mac_failed) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n"); } else{ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: mac failed\n"); return -1; } } skip_mac: *outl = worklen; if (decoder->compression > 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record: compression method %d\n", decoder->compression); ssl_data_copy(comp_str, out_str); ssl_print_data("Plaintext compressed", comp_str->data, worklen); if (!decoder->decomp) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n"); return -1; } if (ssl_decompress_record(decoder->decomp, comp_str->data, worklen, out_str, &uncomplen) < 0) return -1; ssl_print_data("Plaintext uncompressed", out_str->data, uncomplen); *outl = uncomplen; } return 0; } /* Record decryption glue based on security parameters }}} */ #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) static void ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(SslDecryptSession *ssl, GHashTable *key_hash, gnutls_datum_t *subjectPublicKeyInfo) { gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey = NULL; guchar key_id[20]; size_t key_id_len = sizeof(key_id); int r; if (!subjectPublicKeyInfo->size) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: could not find SubjectPublicKeyInfo\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } r = gnutls_pubkey_init(&pubkey); if (r < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to init pubkey: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r)); return; } r = gnutls_pubkey_import(pubkey, subjectPublicKeyInfo, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); if (r < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to import pubkey from handshake: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r)); goto end; } /* Generate a 20-byte SHA-1 hash. */ r = gnutls_pubkey_get_key_id(pubkey, 0, key_id, &key_id_len); if (r < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: failed to extract key id from pubkey: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gnutls_strerror(r)); goto end; } ssl_print_data("lookup(KeyID)", key_id, key_id_len); ssl->private_key = (gcry_sexp_t)g_hash_table_lookup(key_hash, key_id); ssl_debug_printf("%s: lookup result: %p\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *) ssl->private_key); end: gnutls_pubkey_deinit(pubkey); } /* RSA private key file processing }}} */ #endif /* ! defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) */ /*--- Start of dissector-related code below ---*/ /* get ssl data for this session. if no ssl data is found allocate a new one*/ SslDecryptSession * ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t ssl_handle) { void *conv_data; SslDecryptSession *ssl_session; int proto_ssl; proto_ssl = dissector_handle_get_protocol_index(ssl_handle); conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl); if (conv_data != NULL) return (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data; /* no previous SSL conversation info, initialize it. */ ssl_session = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecryptSession); /* data_len is the part that is meaningful, not the allocated length */ ssl_session->master_secret.data_len = 0; ssl_session->master_secret.data = ssl_session->_master_secret; ssl_session->session_id.data_len = 0; ssl_session->session_id.data = ssl_session->_session_id; ssl_session->client_random.data_len = 0; ssl_session->client_random.data = ssl_session->_client_random; ssl_session->server_random.data_len = 0; ssl_session->server_random.data = ssl_session->_server_random; ssl_session->session_ticket.data_len = 0; ssl_session->session_ticket.data = NULL; /* will be re-alloced as needed */ ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data_len = 0; ssl_session->server_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_server_data_for_iv; ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data_len = 0; ssl_session->client_data_for_iv.data = ssl_session->_client_data_for_iv; ssl_session->app_data_segment.data = NULL; ssl_session->app_data_segment.data_len = 0; ssl_session->handshake_data.data=NULL; ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len=0; /* Initialize parameters which are not necessary specific to decryption. */ ssl_session->session.version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; clear_address(&ssl_session->session.srv_addr); ssl_session->session.srv_ptype = PT_NONE; ssl_session->session.srv_port = 0; conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session); return ssl_session; } /* Resets the decryption parameters for the next decoder. */ static void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_client) { if (ssl) { /* Ensure that secrets are not restored using stale identifiers. Split * between client and server in case the packets somehow got out of order. */ gint clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; if (is_client) { clear_flags |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; ssl->session_id.data_len = 0; ssl->session_ticket.data_len = 0; ssl->master_secret.data_len = 0; ssl->client_random.data_len = 0; ssl->has_early_data = FALSE; } else { clear_flags |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; ssl->server_random.data_len = 0; ssl->pre_master_secret.data_len = 0; #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) ssl->private_key = NULL; #endif ssl->psk.data_len = 0; } if (ssl->state & clear_flags) { ssl_debug_printf("%s detected renegotiation, clearing 0x%02x (%s side)\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state & clear_flags, is_client ? "client" : "server"); ssl->state &= ~clear_flags; } } /* These flags might be used for non-decryption purposes and may affect the * dissection, so reset them as well. */ if (is_client) { session->client_cert_type = 0; } else { session->compression = 0; session->server_cert_type = 0; /* session->is_session_resumed is already handled in the ServerHello dissection. */ } } static guint32 ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo, dissector_handle_t app_handle, guint32 last_nontls_frame) { conversation_t *conversation; SslSession *session; /* Ignore if the SSL dissector is disabled. */ if (!ssl_handle) return 0; /* The caller should always pass a valid handle to its own dissector. */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(app_handle); conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); session = &ssl_get_session(conversation, ssl_handle)->session; ssl_debug_printf("%s: old frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, session->last_nontls_frame, (void *)session->app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); ssl_debug_printf("%s: current frame %d, app_handle=%p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, pinfo->num, (void *)app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle)); /* Do not switch again if a dissector did it before. */ if (session->last_nontls_frame) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: not overriding previous app handle!\n", G_STRFUNC); return session->last_nontls_frame; } session->app_handle = app_handle; /* The SSL dissector should be called first for this conversation. */ conversation_set_dissector(conversation, ssl_handle); /* SSL starts after this frame. */ session->last_nontls_frame = last_nontls_frame; return 0; } /* }}} */ /* ssl_starttls_ack: mark future frames as encrypted. {{{ */ guint32 ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo, dissector_handle_t app_handle) { return ssl_starttls(ssl_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num); } guint32 ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t ssl_handle, packet_info *pinfo, dissector_handle_t app_handle) { return ssl_starttls(ssl_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num - 1); } dissector_handle_t ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name) { /* Accept 'http' for backwards compatibility and sanity. */ if (!strcmp(name, "http")) name = "http-over-tls"; return find_dissector(name); } /* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. {{{ */ static gint ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2) { const StringInfo *val1; const StringInfo *val2; val1 = (const StringInfo *)v; val2 = (const StringInfo *)v2; if (val1->data_len == val2->data_len && !memcmp(val1->data, val2->data, val2->data_len)) { return 1; } return 0; } static guint ssl_hash (gconstpointer v) { guint l,hash; const StringInfo* id; const guint* cur; hash = 0; id = (const StringInfo*) v; /* id and id->data are mallocated in ssl_save_master_key(). As such 'data' * should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a guint as * is done below). The intermediate void* cast is to prevent "cast * increases required alignment of target type" warnings on CPUs (such * as SPARCs) that do not allow misaligned memory accesses. */ cur = (const guint*)(void*) id->data; for (l=4; (l < id->data_len); l+=4, cur++) hash = hash ^ (*cur); return hash; } gboolean ssl_private_key_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2) { /* key ID length (SHA-1 hash, per GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1) */ return !memcmp(v, v2, 20); } guint ssl_private_key_hash (gconstpointer v) { guint l, hash = 0; const guint8 *cur = (const guint8 *)v; /* The public key' SHA-1 hash (which maps to a private key) has a uniform * distribution, hence simply xor'ing them should be sufficient. */ for (l = 0; l < 20; l += 4, cur += 4) hash ^= pntoh32(cur); return hash; } /* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. }}} */ /* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. {{{ */ void ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp) { DISSECTOR_ASSERT(main_handle); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(subdissector_handle); /* Registration is required for Export PDU feature to work properly. */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT_HINT(dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(subdissector_handle), "SSL appdata dissectors must register with register_dissector()!"); ssl_debug_printf("association_add %s port %d handle %p\n", dissector_table_name, port, (void *)subdissector_handle); if (port) { dissector_add_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle); if (tcp) dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", port, main_handle); else dissector_add_uint("udp.port", port, main_handle); dissector_add_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle); } else { dissector_add_for_decode_as(dissector_table_name, subdissector_handle); } } void ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove removing %s %u - handle %p\n", tcp?"TCP":"UDP", port, (void *)subdissector_handle); if (main_handle) { dissector_delete_uint(tcp?"tcp.port":"udp.port", port, main_handle); dissector_delete_uint("sctp.port", port, main_handle); } if (port) { dissector_delete_uint(dissector_table_name, port, subdissector_handle); } } void ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port) { copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &session->srv_addr, addr); session->srv_ptype = ptype; session->srv_port = port; } int ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo) { gint ret; if (session->srv_addr.type != AT_NONE) { ret = (session->srv_ptype == pinfo->ptype) && (session->srv_port == pinfo->srcport) && addresses_equal(&session->srv_addr, &pinfo->src); } else { ret = (dissector_get_uint_handle(table, pinfo->srcport) != 0); } ssl_debug_printf("packet_from_server: is from server - %s\n", (ret)?"TRUE":"FALSE"); return ret; } /* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. }}} */ /* Links SSL records with the real packet data. {{{ */ /** * Remembers the decrypted TLS record fragment (TLSInnerPlaintext in TLS 1.3) to * avoid the need for a decoder in the second pass. Additionally, it remembers * sequence numbers (for reassembly and Follow SSL Stream). * * @param proto The protocol identifier (proto_ssl or proto_dtls). * @param pinfo The packet where the record originates from. * @param data Decrypted data to store in the record. * @param data_len Length of decrypted record data. * @param record_id The identifier for this record within the current packet. * @param flow Information about sequence numbers, etc. * @param type TLS Content Type (such as handshake or application_data). * @param curr_layer_num_ssl The layer identifier for this TLS session. */ void ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) { SslRecordInfo* rec, **prec; SslPacketInfo* pi; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl); if (!pi) { pi = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), SslPacketInfo); pi->srcport = pinfo->srcport; pi->destport = pinfo->destport; p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl, pi); } rec = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslRecordInfo); rec->plain_data = (guchar *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len); rec->data_len = data_len; rec->id = record_id; rec->type = type; rec->next = NULL; /* TODO allow Handshake records also to be reassembled. There needs to be * one "flow" for each record type (appdata, handshake). "seq" for the * record should then be relative within this flow. */ if (flow && type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA) { rec->seq = flow->byte_seq; rec->flow = flow; flow->byte_seq += data_len; ssl_debug_printf("%s stored decrypted record seq=%d nxtseq=%d flow=%p\n", G_STRFUNC, rec->seq, rec->seq + data_len, (void*)flow); } /* Remember decrypted records. */ prec = &pi->records; while (*prec) prec = &(*prec)->next; *prec = rec; } /* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */ tvbuff_t* ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record) { SslRecordInfo* rec; SslPacketInfo* pi; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl); if (!pi) return NULL; for (rec = pi->records; rec; rec = rec->next) if (rec->id == record_id) { *matched_record = rec; /* link new real_data_tvb with a parent tvb so it is freed when frame dissection is complete */ return tvb_new_child_real_data(parent_tvb, rec->plain_data, rec->data_len, rec->data_len); } return NULL; } /* Links SSL records with the real packet data. }}} */ /* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache). {{{ */ void ssl_common_init(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data) { mk_map->session = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tickets = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->crandom = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->pre_master = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->pms = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tls13_client_early = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tls13_client_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tls13_server_handshake = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tls13_client_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); mk_map->tls13_server_appdata = g_hash_table_new(ssl_hash, ssl_equal); ssl_data_alloc(decrypted_data, 32); ssl_data_alloc(compressed_data, 32); } void ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file, StringInfo *decrypted_data, StringInfo *compressed_data) { g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->session); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tickets); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->crandom); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pre_master); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->pms); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_early); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_handshake); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_handshake); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_client_appdata); g_hash_table_destroy(mk_map->tls13_server_appdata); g_free(decrypted_data->data); g_free(compressed_data->data); /* close the previous keylog file now that the cache are cleared, this * allows the cache to be filled with the full keylog file contents. */ if (*ssl_keylog_file) { fclose(*ssl_keylog_file); *ssl_keylog_file = NULL; } } /* }}} */ /* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */ #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) /* Load a single RSA key file item from preferences. {{{ */ void ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp) { gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key; gcry_sexp_t private_key; FILE* fp = NULL; int ret; size_t key_id_len = 20; guchar *key_id = NULL; char *err = NULL; dissector_handle_t handle; /* try to load keys file first */ fp = ws_fopen(uats->keyfile, "rb"); if (!fp) { report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, FALSE); return; } if ((gint)strlen(uats->password) == 0) { priv_key = rsa_load_pem_key(fp, &err); } else { priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, uats->password, &err); } fclose(fp); if (!priv_key) { if (err) { report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: %s", uats->keyfile, err); g_free(err); } else report_failure("Can't load private key from %s: unknown error", uats->keyfile); return; } if (err) { report_failure("Load of private key from %s \"succeeded\" with error %s", uats->keyfile, err); g_free(err); } key_id = (guchar *) g_malloc0(key_id_len); ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_get_key_id(priv_key, 0, key_id, &key_id_len); if (ret < 0) { report_failure("Can't calculate public key ID for %s: %s", uats->keyfile, gnutls_strerror(ret)); goto end; } ssl_print_data("KeyID", key_id, key_id_len); private_key = rsa_privkey_to_sexp(priv_key, &err); if (!private_key) { ssl_debug_printf("%s\n", err); g_free(err); report_failure("Can't extract private key parameters for %s", uats->keyfile); goto end; } g_hash_table_replace(key_hash, key_id, private_key); key_id = NULL; /* used in key_hash, do not free. */ ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init private key file %s successfully loaded.\n", uats->keyfile); handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(uats->protocol); if (handle) { /* Port to subprotocol mapping */ guint16 port = 0; if (ws_strtou16(uats->port, NULL, &port)) { if (port > 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init port '%d' filename '%s' password(only for p12 file) '%s'\n", port, uats->keyfile, uats->password); ssl_association_add(dissector_table_name, main_handle, handle, port, tcp); } } else { if (strcmp(uats->port, "start_tls")) ssl_debug_printf("invalid ssl_init_port: %s\n", uats->port); } } end: gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key); g_free(key_id); } /* }}} */ #else void ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats _U_, GHashTable *key_hash _U_, const char* dissector_table_name _U_, dissector_handle_t main_handle _U_, gboolean tcp _U_) { report_failure("Can't load private key files, support is not compiled in."); } #endif /* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. {{{ */ /** store a known (pre-)master secret into cache */ static void ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key, StringInfo *mk) { StringInfo *ht_key, *master_secret; if (key->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: not saving empty %s!\n", G_STRFUNC, label); return; } if (mk->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s not saving empty (pre-)master secret for %s!\n", G_STRFUNC, label); return; } /* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for guint access * so be careful in changing how it is allocated. */ ht_key = ssl_data_clone(key); master_secret = ssl_data_clone(mk); g_hash_table_insert(ht, ht_key, master_secret); ssl_debug_printf("%s inserted (pre-)master secret for %s\n", G_STRFUNC, label); ssl_print_string("stored key", ht_key); ssl_print_string("stored (pre-)master secret", master_secret); } /** restore a (pre-)master secret given some key in the cache */ static gboolean ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key) { StringInfo *ms; if (key->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't restore %smaster secret using an empty %s\n", G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); return FALSE; } ms = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(ht, key); if (!ms) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find %smaster secret by %s\n", G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); return FALSE; } /* (pre)master secret found, clear knowledge of other keys and set it in the * current conversation */ ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); if (is_pre_master) { /* unlike master secret, pre-master secret has a variable size (48 for * RSA, varying for PSK) and is therefore not statically allocated */ ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), ms->data_len); ssl_data_set(&ssl->pre_master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len); ssl->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; } else { ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len); ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET; } ssl_debug_printf("%s %smaster secret retrieved using %s\n", G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); ssl_print_string(label, key); ssl_print_string("(pre-)master secret", ms); return TRUE; } /* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. }}} */ /* Should be called when all parameters are ready (after ChangeCipherSpec), and * the decoder should be attempted to be initialized. {{{*/ void ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) { if (ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* TLS 1.3 implementations only provide secrets derived from the master * secret which are loaded in tls13_change_key. No master secrets can be * loaded here, so just return. */ return; } ssl_debug_printf("%s state = 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state); if (ssl->state & SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY) { ssl_debug_printf(" session key already available, nothing to do.\n"); return; } if (!(ssl->state & SSL_CIPHER)) { ssl_debug_printf(" Cipher suite (Server Hello) is missing!\n"); return; } /* for decryption, there needs to be a master secret (which can be derived * from pre-master secret). If missing, try to pick a master key from cache * (an earlier packet in the capture or key logfile). */ if (!(ssl->state & (SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET)) && !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", FALSE, mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id) && (!ssl->session.is_session_resumed || !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", FALSE, mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket)) && !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", FALSE, mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random)) { if (ssl->cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) { /* how unfortunate, the master secret could not be found */ ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret\n"); return; } else { ssl_debug_printf(" Cannot find master secret, continuing anyway " "because of a NULL cipher\n"); } } if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't generate keyring material\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } /* Save Client Random/ Session ID for "SSL Export Session keys" */ ssl_save_master_key("Client Random", mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random, &ssl->master_secret); ssl_save_master_key("Session ID", mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id, &ssl->master_secret); /* Only save the new secrets if the server sent the ticket. The client * ticket might have become stale. */ if (ssl->state & SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret); } } /* }}} */ /* Load the new key. */ void tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type) { GHashTable *key_map; const char *label; if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s TLS version %#x is not 1.3\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version); return; } if (ssl->client_random.data_len == 0) { /* May happen if Hello message is missing and Finished is found. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s missing Client Random\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } switch (type) { case TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP: DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!is_from_server); label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_early; break; case TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE: if (is_from_server) { label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_handshake; } else { label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_handshake; } break; case TLS_SECRET_APP: if (is_from_server) { label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; key_map = mk_map->tls13_server_appdata; } else { label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; key_map = mk_map->tls13_client_appdata; } break; default: g_assert_not_reached(); } /* Transitioning to new keys, mark old ones as unusable. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s transitioning to new key, old state 0x%02x\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->state); ssl->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); StringInfo *secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl->client_random); if (!secret) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot find %s, decryption impossible\n", G_STRFUNC, label); /* Disable decryption, the keys are invalid. */ if (is_from_server) { ssl->server = NULL; } else { ssl->client = NULL; } return; } /* TLS 1.3 secret found, set new keys. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s Retrieved TLS 1.3 traffic secret.\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_print_string("Client Random", &ssl->client_random); ssl_print_string(label, secret); if (tls13_generate_keys(ssl, secret, is_from_server)) { /* * Remember the application traffic secret to support Key Update. The * other secrets cannot be used for this purpose, so free them. */ SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client; StringInfo *app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret; if (type == TLS_SECRET_APP) { app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data, secret->data_len); ssl_data_set(app_secret, secret->data, secret->data_len); } else { wmem_free(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data); app_secret->data = NULL; app_secret->data_len = 0; } } } /** * Update to next application data traffic secret for TLS 1.3. The previous * secret should have been set by tls13_change_key. */ void tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-7.2 * traffic_secret_N+1 = HKDF-Expand-Label( * traffic_secret_N, * "application traffic secret", "", Hash.length) * * Note that traffic_secret_N is of the same length (Hash.length). */ const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl->cipher_suite; SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client; StringInfo *app_secret = decoder ? &decoder->app_traffic_secret : NULL; if (!cipher_suite || !app_secret || app_secret->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot perform Key Update due to missing info\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } /* * Previous traffic secret is available, so find the hash function, * expand the new traffic secret and generate new keys. */ const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name; int hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name); const guint hash_len = app_secret->data_len; guchar *new_secret; if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(ssl->session.tls13_draft_version, hash_algo, app_secret, "application traffic secret", "", hash_len, &new_secret)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s traffic_secret_N+1 expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } ssl_data_set(app_secret, new_secret, hash_len); wmem_free(NULL, new_secret); tls13_generate_keys(ssl, app_secret, is_from_server); } /** SSL keylog file handling. {{{ */ static GRegex * ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(void) { #define OCTET "(?:[[:xdigit:]]{2})" const gchar *pattern = "(?:" /* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */ "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM (?" OCTET "{32}) " /* Matches first part of encrypted RSA pre-master secret */ "|RSA (?" OCTET "{8}) " /* Pre-Master-Secret is given, it is 48 bytes for RSA, but it can be of any length for DHE */ ")(?" OCTET "+)" "|(?:" /* Matches Server Hellos having a Session ID */ "RSA Session-ID:(?" OCTET "+) Master-Key:" /* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */ "|CLIENT_RANDOM (?" OCTET "{32}) " /* Master-Secret is given, its length is fixed */ ")(?" OCTET "{" G_STRINGIFY(SSL_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) "})" "|(?" /* TLS 1.3 Client Random to Derived Secrets mapping. */ ":CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?" OCTET "{32})" "|CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?" OCTET "{32})" "|SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET (?" OCTET "{32})" "|CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?" OCTET "{32})" "|SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 (?" OCTET "{32})" ") (?" OCTET "+)"; #undef OCTET static GRegex *regex = NULL; GError *gerr = NULL; if (!regex) { regex = g_regex_new(pattern, (GRegexCompileFlags)(G_REGEX_OPTIMIZE | G_REGEX_ANCHORED), G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &gerr); if (gerr) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to compile regex: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gerr->message); g_error_free(gerr); regex = NULL; } } return regex; } static gboolean file_needs_reopen(FILE *fp, const char *filename) { ws_statb64 open_stat, current_stat; /* consider a file deleted when stat fails for either file, * or when the residing device / inode has changed. */ if (0 != ws_fstat64(ws_fileno(fp), &open_stat)) return TRUE; if (0 != ws_stat64(filename, ¤t_stat)) return TRUE; /* Note: on Windows, ino may be 0. Existing files cannot be deleted on * Windows, but hopefully the size is a good indicator when a file got * removed and recreated */ return open_stat.st_dev != current_stat.st_dev || open_stat.st_ino != current_stat.st_ino || open_stat.st_size > current_stat.st_size; } typedef struct ssl_master_key_match_group { const char *re_group_name; GHashTable *master_key_ht; } ssl_master_key_match_group_t; void ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *ssl_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file, const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) { unsigned i; GRegex *regex; ssl_master_key_match_group_t mk_groups[] = { { "encrypted_pmk", mk_map->pre_master }, { "session_id", mk_map->session }, { "client_random", mk_map->crandom }, { "client_random_pms", mk_map->pms }, /* TLS 1.3 map from Client Random to derived secret. */ { "client_early", mk_map->tls13_client_early }, { "client_handshake", mk_map->tls13_client_handshake }, { "server_handshake", mk_map->tls13_server_handshake }, { "client_appdata", mk_map->tls13_client_appdata }, { "server_appdata", mk_map->tls13_server_appdata }, }; /* no need to try if no key log file is configured. */ if (!ssl_keylog_filename || !