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authorkrj <krj@f5534014-38df-0310-8fa8-9805f1628bb7>2009-10-10 13:08:09 +0000
committerkrj <krj@f5534014-38df-0310-8fa8-9805f1628bb7>2009-10-10 13:08:09 +0000
commitbf11c4f10c87e627a532ad7478d590179592f9f8 (patch)
treecef45778100a515a7d404a77aad8844c043d5a6a /asn1/cmp/CMP.asn
parent005fff6aa3cbc6a740b3f7723a3a541c249509d4 (diff)
pkixcmp -> cmp to make directory name consistent with filenames
git-svn-id: http://anonsvn.wireshark.org/wireshark/trunk@30473 f5534014-38df-0310-8fa8-9805f1628bb7
Diffstat (limited to 'asn1/cmp/CMP.asn')
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diff --git a/asn1/cmp/CMP.asn b/asn1/cmp/CMP.asn
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+-- Extracted from RFC4210
+-- by Martin Peylo <martin.peylo@nsn.com>
+--
+-- Changes to the original ASN.1 source:
+-- - Commented out the import of UTF8String which is not needed
+-- - Commented out PKIBody/p10cr since PKCS-10 is not implemented
+-- - Uncommented the definitions for the OIDs used in InfoTypeAndValue
+--
+-- The copyright statement from the original description in RFC4211
+-- follows below:
+--
+-- Full Copyright Statement
+--
+-- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
+--
+-- This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
+-- contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
+-- retain all their rights.
+--
+-- This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
+-- "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
+-- OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
+-- ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
+-- INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
+-- INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
+-- WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+ PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000(16)}
+
+ DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
+
+ BEGIN
+
+ -- EXPORTS ALL --
+
+ IMPORTS
+
+ Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier --,
+ -- UTF8String
+ -- if required; otherwise, comment out
+ FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
+
+ GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
+ FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
+
+ CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedValue, CertId,
+ CertReqMessages
+ FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
+ id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
+
+ -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
+ -- Appendix C of this specification
+
+ CertificationRequest
+ FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2)
+ us(840) rsadsi(113549)
+ pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
+
+ -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
+ -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
+ -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
+
+ ;
+
+ -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
+ -- constructs
+
+ CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+ x509v3PKCert Certificate
+ }
+ -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
+ -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
+ -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
+ -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
+ -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
+ -- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
+ -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
+ -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
+ -- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
+ -- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
+ -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
+ -- this change.)
+
+ -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
+
+ PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
+ header PKIHeader,
+ body PKIBody,
+ protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
+ extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
+ OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
+
+ PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
+ sender GeneralName,
+ -- identifies the sender
+ recipient GeneralName,
+ -- identifies the intended recipient
+ messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
+ -- time of production of this message (used when sender
+ -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
+ -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
+ protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
+ senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ -- to identify specific keys used for protection
+ transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
+ -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
+ -- messages
+ senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
+ -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
+ -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
+ -- the intended recipient of this message
+ freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
+ -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
+ -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
+ generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+ InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
+ -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
+ -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
+ }
+
+ PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
+ -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
+ -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
+ -- to indicate the language of the contained text
+ -- see [RFC2482] for details)
+
+ PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
+ ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
+ ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
+ cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
+ cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
+ -- p10cr [4] CertificationRequest,
+ --imported from [PKCS10]
+ p10cr [4] NULL, -- added for Wireshark to avoid miscounting of the branch_taken
+ popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
+ popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
+ kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
+ kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
+ krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
+ krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
+ rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
+ rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
+ ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
+ ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
+ ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
+ cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
+ rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
+ crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
+ pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
+ nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
+ genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
+ genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
+ error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
+ certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
+ pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
+ pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
+ }
+
+ PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
+
+ ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
+ header PKIHeader,
+ body PKIBody
+ }
+
+ id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
+ PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
+ salt OCTET STRING,
+ -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
+ -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
+ -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
+ owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
+ iterationCount INTEGER,
+ -- number of times the OWF is applied
+ -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
+ -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
+ -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
+ mac AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
+ } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
+
+ id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
+ DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
+ owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
+ mac AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
+ } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
+
+
+ NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
+
+ PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
+ accepted (0),
+ -- you got exactly what you asked for
+ grantedWithMods (1),
+ -- you got something like what you asked for; the
+ -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
+ rejection (2),
+ -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
+ waiting (3),
+ -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
+ -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
+ -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
+ -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
+ -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
+ revocationWarning (4),
+ -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
+ -- imminent
+ revocationNotification (5),
+ -- notification that a revocation has occurred
+ keyUpdateWarning (6)
+ -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
+ -- CertReqMsg
+ }
+
+ PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
+ -- since we can fail in more than one way!
