diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c | 3468 |
1 files changed, 3468 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38d1245d57 --- /dev/null +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-ssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,3468 @@ +/* packet-ssl.c + * Routines for ssl dissection + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro <scott@renfro.org> + * + * $Id$ + * + * Ethereal - Network traffic analyzer + * By Gerald Combs <gerald@ethereal.com> + * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 + * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + * + * See + * + * http://www.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html + * + * for SSL 2.0 specs. + * + * See + * + * http://www.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ + * + * for SSL 3.0 specs. + * + * See RFC 2246 for SSL 3.1/TLS 1.0 specs. + * + * See (among other places) + * + * http://www.graphcomp.com/info/specs/ms/pct.htm + * + * for PCT 1 draft specs. + * + * See + * + * http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/draft-ietf-tls-ecc-05.txt + * + * for Elliptic Curve Cryptography cipher suites. + * + * See + * + * http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-camellia-04.txt + * + * for Camellia-based cipher suites. + * + * Notes: + * + * - Uses conversations in a no-malloc fashion. Since we just want to + * remember the version of the conversation, we store the version + * integer directly in the void *data member of the conversation + * structure. This means that we don't have to manage any memory, + * but will cause problems if anyone assumes that all data pointers + * are actually pointers to memory allocated by g_mem_chunk_alloc. + * + * - Does not support decryption of encrypted frames, nor dissection + * of frames that would require state maintained between frames + * (e.g., single ssl records spread across multiple tcp frames) + * + * - Identifies, but does not fully dissect the following messages: + * + * - SSLv3/TLS (These need more state from previous handshake msgs) + * - Server Key Exchange + * - Client Key Exchange + * - Certificate Verify + * + * - SSLv2 (These don't appear in the clear) + * - Error + * - Client Finished + * - Server Verify + * - Server Finished + * - Request Certificate + * - Client Certificate + * + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +# include "config.h" +#endif + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <glib.h> + +#include <epan/conversation.h> +#include "prefs.h" + +static gboolean ssl_desegment = TRUE; + + +/********************************************************************* + * + * Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures + * + *********************************************************************/ + +/* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */ +static int proto_ssl = -1; +static int hf_ssl_record = -1; +static int hf_ssl_record_content_type = -1; +static int hf_ssl_record_version = -1; +static int hf_ssl_record_length = -1; +static int hf_ssl_record_appdata = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_record = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1; +static int hf_pct_msg_type = -1; +static int hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec = -1; +static int hf_ssl_alert_message = -1; +static int hf_ssl_alert_message_level = -1; +static int hf_ssl_alert_message_description = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_protocol = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_type = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_length = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_client_version = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_server_version = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_random_time = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_session_id = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificates = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificate = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_finished = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_dnames = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl_handshake_dname = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1; +static int hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_cert = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_hash = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_cipher = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_exch = -1; +static int hf_pct_handshake_sig = -1; +static int hf_pct_msg_error_type = -1; + +/* Initialize the subtree pointers */ +static gint ett_ssl = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_record = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_alert = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_handshake = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_cipher_suites = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_comp_methods = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_certs = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_cert_types = -1; +static gint ett_ssl_dnames = -1; +static gint ett_pct_cipher_suites = -1; +static gint ett_pct_hash_suites = -1; +static gint ett_pct_cert_suites = -1; +static gint ett_pct_exch_suites = -1; + +/* The TCP port to associate with by default */ +#define TCP_PORT_SSL 443 +#define TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP 636 +#define TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP 993 +#define TCP_PORT_SSL_POP 995 + +/* version state tables */ +#define SSL_VER_UNKNOWN 0 +#define SSL_VER_SSLv2 1 +#define SSL_VER_SSLv3 2 +#define SSL_VER_TLS 3 +#define SSL_VER_PCT 4 + +/* corresponds to the #defines above */ +static gchar* ssl_version_short_names[] = { + "SSL", + "SSLv2", + "SSLv3", + "TLS", + "PCT" +}; + +/* other defines */ +#define SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC 0x14 +#define SSL_ID_ALERT 0x15 +#define SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE 0x16 +#define SSL_ID_APP_DATA 0x17 + +#define SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 1 +#define SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO 2 +#define SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE 11 +#define SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG 12 +#define SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST 13 +#define SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE 14 +#define SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY 15 +#define SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG 16 +#define SSL_HND_FINISHED 20 + +#define SSL2_HND_ERROR 0x00 +#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01 +#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x02 +#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED 0x03 +#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO 0x04 +#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY 0x05 +#define SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED 0x06 +#define SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 0x07 +#define SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 0x08 + +#define PCT_VERSION_1 0x8001 + +#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO 0x01 +#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO 0x02 +#define PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 0x03 +#define PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY 0x04 +#define PCT_MSG_ERROR 0x05 + +#define PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1 0xa + +#define PCT_CIPHER_DES 0x01 +#define PCT_CIPHER_IDEA 0x02 +#define PCT_CIPHER_RC2 0x03 +#define PCT_CIPHER_RC4 0x04 +#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_112 0x05 +#define PCT_CIPHER_DES_168 0x06 + +#define PCT_HASH_MD5 0x0001 +#define PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64 0x0002 +#define PCT_HASH_SHA 0x0003 +#define PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80 0x0004 +#define PCT_HASH_DES_DM 0x0005 + +#define PCT_CERT_NONE 0x00 +#define PCT_CERT_X509 0x01 +#define PCT_CERT_PKCS7 0x02 + +#define PCT_SIG_NONE 0x0000 +#define PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5 0x0001 +#define PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA 0x0002 +#define PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA 0x0003 + +#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1 0x01 +#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES 0x02 +#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3 0x03 +#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2 0x04 +#define PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4 0x05 +#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3 0x06 +#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES 0x07 +#define PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3 0x08 +#define PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN 0x09 + +#define PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x01 +#define PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED 0x02 +#define PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE 0x03 +#define PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED 0x04 +#define PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED 0x05 +#define PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH 0x06 + +/* + * Lookup tables + * + */ +static const value_string ssl_20_msg_types[] = { + { SSL2_HND_ERROR, "Error" }, + { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, + { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" }, + { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED, "Client Finished" }, + { SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, + { SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" }, + { SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED, "Server Finished" }, + { SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE, "Request Certificate" }, + { SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, "Client Certificate" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ssl_20_cipher_suites[] = { + { 0x010080, "SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x020080, "SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x030080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x040080, "SSL2_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x050080, "SSL2_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x060040, "SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x0700c0, "SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x080080, "SSL2_RC4_64_WITH_MD5" }, + { 0x000000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" }, + { 0x000001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" }, + { 0x000002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x000003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, + { 0x000004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, + { 0x000005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x000006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, + { 0x000007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, + { 0x000018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, + { 0x000019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x00001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x00002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x000048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x000049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" }, + { 0x000061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" }, + { 0x000062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, + { 0x000065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, + { 0x000066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x000084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/ + security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */ + { 0x00fefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, + { 0x00feff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00ffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x00ffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, + /* Microsoft's old PCT protocol. These are from Eric Rescorla's + book "SSL and TLS" */ + { 0x8f8001, "PCT_SSL_COMPAT | PCT_VERSION_1" }, + { 0x800003, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509_CHAIN" }, + { 0x800001, "PCT_SSL_CERT_TYPE | PCT1_CERT_X509" }, + { 0x810001, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_MD5" }, + { 0x810003, "PCT_SSL_HASH_TYPE | PCT1_HASH_SHA" }, + { 0x820001, "PCT_SSL_EXCH_TYPE | PCT1_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1" }, + { 0x830004, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_1ST_HALF | PCT1_CIPHER_RC4" }, + { 0x848040, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_128 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" }, + { 0x842840, "PCT_SSL_CIPHER_TYPE_2ND_HALF | PCT1_ENC_BITS_40 | PCT1_MAC_BITS_128" }, + /* note that ciphersuites of {0x00????