*ssl_keylog_filename) { ssl_debug_printf("%s dtls/ssl.keylog_file is not configured!\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } /* The format of the file is a series of records with one of the following formats: * - "RSA xxxx yyyy" * Where xxxx are the first 8 bytes of the encrypted pre-master secret (hex-encoded) * Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded) * (this is the original format introduced with bug 4349) * * - "RSA Session-ID:xxxx Master-Key:yyyy" * Where xxxx is the SSL session ID (hex-encoded) * Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded) * (added to support openssl s_client Master-Key output) * This is somewhat is a misnomer because there's nothing RSA specific * about this. * * - "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy" * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded) * Where yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded) * (This format allows SSL connections to be decrypted, if a user can * capture the PMS but could not recover the MS for a specific session * with a SSL Server.) * * - "CLIENT_RANDOM xxxx yyyy" * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded) * Where yyyy is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded) * (This format allows non-RSA SSL connections to be decrypted, i.e. * ECDHE-RSA.) * * - "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy" * - "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy" * - "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET xxxx yyyy" * - "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy" * - "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 xxxx yyyy" * Where xxxx is the client_random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded) * Where yyyy is the secret (hex-encoded) derived from the early, * handshake or master secrets. (This format is introduced with TLS 1.3 * and supported by BoringSSL, OpenSSL, etc. See bug 12779.) */ regex = ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(); if (!regex) return; ssl_debug_printf("trying to use SSL keylog in %s\n", ssl_keylog_filename); /* if the keylog file was deleted, re-open it */ if (*keylog_file && file_needs_reopen(*keylog_file, ssl_keylog_filename)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s file got deleted, trying to re-open\n", G_STRFUNC); fclose(*keylog_file); *keylog_file = NULL; } if (*keylog_file == NULL) { *keylog_file = ws_fopen(ssl_keylog_filename, "r"); if (!*keylog_file) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to open SSL keylog\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } } for (;;) { char buf[512], *line; gsize bytes_read; GMatchInfo *mi; line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), *keylog_file); if (!line) break; bytes_read = strlen(line); /* fgets includes the \n at the end of the line. */ if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\n') { line[bytes_read - 1] = 0; bytes_read--; } if (bytes_read > 0 && line[bytes_read - 1] == '\r') { line[bytes_read - 1] = 0; bytes_read--; } ssl_debug_printf(" checking keylog line: %s\n", line); if (g_regex_match(regex, line, G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &mi)) { gchar *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms; StringInfo *key = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo); StringInfo *pre_ms_or_ms = NULL; GHashTable *ht = NULL; /* Is the PMS being supplied with the PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM * otherwise we will use the Master Secret */ hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "master_secret"); if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) { g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms); hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "pms"); } if (hex_pre_ms_or_ms == NULL || !*hex_pre_ms_or_ms) { g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms); hex_pre_ms_or_ms = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, "derived_secret"); } /* There is always a match, otherwise the regex is wrong. */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(hex_pre_ms_or_ms && strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms)); /* convert from hex to bytes and save to hashtable */ pre_ms_or_ms = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo); from_hex(pre_ms_or_ms, hex_pre_ms_or_ms, strlen(hex_pre_ms_or_ms)); g_free(hex_pre_ms_or_ms); /* Find a master key from any format (CLIENT_RANDOM, SID, ...) */ for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(mk_groups); i++) { ssl_master_key_match_group_t *g = &mk_groups[i]; hex_key = g_match_info_fetch_named(mi, g->re_group_name); if (hex_key && *hex_key) { ssl_debug_printf(" matched %s\n", g->re_group_name); ht = g->master_key_ht; from_hex(key, hex_key, strlen(hex_key)); g_free(hex_key); break; } g_free(hex_key); } DISSECTOR_ASSERT(ht); /* Cannot be reached, or regex is wrong. */ g_hash_table_insert(ht, key, pre_ms_or_ms); } else { ssl_debug_printf(" unrecognized line\n"); } /* always free match info even if there is no match. */ g_match_info_free(mi); } } /** SSL keylog file handling. }}} */ #ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG /* {{{ */ static FILE* ssl_debug_file=NULL; void ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name) { static gint debug_file_must_be_closed; gint use_stderr; use_stderr = name?(strcmp(name, SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR) == 0):0; if (debug_file_must_be_closed) fclose(ssl_debug_file); if (use_stderr) ssl_debug_file = stderr; else if (!name || (strcmp(name, "") ==0)) ssl_debug_file = NULL; else ssl_debug_file = ws_fopen(name, "w"); if (!use_stderr && ssl_debug_file) debug_file_must_be_closed = 1; else debug_file_must_be_closed = 0; ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark SSL debug log \n\n"); ssl_debug_printf("Wireshark version: %s\n", get_ws_vcs_version_info()); #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS ssl_debug_printf("GnuTLS version: %s\n", gnutls_check_version(NULL)); #endif ssl_debug_printf("Libgcrypt version: %s\n", gcry_check_version(NULL)); ssl_debug_printf("\n"); } void ssl_debug_flush(void) { if (ssl_debug_file) fflush(ssl_debug_file); } void ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...) { va_list ap; if (!ssl_debug_file) return; va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(ssl_debug_file, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); } void ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len) { size_t i, j, k; if (!ssl_debug_file) return; fprintf(ssl_debug_file,"%s[%d]:\n",name, (int) len); for (i=0; idata, data->data_len); } #endif /* SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG }}} */ /* UAT preferences callbacks. {{{ */ /* checks for SSL and DTLS UAT key list fields */ gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p _U_, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional. *err = NULL; return TRUE; } gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional. *err = NULL; return TRUE; } if (strcmp(p, "start_tls") != 0){ guint16 port; if (!ws_strtou16(p, NULL, &port)) { *err = g_strdup("Invalid port given."); return FALSE; } } *err = NULL; return TRUE; } gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { ws_statb64 st; if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { *err = g_strdup("No filename given."); return FALSE; } else { if (ws_stat64(p, &st) != 0) { *err = g_strdup_printf("File '%s' does not exist or access is denied.", p); return FALSE; } } *err = NULL; return TRUE; } gboolean ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err) { #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) ssldecrypt_assoc_t* f = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r; FILE *fp = NULL; if (p && (strlen(p) > 0u)) { fp = ws_fopen(f->keyfile, "rb"); if (fp) { char *msg = NULL; gnutls_x509_privkey_t priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, p, &msg); if (!priv_key) { fclose(fp); *err = g_strdup_printf("Could not load PKCS#12 key file: %s", msg); g_free(msg); return FALSE; } g_free(msg); gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key); fclose(fp); } else { *err = g_strdup_printf("Leave this field blank if the keyfile is not PKCS#12."); return FALSE; } } *err = NULL; return TRUE; #else *err = g_strdup("Cannot load key files, support is not compiled in."); return FALSE; #endif } /* UAT preferences callbacks. }}} */ /** maximum size of ssl_association_info() string */ #define SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN 8192 typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data { gchar *str; const char *table_protocol; } ssl_association_info_callback_data_t; /** * callback function used by ssl_association_info() to traverse the SSL associations. */ static void ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_data) { ssl_association_info_callback_data_t* data = (ssl_association_info_callback_data_t*)user_data; const int l = (const int)strlen(data->str); g_snprintf(data->str+l, SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN-l, "'%s' %s\n", dissector_handle_get_short_name((dissector_handle_t)handle), data->table_protocol); } /** * @return an information string on the SSL protocol associations. The string has ephemeral lifetime/scope. */ gchar* ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol) { ssl_association_info_callback_data_t data; data.str = (gchar *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN); data.table_protocol = table_protocol; dissector_table_foreach_handle(dissector_table_name, ssl_association_info_, &data); return data.str; } /** Begin of code related to dissection of wire data. */ /* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */ gboolean ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length, int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value) { guint veclen_size; guint32 veclen_value; proto_item *pi; DISSECTOR_ASSERT(offset <= offset_end); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(min_value <= max_value); if (max_value > 0xffffff) { veclen_size = 4; } else if (max_value > 0xffff) { veclen_size = 3; } else if (max_value > 0xff) { veclen_size = 2; } else { veclen_size = 1; } if (offset_end - offset < veclen_size) { proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, "No more room for vector of length %u", veclen_size); *ret_length = 0; return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */ } pi = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_length, tvb, offset, veclen_size, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &veclen_value); offset += veclen_size; if (veclen_value < min_value) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length, "Vector length %u is smaller than minimum %u", veclen_value, min_value); } else if (veclen_value > max_value) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_vector_length, "Vector length %u is larger than maximum %u", veclen_value, max_value); } if (offset_end - offset < veclen_value) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, pi, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small, "Vector length %u is too large, truncating it to %u", veclen_value, offset_end - offset); *ret_length = offset_end - offset; return FALSE; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */ } *ret_length = veclen_value; return TRUE; /* Length is OK. */ } gboolean ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint offset, guint offset_end) { if (offset < offset_end) { guint trailing = offset_end - offset; proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_trailing_data, tvb, offset, trailing, "%u trailing byte%s unprocessed", trailing, plurality(trailing, " was", "s were")); return FALSE; /* unprocessed data warning */ } else if (offset > offset_end) { /* * Returned offset runs past the end. This should not happen and is * possibly a dissector bug. */ guint excess = offset - offset_end; proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small, tvb, offset_end, excess, "Dissector processed too much data (%u byte%s)", excess, plurality(excess, "", "s")); return FALSE; /* overflow error */ } return TRUE; /* OK, offset matches. */ } /** }}} */ static guint32 ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig); /* change_cipher_spec(20) dissection */ void ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gboolean is_from_server, const SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* * struct { * enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type; * } ChangeCipherSpec; */ proto_item *ti; proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: Change Cipher Spec", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown")); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.change_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* CCS is a dummy message in TLS 1.3, do not parse it further. */ return; } /* Remember frame number of first CCS */ guint32 *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame; if (*ccs_frame == 0) *ccs_frame = pinfo->num; /* Use heuristics to detect an abbreviated handshake, assume that missing * ServerHelloDone implies reusing previously negotiating keys. Then when * a Session ID or ticket is present, it must be a resumed session. * Normally this should be done at the Finished message, but that may be * encrypted so we do it here, at the last cleartext message. */ if (is_from_server && ssl) { if (session->is_session_resumed) { const char *resumed = NULL; if (ssl->session_ticket.data_len) { resumed = "Session Ticket"; } else if (ssl->session_id.data_len) { resumed = "Session ID"; } if (resumed) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Session resumption using %s\n", G_STRFUNC, resumed); } else { /* Can happen if the capture somehow starts in the middle */ ssl_debug_printf("%s No Session resumption, missing packets?