+ -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
+ badAlg (0),
+ -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
+ badMessageCheck (1),
+ -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
+ badRequest (2),
+ -- transaction not permitted or supported
+ badTime (3),
+ -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
+ -- as defined by local policy
+ badCertId (4),
+ -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
+ badDataFormat (5),
+ -- the data submitted has the wrong format
+ wrongAuthority (6),
+ -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
+ -- one creating the response token
+ incorrectData (7),
+ -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
+ missingTimeStamp (8),
+ -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
+ -- (by policy)
+ badPOP (9),
+ -- the proof-of-possession failed
+ certRevoked (10),
+ -- the certificate has already been revoked
+ certConfirmed (11),
+ -- the certificate has already been confirmed
+ wrongIntegrity (12),
+ -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
+ -- vice versa
+ badRecipientNonce (13),
+ -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
+ timeNotAvailable (14),
+ -- the TSA's time source is not available
+ unacceptedPolicy (15),
+ -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
+ unacceptedExtension (16),
+ -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
+ addInfoNotAvailable (17),
+ -- the additional information requested could not be
+ -- understood or is not available
+ badSenderNonce (18),
+ -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
+ badCertTemplate (19),
+ -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
+ signerNotTrusted (20),
+ -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
+ transactionIdInUse (21),
+ -- the transaction identifier is already in use
+ unsupportedVersion (22),
+ -- the version of the message is not supported
+ notAuthorized (23),
+ -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
+ -- request or perform the preceding action
+ systemUnavail (24),
+ -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
+ systemFailure (25),
+ -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
+ duplicateCertReq (26)
+ -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
+ -- certificate already exists
+ }
+
+ PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ status PKIStatus,
+ statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
+ failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
+
+ OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
+ hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
+ hashVal BIT STRING
+ -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
+ -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
+ }
+
+ POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
+ -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
+ -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
+
+ Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
+ owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+
+ -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
+ -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
+ -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
+ -- Challenge is to be used).
+
+ witness OCTET STRING,
+ -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
+ -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
+ -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
+ challenge OCTET STRING
+ -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
+ -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
+ -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
+ -- int INTEGER,
+ -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
+ -- sender GeneralName
+ -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
+ -- }
+ }
+
+ POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
+ -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
+ -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
+ -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
+ -- corresponding Challenge.
+
+ CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
+ caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
+ OPTIONAL,
+ response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
+ }
+
+ CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certReqId INTEGER,
+ -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
+ -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
+ -- corresponding request)
+ status PKIStatusInfo,
+ certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
+ rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+ -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
+ -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
+ }
+
+ CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
+ privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL,
+ -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
+ publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
+ certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
+ encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue
+ }
+
+ KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
+ status PKIStatusInfo,
+ newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
+ caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+ CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
+ keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+ CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
+
+ RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certDetails CertTemplate,
+ -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
+ -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
+ -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
+ crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
+ -- requested crlEntryExtensions
+ }
+
+ RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
+ status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
+ -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
+ revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
+ OPTIONAL,
+ -- IDs for which revocation was requested
+ -- (same order as status)
+ crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
+ -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
+ }
+
+ CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
+ oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
+ newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
+ newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
+ }
+
+ CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
+
+ RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
+ status PKIStatus,
+ certId CertId,
+ willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
+ badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
+ crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
+ -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
+ }
+
+ CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
+
+ CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
+
+ CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
+ certHash OCTET STRING,
+ -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
+ -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
+ certReqId INTEGER,
+ -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
+ statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
+
+ InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
+ infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
+ }
+ -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
+ -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
+ -- appropriate for a given environment):
+ --
+ -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
+ CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
+ -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
+ SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
+ EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
+ PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
+ CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
+ -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
+ CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
+ -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
+ UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
+ KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
+ KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
+ -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
+ RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedValue
+ -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
+ ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
+ -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
+ ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
+ -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
+ OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
+ -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
+ SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
+ --
+ -- where
+ --
+ -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
+ -- and
+ -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
+ --
+ --
+ -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
+ -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
+ -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
+ -- specific environments.
+
+ GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
+
+ -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
+ -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
+ -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
+ -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
+ -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
+ -- indicates that the CA may send
+ -- any/all information that it wishes.
+ GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
+ -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
+ -- recognize.
+
+ ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
+ errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ -- implementation-specific error codes
+ errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
+ -- implementation-specific error details
+ }
+
+ PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+ certReqId INTEGER
+ }
+
+ PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+ certReqId INTEGER,
+ checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
+ reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+ END -- of CMP module