} are TLS cipher suites in + * a sslv2 client hello message; the ???? above is the two-byte + * tls cipher suite id + */ + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_20_certificate_type[] = { + { 0x00, "N/A" }, + { 0x01, "X.509 Certificate" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string ssl_31_content_type[] = { + { 20, "Change Cipher Spec" }, + { 21, "Alert" }, + { 22, "Handshake" }, + { 23, "Application Data" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_versions[] = { + { 0x0301, "TLS 1.0" }, + { 0x0300, "SSL 3.0" }, + { 0x0002, "SSL 2.0" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +#if 0 +/* XXX - would be used if we dissected the body of a Change Cipher Spec + message. */ +static const value_string ssl_31_change_cipher_spec[] = { + { 1, "Change Cipher Spec" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; +#endif + +static const value_string ssl_31_alert_level[] = { + { 1, "Warning" }, + { 2, "Fatal" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_31_alert_description[] = { + { 0, "Close Notify" }, + { 10, "Unexpected Message" }, + { 20, "Bad Record MAC" }, + { 21, "Decryption Failed" }, + { 22, "Record Overflow" }, + { 30, "Decompression Failure" }, + { 40, "Handshake Failure" }, + { 42, "Bad Certificate" }, + { 43, "Unsupported Certificate" }, + { 44, "Certificate Revoked" }, + { 45, "Certificate Expired" }, + { 46, "Certificate Unknown" }, + { 47, "Illegal Parameter" }, + { 48, "Unknown CA" }, + { 49, "Access Denied" }, + { 50, "Decode Error" }, + { 51, "Decrypt Error" }, + { 60, "Export Restriction" }, + { 70, "Protocol Version" }, + { 71, "Insufficient Security" }, + { 80, "Internal Error" }, + { 90, "User Canceled" }, + { 100, "No Renegotiation" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_31_handshake_type[] = { + { SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST, "Hello Request" }, + { SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, + { SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, + { SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, "Certificate" }, + { SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG, "Server Key Exchange" }, + { SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST, "Certificate Request" }, + { SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE, "Server Hello Done" }, + { SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY, "Certificate Verify" }, + { SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG, "Client Key Exchange" }, + { SSL_HND_FINISHED, "Finished" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_31_compression_method[] = { + { 0, "null" }, + { 1, "ZLIB" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +#if 0 +/* XXX - would be used if we dissected a Signature, as would be + seen in a server key exchange or certificate verify message. */ +static const value_string ssl_31_key_exchange_algorithm[] = { + { 0, "RSA" }, + { 1, "Diffie Hellman" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string ssl_31_signature_algorithm[] = { + { 0, "Anonymous" }, + { 1, "RSA" }, + { 2, "DSA" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; +#endif + +static const value_string ssl_31_client_certificate_type[] = { + { 1, "RSA Sign" }, + { 2, "DSS Sign" }, + { 3, "RSA Fixed DH" }, + { 4, "DSS Fixed DH" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +#if 0 +/* XXX - would be used if we dissected exchnage keys, as would be + seen in a client key exchange message. */ +static const value_string ssl_31_public_value_encoding[] = { + { 0, "Implicit" }, + { 1, "Explicit" }, + { 0x00, NULL } +}; +#endif + +static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = { + { 0x0000, "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL" }, + { 0x0001, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5" }, + { 0x0002, "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x0003, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, + { 0x0004, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, + { 0x0005, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x0006, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5" }, + { 0x0007, "TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0008, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0009, "TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000a, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000b, "TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000c, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000d, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000e, "TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x000f, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0010, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0011, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0012, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0013, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0014, "TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0015, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0016, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0017, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5" }, + { 0x0018, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5" }, + { 0x0019, "TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x001a, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x001b, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x001c, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x001d, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x001e, "SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x002f, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0030, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0031, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0032, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0033, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0034, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0035, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0036, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0037, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0038, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0039, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x003A, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0041, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0042, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0043, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0044, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0045, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0046, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0047, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA" }, + { 0x0048, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x0049, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x004A, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x004B, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x004C, "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0060, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5" }, + { 0x0061, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5" }, + { 0x0062, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0063, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0064, "TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, + { 0x0065, "TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA" }, + { 0x0066, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA" }, + { 0x0084, "TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0085, "TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0086, "TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0087, "TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0088, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0x0089, "TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA" }, + /* these from http://www.mozilla.org/projects/ + security/pki/nss/ssl/fips-ssl-ciphersuites.html */ + { 0xfefe, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, + { 0xfeff, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0xffe0, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" }, + { 0xffe1, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, + /* note that ciphersuites 0xff00 - 0xffff are private */ + { 0x00, NULL } +}; + +static const value_string pct_msg_types[] = { + { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO, "Client Hello" }, + { PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO, "Server Hello" }, + { PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, "Client Master Key" }, + { PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY, "Server Verify" }, + { PCT_MSG_ERROR, "Error" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string pct_cipher_type[] = { + { PCT_CIPHER_DES, "DES" }, + { PCT_CIPHER_IDEA, "IDEA" }, + { PCT_CIPHER_RC2, "RC2" }, + { PCT_CIPHER_RC4, "RC4" }, + { PCT_CIPHER_DES_112, "DES 112 bit" }, + { PCT_CIPHER_DES_168, "DES 168 bit" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string pct_hash_type[] = { + { PCT_HASH_MD5, "MD5" }, + { PCT_HASH_MD5_TRUNC_64, "MD5_TRUNC_64"}, + { PCT_HASH_SHA, "SHA"}, + { PCT_HASH_SHA_TRUNC_80, "SHA_TRUNC_80"}, + { PCT_HASH_DES_DM, "DES_DM"}, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string pct_cert_type[] = { + { PCT_CERT_NONE, "None" }, + { PCT_CERT_X509, "X.509" }, + { PCT_CERT_PKCS7, "PKCS #7" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; +static const value_string pct_sig_type[] = { + { PCT_SIG_NONE, "None" }, + { PCT_SIG_RSA_MD5, "MD5" }, + { PCT_SIG_RSA_SHA, "RSA SHA" }, + { PCT_SIG_DSA_SHA, "DSA SHA" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string pct_exch_type[] = { + { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1, "RSA PKCS#1" }, + { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES, "RSA PKCS#1 Token DES" }, + { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_DES3, "RSA PKCS#1 Token 3DES" }, + { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC2, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-2" }, + { PCT_EXCH_RSA_PKCS1_TOKEN_RC4, "RSA PKCS#1 Token RC-4" }, + { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3, "DH PKCS#3" }, + { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES, "DH PKCS#3 Token DES" }, + { PCT_EXCH_DH_PKCS3_TOKEN_DES3, "DH PKCS#3 Token 3DES" }, + { PCT_EXCH_FORTEZZA_TOKEN, "Fortezza" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +static const value_string pct_error_code[] = { + { PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, "PCT_ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE" }, + { PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_CLIENT_AUTH_FAILE" }, + { PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE, "PCT_ERR_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE" }, + { PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_INTEGRITY_CHECK_FAILED" }, + { PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "PCT_ERR_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED" }, + { PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH, "PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH" }, + { 0x00, NULL }, +}; + +/********************************************************************* + * + * Forward Declarations + * + *********************************************************************/ + +/* + * SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors + * + */ +/* record layer dissector */ +static int dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version, + gboolean *need_desegmentation); + +/* change cipher spec dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version); + +/* alert message dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version); + +/* handshake protocol dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length, + guint *conv_version); + + +static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version); + + +/* + * SSL version 2 dissectors + * + */ + +/* record layer dissector */ +static int dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version, + gboolean *need_desegmentation); + +/* client hello dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +/* client master key dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); +static void dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +/* server hello dissector */ +static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); +static void dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + + +static void dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +static void dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset); + +/* + * Support Functions + * + */ +static void ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version); +static int ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type); +static int ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type); +static int ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version); +static int ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, + guint8 next_byte); +static int ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset); +static int ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset); +static int ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset); +static int ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, + guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length); +static int ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, + guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length); + +/********************************************************************* + * + * Main dissector + * + *********************************************************************/ +/* + * Code to actually dissect the packets + */ +static void +dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree) +{ + + conversation_t *conversation; + void *conv_data; + guint conv_version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; + proto_item *ti = NULL; + proto_tree *ssl_tree = NULL; + guint32 offset = 0; + gboolean first_record_in_frame = TRUE; + gboolean need_desegmentation; + + /* Track the version using conversations to reduce the + * chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or + * v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows + * us to more frequently set the protocol column properly + * for continuation data frames. + * + * Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy, + * so that we don't have to search the conversation + * table every time we want the version; when setting + * the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation + * in addition to conv_version + */ + conversation = find_conversation(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, + pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0); + if (!conversation) + { + /* create a new conversation */ + conversation = conversation_new(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, + pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0); + } + conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl); + if (conv_data != NULL) + { + conv_version = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(conv_data); + } + + /* Initialize the protocol column; we'll set it later when we + * figure out what flavor of SSL it is (assuming we don't + * throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSL"); + } + + /* clear the the info column */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); + + /* TCP packets and SSL records are orthogonal. + * A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl + * record may be spread across multiple tcp packets. + * + * This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single + * frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp + * packets. + * + * Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets + * may be possible using ethereal conversations, but + * probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream + * reassembly. + */ + + /* Create display subtree for SSL as a whole */ + if (tree) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_ssl, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE); + ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl); + } + + /* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */ + while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) != 0) + { + /* on second and subsequent records per frame + * add a delimiter on info column + */ + if (!first_record_in_frame + && check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + { + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); + } + + /* + * Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation. + */ + need_desegmentation = FALSE; + + /* first try to dispatch off the cached version + * known to be associated with the conversation + */ + switch(conv_version) { + case SSL_VER_SSLv2: + case SSL_VER_PCT: + offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, + offset, &conv_version, + &need_desegmentation); + break; + + case SSL_VER_SSLv3: + case SSL_VER_TLS: + /* the version tracking code works too well ;-) + * at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after + * we already know the version of the connection; + * work around that here by detecting and calling + * the v2 dissector instead + */ + if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset)) + { + offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, + offset, &conv_version, + &need_desegmentation); + } + else + { + offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, + offset, &conv_version, + &need_desegmentation); + } + break; + + /* that failed, so apply some heuristics based + * on this individual packet + */ + default: + if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset)) + { + /* looks like sslv2 or pct client hello */ + offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, + offset, &conv_version, + &need_desegmentation); + } + else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset)) + { + /* looks like sslv3 or tls */ + offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, + offset, &conv_version, + &need_desegmentation); + } + else + { + /* looks like something unknown, so lump into + * continuation data + */ + offset = tvb_length(tvb); + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, + "Continuation Data"); + + /* Set the protocol column */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + ssl_version_short_names[conv_version]); + } + } + break; + } + + /* Desegmentation return check */ + if (need_desegmentation) + return; + + /* If we haven't already set the version information for + * this conversation, do so. */ + if (conv_data == NULL) + { + conv_data = GINT_TO_POINTER(conv_version); + conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, conv_data); + } + + /* set up for next record in frame, if any */ + first_record_in_frame = FALSE; + } + +} + + +/********************************************************************* + * + * SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines + * + *********************************************************************/ +static int +dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version, gboolean *need_desegmentation) +{ + + /* + * struct { + * uint8 major, minor; + * } ProtocolVersion; + * + * + * enum { + * change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22), + * application_data(23), (255) + * } ContentType; + * + * struct { + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 length; + * opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length]; + * } TLSPlaintext; + */ + guint32 record_length; + guint16 version; + guint8 content_type; + guint8 next_byte; + proto_tree *ti = NULL; + proto_tree *ssl_record_tree = NULL; + guint32 available_bytes = 0; + + available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset); + + /* + * Can we do reassembly? + */ + if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { + /* + * Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries? + */ + if (available_bytes < 5) { + /* + * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this + * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many + * more bytes we need, and return. + */ + pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; + pinfo->desegment_len = 5 - available_bytes; + *need_desegmentation = TRUE; + return offset; + } + } + + /* + * Get the record layer fields of interest + */ + content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); + record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3); + + if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) { + + /* + * Can we do reassembly? + */ + if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { + /* + * Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries? + */ + if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) { + /* + * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this + * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many + * more bytes we need, and return. + */ + pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; + pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes; + *need_desegmentation = TRUE; + return offset; + } + } + + } else { + + /* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense + * continuing any further + */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation Data"); + + /* Set the protocol column */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]); + } + return offset + 5 + record_length; + } + + /* + * If GUI, fill in record layer part of tree + */ + if (tree) + { + + /* add the record layer subtree header */ + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record, tvb, + offset, 5 + record_length, 0); + ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record); + } + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + + /* show the one-byte content type */ + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_content_type, + tvb, offset, 1, 0); + offset++; + + /* add the version */ + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb, + offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* add the length */ + proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_length, tvb, + offset, 2, record_length); + offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */ + } + else + { + /* if no GUI tree, then just skip over those fields */ + offset += 5; + } + + + /* + * if we don't already have a version set for this conversation, + * but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's + * not client_hello, then save the version to to conversation + * structure and print the column version + */ + next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN + && ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, next_byte)) + { + if (version == 0x0300) + { + *conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv3; + ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version); + } + else if (version == 0x0301) + { + *conv_version = SSL_VER_TLS; + ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version); + } + } + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)) + { + if (version == 0x0300) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_SSLv3]); + } + else if (version == 0x0301) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + ssl_version_short_names[SSL_VER_TLS]); + } + else + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]); + } + } + + /* + * now dissect the next layer + */ + switch (content_type) { + case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC: + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Change Cipher Spec"); + dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvb, ssl_record_tree, + offset, conv_version); + break; + case SSL_ID_ALERT: + dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, + conv_version); + break; + case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE: + dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, + record_length, conv_version); + break; + case SSL_ID_APP_DATA: + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Application Data"); + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, + "%s Record Layer: Application Data", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]); + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl_record_appdata, tvb, + offset, record_length, 0); + } + break; + + default: + /* shouldn't get here since we check above for valid types */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Bad SSLv3 Content Type"); + break; + } + offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */ + + return offset; +} + +/* dissects the change cipher spec procotol, filling in the tree */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_change_cipher_spec(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version) +{ + /* + * struct { + * enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type; + * } ChangeCipherSpec; + * + */ + if (tree) + { + proto_item_set_text(tree, + "%s Record Layer: Change Cipher Spec", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec, tvb, + offset++, 