\n", G_STRFUNC); } } else { ssl_debug_printf("%s Not using Session resumption\n", G_STRFUNC); } } if (is_from_server && session->is_session_resumed) expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.resumed); } /** Begin of handshake(22) record dissections */ /* Dissects a SignatureScheme (TLS 1.3) or SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (TLS 1.2). * {{{ */ static void tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint32 sighash, hashalg, sigalg; proto_item *ti_sigalg; proto_tree *sigalg_tree; ti_sigalg = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sighash); sigalg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_sigalg, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_alg); /* TLS 1.2: SignatureAndHashAlgorithm { hash, signature } */ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_hash, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &hashalg); proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(sigalg_tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_sig, tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &sigalg); /* No TLS 1.3 SignatureScheme? Fallback to TLS 1.2 interpretation. */ if (!try_val_to_str(sighash, tls13_signature_algorithm)) { proto_item_set_text(ti_sigalg, "Signature Algorithm: %s %s (0x%04x)", val_to_str_const(hashalg, tls_hash_algorithm, "Unknown"), val_to_str_const(sigalg, tls_signature_algorithm, "Unknown"), sighash); } } /* }}} */ /* dissect a list of hash algorithms, return the number of bytes dissected this is used for the signature algorithms extension and for the TLS1.2 certificate request. {{{ */ static gint ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 * struct { * HashAlgorithm hash; * SignatureAlgorithm signature; * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; */ proto_tree *subtree; proto_item *ti; guint sh_alg_length; guint32 next_offset; /* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sh_alg_length, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16 - 1)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + sh_alg_length; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_algs, tvb, offset, sh_alg_length, "Signature Hash Algorithms (%u algorithm%s)", sh_alg_length / 2, plurality(sh_alg_length / 2, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_sig_hash_algs); while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) { tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, subtree, offset); offset += 2; } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } return offset; } /* }}} */ /* Dissection of DistinguishedName (for CertificateRequest and * certificate_authorities extension). {{{ */ static guint32 tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; guint32 dnames_length, next_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; /* Note: minimum length is 0 for TLS 1.1/1.2 and 3 for earlier/later */ /* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &dnames_length, hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + dnames_length; if (dnames_length > 0) { ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_dnames, tvb, offset, dnames_length, "Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)", dnames_length, plurality(dnames_length, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.dnames); asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); while (offset < next_offset) { /* get the length of the current certificate */ guint32 name_length; /* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &name_length, hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_dname); offset += name_length; } } return offset; } /* }}} */ /** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). {{{ */ static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end); } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1 * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; * struct { * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> * } ProtocolNameList; */ proto_tree *alpn_tree; proto_item *ti; guint32 next_offset, alpn_length, name_length; guint8 *proto_name = NULL; guint32 proto_name_length = 0; /* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alpn_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + alpn_length; ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_list, tvb, offset, alpn_length, ENC_NA); alpn_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_alpn); /* Parse list (note missing check for end of vector, ssl_add_vector below * ensures that data is always available.) */ while (offset < next_offset) { /* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alpn_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { return next_offset; } offset++; proto_tree_add_item(alpn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str, tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); /* Remember first ALPN ProtocolName entry for server. */ if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { proto_name_length = name_length; proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, offset, proto_name_length, ENC_ASCII); } offset += name_length; } /* If ALPN is given in ServerHello, then ProtocolNameList MUST contain * exactly one "ProtocolName". */ if (proto_name) { /* '\0'-terminated string for prefix/full string comparison purposes. */ for (size_t i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(ssl_alpn_protocols); i++) { const ssl_alpn_protocol_t *alpn_proto = &ssl_alpn_protocols[i]; if ((alpn_proto->match_exact && proto_name_length == strlen(alpn_proto->proto_name) && !strcmp(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_name)) || (!alpn_proto->match_exact && g_str_has_prefix(proto_name, alpn_proto->proto_name))) { dissector_handle_t handle; /* ProtocolName match, so set the App data dissector handle. * This may override protocols given via the UAT dialog, but * since the ALPN hint is precise, do it anyway. */ handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(alpn_proto->dissector_name); ssl_debug_printf("%s: changing handle %p to %p (%s)", G_STRFUNC, (void *)session->app_handle, (void *)handle, alpn_proto->dissector_name); /* if dissector is disabled, do not overwrite previous one */ if (handle) session->app_handle = handle; break; } } } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04#page-3 * The "extension_data" field of a "next_protocol_negotiation" extension * in a "ServerHello" contains an optional list of protocols advertised * by the server. Protocols are named by opaque, non-empty byte strings * and the list of protocols is serialized as a concatenation of 8-bit, * length prefixed byte strings. Implementations MUST ensure that the * empty string is not included and that no byte strings are truncated. */ guint32 npn_length; proto_tree *npn_tree; /* List is optional, do not add tree if there are no entries. */ if (offset == offset_end) { return offset; } npn_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_npn, NULL, "Next Protocol Negotiation"); while (offset < offset_end) { /* non-empty, 8-bit length prefixed strings means range 1..255 */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, npn_tree, offset, offset_end, &npn_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { return offset_end; } offset++; proto_tree_add_item(npn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str, tvb, offset, npn_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); offset += npn_length; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.2 * struct { * opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>; * } RenegotiationInfo; * */ proto_tree *reneg_info_tree; guint32 reneg_info_length; reneg_info_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, NULL, "Renegotiation Info extension"); /* opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, reneg_info_tree, offset, offset_end, &reneg_info_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info_len, 0, 255)) { return offset_end; } offset++; if (reneg_info_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(reneg_info_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_reneg_info, tvb, offset, reneg_info_length, ENC_NA); offset += reneg_info_length; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.5 * struct { * NamedGroup group; * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; * } KeyShareEntry; */ guint32 key_exchange_length, group; proto_tree *ks_tree; ks_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, NULL, "Key Share Entry"); proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &group); offset += 2; proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ": Group: %s", val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)")); /* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ks_tree, offset, offset_end, &key_exchange_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; /* Bad (possible truncated) length, skip to end of KeyShare extension. */ } offset += 2; proto_item_set_len(ks_tree, 2 + 2 + key_exchange_length); proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ", Key Exchange length: %u", key_exchange_length); proto_tree_add_item(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange, tvb, offset, key_exchange_length, ENC_NA); offset += key_exchange_length; return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type) { proto_tree *key_share_tree; guint32 next_offset; guint32 client_shares_length; if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > guint32) */ return offset; } key_share_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share, NULL, "Key Share extension"); switch(hnd_type){ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: /* KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end, &client_shares_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + client_shares_length; while (offset + 4 <= next_offset) { /* (NamedGroup (2 bytes), key_exchange (1 byte for length, 1 byte minimum data) */ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset); } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, next_offset)) { return next_offset; } break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: proto_tree_add_item(key_share_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_selected_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN ); offset += 2; break; default: /* no default */ break; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.8 * struct { * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; * } PskIdentity; * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; * struct { * select (Handshake.msg_type) { * case client_hello: * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; * case server_hello: * uint16 selected_identity; * }; * } PreSharedKeyExtension; */ proto_tree *psk_tree; psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_pre_shared_key, NULL, "Pre-Shared Key extension"); switch (hnd_type){ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: { guint32 identities_length, identities_end, binders_length; /* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &identities_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; identities_end = offset + identities_length; while (offset < identities_end) { guint32 identity_length; proto_tree *identity_tree; identity_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(psk_tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, NULL, "PSK Identity ("); /* opaque identity<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, identity_tree, offset, identities_end, &identity_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return identities_end; } offset += 2; proto_item_append_text(identity_tree, "length: %u)", identity_length); proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity, tvb, offset, identity_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += identity_length; proto_tree_add_item(identity_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_obfuscated_ticket_age, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; proto_item_set_len(identity_tree, 2 + identity_length + 4); } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, identities_end)) { offset = identities_end; } /* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &binders_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders, tvb, offset, binders_length, ENC_NA); offset += binders_length; } break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: { proto_tree_add_item(psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_selected, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } break; default: break; } return offset; } static guint32 ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end _U_, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.7 * struct {} Empty; * struct { * select (Handshake.msg_type) { * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; * case client_hello: Empty; * case encrypted_extensions: Empty; * }; * } EarlyDataIndication; */ switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: /* Remember that early_data will follow the handshake. */ if (ssl) { ssl_debug_printf("%s found early_data extension\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl->has_early_data = TRUE; } break; case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_max_early_data_size, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; break; default: break; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.1 * struct { * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; * } SupportedVersions; */ guint32 versions_length, next_offset; /* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &versions_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, 2, 254)) { return offset_end; } offset++; next_offset = offset + versions_length; while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.2 * struct { * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; * } Cookie; */ guint32 cookie_length; /* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie, tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA); offset += cookie_length; return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.6 * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; * * struct { * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; * } PskKeyExchangeModes; */ guint32 ke_modes_length, next_offset; /* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ke_modes_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 1, 255)) { return offset_end; } offset++; next_offset = offset + ke_modes_length; while (offset < next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_mode, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; } return offset; } static guint32 ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.2.3.1 * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; * struct { * DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>; * } CertificateAuthoritiesExtension; */ return tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.3.2.1 * struct { * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; * } OIDFilter; * struct { * OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>; * } OIDFilterExtension; */ proto_tree *subtree; guint32 filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; const char *oid, *name; /* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &filters_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; offset_end = offset + filters_length; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); while (offset < offset_end) { subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_oid_filter, NULL, "OID Filter"); /* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &oid_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { return offset_end; } offset++; dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(FALSE, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset, hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, &oid); offset += oid_length; /* Append OID to tree label */ name = oid_resolved_from_string(wmem_packet_scope(), oid); proto_item_append_text(subtree, " (%s)", name ? name : oid); /* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &values_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; proto_item_set_len(subtree, 1 + oid_length + 2 + values_length); if (values_length > 0) { value_offset = offset; value_offset = dissect_ber_identifier(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL, NULL); value_offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, subtree, tvb, value_offset, NULL, NULL); call_ber_oid_callback(oid, tvb, value_offset, pinfo, subtree, NULL); } offset += values_length; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3 * * struct { * NameType name_type; * select (name_type) { * case host_name: HostName; * } name; * } ServerName; * * enum { * host_name(0), (255) * } NameType; * * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; * * struct { * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> * } ServerNameList; */ proto_tree *server_name_tree; guint32 list_length, server_name_length, next_offset; /* The server SHALL include "server_name" extension with empty data. */ if (offset == offset_end) { return offset; } server_name_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_server_name, NULL, "Server Name Indication extension"); /* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + list_length; while (offset < next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; /* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, next_offset, &server_name_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name, tvb, offset, server_name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); offset += server_name_length; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { guint ext_len = offset_end - offset; if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO && ssl && ext_len != 0) { tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ext_len); /* Save the Session Ticket such that it can be used as identifier for * restoring a previous Master Secret (in ChangeCipherSpec) */ ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl->session_ticket.data, ext_len); ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ext_len; tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ext_len); } proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, NULL, "Data (%u byte%s)", ext_len, plurality(ext_len, "", "s")); return offset + ext_len; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, guint16 ext_type, SslSession *session) { guint8 cert_list_length; guint8 cert_type; proto_tree *cert_list_tree; proto_item *ti; switch(hnd_type){ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: cert_list_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; if (offset_end - offset != (guint32)cert_list_length) return offset; ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types, tvb, offset, cert_list_length, cert_list_length); proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%d)", cert_list_length); /* make this a subtree */ cert_list_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_cert_types); /* loop over all point formats */ while (cert_list_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(cert_list_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; cert_list_length--; } break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE) { session->client_cert_type = cert_type; } if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE) { session->server_cert_type = cert_type; } break; default: /* no default */ break; } return offset; } static guint32 ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { guint32 quic_length, parameter_length, supported_versions_length, next_offset; /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-04#section-7.3 * uint32 QuicVersion; * enum { * initial_max_stream_data(0), * initial_max_data(1), * initial_max_stream_id(2), * idle_timeout(3), * truncate_connection_id(4), * max_packet_size(5), * stateless_reset_token(6), * (65535) * } TransportParameterId; * * struct { * TransportParameterId parameter; * opaque value<0..2^16-1>; * } TransportParameter; * * struct { * select (Handshake.msg_type) { * case client_hello: * QuicVersion negotiated_version; * QuicVersion initial_version; * * case encrypted_extensions: * QuicVersion supported_versions<2..2^8-4>; * }; * TransportParameter parameters<30..2^16-1>; * } TransportParameters; */ switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_negotiated_version, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_initial_version, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; break; case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: /* QuicVersion supported_versions<2..2^8-4>;*/ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &supported_versions_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions_len, 2, G_MAXUINT8-3)) { return offset_end; } offset += 1; next_offset = offset + supported_versions_length; while (offset < next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_supported_versions, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; } break; case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: break; default: return offset; } /* TransportParameter parameters<30..2^16-1>; */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &quic_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, 30, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + quic_length; while (offset < next_offset) { guint32 parameter_type; proto_tree *parameter_tree; parameter_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_quictp_parameter, NULL, "Parameter"); /* TransportParameterId parameter */ proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, ¶meter_type); offset += 2; proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, ": %s", val_to_str(parameter_type, quic_transport_parameter_id, "Unknown")); /* opaque value<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, next_offset, ¶meter_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " (len=%u)", parameter_length); proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_value, tvb, offset, parameter_length, ENC_NA); switch (parameter_type) { case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_data, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset)); offset += 4; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_DATA: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_data, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset)); offset += 4; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_ID: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_stream_id, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset)); offset += 4; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_IDLE_TIMEOUT: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_idle_timeout, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u secs", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); offset += 2; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_OMIT_CONNECTION_ID: /* No Payload */ break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_max_packet_size, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_append_text(parameter_tree, " %u", tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); /*TODO display expert info about invalid value (< 1252 or >65527) ? */ offset += 2; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN: proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_stateless_reset_token, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 16; break; default: offset += parameter_length; /*TODO display expert info about unknown ? */ break; } } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean from_server, gboolean is_hrr) { nstime_t gmt_unix_time; guint8 sessid_length; proto_tree *rnd_tree; proto_tree *ti_rnd; guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; /* Prepare for renegotiation by resetting the state. */ ssl_reset_session(session, ssl, !from_server); if (ssl) { StringInfo *rnd; if (from_server) rnd = &ssl->server_random; else rnd = &ssl->client_random; /* save provided random for later keyring generation */ tvb_memcpy(tvb, rnd->data, offset, 32); rnd->data_len = 32; if (from_server) ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM; else ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("%s found %s RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, from_server ? "SERVER" : "CLIENT", ssl->state); } ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_random, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */ rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, hf->ett.hs_random); /* show the time */ gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0; proto_tree_add_time(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_time, tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time); offset += 4; /* show the random bytes */ proto_tree_add_item(rnd_tree, hf->hf.hs_random_bytes, tvb, offset, 28, ENC_NA); offset += 28; } else { if (is_hrr) { proto_item_append_text(ti_rnd, " (HelloRetryRequest magic)"); } offset += 32; } /* No Session ID with TLS 1.3 on Server Hello before draft -22 */ if (from_server == 0 || !(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) { /* show the session id (length followed by actual Session ID) */ sessid_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; if (ssl) { /* save the authorative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec. * (D)TLS restricts the SID to 32 chars, it does not make sense to * save more, so ignore larger ones. */ if (from_server && sessid_length <= 32) { tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_id.data, offset, sessid_length); ssl->session_id.data_len = sessid_length; } } if (sessid_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id, tvb, offset, sessid_length, ENC_NA); offset += sessid_length; } } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, gboolean has_length) { /* TLS 1.2/1.3 status_request Client Hello Extension. * TLS 1.2 status_request_v2 CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 type. * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8 (status_request) * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2 (status_request_v2) * struct { * CertificateStatusType status_type; * uint16 request_length; // for status_request_v2 * select (status_type) { * case ocsp: OCSPStatusRequest; * case ocsp_multi: OCSPStatusRequest; * } request; * } CertificateStatusRequest; // CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 * * enum { ocsp(1), ocsp_multi(2), (255) } CertificateStatusType; * struct { * ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1>; * Extensions request_extensions; * } OCSPStatusRequest; * opaque ResponderID<1..2^16-1>; * opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1>; */ guint cert_status_type; cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; if (has_length) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } switch (cert_status_type) { case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP: case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI: { guint32 responder_id_list_len; guint32 request_extensions_len; /* ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &responder_id_list_len, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; if (responder_id_list_len != 0) { proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded, tvb, offset, responder_id_list_len, "Responder ID list is not implemented, contact Wireshark" " developers if you want this to be supported"); } offset += responder_id_list_len; /* opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &request_extensions_len, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; if (request_extensions_len != 0) { proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.hs_ext_cert_status_undecoded, tvb, offset, request_extensions_len, "Request Extensions are not implemented, contact" " Wireshark developers if you want this to be supported"); } offset += request_extensions_len; break; } } return offset; } static guint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2 * struct { * CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1>; * } CertificateStatusRequestListV2; */ guint32 req_list_length, next_offset; /* CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &req_list_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + req_list_length; while (offset < next_offset) { offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, TRUE); } return offset; } static guint32 tls_dissect_ocsp_response(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { guint32 response_length; proto_item *ocsp_resp; proto_tree *ocsp_resp_tree; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; /* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>; */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &response_length, hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) { return offset_end; } offset += 3; ocsp_resp = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ocsp, tvb, offset, response_length, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_item_set_text(ocsp_resp, "OCSP Response"); ocsp_resp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ocsp_resp, hf->ett.ocsp_response); asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1); offset += response_length;; return offset; } guint32 tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* TLS 1.2 "CertificateStatus" handshake message. * TLS 1.3 "status_request" Certificate extension. * struct { * CertificateStatusType status_type; * select (status_type) { * case ocsp: OCSPResponse; * case ocsp_multi: OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2 * } response; * } CertificateStatus; * opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1>; * struct { * OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1>; * } OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2 */ guint32 status_type, resp_list_length, next_offset; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &status_type); offset += 1; switch (status_type) { case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP: offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI: /* OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &resp_list_length, hf->hf.hs_ocsp_response_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) { return offset_end; } offset += 3; next_offset = offset + resp_list_length; while (offset < next_offset) { offset = tls_dissect_ocsp_response(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset); } break; } return offset; } static guint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.4 * enum { ..., (0xFFFF) } NamedGroup; * struct { * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> * } NamedGroupList; * * NOTE: "NamedCurve" (RFC 4492) is renamed to "NamedGroup" (RFC 7919) and * the extension itself from "elliptic_curves" to "supported_groups". */ guint32 groups_length, next_offset; proto_tree *groups_tree; proto_item *ti; /* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &groups_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + groups_length; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups, tvb, offset, groups_length, "Supported Groups (%d group%s)", groups_length / 2, plurality(groups_length/2, "", "s")); /* make this a subtree */ groups_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_groups); /* loop