1, FALSE); + } +} + +/* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version) +{ + /* struct { + * AlertLevel level; + * AlertDescription description; + * } Alert; + */ + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *ssl_alert_tree = NULL; + gchar *level; + gchar *desc; + guint8 byte; + if (tree) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_alert_message, tvb, + offset, 2, 0); + ssl_alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_alert); + } + + /* + * set the record layer label + */ + + /* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */ + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */ + level = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_level); + + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */ + desc = match_strval(byte, ssl_31_alert_description); + + /* now set the text in the record layer line */ + if (level && desc) + { + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, + "Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)", + level, desc); + } + else + { + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Alert"); + } + + if (tree) + { + if (level && desc) + { + proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert " + "(Level: %s, Description: %s)", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version], + level, desc); + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_level, + tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE); + + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_alert_tree, hf_ssl_alert_message_description, + tvb, offset++, 1, FALSE); + } + else + { + proto_item_set_text(tree, + "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version]); + proto_item_set_text(ssl_alert_tree, + "Alert Message: Encrypted Alert"); + } + } +} + + +/* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length, guint *conv_version) +{ + /* struct { + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * select (HandshakeType) { + * case hello_request: HelloRequest; + * case client_hello: ClientHello; + * case server_hello: ServerHello; + * case certificate: Certificate; + * case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange; + * case certificate_request: CertificateRequest; + * case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone; + * case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify; + * case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange; + * case finished: Finished; + * } body; + * } Handshake; + */ + proto_tree *ti = NULL; + proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree = NULL; + gchar *msg_type_str = NULL; + guint8 msg_type; + guint32 length; + gboolean first_iteration = TRUE; + + + /* just as there can be multiple records per packet, there + * can be multiple messages per record as long as they have + * the same content type + * + * we really only care about this for handshake messages + */ + + /* set record_length to the max offset */ + record_length += offset; + while (offset < record_length) + { + msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type); + length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1); + + if (!msg_type_str && !first_iteration) + { + /* only dissect / report messages if they're + * either the first message in this record + * or they're a valid message type + */ + return; + } + + /* on second and later iterations, add comma to info col */ + if (!first_iteration) + { + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", "); + } + + /* + * Update our info string + */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s", (msg_type_str != NULL) + ? msg_type_str : "Encrypted Handshake Message"); + + if (tree) + { + /* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */ + if (first_iteration) + { + proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version], + (msg_type_str!=NULL) ? msg_type_str : + "Encrypted Handshake Message"); + } + else + { + proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", + ssl_version_short_names[*conv_version], + "Multiple Handshake Messages"); + } + + /* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */ + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, tvb, + offset, length + 4, 0); + ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_handshake); + + if (ssl_hand_tree) + { + /* set the text label on the subtree node */ + proto_item_set_text(ssl_hand_tree, "Handshake Protocol: %s", + (msg_type_str != NULL) ? msg_type_str : + "Encrypted Handshake Message"); + } + } + + /* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */ + if (!msg_type_str) + { + return; + } + + if (ssl_hand_tree) + { + /* add nodes for the message type and message length */ + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_type, + tvb, offset, 1, msg_type); + offset++; + proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_length, + tvb, offset, 3, length); + offset += 3; + + /* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */ + switch (msg_type) { + case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST: + /* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */ + break; + + case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG: + /* unimplemented */ + break; + + case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE: + /* server_hello_done has no fields, so nothing to do! */ + break; + + case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY: + /* unimplemented */ + break; + + case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG: + /* unimplemented */ + break; + + case SSL_HND_FINISHED: + dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, + offset, conv_version); + break; + } + + } + else + { + offset += 4; /* skip the handshake header */ + } + offset += length; + first_iteration = FALSE; /* set up for next pass, if any */ + } +} + +static int +dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset) +{ + /* show the client's random challenge */ + guint32 initial_offset = offset; + nstime_t gmt_unix_time; + guint8 session_id_length = 0; + + if (tree) + { + /* show the time */ + gmt_unix_time.secs = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset); + gmt_unix_time.nsecs = 0; + proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_time, + tvb, offset, 4, &gmt_unix_time); + offset += 4; + + /* show the random bytes */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes, + tvb, offset, 28, 0); + offset += 28; + + /* show the session id */ + session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len, + tvb, offset++, 1, 0); + if (session_id_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_session_id, + tvb, offset, session_id_length, + tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length), + "Session ID (%u byte%s)", + session_id_length, + plurality(session_id_length, "", "s")); + offset += session_id_length; + } + + } + return offset - initial_offset; +} + +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * Random random; + * SessionID session_id; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>; + * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * } ClientHello; + * + */ + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *cs_tree; + guint16 cipher_suite_length = 0; + guint8 compression_methods_length = 0; + guint8 compression_method; + + if (tree) + { + /* show the client version */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, tvb, + offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* show the fields in common with server hello */ + offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset); + + /* tell the user how many cipher suites there are */ + cipher_suite_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len, + tvb, offset, 2, cipher_suite_length); + offset += 2; /* skip opaque length */ + + if (cipher_suite_length > 0) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites, + tvb, offset, cipher_suite_length, + "Cipher Suites (%u suite%s)", + cipher_suite_length / 2, + plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s")); + + /* make this a subtree */ + cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites); + if (!cs_tree) + { + cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */ + } + + while (cipher_suite_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + cipher_suite_length -= 2; + } + } + + /* tell the user how man compression methods there are */ + compression_methods_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len, + tvb, offset, 1, compression_methods_length); + offset++; + + if (compression_methods_length > 0) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods, + tvb, offset, compression_methods_length, + "Compression Methods (%u method%s)", + compression_methods_length, + plurality(compression_methods_length, + "", "s")); + + /* make this a subtree */ + cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_comp_methods); + if (!cs_tree) + { + cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */ + } + + while (compression_methods_length > 0) + { + compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (compression_method < 64) + proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method, + tvb, offset, 1, compression_method); + else if (compression_method > 63 && compression_method < 193) + proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1, + "Compression Method: Reserved - to be assigned by IANA (%u)", + compression_method); + else + proto_tree_add_text(cs_tree, tvb, offset, 1, + "Compression Method: Private use range (%u)", + compression_method); + offset++; + compression_methods_length--; + } + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * Random random; + * SessionID session_id; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * CompressionMethod compression_method; + * } ServerHello; + */ + + if (tree) + { + /* show the server version */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, tvb, + offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* first display the elements conveniently in + * common with client hello + */ + offset += dissect_ssl3_hnd_hello_common(tvb, tree, offset); + + /* now the server-selected cipher suite */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* and the server-selected compression method */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method, + tvb, offset, 1, FALSE); + } +} + +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + + /* opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>; + * + * struct { + * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ + guint32 certificate_list_length; + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *subtree; + + if (tree) + { + certificate_list_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len, + tvb, offset, 3, certificate_list_length); + offset += 3; /* 24-bit length value */ + + if (certificate_list_length > 0) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_certificates, + tvb, offset, certificate_list_length, + "Certificates (%u byte%s)", + certificate_list_length, + plurality(certificate_list_length, + "", "s")); + + /* make it a subtree */ + subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_certs); + if (!subtree) + { + subtree = tree; /* failsafe */ + } + + /* iterate through each certificate */ + while (certificate_list_length > 0) + { + /* get the length of the current certificate */ + guint32 cert_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset); + certificate_list_length -= 3 + cert_length; + + proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len, + tvb, offset, 3, FALSE); + offset += 3; + + proto_tree_add_bytes_format(subtree, + hf_ssl_handshake_certificate, + tvb, offset, cert_length, + tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, cert_length), + "Certificate (%u byte%s)", + cert_length, + plurality(cert_length, "", "s")); + + offset += cert_length; + } + } + + } +} + +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cert_req(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* + * enum { + * rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4), + * (255) + * } ClientCertificateType; + * + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + */ + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *subtree; + guint8 cert_types_count = 0; + int dnames_length = 0; + + if (tree) + { + cert_types_count = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count, + tvb, offset, 1, cert_types_count); + offset++; + + if (cert_types_count > 0) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types, + tvb, offset, cert_types_count, + "Certificate types (%u type%s)", + cert_types_count, + plurality(cert_types_count, "", "s")); + subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cert_types); + if (!subtree) + { + subtree = tree; + } + + while (cert_types_count > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type, + tvb, offset, 1, FALSE); + offset++; + cert_types_count--; + } + } + + dnames_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len, + tvb, offset, 2, dnames_length); + offset += 2; + + if (dnames_length > 0) + { + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_dnames, + tvb, offset, dnames_length, + "Distinguished Names (%d byte%s)", + dnames_length, + plurality(dnames_length, "", "s")); + subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_dnames); + if (!subtree) + { + subtree = tree; + } + + while (dnames_length > 0) + { + /* get the length of the current certificate */ + guint16 name_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + dnames_length -= 2 + name_length; + + proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_bytes_format(subtree, + hf_ssl_handshake_dname, + tvb, offset, name_length, + tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, name_length), + "Distinguished Name (%u byte%s)", + name_length, + plurality(name_length, "", "s")); + offset += name_length; + } + } + } + +} + +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_finished(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + guint *conv_version) +{ + /* For TLS: + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[12]; + * } Finished; + * + * For SSLv3: + * struct { + * opaque md5_hash[16]; + * opaque sha_hash[20]; + * } Finished; + */ + + /* this all needs a tree, so bail if we don't have one */ + if (!tree) + { + return; + } + + switch(*conv_version) { + case SSL_VER_TLS: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_finished, + tvb, offset, 12, FALSE); + break; + + case SSL_VER_SSLv3: + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash, + tvb, offset, 16, FALSE); + offset += 16; + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash, + tvb, offset, 20, FALSE); + offset += 20; + break; + } +} + +/********************************************************************* + * + * SSL version 2 Dissectors + * + *********************************************************************/ + + +/* record layer dissector */ +static int +dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, + guint32 offset, guint *conv_version, + gboolean *need_desegmentation) +{ + guint32 initial_offset = offset; + guint8 byte = 0; + guint8 record_length_length = 0; + guint32 record_length = 0; + gint is_escape = -1; + gint16 padding_length = -1; + guint8 msg_type = 0; + gchar *msg_type_str = NULL; + guint32 available_bytes = 0; + + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *ssl_record_tree = NULL; + + /* pull first byte; if high bit is set, then record + * length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise + * record length is two bytes + */ + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3; + + /* + * Can we do reassembly? + */ + available_bytes = tvb_length_remaining(tvb, offset); + + if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { + /* + * Yes - is the record header split across segment boundaries? + */ + if (available_bytes < record_length_length) { + /* + * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this + * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many + * more bytes we need, and return. + */ + pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; + pinfo->desegment_len = record_length_length - available_bytes; + *need_desegmentation = TRUE; + return offset; + } + } + + /* parse out the record length */ + switch(record_length_length) { + case 2: /* two-byte record length */ + record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8; + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); + record_length += byte; + break; + case 3: /* three-byte record length */ + is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE; + record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8; + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); + record_length += byte; + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); + padding_length = byte; + } + + /* + * Can we do reassembly? + */ + if (ssl_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { + /* + * Yes - is the record split across segment boundaries? + */ + if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) { + /* + * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this + * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many + * more bytes we need, and return. + */ + pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; + pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length) + - available_bytes; + *need_desegmentation = TRUE; + return offset; + } + } + offset += record_length_length; + + /* add the record layer subtree header */ + ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset, + record_length_length + record_length, 0); + ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_record); + + /* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */ + msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length); + + /* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set + * this to sslv2 + */ + if (*conv_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) + { + if (ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, + (initial_offset + + record_length_length), + record_length)) { + *conv_version = SSL_VER_PCT; + ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version); + } + else if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8) + { + *conv_version = SSL_VER_SSLv2; + ssl_set_conv_version(pinfo, *conv_version); + } + } + + /* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the + * conversation, then set a version for just this frame + * (e.g., on a client hello) + */ + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL)) + { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) ? "PCT" : "SSLv2"); + } + + /* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is + * probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail + */ + msg_type_str = match_strval(msg_type, + (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) + ? pct_msg_types : ssl_20_msg_types); + if (!msg_type_str + || ((*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) && + !ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset + + record_length_length, + record_length)) + || ((*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) && + !ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvb, initial_offset + + record_length_length, + record_length))) + { + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", + (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) + ? "PCT" : "SSLv2", + "Encrypted Data"); + } + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Encrypted Data"); + return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length; + } + else + { + if (check_col(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO)) + col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, msg_type_str); + + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", + (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) + ? "PCT" : "SSLv2", + msg_type_str); + } + } + + /* We have a valid message type, so move foward, filling in the + * tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length, + * if present in the original packet + */ + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + /* add the record length */ + ti = proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree, + hf_ssl_record_length, tvb, + initial_offset, record_length_length, + record_length); + } + if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1) + { + proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree, + hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb, + initial_offset, 1, is_escape); + } + if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1) + { + proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, + hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb, + initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length); + } + + /* + * dissect the record data + */ + + /* jump forward to the start of the record data */ + offset = initial_offset + record_length_length; + + /* add the message type */ + if (ssl_record_tree) + { + proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, + (*conv_version == SSL_VER_PCT) + ? hf_pct_msg_type : hf_ssl2_msg_type, + tvb, offset, 1, 0); + } + offset++; /* move past msg_type byte */ + + if (*conv_version != SSL_VER_PCT) + { + /* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */ + switch (msg_type) { + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: + dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: + dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + + case SSL2_HND_ERROR: + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED: + case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY: + case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED: + case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + /* unimplemented */ + break; + + default: /* unknown */ + break; + } + } + else + { + /* dissect the message */ + switch (msg_type) { + case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO: + dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO: + dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY: + dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + case PCT_MSG_ERROR: + dissect_pct_msg_error(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); + break; + + default: /* unknown */ + break; + } + } + return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length); +} + +static void +dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* struct { + * uint8 msg_type; + * Version version; + * uint16 cipher_spec_length; + * uint16 session_id_length; + * uint16 challenge_length; + * V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length]; + * opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length]; + * Random challenge; + * } V2ClientHello; + * + * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version + * + */ + guint16 version; + guint16 cipher_spec_length; + guint16 session_id_length; + guint16 challenge_length; + + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *cs_tree; + + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) + { + /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ + return; + } + + if (tree) + { + /* show the version */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_record_version, tvb, + offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */ + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites, + tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, + "Cipher Specs (%u specs)", + cipher_spec_length/3); + + /* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */ + cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites); + if (!cs_tree) + { + cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */ + } + + /* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */ + while (cipher_spec_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, + tvb, offset, 3, FALSE); + offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */ + cipher_spec_length -= 3; + } + + /* if there's a session id, show it */ + if (session_id_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_session_id, + tvb, offset, session_id_length, + tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, session_id_length), + "Session ID (%u byte%s)", + session_id_length, + plurality(session_id_length, "", "s")); + + offset += session_id_length; + } + + /* if there's a challenge, show it */ + if (challenge_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, + tvb, offset, challenge_length, 0); + offset += challenge_length; + } + } +} + +static void +dissect_pct_msg_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + guint16 CH_CLIENT_VERSION, CH_OFFSET, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH; + proto_item *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, *CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, *CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti; + proto_tree *CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, *CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, *CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, *CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree; + gint i; + + CH_CLIENT_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + if(CH_CLIENT_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1) + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1); + else + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD"); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Client Session ID Data (32 bytes)"); + offset += 32; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Challange Data(32 bytes)"); + offset += 32; + + CH_OFFSET = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + if(CH_OFFSET != PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1) + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d, should be %d in PCT version 1", CH_OFFSET, PCT_CH_OFFSET_V1); + else + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CH_OFFSET: %d", CH_OFFSET); + offset += 2; + + CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CIPHER_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "HASH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "CERT_SPECS Length: %d", CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "EXCH_SPECS Length: %d", CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + if(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH) { + CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE); + CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cipher_suites); + + for(i=0; i<(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_LENGTH/4); i++) { + proto_tree_add_item(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset)); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(CH_CIPHER_SPECS_tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64); + offset += 1; + } + } + + if(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH) { + CH_HASH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, tvb, offset, CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE); + CH_HASH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_HASH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_hash_suites); + + for(i=0; i<(CH_HASH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { + proto_tree_add_item(CH_HASH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + } + } + + if(CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) { + CH_CERT_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, tvb, offset, CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE); + CH_CERT_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_CERT_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_cert_suites); + + for(i=0; i< (CH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { + proto_tree_add_item(CH_CERT_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + } + } + + if(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH) { + CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, tvb, offset, CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH, FALSE); + CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(CH_EXCH_SPECS_ti, ett_pct_exch_suites); + + for(i=0; i<(CH_EXCH_SPECS_LENGTH/2); i++) { + proto_tree_add_item(CH_EXCH_SPECS_tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + } + } + + if(CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH); + offset += CH_KEY_ARG_LENGTH; + } +} + +static void +dissect_pct_msg_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ +/* structure: +char SH_MSG_SERVER_HELLO +char SH_PAD +char SH_SERVER_VERSION_MSB +char SH_SERVER_VERSION_LSB +char SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK +char SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ +char SH_CIPHER_SPECS_DATA[4] +char SH_HASH_SPECS_DATA[2] +char SH_CERT_SPECS_DATA[2] +char SH_EXCH_SPECS_DATA[2] +char SH_CONNECTION_ID_DATA[32] +char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_MSB +char SH_CERTIFICATE_LENGTH_LSB +char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB +char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB +char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_MSB +char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_LENGTH_LSB +char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_MSB +char SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH_LSB +char SH_CERTIFICATE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] +char SH_CLIENT_CERT_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] +char SH_CLIENT_SIG_SPECS_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] +char SH_RESPONSE_DATA[MSB<<8|LSB] + +*/ + + guint16 SH_SERVER_VERSION, SH_CERT_LENGTH, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD"); + offset += 1; + + SH_SERVER_VERSION = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + if(SH_SERVER_VERSION != PCT_VERSION_1) + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version, should be %x in PCT version 1", PCT_VERSION_1); + else + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Version (%x)", PCT_VERSION_1); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_RESTART_SESSION_OK flag"); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SH_CLIENT_AUTH_REQ flag"); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cipher, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "Encryption key length: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset)); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "MAC key length in bits: %d", tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) + 64); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_hash, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_exch, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Connection ID Data (32 bytes)"); + offset += 32; + + SH_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Certificate Length: %d", SH_CERT_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client CERT_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client SIG_SPECS Length: %d", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + if(SH_CERT_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_LENGTH, "Server Certificate (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_LENGTH); + offset += SH_CERT_LENGTH; + } + + if(SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH, "Client CERT_SPECS (%d bytes)", SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH); + offset += SH_CERT_SPECS_LENGTH; + } + + if(SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH, "Client Signature (%d bytes)", SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH); + offset += SH_CLIENT_SIG_LENGTH; + } + + if(SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += SH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + } + +} + +static void +dissect_pct_msg_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + guint16 CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD"); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_cert, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_handshake_sig, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Clear Key Length: %d",CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Encrypted Key Length: %d",CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH= tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "IV Length: %d",CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Verify Prelude Length: %d",CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE); + offset += 2; + + CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Client Cert Length: %d",CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Response Length: %d",CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + if(CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH, "Clear Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH); + offset += CMK_CLEAR_KEY_LENGTH; + } + if(CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH, "Encrypted Key data (%d bytes)", CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH); + offset += CMK_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH; + } + if(CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH, "IV data (%d bytes)", CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH); + offset += CMK_KEY_ARG_LENGTH; + } + if(CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE, "Verify Prelude data (%d bytes)", CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE); + offset += CMK_VERIFY_PRELUDE; + } + if(CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH, "Client Certificate data (%d bytes)", CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH); + offset += CMK_CLIENT_CERT_LENGTH; + } + if(CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Response data (%d bytes)", CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += CMK_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + } +} + +static void +dissect_pct_msg_server_verify(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + guint16 SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "PAD"); + offset += 1; + + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 32, "Server Session ID data (32 bytes)"); + offset += 32; + + SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Server Response Length: %d", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += 2; + + if(SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH, "Server Response (%d bytes)", SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + offset += SV_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + } +} + +static void +dissect_pct_msg_error(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + guint16 ERROR_CODE, INFO_LEN; + + ERROR_CODE = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_pct_msg_error_type, tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + INFO_LEN = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 2, "Eror Information Length: %d", INFO_LEN); + offset += 2; + if (ERROR_CODE == PCT_ERR_SPECS_MISMATCH && INFO_LEN == 6) + { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CIPHER"); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_HASH"); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CERT"); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_EXCH"); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_CERT"); + offset += 1; + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, 1, "SPECS_MISMATCH_CLIENT_SIG"); + offset += 1; + } + else if(INFO_LEN) { + proto_tree_add_text(tree, tvb, offset, INFO_LEN, "Error Information dta (%d bytes)", INFO_LEN); + offset += INFO_LEN; + } +} + +static void +dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* struct { + * uint8 msg_type; + * V2Cipherspec cipher; + * uint16 clear_key_length; + * uint16 encrypted_key_length; + * uint16 key_arg_length; + * opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length]; + * opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length]; + * opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length]; + * } V2ClientMasterKey; + * + * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher + */ + guint16 clear_key_length; + guint16 encrypted_key_length; + guint16 key_arg_length; + + /* at this point, everything we do involves the tree, + * so quit now if we don't have one ;-) + */ + if (!tree) + { + return; + } + + /* show the selected cipher */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, + tvb, offset, 3, FALSE); + offset += 3; + + /* get the fixed fields */ + clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* show the variable length fields */ + if (clear_key_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, + tvb, offset, clear_key_length, FALSE); + offset += clear_key_length; + } + + if (encrypted_key_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, + tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, FALSE); + offset += encrypted_key_length; + } + + if (key_arg_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, + tvb, offset, key_arg_length, FALSE); + offset += key_arg_length; + } + +} + +static void +dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +{ + /* struct { + * uint8 msg_type; + * uint8 session_id_hit; + * uint8 certificate_type; + * uint16 server_version; + * uint16 certificate_length; + * uint16 cipher_specs_length; + * uint16 connection_id_length; + * opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length]; + * opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length]; + * opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length]; + * } V2ServerHello; + * + * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit + */ + guint16 certificate_length; + guint16 cipher_spec_length; + guint16 connection_id_length; + guint16 version; + proto_tree *ti; + proto_tree *subtree; + + /* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so + * quit now if we don't have one + */ + if (!tree) + { + return; + } + + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) + { + /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ + return; + } + + + /* is there a hit? */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, + tvb, offset, 1, FALSE); + offset++; + + /* what type of certificate is