over all groups */ while (offset + 2 <= offset_end) { proto_tree_add_item(groups_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, groups_tree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } return offset; } static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint8 ecpf_length; proto_tree *ecpf_tree; proto_item *ti; ecpf_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats, tvb, offset, ecpf_length, "Elliptic curves point formats (%d)", ecpf_length); /* make this a subtree */ ecpf_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.hs_ext_curves_point_formats); /* loop over all point formats */ while (ecpf_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(ecpf_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; ecpf_length--; } return offset; } static guint32 tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.2 * enum { v1(0), (255) } Version; * struct { * opaque key_id[32]; * } LogID; * opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1>; * struct { * Version sct_version; * LogID id; * uint64 timestamp; * CtExtensions extensions; * digitally-signed struct { ... }; * } SignedCertificateTimestamp; */ guint32 sct_version; guint64 sct_timestamp_ms; nstime_t sct_timestamp; guint32 exts_len; const gchar *log_name; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &sct_version); offset++; if (sct_version != 0) { // TODO expert info about unknown SCT version? return offset; } proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_logid, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); log_name = bytesval_to_str(tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, 32), 32, ct_logids, "Unknown Log"); proto_item_append_text(tree, " (%s)", log_name); offset += 32; sct_timestamp_ms = tvb_get_ntoh64(tvb, offset); sct_timestamp.secs = (time_t)(sct_timestamp_ms / 1000); sct_timestamp.nsecs = (int)((sct_timestamp_ms % 1000) * 1000000); proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &sct_timestamp); offset += 8; /* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len, hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; if (exts_len > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions, tvb, offset, exts_len, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += exts_len; } offset = ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version, hf->hf.sct_sct_signature_length, hf->hf.sct_sct_signature); return offset; } guint32 tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3 * opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>; * struct { * SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>; * } SignedCertificateTimestampList; */ guint32 list_length, sct_length, next_offset; proto_tree *subtree; /* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length, hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; while (offset < offset_end) { subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.sct, NULL, "Signed Certificate Timestamp"); /* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &sct_length, hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + sct_length; proto_item_set_len(subtree, 2 + sct_length); offset = tls_dissect_sct(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, version); if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } } return offset; } /** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). }}} */ /* Whether the Content and Handshake Types are valid; handle Protocol Version. {{{ */ gboolean ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type) { switch ((ContentType) type) { case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL_ID_ALERT: case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE: case SSL_ID_APP_DATA: case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT: return TRUE; } return FALSE; } gboolean ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls) { switch ((HandshakeType) hs_type) { case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: /* hello_verify_request is DTLS-only */ return is_dtls; case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST: case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: case SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG: case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE: case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY: case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG: case SSL_HND_FINISHED: case SSL_HND_CERT_URL: case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS: case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA: case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE: case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS: return TRUE; } return FALSE; } static gboolean ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type, gboolean is_dtls) { /* Consider all valid Handshake messages (except for Client Hello) and * all other valid record types (other than Handshake) */ return (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE && ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(handshake_type, is_dtls) && handshake_type != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) || (content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE && ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)); } /** * Scan a Server Hello handshake message for the negotiated version. For TLS 1.3 * draft 22 and newer, it also checks whether it is a HelloRetryRequest. */ void tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 *server_version, gboolean *is_hrr) { /* SHA256("HelloRetryRequest") */ static const guint8 tls13_hrr_random_magic[] = { 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c }; guint8 session_id_length; *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); /* * Try to look for supported_versions extension. Minimum length: * 2 + 32 + 1 = 35 (version, random, session id length) * 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 (cipher suite, compression method, extensions length) * 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 (ext type, ext len, version) */ if (*server_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION && offset_end - offset >= 46) { offset += 2; *is_hrr = tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, tls13_hrr_random_magic, sizeof(tls13_hrr_random_magic)) == 0; offset += 32; session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); offset++; if (offset_end - offset < session_id_length + 5u) { return; } offset += session_id_length + 5; while (offset_end - offset >= 6) { guint16 ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); guint16 ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); if (offset_end - offset < 4u + ext_len) { break; /* not enough data for type, length and data */ } if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS && ext_len == 2) { *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); return; } offset += 4 + ext_len; } } else { *is_hrr = FALSE; } } void ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type, gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version) { guint8 tls13_draft = 0; if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type, is_dtls)) return; if (handshake_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) { tls13_draft = tls13_draft_version(version); if (tls13_draft != 0) { /* This is TLS 1.3 (a draft version). */ version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; } } switch (version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: if (is_dtls) return; break; case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: if (!is_dtls) return; break; default: /* invalid version number */ return; } session->tls13_draft_version = tls13_draft; session->version = version; if (ssl) { ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION; ssl_debug_printf("%s found version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, version, ssl->state); } } void ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo, guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi, guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb) { guint max_expansion; if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* TLS 1.3: Max length is 2^14 + 256 */ max_expansion = 256; } else { /* RFC 5246, Section 6.2.3: TLSCiphertext.fragment length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048 */ max_expansion = 2048; } if (record_length > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + max_expansion) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid, "TLSCiphertext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + %u", max_expansion); } if (decrypted_tvb && tvb_captured_length(decrypted_tvb) > TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, length_pi, &hf->ei.record_length_invalid, "TLSPlaintext length MUST NOT exceed 2^14"); } } static void ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher) { /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */ ssl->session.cipher = cipher; if (!(ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(cipher))) { ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher suite 0x%04X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher); } else { /* Cipher found, save this for the delayed decoder init */ ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("%s found CIPHER 0x%04X %s -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher, val_to_str_ext_const(cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown"), ssl->state); } } /* }}} */ /* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. {{{ */ static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls); void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs) { /* struct { * ProtocolVersion client_version; * Random random; * SessionID session_id; * opaque cookie<0..32>; //new field for DTLS * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>; * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; * Extension client_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>; * } ClientHello; */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *cs_tree; guint32 cipher_suite_length; guint32 compression_methods_length; guint8 compression_method; guint32 next_offset; /* show the client version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_client_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, FALSE, FALSE); /* fields specific for DTLS (cookie_len, cookie) */ if (dtls_hfs != NULL) { guint32 cookie_length; /* opaque cookie<0..32> (for DTLS only) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len, 0, 32)) { return; } offset++; if (cookie_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie, tvb, offset, cookie_length, ENC_NA); offset += cookie_length; } } /* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { return; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + cipher_suite_length; if (ssl && cipher_suite_length == 2) { /* * If there is only a single cipher, assume that this will be used * (needed for 0-RTT decryption support in TLS 1.3). */ ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); } ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites, tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length, "Cipher Suites (%d suite%s)", cipher_suite_length / 2, plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s")); cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cipher_suites); while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, cs_tree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } /* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compression_methods_length, hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { return; } offset++; next_offset = offset + compression_methods_length; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_methods, tvb, offset, compression_methods_length, "Compression Methods (%u method%s)", compression_methods_length, plurality(compression_methods_length, "", "s")); cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.comp_methods); while (offset < next_offset) { compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* TODO: make reserved/private comp meth. fields selectable */ if (compression_method < 64) proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1, compression_method); else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193) proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1, compression_method, "Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)", compression_method); else proto_tree_add_uint_format_value(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1, compression_method, "Private use range (%u)", compression_method); offset++; } /* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */ if (offset < offset_end) { ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, session, ssl, dtls_hfs != NULL); } } void ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls, gboolean is_hrr) { /* struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; * Random random; * SessionID session_id; // TLS 1.2 and before * CipherSuite cipher_suite; * CompressionMethod compression_method; // TLS 1.2 and before * Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>; * } ServerHello; */ guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); /* Initially assume that the session is resumed. If this is not the case, a * ServerHelloDone will be observed before the ChangeCipherSpec message * which will reset this flag. */ session->is_session_resumed = TRUE; /* show the server version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* dissect fields that are also present in ClientHello */ offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, TRUE, is_hrr); if (ssl) { /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */ ssl_set_cipher(ssl, tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset)); } /* now the server-selected cipher suite */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* No compression with TLS 1.3 before draft -22 */ if (!(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) { if (ssl) { /* store selected compression method for decryption */ ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); } /* and the server-selected compression method */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; } /* SSL v3.0 has no extensions, so length field can indeed be missing. */ if (offset < offset_end) { ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, is_hrr ? SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, session, ssl, is_dtls); } } /* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. }}} */ /* New Session Ticket dissection. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 (TLS >= 1.0): * struct { * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; * } NewSessionTicket; * * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.5.1 * struct { * uint32 ticket_lifetime; * uint32 ticket_age_add; * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; // new in draft -21, updated in -22 * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; * } NewSessionTicket; */ proto_tree *subtree; guint32 ticket_len; gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.session_ticket, NULL, "TLS Session Ticket"); /* ticket lifetime hint */ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_lifetime_hint, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; if (is_tls13) { /* for TLS 1.3: ticket_age_add */ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_age_add, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; /* for TLS 1.3: ticket_nonce (coming with Draft 21)*/ if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 21) { guint32 ticket_nonce_len; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_nonce_len, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce_len, 0, 255)) { return; } offset++; proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce, tvb, offset, ticket_nonce_len, ENC_NA); offset += ticket_nonce_len; } } /* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1> (with TLS 1.3 the minimum is 1) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_len, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return; } offset += 2; /* Content depends on implementation, so just show data! */ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket, tvb, offset, ticket_len, ENC_NA); /* save the session ticket to cache for ssl_finalize_decryption */ if (ssl && !is_tls13) { tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ticket_len); ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl->session_ticket.data, ticket_len); ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ticket_len; tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ticket_len); /* NewSessionTicket is received after the first (client) * ChangeCipherSpec, and before the second (server) ChangeCipherSpec. * Since the second CCS has already the session key available it will * just return. To ensure that the session ticket is mapped to a * master key (from the first CCS), save the ticket here too. */ ssl_save_master_key("Session Ticket", session_hash, &ssl->session_ticket, &ssl->master_secret); ssl->state |= SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; } offset += ticket_len; if (is_tls13) { ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET, session, ssl, is_dtls); } } /* }}} */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.1.4 * struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; * CipherSuite cipher_suite; // not before draft -19 * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; * } HelloRetryRequest; */ guint32 version; guint8 draft_version; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version); draft_version = tls13_draft_version(version); offset += 2; if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; } ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, session, ssl, is_dtls); } void ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.3.1 * struct { * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; * } EncryptedExtensions; */ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, session, ssl, is_dtls); } /* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_, GHashTable *key_hash _U_, gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls) { /* opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>; * * struct { * select(certificate_type) { * * // certificate type defined in RFC 7250 * case RawPublicKey: * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; * * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246 * case X.509: * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; * }; * } Certificate; * * draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20: * struct { * select(certificate_type){ * case RawPublicKey: * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; * * case X.509: * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; * } * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; * } CertificateEntry; * struct { * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; * } Certificate; */ enum { CERT_X509, CERT_RPK } cert_type; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) gnutls_datum_t subjectPublicKeyInfo = { NULL, 0 }; #endif guint32 next_offset, certificate_list_length, cert_length; proto_tree *subtree = tree; guint certificate_index = 0; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); if ((is_from_server && session->server_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY) || (!is_from_server && session->client_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY)) { cert_type = CERT_RPK; } else { cert_type = CERT_X509; } #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) /* Ask the pkcs1 dissector to return the public key details */ if (ssl) asn1_ctx.private_data = &subjectPublicKeyInfo; #endif /* TLS 1.3: opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { guint32 context_length; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) { return; } offset++; if (context_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context, tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA); offset += context_length; } } if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && cert_type == CERT_RPK) { /* For RPK before TLS 1.3, the single RPK is stored directly without * another "certificate_list" field. */ certificate_list_length = offset_end - offset; next_offset = offset_end; } else { /* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &certificate_list_length, hf->hf.hs_certificates_len, 0, G_MAXUINT24)) { return; } offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */ next_offset = offset + certificate_list_length; } /* RawPublicKey must have one cert, but X.509 can have multiple. */ if (certificate_list_length > 0 && cert_type == CERT_X509) { proto_item *ti; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificates, tvb, offset, certificate_list_length, "Certificates (%u bytes)", certificate_list_length); /* make it a subtree */ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.certificates); } while (offset < next_offset) { switch (cert_type) { case CERT_RPK: /* TODO add expert info if there is more than one RPK entry (certificate_index > 0) */ /* opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length, hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) { return; } offset += 3; dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); offset += cert_length; break; case CERT_X509: /* opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &cert_length, hf->hf.hs_certificate_len, 1, G_MAXUINT24)) { return; } offset += 3; dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) if (is_from_server && ssl && certificate_index == 0) { ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(ssl, key_hash, &subjectPublicKeyInfo); /* Only attempt to get the RSA modulus for the first cert. */ asn1_ctx.private_data = NULL; } #endif offset += cert_length; break; } /* TLS 1.3: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> */ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset, next_offset, SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, session, ssl, is_dtls); } certificate_index++; } } void ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls) { /* From SSL 3.0 and up (note that since TLS 1.1 certificate_authorities can be empty): * enum { * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4), * (255) * } ClientCertificateType; * * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; * * struct { * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>; * } CertificateRequest; * * * As per TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246) the format has changed to: * * enum { * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4), * rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(5), dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(6), * fortezza_dms_RESERVED(20), (255) * } ClientCertificateType; * * enum { * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), * sha512(6), (255) * } HashAlgorithm; * * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } * SignatureAlgorithm; * * struct { * HashAlgorithm hash; * SignatureAlgorithm signature; * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; * * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; * * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; * * struct { * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; * } CertificateRequest; * * draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18: * struct { * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; * SignatureScheme * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>; * } CertificateRequest; * * draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19: * * struct { * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; * } CertificateRequest; */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; guint32 next_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; if (!tree) return; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); if (is_tls13) { guint32 context_length; /* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) { return; } offset++; if (context_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context, tvb, offset, context_length, ENC_NA); offset += context_length; } } else { guint32 cert_types_count; /* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_types_count, hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { return; } offset++; next_offset = offset + cert_types_count; ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf->hf.hs_cert_types, tvb, offset, cert_types_count, "Certificate types (%u type%s)", cert_types_count, plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cert_types); while (offset < next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf->hf.hs_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; } } if (session->version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION || (is_tls13 && (draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 19))) { offset = ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end); } if (is_tls13 && (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 19)) { /* * TLS 1.3 draft 19 and newer: Extensions. * SslDecryptSession pointer is NULL because Certificate Extensions * should not influence decryption state. */ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, session, NULL, is_dtls); } else if (is_tls13 && draft_version <= 18) { /* * TLS 1.3 draft 18 and older: certificate_authorities and * certificate_extensions (a vector of OID mappings). */ offset = tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); } else { /* for TLS 1.2 and older, the certificate_authorities field. */ tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); } } /* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. }}} */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) { ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version, hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len, hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig); } /* Finished dissection. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs) { /* For SSLv3: * struct { * opaque md5_hash[16]; * opaque sha_hash[20]; * } Finished; * * For (D)TLS: * struct { * opaque verify_data[12]; * } Finished; * * For TLS 1.3: * struct { * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; * } */ if (!tree) return; if (session->version == SSLV3_VERSION) { if (ssl_hfs != NULL) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_md5_hash, tvb, offset, 16, ENC_NA); proto_tree_add_item(tree, ssl_hfs->hs_sha_hash, tvb, offset + 16, 20, ENC_NA); } } else { /* Length should be 12 for TLS before 1.3, assume this is the case. */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_finished, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, ENC_NA); } } /* }}} */ /* RFC 6066 Certificate URL handshake message dissection. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint16 url_hash_len; /* enum { * individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255) * } CertChainType; * * struct { * CertChainType type; * URLAndHash url_and_hash_list<1..2^16-1>; * } CertificateURL; * * struct { * opaque url<1..2^16-1>; * unint8 padding; * opaque SHA1Hash[20]; * } URLAndHash; */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; url_hash_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_hash_list_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; while (url_hash_len-- > 0) { proto_item *urlhash_item; proto_tree *urlhash_tree; guint16 url_len; urlhash_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); urlhash_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(urlhash_item, hf->ett.urlhash); url_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_url, tvb, offset, url_len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); offset += url_len; proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_padding, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; /* Note: RFC 6066 says that padding must be 0x01 */ proto_tree_add_item(urlhash_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_sha1, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA); offset += 20; } } /* }}} */ /* Dissection of TLS Extensions in Client Hello, Server Hello, etc. {{{ */ static gint ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_dtls) { guint32 exts_len; guint16 ext_type; guint32 ext_len; guint32 next_offset; proto_tree *ext_tree; gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; /* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2> (for TLS 1.3 HRR/CR min-length is 2) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len, hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; offset_end = offset + exts_len; while (offset_end - offset >= 4) { ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); ext_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, offset, 4 + ext_len, hf->ett.hs_ext, NULL, "Extension: %s (len=%u)", val_to_str(ext_type, tls_hello_extension_types, "Unknown type %u"), ext_len); proto_tree_add_uint(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_type, tvb, offset, 2, ext_type); offset += 2; /* opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, offset_end, &ext_len, hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + ext_len; switch (ext_type) { case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_NAME: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST: if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, FALSE); } else if (is_tls13 && hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE) { offset = tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ext_type, session); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(hf, tvb, ext_tree, pinfo, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP: if (is_dtls) { offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); } else { // XXX expert info: This extension MUST only be used with DTLS, and not with TLS. } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_HEARTBEAT: proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_heartbeat_mode, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ALPN: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, session); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST_V2: if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP: // TLS 1.3 note: SCT only appears in EE in draft -16 and before. if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO || hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS || hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE) offset = tls_dissect_sct_list(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session->version); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE: case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SERVER_CERT_TYPE: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ext_type, session); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PADDING: proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_padding_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA); offset += ext_len; break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: if (ssl && hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) { ssl_debug_printf("%s enabling Encrypt-then-MAC\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl->state |= SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: if (ssl) { switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; break; default: /* no default */ break; } } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SESSION_TICKET_TLS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(hf, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_KEY_SHARE: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_EARLY_DATA: case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_TICKET_EARLY_DATA_INFO: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; break; } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_COOKIE: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_OID_FILTERS: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_NPN: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_DRAFT_VERSION_TLS13: proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_draft_version_tls13, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; break; default: proto_tree_add_item(ext_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_data, tvb, offset, ext_len, ENC_NA); offset += ext_len; break; } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset)) { /* Dissection did not end at expected location, fix it. */ offset = next_offset; } } /* Check if Extensions vector is correctly terminated. */ if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end)) { offset = offset_end; } return offset; } /* }}} */ /* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { gint point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree; ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Client Params"); /* point */ point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point, tvb, offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA); } static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { gint yc_len; proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree; ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Client Params"); /* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic.dh_public (explicit) */ yc_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_yc, tvb, offset + 2, yc_len, ENC_NA); } static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, const SslSession *session) { gint epms_len; proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree; ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret"); /* EncryptedPreMasterSecret.pre_master_secret */ switch (session->version) { case SSLV2_VERSION: case SSLV3_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: /* OpenSSL pre-0.9.8f DTLS and pre-TLS quirk: 2-octet length vector is * not present. The handshake contents represents the EPMS, see: * https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=10222 */ epms_len = length; break; default: /* TLS and DTLS include vector length before EPMS */ epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; break; } proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb, offset, epms_len, ENC_NA); } /* Used in PSK cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { guint identity_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Client Params"); /* identity */ identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA); } /* Used in RSA PSK cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { gint identity_len, epms_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA PSK Client Params"); /* identity */ identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + identity_len; /* Yc */ epms_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_epms, tvb, offset + 2, epms_len, ENC_NA); } /* ClientKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */ /* Dissects DigitallySigned (see RFC 5246 4.7 Cryptographic Attributes). {{{ */ static guint32 ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig) { guint32 sig_len; switch (version) { case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, tree, offset); offset += 2; break; default: break; } /* Sig */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sig_len, hf_sig_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_sig, tvb, offset, sig_len, ENC_NA); offset += sig_len; return offset; } /* }}} */ /* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. {{{ */ /* dissects signed_params inside a ServerKeyExchange for some keyex algos */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) { /* * TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246 sec 7.4.8) * struct { * digitally-signed struct { * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; * } * } CertificateVerify; * * TLSv1.0/TLSv1.1 (RFC 5436 sec 7.4.8 and 7.4.3) works essentially the same * as TLSv1.2, but the hash algorithms are not explicit in digitally-signed. * * SSLv3 (RFC 6101 sec 5.6.8) essentially works the same as TLSv1.0 but it * does more hashing including the master secret and padding. */ ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig_len, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig); } static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version, gboolean anon) { /* * RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS * * struct { * ECCurveType curve_type; * select (curve_type) { * case explicit_prime: * ... * case explicit_char2: * ... * case named_curve: * NamedCurve namedcurve; * }; * } ECParameters; * * struct { * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; * } ECPoint; * * struct { * ECParameters curve_params; * ECPoint public; * } ServerECDHParams; * * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { * case ec_diffie_hellman: * ServerECDHParams params; * Signature signed_params; * } ServerKeyExchange; */ gint curve_type; gint point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree; ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params"); /* ECParameters.curve_type */ curve_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; if (curve_type != 3) return; /* only named_curves are supported */ /* case curve_type == named_curve; ECParameters.namedcurve */ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_named_curve, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* ECPoint.point */ point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point, tvb, offset + 1, point_len, ENC_NA); offset += 1 + point_len; /* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */ if (!anon) { dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_ecdh_tree, offset, offset_end, version); } } static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version, gboolean anon) { gint p_len, g_len, ys_len; proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree; ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "Diffie-Hellman Server Params"); /* p */ p_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_p, tvb, offset + 2, p_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + p_len; /* g */ g_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_g, tvb, offset + 2, g_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + g_len; /* Ys */ ys_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys_len, tvb, offset, 2, ys_len); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_dh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_ys, tvb, offset + 2, ys_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + ys_len; /* Signature (if non-anonymous KEX) */ if (!anon) { dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_dh_tree, offset, offset_end, version); } } /* Only used in RSA-EXPORT cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) { gint modulus_len, exponent_len; proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree; ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "RSA-EXPORT Server Params"); /* modulus */ modulus_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_modulus, tvb, offset + 2, modulus_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + modulus_len; /* exponent */ exponent_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_rsa_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_exponent, tvb, offset + 2, exponent_len, ENC_NA); offset += 2 + exponent_len; /* Signature */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_rsa_tree, offset, offset_end, version); } /* Used in RSA PSK and PSK cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { guint hint_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); if ((2 + hint_len) != length) { /* Lengths don't line up (wasn't what we expected?) */ return; } ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Server Params"); /* hint */ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, tvb, offset + 2, hint_len, ENC_NA); } /* ServerKeyExchange algo-specific dissectors. }}} */ /* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, const SslSession *session) { switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) { case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; DHE_DSS, DHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DH_RSA, DH_ANON: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */ case KEX_DH_DSS: case KEX_DH_RSA: case KEX_DHE_DSS: case KEX_DHE_RSA: dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */ /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */ break; case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */ case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: case KEX_ECDH_RSA: case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA: case KEX_ECDHE_RSA: dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; ec_diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */ /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */ break; case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; krb5: KerberosWrapper */ /* XXX: implement support for KRB5 */ break; case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk: psk_identity */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_RSA: /* RFC 5246; rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length, session); break; case KEX_RSA_PSK: /* RFC 4279; rsa_psk: psk_identity, EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ClientSRPPublic */ case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS: case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA: /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */ break; default: /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */ break; } } void ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, const SslSession *session) { switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) { case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; ServerDHParams */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE); break; case KEX_DH_DSS: /* RFC 5246; not allowed */ case KEX_DH_RSA: /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */ break; case KEX_DHE_DSS: /* RFC 5246; dhe_dss, dhe_rsa: ServerDHParams, Signature */ case KEX_DHE_RSA: dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE); break; case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity_hint, ServerDHParams */ /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */ break; case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams (without signature for anon) */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE); break; case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; psk_identity_hint, ServerECDHParams */ /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */ break; case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams, Signature */ case KEX_ECDH_RSA: case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA: case KEX_ECDHE_RSA: dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE); break; case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; not allowed */ /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */ break; case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity*/ case KEX_RSA_PSK: dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end - offset); break; case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits*/ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version); break; case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ServerSRPParams, Signature */ case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS: case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA: /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */ break; default: /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */ break; } } /* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. }}} */ void tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.5.3 * enum { * update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255) * } KeyUpdateRequest; * * struct { * KeyUpdateRequest request_update; * } KeyUpdate; */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_key_update_request_update, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); } void ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options) { prefs_register_string_preference(module, "psk", "Pre-Shared-Key", "Pre-Shared-Key as HEX string. Should be 0 to 16 bytes.", &(options->psk)); prefs_register_filename_preference(module, "keylog_file", "(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename", "The name of a file which contains a list of \n" "(pre-)master secrets in one of the following formats:\n" "\n" "RSA \n" "RSA Session-ID: Master-Key:\n" "CLIENT_RANDOM \n" "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM \n" "\n" "Where:\n" " = First 8 bytes of the Encrypted PMS\n" " = The Pre-Master-Secret (PMS) used to derive the MS\n" " = The SSL Session ID\n" " = The Master-Secret (MS)\n" " = The Client's random number from the ClientHello message\n" "\n" "(All fields are in hex notation)", &(options->keylog_filename), FALSE); } void ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { if (ssl_session && ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && !(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) { guint32 old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len; ssl_debug_printf("Calculating hash with offset %d %d\n", offset, length); ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length); if (tvb) { tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, offset, length); } else { memset(ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, 0, length); } ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length; } } /* * Editor modelines - http://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html * * Local variables: * c-basic-offset: 4 * tab-width: 8 * indent-tabs-mode: nil * End: * * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab: * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true: */