this? */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, + tvb, offset, 1, FALSE); + offset++; + + /* now the server version */ + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, + tvb, offset, 2, FALSE); + offset += 2; + + /* get the fixed fields */ + certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len, + tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length); + offset += 2; + + cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, + tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length); + offset += 2; + + connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, + tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length); + offset += 2; + + /* now the variable length fields */ + if (certificate_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, hf_ssl_handshake_certificate, + tvb, offset, certificate_length, + tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, certificate_length), + "Certificate (%u byte%s)", + certificate_length, + plurality(certificate_length, "", "s")); + offset += certificate_length; + } + + if (cipher_spec_length > 0) + { + /* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */ + ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, + hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites, + tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, + "Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)", + cipher_spec_length/3, + plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s")); + subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ssl_cipher_suites); + if (!subtree) + { + subtree = tree; + } + + /* iterate through the cipher specs */ + while (cipher_spec_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, + tvb, offset, 3, FALSE); + offset += 3; + cipher_spec_length -= 3; + } + } + + if (connection_id_length > 0) + { + proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, + tvb, offset, connection_id_length, FALSE); + offset += connection_id_length; + } + +} + + + + +/********************************************************************* + * + * Support Functions + * + *********************************************************************/ + +static void +ssl_set_conv_version(packet_info *pinfo, guint version) +{ + conversation_t *conversation; + + if (pinfo->fd->flags.visited) + { + /* We've already processed this frame; no need to do any more + * work on it. + */ + return; + } + + conversation = find_conversation(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, + pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0); + + if (conversation == NULL) + { + /* create a new conversation */ + conversation = conversation_new(&pinfo->src, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, + pinfo->srcport, pinfo->destport, 0); + } + + if (conversation_get_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl) != NULL) + { + /* get rid of the current data */ + conversation_delete_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl); + } + conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, GINT_TO_POINTER(version)); +} + +static int +ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 type) +{ + + switch (type) { + case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST: + case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: + case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: + case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: + case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG: + case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: + case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE: + case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY: + case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG: + case SSL_HND_FINISHED: + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type) +{ + if (type >= 0x14 && type <= 0x17) + { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(guint16 version) +{ + gchar *version_str = match_strval(version, ssl_versions); + return version_str != NULL; +} + +static int +ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, + guint8 next_byte) +{ + if (content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE + && ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(next_byte)) + { + return (next_byte != SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO); + } + else if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type) + && content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE) + { + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset) +{ + guint8 byte; + + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */ + { + return 0; + } + + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2); + if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */ + { + return 0; + } + + /* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */ + return 1; +} + +/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether + * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a + * valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible, + * but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway. + */ +static int +ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset) +{ + /* here's the current approach: + * + * we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can + * assume that there is not padding. This means that the + * first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2 + * msg_type in the third byte + */ + + /* get the first byte; must have high bit set */ + guint8 byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (byte < 0x80) + { + return 0; + } + + /* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about + * unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for + * encrypted messages), we just check against that list + */ + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); + switch(byte) { + case SSL2_HND_ERROR: + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: + case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + case PCT_MSG_ERROR: + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* this applies a heuristic to determine whether + * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a + * valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable + * than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol + */ +static int +ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset) +{ + /* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid + * protocol version + */ + guint8 byte; + guint16 version; + + /* see if the first byte is a valid content type */ + byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte)) + { + return 0; + } + + /* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */ + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); + if (version != 0x0300 && version != 0x0301) + { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* applies a heuristic to determine whether + * or not the data beginning at offset looks + * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message. + * since it isn't possible to completely tell random + * data apart from a valid message without state, + * we try to help the odds. + */ +static int +ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length) +{ + /* first byte should be a msg_type. + * + * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key, + * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if + * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8 + * chance of saying yes with random payload) + * + * - for those three types that we know about, do some + * further validation to reduce the chance of an error + */ + guint8 msg_type; + guint16 version; + guint32 sum; + + /* fetch the msg_type */ + msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + switch (msg_type) { + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: + /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */ + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1); + return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); + break; + + case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: + /* version is three bytes after msg_type */ + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3); + return ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); + break; + + case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + /* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length + * must be less than record length + */ + sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */ + if (sum > record_length) + { + return 0; + } + return 1; + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + return 0; +} + +/* applies a heuristic to determine whether + * or not the data beginning at offset looks + * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message. + * since it isn't possible to completely tell random + * data apart from a valid message without state, + * we try to help the odds. + */ +static int +ssl_looks_like_valid_pct_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, + guint32 record_length) +{ + /* first byte should be a msg_type. + * + * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key, + * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if + * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8 + * chance of saying yes with random payload) + * + * - for those three types that we know about, do some + * further validation to reduce the chance of an error + */ + guint8 msg_type; + guint16 version; + guint32 sum; + + /* fetch the msg_type */ + msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + + switch (msg_type) { + case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_HELLO: + /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */ + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1); + return version == PCT_VERSION_1; + break; + + case PCT_MSG_SERVER_HELLO: + /* version is one byte after msg_type */ + version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+2); + return version == PCT_VERSION_1; + break; + + case PCT_MSG_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + /* sum of various length fields must be less than record length */ + sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* clear_key_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* encrypted_key_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 10); /* key_arg_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 12); /* verify_prelude_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 14); /* client_cert_length */ + sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 16); /* response_length */ + if (sum > record_length) + { + return 0; + } + return 1; + break; + + case PCT_MSG_SERVER_VERIFY: + /* record is 36 bytes longer than response_length */ + sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 34); /* response_length */ + if ((sum + 36) == record_length) + return 1; + else + return 0; + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + return 0; +} + + +/********************************************************************* + * + * Standard Ethereal Protocol Registration and housekeeping + * + *********************************************************************/ +void +proto_register_ssl(void) +{ + + /* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/ + static hf_register_info hf[] = { + { &hf_ssl_record, + { "Record Layer", "ssl.record", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Record layer", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_record_content_type, + { "Content Type", "ssl.record.content_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0, + "Content type", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_ssl2_msg_type, + { "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.handshake.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0, + "SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_pct_msg_type, + { "Handshake Message Type", "ssl.pct_handshake.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(pct_msg_types), 0x0, + "PCT handshake message type", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_ssl_record_version, + { "Version", "ssl.record.version", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, + "Record layer version.", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_record_length, + { "Length", "ssl.record.length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of SSL record data", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_record_appdata, + { "Application Data", "ssl.app_data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Payload is application data", HFILL } + }, + { & hf_ssl2_record, + { "SSLv2/PCT Record Header", "ssl.record", + FT_NONE, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "SSLv2/PCT record data", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, + { "Is Escape", "ssl.record.is_escape", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Indicates a security escape", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, + { "Padding Length", "ssl.record.padding_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of padding at end of record", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_change_cipher_spec, + { "Change Cipher Spec Message", "ssl.change_cipher_spec", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Signals a change in cipher specifications", HFILL } + }, + { & hf_ssl_alert_message, + { "Alert Message", "ssl.alert_message", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Alert message", HFILL } + }, + { & hf_ssl_alert_message_level, + { "Level", "ssl.alert_message.level", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0, + "Alert message level", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_alert_message_description, + { "Description", "ssl.alert_message.desc", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0, + "Alert message description", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_protocol, + { "Handshake Protocol", "ssl.handshake", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Handshake protocol message", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_type, + { "Handshake Type", "ssl.handshake.type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0, + "Type of handshake message", HFILL} + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_length, + { "Length", "ssl.handshake.length", + FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of handshake message", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_client_version, + { "Version", "ssl.handshake.version", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, + "Maximum version supported by client", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_server_version, + { "Version", "ssl.handshake.version", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, + "Version selected by server", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_random_time, + { "Random.gmt_unix_time", "ssl.handshake.random_time", + FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Unix time field of random structure", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_random_bytes, + { "Random.bytes", "ssl.handshake.random", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Random challenge used to authenticate server", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites_len, + { "Cipher Suites Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_suites_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of cipher suites field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suites, + { "Cipher Suites", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuites", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "List of cipher suites supported by client", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cipher_suite, + { "Cipher Suite", "ssl.handshake.ciphersuite", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_31_ciphersuite), 0x0, + "Cipher suite", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, + { "Cipher Spec", "ssl.handshake.cipherspec", + FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_20_cipher_suites), 0x0, + "Cipher specification", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id, + { "Session ID", "ssl.handshake.session_id", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Identifies the SSL session, allowing later resumption", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods_len, + { "Compression Methods Length", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of compression methods field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_methods, + { "Compression Methods", "ssl.handshake.comp_methods", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "List of compression methods supported by client", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_comp_method, + { "Compression Method", "ssl.handshake.comp_method", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_compression_method), 0x0, + "Compression Method", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates_len, + { "Certificates Length", "ssl.handshake.certificates_length", + FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of certificates field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_certificates, + { "Certificates", "ssl.handshake.certificates", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "List of certificates", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate, + { "Certificate", "ssl.handshake.certificate", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Certificate", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_certificate_len, + { "Certificate Length", "ssl.handshake.certificate_length", + FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of certificate", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types_count, + { "Certificate types count", "ssl.handshake.cert_types_count", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Count of certificate types", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_types, + { "Certificate types", "ssl.handshake.cert_types", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "List of certificate types", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_cert_type, + { "Certificate type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_client_certificate_type), 0x0, + "Certificate type", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_finished, + { "Verify Data", "ssl.handshake.verify_data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Opaque verification data", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_md5_hash, + { "MD5 Hash", "ssl.handshake.md5_hash", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_sha_hash, + { "SHA-1 Hash", "ssl.handshake.sha_hash", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_session_id_len, + { "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of session ID field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames_len, + { "Distinguished Names Length", "ssl.handshake.dnames_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of list of CAs that server trusts", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_dnames, + { "Distinguished Names", "ssl.handshake.dnames", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "List of CAs that server trusts", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_dname_len, + { "Distinguished Name Length", "ssl.handshake.dname_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of distinguished name", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl_handshake_dname, + { "Distinguished Name", "ssl.handshake.dname", + FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Distinguished name of a CA that server trusts", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, + { "Challenge", "ssl.handshake.challenge", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, + { "Cipher Spec Length", "ssl.handshake.cipher_spec_len", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of cipher specs field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, + { "Session ID Length", "ssl.handshake.session_id_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of session ID field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, + { "Challenge Length", "ssl.handshake.challenge_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of challenge field", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, + { "Clear Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of clear key data", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, + { "Encrypted Key Data Length", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of encrypted key data", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, + { "Key Argument Length", "ssl.handshake.key_arg_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of key argument", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, + { "Clear Key Data", "ssl.handshake.clear_key_data", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, + { "Encrypted Key", "ssl.handshake.encrypted_key", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, + { "Key Argument", "ssl.handshake.key_arg", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, + { "Session ID Hit", "ssl.handshake.session_id_hit", + FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, + { "Certificate Type", "ssl.handshake.cert_type", + FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0, + "Certificate Type", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, + { "Connection ID Length", "ssl.handshake.connection_id_length", + FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, + "Length of connection ID", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, + { "Connection ID", "ssl.handshake.connection_id", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "Server's challenge to client", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_cipher_spec, + { "Cipher Spec", "pct.handshake.cipherspec", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "PCT Cipher specification", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_cipher, + { "Cipher", "pct.handshake.cipher", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cipher_type), 0x0, + "PCT Ciper", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_hash_spec, + { "Hash Spec", "pct.handshake.hashspec", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "PCT Hash specification", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_hash, + { "Hash", "pct.handshake.hash", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_hash_type), 0x0, + "PCT Hash", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_cert_spec, + { "Cert Spec", "pct.handshake.certspec", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "PCT Certificate specification", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_cert, + { "Cert Spec", "pct.handshake.cert", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_cert_type), 0x0, + "PCT Certificate", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_exch_spec, + { "Exchange Spec", "pct.handshake.exchspec", + FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, + "PCT Exchange specification", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_exch, + { "Exchange", "pct.handshake.exch", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_exch_type), 0x0, + "PCT Exchange", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_handshake_sig, + { "Sig Spec", "pct.handshake.sig", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_sig_type), 0x0, + "PCT Signature", HFILL } + }, + { &hf_pct_msg_error_type, + { "PCT Error Code", "pct.msg_error_code", + FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(pct_error_code), 0x0, + "PCT Error Code", HFILL } + }, + }; + + /* Setup protocol subtree array */ + static gint *ett[] = { + &ett_ssl, + &ett_ssl_record, + &ett_ssl_alert, + &ett_ssl_handshake, + &ett_ssl_cipher_suites, + &ett_ssl_comp_methods, + &ett_ssl_certs, + &ett_ssl_cert_types, + &ett_ssl_dnames, + &ett_pct_cipher_suites, + &ett_pct_hash_suites, + &ett_pct_cert_suites, + &ett_pct_exch_suites, + }; + + /* Register the protocol name and description */ + proto_ssl = proto_register_protocol("Secure Socket Layer", + "SSL", "ssl"); + + /* Required function calls to register the header fields and + * subtrees used */ + proto_register_field_array(proto_ssl, hf, array_length(hf)); + proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); + + { + module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_ssl, NULL); + prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, + "desegment_ssl_records", + "Desegment SSL records", + "When enabled, SSL records that span multiple TCP segments are desegmented", + &ssl_desegment); + } + + register_dissector("ssl", dissect_ssl, proto_ssl); + +} + +/* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration + * routine. This format is required because a script is used to find + * these routines and create the code that calls these routines. + */ +void +proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void) +{ + dissector_handle_t ssl_handle; + + ssl_handle = find_dissector("ssl"); + dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL, ssl_handle); + dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_LDAP, ssl_handle); + dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_IMAP, ssl_handle); + dissector_add("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_SSL_POP, ssl_handle); +} |